GUERRILLA PROSPECTS IN MOZAMBIQUE

Created: 12/8/1964

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CENTRAL IITILLHEHC

CFFICB OP HA71CHAL ESTIMATES

APPROVED FOR RRI.RASP DATE: DEC

SUWAFY.

Aa vc estimated earlier tblahe Mozambique nationalist movesmit, encouraged by Increased foreign support, baa launched tone guerrilla forays into tbat province. However, tbe aoveneot iseen lied and divided, and tbe Portuguese aro aanlfesting their Intention to hold on byoc-nmn military force. Hence, though longer-tern proopects are doubtful, we continue to believe tbat tbe Portuguese vlll retain control for at least the next year or bo.

Current Situation

uail-scale attacks on military patrols, ednlnlstrative posts, and ccrfminlcations lines in northern Mozambique In late

, "Short-Term Procpects for the African Rationalist Movements In Angola and.

September marked tbe outbreak of guerrilla violence in that Portuguese territory which bad rccalnod largely free of nationalist agitation. Until then Frellao, tbe principal Mozambique nationalist organization, which is led by Eduardo Hondlane and baaed la Tanzania, sought to avoid guerrilla operations until it had substantially improved its organization and broadened its following inside Rozsmbique. Frelimo'o, or more precisely, Mcodlene'a, changed tactics stem largely from external considerations, but also reflect some minor changes in nationalist capabilities within Mozambique.

2. In Africa generally, in recoct months, there has been renewed pressure to show acme progress in "liberating" the white-dominated areas in southern Africa. Emotlooaliam on this issue dominated tbe Organization of African Unity (OAU) Heads of State meeting ln July, and it continuedigh pitch at tbe "tlooallgned" Conference in Cairo ia October. Meanwhile, growing African resentment over developments In tbe Congo after Tabxmbe took office, notably, his introduction of white mercenaries, paved tbe way for those radicals interested in whipping up strident African aatlonallsm. Indeed, tbe Congo basolden opportunity for tbe more militant radicals throughout Africa to press their demands that all African states demonstrate their

willingness at last to support direct action against "lcpcrialiBt" regimes. With tbe Angolan rebellion stalled, with tbe Rhodeelan nationalists disposed to await action by the new Labor Government ln the UK, and with South Africa much too difficult to crack, Mozambique seemed to theood chance to dramatize tbe "Bnticolonialist" struggle through aimed action.

3. Largely because of this Increased support from abroad, Prelimo bas enhanced its operational capabilitiesegree. It claimsighters. Although this figure is probebly exaggerated, perhaps byercent, some revolutionaries,lgerian-trained guerrillaa, are now receiving training from Tanzania's armed forces at sltea near tho Mozambique border. Prelimo'b irregulars now bave access to Soviet, Algerian, and possibly Chineae, arms, ood chronic fund shortages have been alleviated by subsidies from Pelplng and, more recently, by an allocation from the OAJJ's Liberation Committee amounting to about

f which somehas been received. Also, there is evidence tbat Prelimo has been able to maintain communications into southern Mozambique, to organize some cells In that region, and toumber of tribal chiefs appointed by the Portuguese.

cumarehouse. Kcat of the bands were quickly captured or scattered by the Portuguese military, although elements of tvo nay still be at large. An ambush of army units from tbe Mueda garrison, and the spreading apprehension among plantation owners apparentlyecision to bave tbe Portuguese military forceaordon sanltelre along the Tacionla bonier. Tills has led to the burning or some African villagea, and hasthe exodus of several thousand refugees into Tanzania. Their fato has further enflamcd Afrloen opinion and focussed international attention on tbe Mozambique problem.

6. Within Mozambique the Insurgents seam to bave achieved enly modest results at best, and additional forays on tho September scale have not since been initiated. ew minor inoidente nave occurred subsequently, end the Portuguese are still conducting patrolo. The chief consequences of tbe raids probably have been tbe growingalthough still limitedamong the Portuguese settlers ss far south aa ^climate, and the temporary ictlsldatlon of African labor from working tbe siiol and sugar plantations vlth possible economic effects.

Outlook

tbe guerrilla outbreak, sod tbe improvedof tbe natlcnalista, particularly In anui axd externaldo not look for r. widespread uprising of Hoiambleans to Join

tbe nationalist cause. (That cause still scemo to lock popular support except possibly among the Kakundes who straddle the Tanxaniac border.) Hot do we considerapidIn tba general security situation In Mozambique. It Is true, of course, that tbe Portuguese enncot prevent tbe infiltration of Individuals or small groups acrosa their northern or eastern frontiers on terrorist or recruiting missiona; and that tbe radical African states and the Cceaounlsts will continue toand back the nationalists vltb training, eras, and cash. It Is also true tbat tbe threat to tbe Portuguese would develop more rapidly If Kamcona should come to power in Tanzania, or If President Bnnda in Malawi should be replaced by political foes who object to bis "pro-Portuguese" policies.

at present the Moiamblquestill appears poorly organised and divided. has yet to be tested. Secondary officials arc Further internal disputes seem llkoly: in particular.

Cairo's Ban, Gunane, leader ofseek aInfluential role for hia group vitbin Preliao. Trained guerrilla fighters are still scarce, sod increased eras and funds in themselves cannot overcome thatlcily. Moreover, the fairly efficient sanner by vhlch tbe Portuguese repulsed the guerrilla incursion, and the harsh retaliation on the African populace Is likely to discourage coy impulse for popular supporttill largely politically Inert people.

The nationalists will almost certainly attempt nev guerrilla raids. Tbay coy now also seek to initiate terrorist ceopnigns In Important urban areaa to the south such as Zclre. and Lourenco Marques, although urban terrorist csnpalgns vouldegree cf expert1bo which the Angolan rebels have been unable to master after nearly four years of effortespite Moroccan and Algerian training. Thus, tba nationalists seem too weak to sustain otherothersome exile movement for many nccths to care.

Ibis is not to say that the Portuguese are without problem They have been forced into Increasing expenditures toCO0-man nilitary force In an econcmtlcally unrewarding area, to build new nilitary and naval facilities and roads, and to strengthen the police and provide physical security for essential services.

But at tbo ncEcnt, the =alc Portuguese concern is scarcely acre than tbe flagging xoralc on tbe port of some settlers,particularly in the less populated areas in tbe north. The chief danger In the situation will be that even occasional rebel incursions way spark demands aaong the Portuguese in Lisbon or Hotaablque for reprisals agalnet Tanzania vhlch vould bring about seriousin Africa. In aura, although there is likely to be scrae erosion of Portugal's ability to naintaln order, it seerao unlikelr tfcat any eventuality vlll arise In Mozambique during the next year or so vhlch the Portuguese cannot handle.

susrkan Karr

Chalrnac

FOR TEE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

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