APPROVED FCP.F, EATE: 4
Tha capability of other mmo Jcciin nuclear weapons depends upon che following factors: (l) aviUofcilicy ofhe abil
COrtai nuclear scientificechnologicalaa;cientific and engineering capability ln eleccronics, explosives, ate. fcr non-nuclear components,ha ability co taake tha needed IrvisdmoEI within available national resourceseapons program. There ficctrs, of course, boar upon but areof che raosc loportantn mbarkinguclear weapons prograa, whichational ccclsion to do so. 4 ofssesses chose factors and ccncludes chae within the nexe decade those countries capable of developing Independent nuclearre India, Israel, Sweden, West Cernany, ZeaLy, Japan, and Canada. Oi tne countriesapability, che escimate concludes that only in the case of India are che chances better than ever,ecision will be cade to develop nuclear weapons wlchln che nexc few years.
Uich respect Co ali the othe
councrlee analyzed, che judgaenc is that che chances are less chan even co unlikelyaclonal decision co acquire nuclear weapons will be taken.
then, are che elen-enCs in support of civilian aconic energy prograas chac could assise Chese nations and perhaps others having IfliMI capabilities should they decide at some point tn the fucuce to erabarliupon ,.
a weapons program. Saste Information baa already been published andod nuclear physics, neutron cross sections, uraniummetallurgy, power reactor technology, and chemical In addition, the field of controlled thermonuclearunclassified and much literatura is available* international ly in On the basis of the existing fund of information, chosethe scientific and technical personnel Co apply tteaponsprobably have ac hand sach of the capability required to achievenuclear materials produccion base Involving plutonium essential tocapability. ufficient amount of information is generally
with respect to the design of nuclear fission weapons so that once special nuclear material not subject co safeguards is available, tho problem ofevice and developing deliverable weapons ia not regarded as an insurmountable limitation. The National Intelligence Estimate generally describes this ln termsime factor of one to three years.
What are the factors dete:mlr.f; wr.ation can produce its own
special nuclear material? Appendixdesicrlbes free world availability
of natural uraniua and concentrate production capability, exclusive of the United States. It can be seen thit ovar the next decade lt will be increasingly difficut to maintain complete safeguards or. the supply of natural uranlun, which ia basic to the production of either enriched uranium or plutonium. Moreover, over the next five Co ten years, the world supply of natural uraniua will probably exceed deoa-ati, thereby makingighly competitive situation which will not be conducive to establishment of uniform and rigorous
safeguards over Its end use. able setting forth.
major free world reactor auppovciexclusive of the United States which constitutes ancr. of Ihe level In various countries
of Available nuclear technology vhich could be used as the baseeapons effort.
Appendix v_ describes tha nuclear reactors of the free world excluding
those of the United States and the United Kingdom and notes the acounc of
estimated annual plutonium production for each. It can be seen froa this
appendix that large quantities of plutonium will be produceducber
of countries. It ahould be noted, however, chat the plutonium produced in
the majority of these facilities i3 subject to guaranties and safeguards agalnat
use of generated material for any Military purpose. In connection with the
world-wide availability of power reactors, the United Kingdom,.Canada, and
France all are active In seeking foreign markets for their reactor concepts.
As all of these concepts involve the use of natural uranium fuel, other factors
being equal theyompetitive advantage. enriched uranium
reactors, since other nations prefer natural uranium fuel over enriched uranium
because of the forcer's much wider availability under more normal market
conditions. (Thus far. has sold two large power reactors abroad;
Canada one, with ac least two others un-ler active negotiation; while France
recentlyWe reactor to Spain vith few if any safeguards comparable
to those required byniofai is ue have been able to determine.)
However, tn most instances, the ecsnomt; superiority (particularly In capital
cost). power reactors, tcgether with our long-term fuel supply policy
for enriched uranium fuel, has led co che solectioa. reactor. For
example, until the last moment, th- Iciiiins vere unwilling to consider other
atural uranium reactor for installation at Tarapur. Nevertheless, the
decisive economic superiority of the General Electric offer on an enriched
uranium reactor led to its ultl;ace iccipiiuce and,urther consequence,
the acceptance of international safeguards on the reactor as well. (Although
Che Tarapur reactor received AID financing assistance, the assistance was from AID funds already allocated CO IndlA snd, hence, displaced*other high priority Indian development projects.
forth chemical processing facilities outside tha
United States that are built or will be constructed0 and Is an Important lndlcacloo of cba extant to which chemical separations
stimates chat the cos:odest program for pro-
ducing plutonium weapons would not be prohibitive to most of the middle powers. rogram to produce oie cr tco low yield (aboutt) plutonium fission weapons per year0rough
the first detonation,er yearbe estimate points out that cos: Increases markedlyore than minimum program and notes, for exaxrple, tnat production of fifteen to
thirty plutonium fission weapons pirould probably0
0 plus subsequent annual operating expenses of It La Important to point out tnat these cost figures are independent of any coats that mi;.ht je. incurved to produce delivery vehicles.
The bulk of these costs represents building plutonium producing reactors and chemical separation: facilities on the assumption chat
natural uranium can be procured iron aichcr internal sources or or. the
without safeguards. lr: of race, this has beta the routa
by France in achieving aha prcsancly possesses.
The controls envisaged rgyto prevent nuclear
are predicated on
a nuclear weapons capability
of rpaclal nuelesr
material aot subject to appropriate .urii and controls. In keeping with this premise, the United States has even refused to exchangeon production processes for the enrichment,. developed subsequent to our World Uar II cooperation, uith the United Kingdom. Further, when Lt became apparent eta: gas centrifuge technology mightseful means for producing highly -inrichad uranium, the United States Imposed stringent classification on che process and assumed leadership in persuading those Western countries (Cermany and the Netherlands) which were working in the centrifuge ares to impose rigid classification on che results of their workll as on the foreign commercialof the process. The ability to control plutonium hasore complex problem due to the fact that as earlyountries other than the United States had Independently developed power reactor technology using natural uranium grtphlte reactors cspable of producing substantial quantities of pluton'.jm.
A major purpose ofur ? rogram was to deterfrom developing Indeper, leu;iearwhich might be avalo* tfi inonc use. This in turndemonstrated willingness oo i cinited States to eastpesceful needs of fo:o iifirlta under suitablefor alightly enriched uraatt ifuel for large-
scale civilian power reactor pre ;r. . 1 cs the more highly enriched uranium necessary for hi it upuclear technology.
Tha actions taken under theC- .a; fufica Frogram to escouxage United Statea induatry to develop eco-icclc nuclear power reactors, to
simultaneously Lnteresc Ln using power reaccorsasic energy source abroad, aod Co assise ln che building abroad of suppocclng facilitiesivilian nuclear power industry were undertaker,ioe when che production of electricity by nuclear energy was not economic. Within the last two years, nuclear power has economically come ofand che efforts abroad organized to exploit the nucleuaource of electric energy have not been, in any sense, oriented toward che production of weapons. In tha stsjorlty of Instances, there haa alao developed adependence upon tbe Uniced States as the exclusive long-term supplier of slightly enriched uraniua for economic power reactor syscems as developed by che AEC and U. S, industry. Thia latcer face is extremely important since all aupply of enriched uranium by Che United States has been predicated on arrangementa calling for safeguards and inspection to aaaura that che special nuclear arterial used and pluconlua produced will alwaya be used exclusively for civilhe growing coedtcent, Chen, of many foreign naclooa co civilian nuclear power programs bajed on slightly enrichedfegu.ird* and controls requires Chat any oacional decision co embarkeo-ms program Involve new facilities for che production of special oucl:ar materials for use in weapons. Thla in turn tends to require the development of lndapendeac weapons production foclllclea as against multi-purpose (plutonium production and power) facilities and has che continuing kauplng the cost of. encrypecial nuclear materialeapons effortairly high level. In chose countries where national programs cust.be
mounted od the basis of relatively limited resources, the extent to which eoaey end scientific end technics! ounpower are engaged already in Important nuclear progress related to civil uses may wellurther limiting effect on any decision to establish an independent nuclear weapons capability.
Finally, ln the long-term, dependence upon the Cnited States as the economic supplier ofill provide Increasingly an important leverage in diplomacy for assuring that materials dependent countries pursue policies in support of non-proliferation, since the possibility of withholding special nuclear material or reactor technology will Increasingly entail profound consequences on foreign economies.Original document.