Created: 8/5/1964

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ORARY Mandatory Review

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Short-Term Prospects for the Tshombe Government in the Congo





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Short-Term Prospects for the Tshombe Government in the Congo



To examine the prospects for the Ishonibe government duiing tlic next si* to nine months.*


A In recent months, regional dissideivce and violence haseserious propoitions. even b> Congolesendthe threatotal breakdown in governmental authority. The difficulties confronting Prune Minister Tshombe are cnorn>ous. His greatest needflitaiy fori* which can handle the vaitous rebellions. His political position will be thicatened by other aspirants to power. We think the chance* are about even that he will be able to remain 1'itnve Minister over (he next six to nine months. If Tshombe is able to avoid anarchy in the Congo, he will have scored aichieirment, but there is little prospect ofentral government which willubstantial degree of authoritythe country. (Pares.,

ft. Should Tshombe fall, the piospeeis are dark. Extremists would Ik? likely tn gain increased influence In Leopoldvillc. secessionist regiirvcs might break off and disorder would spread. (Paras.

C.licve Tshombe willenerally pro-Westwithin the confinesro {onita non-atitmed :rolicv. He will probably remain elose to the Belgians and Susceptible to theirwe believe he will cooperate with the US. Although still suspect by many African leaders, we believe Tshombe would become geitciaily acceptable in Black Africa if he succeeded inorkable solution to the Congo's pioblenn )

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Ft In* Minister Motse lshombe was long ihe principal adversary ol those who Mt scelinj toentral authority in post-colon si LeoyoUvslle.j j-fstifrn lo thenature oU Congo politics ami the extent ol tl* desperation felt by Prcvidrnt Ktsartibu and Ceneral Mobutu in their efloils to preserve the Congolese entity. Political panics have little effect un the national scene, although they aie often influential in meat of their tribal haw. No man or putyolid claimational political followingandful of the country'1 pciitical figure* have any concept of tlie national interest or the resoonsibtbtkes ol national leadership Ihe central government has lacied the minimal imbvinenli of power suchoyal and effectiveforceeasonably roinpcteiit burcaiKiacy.

These problems, plus the coriup*ion. Uresponsibility, and perhaps above all the inertia of the Congo's inciprricnccd politicians, both government and opposition, stymied Adoula'* efforts to rebuild the adminitQalion. brought fledgling political institutions such as parliament into disrepute, and widened the gapopotdii<lc and the provinces Although outside assistance and the UN presence preserved tl* Congo'i basse teu.le-rial mtegiity, Adoula was ablemcise his authority outside loopoldsilie nnly uncs<cniy and sporadically, relying on financial subventions and Ihe Congolese National Armyy and large, provincial iiffkials were inept and often corrupt and did little to further national objectives. The ANC in many instinces fedpeaVJvtlle hostility lis- actsprlbgr Inl giMsamvv and the ckteisofaiioo of order tparlcd the gio*th of nsitnctous. doparategroups in several proiuisss. notably Kutlu, Kisu, and North Katanga

Many other reasons also help account for the rise of the rebellious groups. Longstanding tribal feuds, which had been repressed by the Belgians before independence, have revived in the absence of effective security fmcei This has been tie ease pariKulirU where one tribe dominated ihe goseiiMneutity or province which emUaccd Other tiibev as well In areas where disputes are not important, political discontent has arisea from smh conditions as the absence of familiar consumer goods and food and the nutlet tiiencss of governmental authorities.

J. Rebellious outbreaks in (he provinces have been encouraged and probably in one ease started by exile gioups based in Congo tand Burundi These groups are composed ofiUctmvl followers of laimumba and Ci/enga and have adopted Ihe label of the Committee of Natrona! libera-tidnlthough tl* CM. is badly divided and its member* lark political statureirable following Insiu right, they haie been given small scale Soviet and Chinese Communist financial support.

5 lb* necessity of appou.ting an interim eycrnme'it at this time ofthe dwindling the nloc ActouU. the depaitvre of the VN

militaiy fuecc.hreatened total breakdown id go.einmer.tal

i.ii i Minns which led President kasavubu to call on Tthombf

toovernment ol " ichhkil.iiion In addition. IsIkMiiIh'. with access to the wealth and contiot of theot* southern Katanga, waitrong force to he recaonod with and if ricludcd liein the national scene could hueormidable threat


primary problem it toodicum of internal ordertribal and loial dtsiidencessumed venous proportionsCongolese standards. He must lapedls dernom'raie convincingand obtain an Unproved pctformance fruin the security forcesihe perpetually squabbling and divisive pohtral fiteiiom at bay.tlie last of these objectives, he will have lo male political truceswith ilval or potenlially rival leaden particularly inMany African leaders suspect that Tshombeuppet ofand his domntic foes can piobabh count on the* svn.palhyMipitotl of the more radical Aliiean states, eg. Algeria and Chana,some subversive assistance. FWew reasons, Tilsoinlie isto achieve some quick results

attacking theseliombe can muster some Hiapoitant assets.widelylrfmif, brail iIn- Congo and is sympathetically regarded byleaders whoigh dcgiec of autonomy. He is ihefigure in the economically impottant southern Katanga area. Ifa time, he is apparently receiving support from widely divcise figurescentral tjoserninr nt. including Kavaiubu. Mevhnlu ami Surete Chiefmr tinuing suppm jt least foe the next few months, is sutually ato Ids sutxnal in office. Since noan be installedthe mitiunal rice lions, now scheduled forshombe lannolbe removed from office except by Kiuml-i

S Tshotnbe'i fair for politics mi* U* his bw renamevidence that his return to Ihe Congo uaireceived not only in Katanga but in sexual areas fed up with Leopoldsillct bumbling and eagerhange TslrOrnbe Is ambiliouv and usually admit and is al mm* in live ceaseless mine um-ing of ihe Congo's milieuu- hu nut Itcsitited to male and break tacticaluahalise or radical frnrtps e? theoe politkssl gain. He has twieideijlile personal ihircn and ma^tretisnt He might be able to eitablish huim-fiational figureolorful brand of pi'iionil leadctslitp ol tlie style popular elscwheie in Africa.

shombe has abrade set hit personal stamp un the-! eovciurnenl Despite comidcrabit enthusiasmroadly based eosienrrmit of nitiorul reconciliation. Tslionibe has in factCo*cii.incut of Public Safety"

with virtually all ministerial power irskling in hi* hands or those of hiscollaborator. Minister of the Interior CooVfroiJ Resident Kautubu. who laresXrvaMlry hat authority over defenvc rrutteri. Mobutu and Nrndaka arc the only Other important figure* In the government.

n his Initial moves as hiinc MiluVir. Tihointx! has concentrated on refurbishing hit povition in touthem Katanga. Meanwhile, he has tried to boliti hit popularity in other province* and to win the support ol tome elements of the left He has sent Munongo to crush the North Katanga rebellion which hat spread as tlie ANC In that area hat nearly collapsed, lhis effort has thus far been wirltout results. He inoicc of former gctidai mes. both from those who look refuge In Angola and those who remained in Katanga He apparently found much opposition to his plan lo .ncorpotate these torn aMo the ANC and may now be planning to merge them inio llie polxe system Use* whtie. he has dismissed someopoldvillcs worst appointees in the provinces, and hasost of political piisoncis. including Ci/riiga. These vigotous efforts to dominatecene have of course evoled some concern among leaders of the various (actions displeased at being evcloded. It remains to be teen wiKther Tthornbc can escape the fate of others whoioudy sought or gained. beHOfr.Ing tlie principal target of all Other individuals and factions, irrespective of nominal paily aflilialion, which aspirehe manifold benefits which accompany public office in Ihe Congo.

III. TSWMrYBE'S PKOSPECIS A. Inlernol Security

II. Above oil, Tshombe will probably seek lo give the Impression that he is effectively in chaige in the Congo, and to convey to the Congolese people the impression of vigorous leadership and action. He lias been attempting to resolve tubal insurgency by cheap and easyrranging for paymtnti ol aiiears in salaries *nd engaging In palavcss with tribal anJ provincial leadersrtuu-tlibal animosities and local glicviinccs are difficult lo sort out. and while Tshombe was enthutlavticallv welcomed at llukavu andlittle Other wicevtsurning to hai trier laclks and hehiely to use such fotce as is available to hun. including the ANC. his cs-h'ata'vga gcndannes, and sshite mercenaries.

he crucial question isM.kavvill be able to achieve aImprovement in the performance of ihe troops at his disposalruyw part of ihe Congo falls to the rebels Mobutu and Tthornbc arewurkuig toother and Mobutu seems to terognire (he necessitv Uh more adskv and training. Without tompelciit leadtisliip of tic tronjiv at the operational level, neither the deinoralijcd ANC nor Tvliombcj gendarmes mill be able to deal with present and cvpcitcd uprisings lshombe is seekuii! to fuinivh such leaeteiihip llaough the use of white mercenaryew such rrsereenaries have already returned lo the Congoood mailt more arc ready in South Africa and elsewhere. We think Tshombe is willing to fare

theble (Cpcieussitstuiti mil almost tcitatnlvioth In puisihe C'liigo and in otbei "ifiiciiiront the me ol white- nwrceii.iry otReeiv leading Congolese-lie "ill piububb also be ableel additionaltry advisorsrom Belgium iind ekruherr in Ihe Wol. but we believe he plain to use suchoiiiiom in iiippoii .iiai piuming (unctions.

he rebellious groups are generally unorganised weal and are rpit'e independent of each olher Ihe* sacvcMM in mostave been due lo the absence of Opposition rather thin to (hear own abilities It It probable thai even Small governmentisciplined and well led. could testier lb; inturgciitv Indeed. ifddthr wnpeenion ol rnomrnlum in rrassriling national authornd al bn force* couldictorytair ehsrue dot the invuegenl gioupse ail and that insurgency would cease hiritical threat lo iheOn ihe other hand,tfsstna'h no eh-iner tint sporadic oulbrcalxeniireh eliminated.

1 further reverses were suflnrd by government forces however, there could easilyirtual collapse ol tlie discipline of the troops, and individual units might commit ihcimclvit lo provincialtlioiii as iliey did1 In these circu instances, the sltnition could deteriorate into aof small scale, uncoordinated recoils, causing disorder and marauding over much of the Congo If lihc-nbes difficulties per tin. Congo eairvrnhh mav be able to forment an antf-ishonibe mil svar or establish jn msuiioctionar*-reglnie supported by radical African sl.iles and by CoiriimnislivesBrarraville and Bujambura This would inouni if one of the larger cities in ihe castcin Congo, eg Stinlcsvtlle or Uutavu, fell lo rebel forces In such an eattemit)', Tilicenbc would probably -si; tbe Belgians to intervene mditarilv.


lthough Tshoinlic wonU almost intainly prefer tone-man vhow. fie is aware of the staggeringofosesrimenthe Congo, and vse believe he has suttcsenl tactual fkvibililv lo male dealsvarious groups He has said that he intends to restore ihe prestige andi*of ihe chiefs in tbose regions when-t patterns arc especially strong and lie probably hopes that through iiilmdici and other means thev will he ableOnl'Ol the wildernlitkal voulll> clement* who have bevii responsible for iihkIi of tin* tt-ihulcniv in the provinces For tin- present. Tstio'iibe probably believes* litile lupolHtc-dlv from 'he *nll leadcfWas and outvend left, though lie mav bring in addition-il iiulividu.ils fium tlie CNL should his administriiliurior should he sonic to brbesc ihe CNL sufficiently impoilant.

I Tshombe is to aeconiplkh even ihis much, he will need continuediv and ciotiomic assistance Profrsuonal military advice and some equipmentprobably represenl the most urgent needs, though Tthornbc will alio need con udci able numbeiv ot IS and Belgian administrative tvpeds He will alvn prohibit coolm-jc lo repaire lood and additional Kindt for stepped-tip public worlt and subsidio inrovinces. As inave,would offer no guarantee of sirtceu

IS If Tshombe lost office either because ofolitical intrigues or because he could not deal with the internal security situation, the likelywould be grim. Tshombe would probably withdraw* to his Katanga stroue.hold. raiting the threat ol another secession attempt on his pail (hi the national scene, we believe evirrimsis and ptoCommunist figures would take advantageilhissOn and apathv and gainin what passedential tovrrnmcnt

C. Economic

he bulk of the approximatelyillion Congolese people are dependent upon tubs it tenet* farming hunting, and Bdiing. and will remainder economic con sides at iont. Despite ncarlv four tears of political turmoil movr of the modern tec lor of the econornv Kill functions at approvi-matcK pre-utoVpeeidetvce artels The large Kurnctranooned and -operated mining entcprises and plantations are self-sufficient and although ihcy have had some transportation problems, they have remained largely unaffected by widespread strife They provide most of the Congo's badly needed foreignand they can probabk continue lo opnate shortubic order. The most serious economic problems arise In urbanhere ihesc isnd chronic unemplovment. and in provincial teniettthere are food and other shoitagesesult of the dittidcnce

and the cornetjucnt mteiiuption of cotTimun scat ions and transportationhe Congo Covcinmenl now- receives annually tome 5S5 SO million m

economic and technical nssittarscc. including about SO million from Belgium.

aboutillion from. andillion from the UN. In addition.

Delsjliunome WS million annually in debt services Because Tshombe

rceognizcs thai Itclgiiirn will probably continue lo be hit best souice of technical and administrative aid. and because Belgian business intercut in the Congo ate likely to support his cause, we bclR-vc he will maintain dose economic tics with Ihe Belgians. Given piesesit levels of csienial assistance, we believe that economic grievances will almost cettainly not representmajor threatin-government dining the next sis months or so.


We believe that Tshombe willencrallv pro-West orientation within the confinesro fotrna non aligned policy'. In tlie past, he hasisposition to turn first to his contacts and friends In ihe West,theo help his cause. He feels at home in the West and is impressed by Western achievements and power. Since comingffice, he has lalcn some paint to suggest thatarbors no grievances over the Wests hostility toward Mm and his former secessionist regime Moreover, although Tshombe has Silted wiih tlse Soviets on occasion, it has usuallv been In tbel maneuvering for advantage on the Congolese scenebecause he felt threatened by the West. He is almost certainly aware that he can hope for little support fiom the Communisls. although he nuv peiinit the Soviets lo reopen their embassy. By and laige. we believe Tshombe will remain close to the Belgians and susceptible to their ititln.mce, but as evidence accumulates that they cannot meet all his needs. Ire will probably turn incrcasinglv lo the CS and. perhaps, to France.

Tshombe almost certainly hords the VS largelv responsible for the IN military action which dcstioycd his Katanga regime. Now, however, he is aware of the Congo's present and prospective dertendenco on the US for aid and military equipment. He is likely to prove generally cooperative on matters in thu UN and elsewhere, at least so long as lie ihinks the I'S it not actively opposed to him. However, should Tshombe come lo believe that the US was reluctant to support his administration, he would react sharply and seek methods of exerting pressure on thev propaganda calculated to embarrass the US Government domestically.

atorabe is still regarded with suspicion and hostility bv manv African leaders. This was demonstrated at the Julv Cairo meeting of thcOigani/ation of African Unityhose feelings will be intensified if he gives other Africans cause to believe that be maintains friendly relations with the South Africans and Portuguese. He has. however, taken some steps to improve his acceptance inin- release ofand approval /ormumba's return to the Congo. We believe he will permit Ihe Angolan Covnn-ment in Evile to continue to operate in Ihe Congo, ailhotirh he will prolwbh do little to facilitate its endeavors. Although Tsliombv stands suntfhimself sufficienllyeceive the blessing of Ghana and Algeria, there is little these Stales can do al the moment that can sciiously affect him. Bv and large, however, we believe Tshombes eventual accpfancc lis most of the Afiican

states will depend largely on hit success at home. Most Ah lean stale* solution which would avoid chaos in the Congo. If he canot sable answer to the Congo's problems, we believe he will obtain fairly genera) acceptance in Africa.


Si. We believe that Tshombe has almost certainly set his sights on the nrcsidettcy, hoping ihus to become the effective boss of the Congo If. in the nest sisoodest degree ofstability and secure some irnprovcinciit in internal security and admtnfitrstive order, he will belicing position to consolidate hit politleal ptwitiVvn in 'he national electrons. Iscyood these consideri, no clear estimate of prospects in theiantcd, cHher than that it will remain an area ol chronic upset and of possible major crisis.



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