TITLE: Work With Walk-ins AUTHOR: Ivan A. Serov
A colieclion ol articles on theperational, doclrinal, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence.
All statements of Tact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence arc those of
the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations,
The following article it adapted from one of several onbiteUioence doctrine wrutm tyMgh-ranking officer)
nally publishedhe articles apparently constituted part of an effort to improve the unsatisfactory performance of theurpose which had reportedly motivated the installation of General of the Army Serov as its chief8 Although addressed particularly to GRU operations officers, the papers can be said to reflect Soviet operational doctrine generally. The civilian KGB, because of its securityis ccmnterintelligence-oriented, but the operational philosophies and practices of the two services are similar. The Serov lecture on walk-ins, in particular, which formalizes aof GRU operational principles in that field, isbased on his long experience in MVD/KGB operations.
SeroVs treatment shows that Soviet problems in assessing and handling the walk-in are not unlike our own. Earlier, it seems, the hazards hod been evadedrush-off policy: GRU officers avoided difficult decisions and the possibility of security flaps by simply refusing to receive walk-ins. Serov changed this policy. Re makes it clear that walk-ins at GRUwill nowearing and be carefully assessed.
WORK WITH WALK-INS Ivan A. Scror'
The main task of Intelligence ls to give timely warning to our government and to the Command erf the Armed Forces regarding imperialist preparations for surprise attack on the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp. Success In discharging the Important responsibilities placed oneat extent on proper planning and dl ie work' and ofiThe abllt ty to rnafcc use'&fall possible means.
A significant role In Intelligence activities Is played by work withersons who approach Sovietof their own accord, wishing to help the Soviet Union and offering their services, in particular to obtain documents of value to us.umber of countries (USA, France, Western Germany, Italy, and others) approaches by such walk-Ins are not an Infrequent occurrence. For this there Is, In ourogical explanation.
Many people ln capitalist countries are ln serious financial straits, living In constant anxiety about the future. Theyresort to any possible means of earning some money to put aside, and for the sake of this financial security tbey are ready to run the risks Involved In offering to collaborate with
baaon| career Id tie Soviet securllr and Intelligence services. Reportedly rtilnghe Central Committee apparatus that controlled lhe services, he entered State Security (then the NKVOl during the uilrtles. He flat gained notoriety aa organizer offrom the Baltic iUM after their annexation in 1M0 and ot the relocation of inspect nauoneUUes to the USSR during the war. When LavrenUT Berlya was overthrown in IBM. Brror became chief of the reorganlEed and carefully
appointment aa chief of the ORD at the end of pabnc, but It la raid to banade becauseerit with ORD performance The dircorery in UfS that Oleg PenkoTsklyS-UK agent led to this pott.
"Tbe Russianobrorheiatef.s used here virtually the equivalent of ourote the term's poslUve psychological value In contrast to the derogatory connotaUon of our "defector."
us. In these countries there also live many who came from countries of the socialist camp and have retained their love for the motherland, and others who have paid visits during the last few years to the Soviet Onion, have come to know thepeople better, and are genuinely eager to do what they can to help us.
The majority, to be sure, of those who turn up regularly at our embassies declaring that they are Ln sympathy with the Soviet Union and want to help it In some way or other offer "Inventions" or'"important" documenthen prove to be of no value. Counterintelligence often ra of such approaches in order to see which of our officers react to the "tempting" offers and so find out which ones areofficers and what their methods are. These visitors bring drawings and various descriptions of their "inventions" and ask to see the military or naval attache to show them to him.ule they arc received by personnel of tbe attache's office. They usually say that they are In sympathy with the USSR and for this reason are approaching the Soviet embassy; otherwise they would have offered their services to thethey would like to get some financial reward. Some declare that they are ready to go to the USSR Ln order to develop the Invention. But In the course of detailedwith these "Inventors" It emergesule that they know little about their own Inventions or about militaryIn the branches in which they have presented themselves as specialists. This probing of their story leads to the timely detection of counterintelligence agents.
One might think that work with walk-ins presents nodifficulties, if only for the reason that one does not have to seek them out, find ways of approaching them. etc. Such reasoning Ls misleading. Working with persons who offer their servicesery complicated business. First of alt It lstouick assessment of the true motives oferson, to discern the real reasons for the offer, and accordingly to make the right decision.
It will be seen In the case histories following that people walk Into official Soviet establishments abroad with all kinds ofSome are Ideologically close to us and genuinely andanxious to help us; some are In sympathy with the
Soviet Union but want at the same time to supplement their income; and some, though not in accord with our ideas and views, are still ready to collaborate honestly with us (orreasons. On the other hand. Soviet representatives often have to deal with unemployed persons who come to ourout of desperationast hope of getting some means of livelihood; needless to say these haveule no agent potential and cannot be of any use to us, Approaches are also made by various kinds of rogues, swindlers, and black-
anything and to whom nothing Is sacred; today they willtate secret entrusted to them, and tomorrow they willthe one to whom they sold It. Finally, counterintelligence often tries to plant agents under the guise of walk-Ins, and here the slightest mistake can lead to very undesirable
Offers of service may be made by letter (through toe malls or In some othery telephone, or In person at the Soviet establishment. The manner of approach can be very different. Persons wanting to make money usuallyarge quantity of documents and talk much and willingly about themselves, trying toavorable Impression.and blackmailers usually act Impudent, making their offer In the form of an ultimatum and even resorting to open threats-It Is essential that the staffs of the service attaches and other mission offices be able to assess correctly the persons whothem, their motives, and the material they offer, so as to make the right decision regarding further action.
It must be said that until lately our offlcers. in the majority of cases, have acted without thinking things out properly; on the assumption that all offers are provocations they haveule turned them down and reported their decision to theafterwards, when it was too late to correct any mistake. It la only during the last two years, after Intervention by the Center, that legalnd the military attaches'have started to show greater thought!"ulnoss in makingon such questions, and the results have not been slow in becoming apparent.
We would sayffldal-coTer field HaUon*.
^.. 1 11 laiafUi.,
Here are some concrete examples of correct and Incorrectby Soviet representatives with respect to persons offering their services, together with some conclusions and practical suggestions for Improving work of this kind.
Potential Agents with Financial Motivation Dangerous Contacts
0 there was found tn the mailbox of one of our em-
he could tell us and gave only his home telephone number. From this number the officers of the residency were able tothe name of the correspondent, and with the help of local reference books they assembled all the essential details about him (where he worked, his job, his office andt was evident that heosition which gave him access to valuable Information, and there was good reason, therefore, foreeting with him. We shall call him x:
The residency decided to telephone thead given and ask him to comeeetingtipulated place, but to intercept him on bis way there so that counterlnteUigence. if it listened In on the telephone call, would not be able to mount surveillance on the meeting. This plan was carried out.
During theave some details about himself and said that he had access to Important documentary Information which he would pass to us If we would pay for It. Hisabout himself agreed with the information that had been developed by the residency. At the end of the meeting It was agreedould come the following week with some of the material to one of the embassy's houses.
On the appointed day he arrived with the secret documents, and they proved to bealk was held with htm In which the possibilities of getting material of interest to us and the motives which had prompted him to offer his services were thoroughly explored. Then,urther check on X's honesty, it was suggested to him that be bring another batch of suitable material to the sameefused to do this, saying that he could not run the risk again, and suggested that arrange-
oy telephone, as bad been agreed. At thisesidency iffieor ascertained his potential (or supplying information, gave him the task ofarticular document, and agreed on the way It should be passed.
At the appointed timethe document to the
air attache's office, and It proved to be of value. But before long the residencyable to the effect that further contact with him was risky, and it had to drop him.
of all, an Inadequately trained officer was allowed to Interview
Moreover, this officer did not display any Initiative and
even failed to make arrangementsubsequent meeting,the reestabllshment of contact required use of theRepeated telephone conversations withhis
visits to the air attache's house and office evidently attracted the attention of counterintelligence; hence the warning cable.ossibly valuable source was lost through carelessness.
1 our embassy In one of the NATO countries was visitedan we will call D. Be gave an assumed name and said heitizen of the country, working ln one of Its Important military establishments. He wanted to meet andalk with some military official of ours. His request was granted; he was Introducedember of the military attache's staff.
D declared that on certain conditions be could hand us secret Information which passed through his' office. He had not brought any material with him, but he had accessumber of Important Secret and Top Secret documents which he could show us at any time. Heery large sum for delivering this material. He refused to give his real name. TheIntelligence officeresire to see the documents, and they agreedeeting in town for this purpose. If the rendezvous shouldould be reachedublicthe number of which he supplied
The residency analysed the circumstances underad presented himself, his behavior, and the operational situation
and decided to check up on him more thoroughly. Init was decided not to go through with the meeting but to establish by means of secret observationent to the prescribed place and whether signs of counterintelligence activity were In evidence in the area. At the appointedhowed up at the meeting placeundle, and nothing suspicious was seen by the watchers stationed in the area.
With this reassurance, it was decided ton the agreed public telephone and suggest that he bring the material to one
terintelugence to stage angreed, and at thetime he brought In two Top Secret document* These proved to be genuine andasuitable amount for them and recruitedegular agent
Further meetings were held with D, both In the officialand In town. He handedumber of valuable papers to us. signed the receipts for money paid him, and gave his band-written agreement to collaborate with usegular basis. His personal papers were also photographed- Thecontinued ton person at these meetings and through other channels
In the course of this collaboration and study the following facts were established about D:
He was fond of gambling.
He had offered us his services for financial reasons, being In heavy debt because of gambling losses.
He did not sympathise with our Ideas and did not disguise Ids dislike of us.
Being an ardent gambler, he wasrgent need of money, and he not Infrequently handed us ultimatums that large sums should be paid him or he would cease biswith us.
He was not only not Intelligentery flighty person:he failed to keep agreed appointments; sometimes he turned up at meetings drunk; and on one occasion he broke off the meeting In the middle and rushed awayage.
Because of D's slow-wittedness, the instability of hishis casual attitude, and his greed heery difficult agent to run. and the maintenance of contact with himserious dangers. Some risk was justified because the material he obtained was very valuable. But In working withersonality the officers of the residency should have been especially circumspect and careful to avoid the slightestinhould not have been asked to come to
tary establishments who have weaknesses of character and are given to gambling are undoubtedly under the eye of
A man walked into the official building of the militaryIn the USA. He gave his name, showed the coverop Secret document to an intelligence officer, and asked whether .It would be of Interest to us. The officer answered that he might be interested In the text, not In the cover. The man fished the document out of the pocket of his overcoat and said that he could let us have It for fifty dollars. The officer examined the contents of the document and paid the money. It was agreed that the visitor would later furnish another such document, bringing It to the same building.
At the secondhorough talk was held with the man, going into his particulars and possibilities as an agent, his job, and certain other questions concerning his history and personal qualities. The residency's officers got the impression that he was notouble game, had good potential, and was genuinely anxious to work with us. They therefore came to agreement with him on the terms under which he wouldsupply documentary material. Future meetings,would be held outside of Washington-Later on, contact arrangements with this man grewmore complicated with the introduction of dead drops, emergency meetings, reserve meetings, etc. During his coUabc-ration he furnishedarge quantity of valuable documents.
The material was paid for in accordance wkih its nature and value*
It would appear that in this example everything went well. Here too, however, mistakes were made. Clearly, not enough thought had been given to the first steps. In the first place, arrangements should not have been madeecondwith the visitor In an official building. Even II it Is assumed that his first visitoviet establishment had not beenby counterintelligence nothing can justify the risk which
Moreover, the residency officers did not carryhorough and all-around check when leaving for the first meeting with this man outside. They should have, because they had no guarantee whatever that the visitor was not aplant. Surely It cannot be excluded thatmight sacrifice several Important documents In order to putlanned scheme for compromising SovietThis example shows that even when everything goes as It should It Is wrong not to have exercised the greatestforesight, and care, thinking everything through to Its logical end and committing oneself to action only when fully convinced of success.
Prom Peddler to Agent
In April of last year aus call himInto our embassy In one of the European countries and asked to see the military attache. Be was Interviewed first by the military attache's Interpreter and then by the attache himself.his personalxplained that he was working at an Important military target, was badly in need of money, and therefore was prepared, though not In sympathy with the Soviet
"Tills operation, while not fully Identified, may hare been reflected In several seemingly unrelated Incidents that occurred in and around Washington Inn August of tbatuardorfolk shipyard where an aircraft carrier was under construe Uoo went Into the Boriet military attache'a office, it waa later ascertained that belearance. Although Identified by six witnesses, he denied eren being In Washington on the date In Question. On at least six occasions4 personnel of the Soviet naval attache's officeooded area near Arlington, Virginia, These visits, possibly toead drop, are believed to bave some relationship to tbe guard's acUvlty.
Union, to sell us documentsilitary nature. As proof of his bona fides he produced an important and undoubtedlyNATO document which showed that he really had poten tiai as an agent.
M's papers were photographed, and arrangements werehimoutine meeting In town. To this meetinganother document and received payment for it Itthat in theurely commercialbe maintained, with transactions to be consummated
- ItemlJyjRehi'on M'TiTutuuive. ..
During subsequent meetings the case officer, by displaying an interest In M's family and home life, managed to win hisand get on friendly terms with him. He succeeded In finding out M's exact Job. addresses, and telephone numbers. Arrangements were made enabling either party to summon the other to urgentystem of signals was set up In town. In this way Id began toegular supply of the top secret material to which he had access. Gradually relations developed to the pointeal agent. Tblschieved through clever handling in which the case officer had to overcomeumber of difficulties; at the beginning, foranted toarge sum of moneyfor handing over one or two documents.
Attention Is drawn to this case because some militaryofficers have the wrong Impression about the possibilities and the time needed to get on agent termsalk-In. Many act too hastily In this respect, evidently on the theory that when someone comes In with an offer, then Ls tbe time to act: recruit him andood mark. Thisarmful approach, fraught with unpleasant consequences. Here It Is very relevant to quote the old proverb. "Seven times measure; cut once."
Peddlers Without Goods
7 an Austrian, oneapproached the Sovietin Vienna with an offer to obtain for us from theof American forces ln West Germany severaltests of new American weapons. The case officerpapers and extracted the dataame-
check. Upono-ahead from the Center he advanced the man his expensesound trip to West Germany, with the understanding that he would be paid for the movies after they had been examined.
After some daysand handedilm, but
examination revealed that It depicted American aircraftequipment of which photographs had appeared inand magazines and was therefore of noto us.alk without that he
ice, believing that he could be of use to us In some way.'" Perennial Con-Man
Intranger called at the Soviet consulate In Copenhagen wanting to talk to someone In the militaryoffice. In the ensuing conversation the man gave bis
name assaid that In return for money he could give
us Information verbally or In writing (with photographson the Nike anti-aircraft missile sites in thearea. He pointed out that he had previously soldInformation to an officer on the staff of the Soviet military attache In Paris. He displayed several photographs ofmissile sites which seemed of doubtful value. He was asked to stand byew days and then telephone theofficer at home.
A check was requested of the Center, and It was established
that althoughhad been given money for passing
military information to our officers In France, his reports had been of little value. The Center therefore instructednot to meet him or accept any material from him.
Nevertheless, whenagain to theear
alf later, onn officer In the militaryoffice entered into conversation with him. After telling
about his financial difficultiestoeport
on the same old subject, the Nike missile sitesanish kroner. The militarynstead
of turning down the offer, hadthe report on the
spot and paidroner for It. The Information wasworthless, and the Instruction to have no further contact with the man had to be repeated.
This shows how some people will try to take advantage of the inexperience and Ignorance of our officers and how someare hasty In their decisions, spend money unjustifiably, and run unnecessary risks.
ertaina displaced person of Ukrainianvisited the official building of the military attach*of the European countries. He claimed to know thatofSoviet leaders and offered his services In ferretingdetails of this plot and the Identity of those whocany out theofong talk withfind out more
about him, his connections, and his sources of Information,accepted his story on faith and arranged to meetnext dayesignated spot and give him the moneyto travel to the city where the terrorists were. Onfrom the Center, however,character and his .
Information were checked. It turned out that his story was false. He had evidently Invented the whole thing to get money for moving from one country to another.
Et Dona Ferentes
8 several approaches were made to the Soviet consulate In Vienna by Greeks, mostly small merchants or students. A
Greek namedespecially persistent In offering his
services; he declared straight out that he wanted to help the Soviet Union for financial reasons. Asked why he was making this offer In Vienna rather than in Greece and how he thought he could help us. he replied that he was afraid of visiting the embassy In Athens but was often In Austria on business and that he himself had no special access but could get ^formation through hisergeant at one of the American bases In Greece.
It was learned later that Greeks were making similar offers to embassies of other countries of tbe socialist camp. In fact to all establishments where In their opinion they mightaker. This example shows, among other things, that walk-Ins should "be checked against information from the militaryof other countries.
A great danger ts presented by persons who offer theirfrom dishonest, mercenary motives or with provocation inextortioners, swindlers, and persons acting under the control of counterintelligence. Special care has to be exercised Ln dealing with them
osajjational.camcJo^thc official bull ding
a nufftary^vBTflffhe. Herhaa certMdoirV test pllotTor an
aircraft firm, and he offered the design of an electromagnetic engine he hadrief examination showed theto be of no Interest whatever, and It was turned down. Nevertheless, the man did not leave; he complained about being badly off. mentioned debts, said that he was poorly treated where he was working, and finally asked our officer0oan, promising that he would help us In any way he could
In general, the residency's officersavorableof In reporting the Incident to the Center they
suggested that he beoan andeceipt be obtained for It. The Center did not approve this proposal; It saw many
suspicious features Lnapproach and behavior, savoring
of preparationsrovocation. It sent Instructions to break off contact with turn.
At the endpproached oureeting in town; and the resident, without thepermission, authorized the renewed contact. At this
meetinghanded our officer diagrams of some of tbe
equipment on the antisubmarine aircraft Argus, tbe value of which was Judged by Intelligence to be moderate. He alsothat he had transferred to another aircraft company, complained about his financial position, and asked for help. At subsequent meetings he handed over two secret papers (one of which wasoasted about his access to secretespecially on the Bo marc antiaircraft missile, asked that he be advanced ten thousand dollars toouse, and hinted that he had Important connections In circles of interest to us
The Center sent Instructions to stop all contact with
who. however, continued to telephone and call In person at tbe official building and mail postcards there. The residency, for
its part, tried insistently to get the Center's permission to have meetings with the man and seemed to have no misgivings that he mightounterintelligence plant and bent onFinally, when these efforts to reestablish contact proved
of no avail.to blackmail and intimidation. In
several letters addressed to the military attach* at his office and offering more "important" documents, he demanded the payment of ten thousand dollars for the material alreadyand threatened to put theransaction" intoandio'txxnmterw^
In analyzing this case it Is easy to see that In addition to the attempt at blackmail there cannot be excluded the possibility that counterintelligenceinger In the pie:
have been given the task of arousing the interest of
our officers In order to compromise them at some suitable moment. Among the weaknesses shown by the residency's
offlcers was the fact that they failed to see through
the Initial stages of their work wltb him, made an Incorrect assessment of him, did not Investigate his potential, didearn his real Intentions, did not study or check up on him properly, and did not attach sufficient importance to thefeatures In his behavior.
tranger came to the Paris embassy, said that heieutenant In. Army and badly In need of money, and offered some typewritten documents. Our officers, without studying the material properly, paid twenty thousand francs for it. Examined more closely, what had seemed reports on the disposition of. 'units in West Germany turned out to be only an exercise for use In typist training.
The "lieutenant" was not seen again In Paris, but some time later he visited our embassy In Denmark, saying that he had collaborated with the military attache's office In Paris and asking for moneyromise of some documents. He could have beenwindler looking for some easy money, but he may havelant of NATO counterintelligence trying to Identify our personnel.
Reserve called at our embassy in Paris. He said that he was willing to help Soviet Intelligence If we made It worth his
while. He himself had no access to information but heriend whoaptain serving at an air base in Spain who wanted to earn some money and had asked to be put in
touch with Soviet intelligence. for money for
a trip to Spain and promised to bringopy of the VS. field service regulations.
The conversation withcarried on through ansince he spoke only English; but he made aon the officer who talked with him. On his ivrm the mra
he got to Spain, however, he telephoned our officer demanding more money. The tone he used left no doubt that heogue and an extortioner. Our officer hung up the receiver.
Later it was discovered thatgone from thewith our officer to French counterintelligence, wherethem that he was an agent of the Soviet Intelligenceand was willing to help them. The French, however,they verified that he had visited our militaryrefused his services, recognizing that he was simplyTwo months later the man turned up at ourBeirut and approached the ambassador and thewith the same kind of offer. On Instruction fromhe was asked to leave the embassy.
This was an obvious example of carelessness and credulity on the part of our officer In Paris.
In8 the embassy ln SwedenetterIn English which said:
"Do you know the method by which NATO intends toyour submarines? Have you heard of the DAB. equipment, which. In conjunction with new antisubmarine mines,o you know where thefordetection] will be situated? If you want answers [to theseill be glad to let you have the main principles on which DAR equipment operates, and how this equipment will detect your submarines regardless of theof thean also explain to you how to save hundreds of your submarines from the new mines.an
tell you approximately where the first two fields will be laid (to within two miles).
"The writer of these lines, who wishes to remainhas come to Stockholm onlyew days and willreturning to his station in Germany. For thebe supplied, if it Ism asking tendollars. The Information will be handed over toportions worth three thousand American dollars each,to be made .later. This means that if the first lottou4wiU pay lorjgSfefcv-LU
"The material can be handed over In Switzerland or in Sweden, whichever youill have two weeks' leave In June or July. In order to convince me that you areI would like you to pay my travel expenses In advance at the same time you inform me which country you would like to meet me In. Your answer, together0 Swedish kroner In the currency of any West European country, can be left at the checkroom at Lldingo up0 hoursay. You can put your messageair of old shoes and tell the attendant at the checkroom that the parcel will be picked upessenger from Mr. Ekker."
The letter waarovocation. The residency acted correctly in leaving It unanswered.
In0 an approach to the military attache's office In Vienna was madean who said heest German citizen. Konrad Loezel,iving at Nuernberg,nterviewed by an assistant militaryoezel declared that heenuine friend of the Soviet Union andong time had sought an opportunity to get Into touch with us; he wasosition to pass us some very Important informaUon, ba particular the formulaew military material which had recently been developed In great secrecy. Heajor Bauer, serving In the NATO 3rd Fighter Squadron located at Fuerth; he himself was in chargeravel bureau In Nuernberg (heocument to confirmeember of the FreeParty of West Germanyember of the Defense Committee of the Bavarian Landtag, where he had many friends
among the deputies; he was well informed about all military construction work in Bavaria.
In giving all these details he was obviously trying to arouse interest in his potential. Butealth of detail appeared suspicious to the residency's officers, and they pressed for more particulars on some of the points. Loezel grew confused In his replies, and what he represented became evident
Lures in Rome
Oncev an Italian telephoned the embassy and askedeeting in town with an officer of the military attache's staff, specifying the time and place. The resident decided that no one should go to the meeting, but the area where it was to be held should be put under surveillance. It turned out that counterintelligence officers were stationed all around.
Another Italian took advantage of receptions and otherfunctions to make approaches to first one and thenoviet representatives with offers of his services, attempting to arrange meetings ln other, less official surroundings. This person's conduct appeared suspicious to the residency'sand they politely but firmly turned down all his advances. Then he switched his attentions to the Czech military attache, and not without success. But during one of their meetingsestaurant, when the Italian had got up and gone to the men'saiter informed the Czech that his friendrovocateur employed by the police.
Although in these examples our officers displayed dueand did not take the bait, ft is unfortunately the case that not all of them so conduct themselves always Some still show weaknesses lnituation, do not analyze events sufficiently deeply and thoroughly, and tolerate lapses In security.
In the summerertainto the building housing our mission andeetingember of the staff. The personthat day. an Intelligence officer of the residencyjob was technical, not diplomatic, and in whom countcr-
intelligence had recentlyarticular interest, answered thatoliday there were no senior members of the staff in
the office. that since he could not stay over until
Monday he would come along andalk with theThe latter, explaining that be was busy at thecallittle later, and he immediatelythe matter to tbe resident. Because of his currentfor counterintelligence, he had been instructedail work with agents for the present.
Now the resffienVgaVe htm strtct'^ers'that If
up at the building he should listen to what ho had to say but not accept any material from him or commit himself In any way by any arrangements or premises. The decision of the resident was undoubtedly the correct one. especially since
one or two thingshad been suspicious; he was clearly
trying to Interest the duty officer in his potentialresident's Instruction, however, the officer fell foreasy dangled recruitment and whenagain agreed to meetong way out of townthe detailed arrangements he suggested.
The resident gave categorical orders that the meetingto take place; he assumed thatprobably aagent. The counterintelligence service wasaware that the officer In whom It was Interestedduty that day. Having some knowledge of his character.
It reckoned on his not being able to resistoffer to
hand over Informationind not previously received byhen it had aroused his Interest and Induced him to comeeeting outside of town, Jt would then try tohim
This conclusion was strengthenedurtherweeks later, when the same officer was on duty, aMr.for an appointment, came to the
building, and told this officer that he could pass usmilitary electronics. In confirmation of his access hea film showing the buildings of the school ofAgain the officer displayed quiteHe accepted the film, which was of noand arranged to meetln town toIt. This was evidently just what counterintelligence
was trying tocatch our man at the meeting place with the film on him. as tangible grounds for compromising him. This meeting was likewise forbidden.
This example Illustrates that the reception ot walk-Ins should be reserved to experienced case officers who can handle the interview expertly and avoid hasty decisions.
At the end9 one of the staffilitary attache's office, Nlkolay, noticed on luVway home from work that he was being followedounterintelligence car In which, strangely, there was only the driver; usually at least two counterintelligence agents rode together. He had been about to stoparge self-service store to get some groceries. While he wasection of the store where there were no other customers at the time, the counterintelligence man came up and said thatarge sum of money be wouldthe whereabouts of two former citizens of countries of the socialist camp who were betraying their motherland.
Nlkolay replied, reasonably, that neither the whereabouts nor the fate of traitors could be of Interest to the countries they had betrayed. The man did not give up, however; he advised Nlkolay to think about his offer and said that he hoped to have further conversations with him on the subject.
The Incident was reported to the Center. Although the counterintelligence agent's whole behavior and the way he had chosen to make the contact gave grounds to believe that the money motive was genuine, the Center approved Nlkolay's refusal and Issued Instructions that If the agent made another approach all his offers were to be turned down and noentered Into.
This example shows that In some, let us say very rare, cases even counterintelligence officers may approach us In the hope of making money. Our people must be particularly careful In dealing with walk-Ins in this category; when conversations with them are approved by the Center they should beonly to the most experienced and best trained offlcers.
Ino men. having asked for an Interview, were received by our military attache in Stockholm and his assistant They said that they had served ln the army and had certain information, particularly about the naval base, which they would be willing to give us for an appropriate reward. The military attache Immediately broke off the conversation and asked them to leave,ew days Later he reported theto the cfBctal representative of the Swedish Ministry of Defense, who informed the Swedish security police. '"v*
ear later, onhe Swedishreported underheadlines the arrest of these two men for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. According to the representative of the Ministry of Defense, the police had needed this time to establish their identity. It Is characteristic that the reactionary press, reviving ln this connection Its periodic anti-Soviet spy-mania campaign,the factsendentious way. Without denying that the Investigation was Initiatedarning from the Soviet military attache, the newspapers made the deliberately false charge that he had accepted documents from the men and In Informing the Ministry of Defense of their visit made noot these.
Both the men were brought up for trial. On the stand they denied any act or intent of espionage, declaring that they had Just wanted tooviet establishment Into giving them two thousand kroner to relieve them of the financial straits they were in. The trial proceedings were also used as anfor antl-Soviet propaganda by the reactionary press
In this case the military attache and his assistant had acted very thoughtlessly. Their mistake not only repulsed andtwo men who may really have wanted to help us, not only provided an opening for the development of an tl-Soviet propaganda, but also made the work of other Sovietmore difficult The case became known outside Sweden, and It cannot be excluded that It has given pause to more than one budding walk-In, making them wonder whether anto Soviet officials would get them anywhere.
During the period from April to Augustne of ourbegan to receive byeries of unsolicited reports always bearing tbe same signature In Russian, "Your friendut eachifferent addressertain town that was off limits to our representatives. The first reports were of no Interest, but then documents of considerable valueto arrive, showing that Mun had good access to Important Information on.mlutajy^tcchnlcaj_matters In .his country. The residencyrTdio'fot more to establishwith him. They were uncertain about his real address, and his telephone number was unknown. They therefore sat back and waited for further Initiatives on his part.
For some time nothing was received from Mun, but Inof the sameetter arrived In which he pointed out that he had sent us various kinds of "photographs'" and asked us to let him know whether we were receiving his letters; If so he would continue to write now and then and "ask questions about life In the USSR" In the letter he gave his true full name andheck established that he really did live In the town he had named from the beginning. The residency replied that It was receiving his letters and gave him tothat it hoped to establish personal contact with him.
Having weighed and analyzed all the details of the case, the Center decided that it was worth running some risk tocontact with Mun and gave Instructions that he should be approachedesidency officerosition to travel around the country without Informing the local authorities ofeeting took place, but then the contact was broken with no warning or explanation to Mun, who.and anxious to renew the operation, therefore came to our official mission with valuable material on his person.
Thus faulty action on the part of the residency's officers compelled Mun to behaveay that compromised him. They failed to take advantage of the favorable circumstances that had been presented for collaboration and Mun's genuine desire to help us, acted Irresponsibly In conducting theand did not display tho necessary discreet Initiative.
Good Agent; Poor Access
At the end1 the Soviet embassy in one of thecountries was visitedocal
who declared that he supported the policy of the USSR and was against that of the USA and would like to help us in any way he could. At the first meeting he refused to give hiswishing evidently to find out first what attitude we would take towards him. but he handed over aerialof NATO airfields ln'hls country markedand later Judged to be of Indifferentt was arranged that he should come back again after ten days.
This timea secret text for training in work
on missiles. He said he had taken It from the safe of an officer who had left the key In the lock while off on an official trip. Now he let us have his surname, his address, and Job, but he reported that he was being sentear to another city. The case officer arranged to meet him, however, when he was in town on leave or holiday.
The case officer got the Impression thatanxious to help us. that he really was who he saidand that he was acting carefully and thoughtfully,In his conversation he displayed knowledge of thea military man In his stated speciality should have; ifnotuestion he said so straight out; hehis name at the first meeting, and he hadto cover up his intentions as he walked past aon duty at the gates of the embassy.
The residency reported these views to the Center andthat we should continue working withIt was
decided, however, that despite his genuine desire to be helpful to us It would be unproductive to maintain further relations with him: he was not nowosition to obtain information of Interest to us. There remained the task of breaking offwith him skillfully, so as to preserve his access to us In case some valuable information came Into his hands, and, more Important, tactfully, so that he would not feel hurt by theAll these considerations have to be taken Into account.
oviet embassyetterr. Tom saying that he was an ex-employee of an Importantin his country and had information which In his opinion would be of great interest to the USSR. His address andnumber wereheck of the city directory showederson was listed, butifferent address. Further checks, however, established that he had recently moved tonew apartment, at the address given In the letter.
ThTreaident decided toTnake contact'theater ticketertain date was sent to his home address,ase officer. Peter, attended the same performance. Without contacting Tom. he succeeded ln identifying him and even got the tag number on the car ln which he drove away. Then two weeks were devoted to attempts to Intercept him on the street as he left the apartment; these ended in failure.
Finally Peter, acting In accordancelan approved by the Center, ascertained by telephone that Tom was at home andew minutes paidisit Ln his suburbanTom gave particulars about himself and provided some Information of apparent Interest He said that during World War II he had servedaptain In the air force.4 he had applied for employment in one of the Importantagencies, and after thorough security inquiries he got the necessary clearance. His work Involved study of thepress for items which might be of mterest to theInowever, he had left this agency of his own accord.
A second meeting with Tom tookeek later. At this meeting the question of how he could be useful wasparticularly the suggestion that beob at one of the defense targets, where he could regularly get Information which would be of value to us and for which he would be paid.hird meeting was held, but at the fourth meeting Tom did not show up.
Peter thereupon went to see him at home. Tom. whom he found very nervous, told him categorically that he did not wish to have any further contact with us. Two months later the residencyrief notice In the local press that Tom had committedeek later Peter, on leave In Mos-
cow. learned that his entry visa to the country hadear the publication of certainoupled with an analysis of material In our possession, showed that Tom's contacts with us had most probably come to the notice of counterintelligence, presumably through the telephone call to his apartment.1
This example shows that counterintelligence keepsof Important establishments 'tnder observation for some time after they have stopped working there. Our officers should bear this in mind. -tannr'T-'
In Hay of Last year an American soldier came to the Soviet embassy In one of the Latin American countries and asked to see the military attache. He said he hadpecial trip there In order to tell us about the preparations for war being made ln the USA; he did not want to take part In another war and kill honest people in the Interests of AmericanHe gave from personal observation some details about the battle training of American troops, handed over some manuals which were of no value, and reported thatew months he would be going with his unit to Europe.
Two months later he came to see us again, handedirective which was of some interest, and gave some verbalWe arranged that on arrival In Europe he would make contactepresentative of the Soviet militaryin one of the West European countries. The Center checked Into the particulars which he had given aboutand confirmed them.
Soon the soldier did arrive In Europe and. as arranged met our representativeshird country, having gone there on leave ostensibly to see the sights- He was undoubtedly awalk-In. but he did not have access to secret material and therefore could not be of any use. This operationaste of effort.
' This ease appears to be that of Nick Clarkormer CIA employee who committed suicide onpril ISM. Tbe Washington Sunday Star, In reporting his death, laid that WaUea had had aassociation with Anatoli A. Popov, assistant Sovtet militarynd that the Utters reentry visa had been cancelede Bute Department.
Inocal citizen.came to the Soviet
embassy in an African country and said that he would like to
see our officercame and introduced himself, but
to give his name. He did not want to talk In
the embassy; couldhim in some public place in
town?and theylace and time.
When they met In townthat he was an employee
esire to be helpful. He gave his name, butreluctance.thatoffer of hiswas an attempt at provocation. He recommended tothat no more meetings with him be held.
The Center, however, concluded thatshould have
another meeting withcertain securitywhich It specified. This was the right decision: tofurther meetings have been held, and at two ofwritten and verbal InformaUon has been received from
In analyzing this case note should be taken ofrior check and the receipt ofdata oncase officer should not have gone to a
meeting with him. Having taken the risk, however, andrecognizedosition to supplyof Interest to us. he should not have decided againstmeetings with him but conducted them inayman would not trunk he was being exploited as an agent.
Key to Nothing
In6 the officer on duty at one of our missions found the keyaggage locker In the mailbox. Clearly it had come from someone wishing to establish contact with us. An officer was given the touchy Job of going to the airport and railroad staHon to study the layout and try to find out where the corresponding locker was. He must have been either In-suffidenUy experienced or In loourry; he failed toanything.
On the nextan calling himselfthe
mission and asked whether the key had been used. Told we
didn't know where It should be used, he said the locker was al the bus station. Our officer went to the bus station, but he spotted several counterintelligence cars In the neighborhood.
It was clear that the telephone conversation with
been monitored, and of course we could not open the locker.
A day laterthe rnlsslon again, this time
from another town, to find out If we had succeeded In picking up his material. After this telephone call counterinteUigence again displayed activity with respect to our officers leaving
the rnlsslon. made no furtheratattempt to getdnto
tmichwithu*. can be hypothesized thata real walk-In who
did not want to make personal contact for fear ofhimself. If this was the case then the residency wasguilty of negligence In falling to find the locker promptly and so not discovering what was In It andhance to establish relationserson who could have
been useful. On the other hand, the possibility that
acUng under the direction of counterintelligence cannot be excluded The residency should ln any case have firstut whom It was dealinggenuine walk-In or athen acted In accordance with the situation.*
No Interest In US. Bases
In the summeroreigner who described himselfpanish journalist came to the consulate In Vienna. Re said that through reliable senior officer friends In the Spanish army he had obtained plans of American military targetsconstruction Inroads, stores, and oil plpe-
Inan using the nam* Dr. RuMrosa telephoned the office of the Soviet military attache In Washington and asked for an assistant attache who had recently been declared persona turn grate. Later the same day an unidentified manmail envelope to the office door. The next day -Rablroaa" called to asked key bad been received. Then be called twice more: on is October he was told the Information vould be picked ap as soon aa possible, bat oa the following day the Soviets laid they were notashington bus terminal locker was found to contain schemsUe wiring diagrams for an electronic device. Although "Dr. Rublrosa" was never firmlyikely respect was foundormer employee of an Industrial concern,mental case.
lines. These he wanted to sell. Refusing to give his name or show his personal papers, he asked to talkember of the consulate star! who had the necessary authority. He alsoto show the plans to the consular official or to visit theecond time, declaring that the only question to be settled was the price we would pay for the plans.
The resident was Informed and he consulted the KGBThe two then conferred with the embassy counselor, and together they agreed on thefollowing answer.to_behe Spaniard: Since the SovtetXJniornhastng with Spain, plans of military structures on the territory of Spain are of no interest whatever to us; the only thing In which the Soviet Union is Interested, and what It desires for the Spanish people. Is that they should rid themselves as quickly as possible of the dictatorship of Franco. When he was given this answer the Spaniard, surprised and angry, said he would find another buyer for his plans and left-Did the residents and counselor act correctly In this case? Of course not. First of all It la Incorrect that Americanbases In Spain are of no interest to us. Moreover, the officers did not even look at the plans, did not examine any details of the offer, and summarilyerson who might have proved of use to us. From this example it can be seen that some of our officers do not attach sufficientto the fulfillment of the tasks given them, do not display Intelligent Initiative, and make Incorrect decisions. Archery at Dusk
In the summer8 an arrowports bowote attached to it was found In the courtyard of one of our missions. The note Informed userson using the name Ar was prepared to give us informationpecified sum of money andime and placeeeting in town. The resident decided that we should not meet with Arto these Instructions. He gave orders that the property across the street from the mission, whence the arrowcame, should be watched for two days.
On the nextunday, when darkness wasar stopped not far from the missionoung manirl got out and started to walk obtrusively toward our
trance, paying no attention to the counterintelligence men on duty nearby. In theecond young man who had remained in the car shot another arrow into the courtyard. This was found likewise toote attached, with the same contents as the first.
Having analyzed all that had happened and taking Intotbat by that time the operational situation had become unfavorable, the residency decided that It was inexpedient to establish contact with Ar. espcchUhr^rice two other people ^werVuT*on the "offer. Itciudedell-planned counterintelligence provocation scheme. But It cannot be stated with certainty that these young people were not genuinely anxious to help us.
Local Party Members
We do not run agents in friendly countries of the socialist camp, andumber of other places (certain African and Arab countries. Cuba) we do not recruit local citizens as agents but use the citizens of capitalist countries who live there. Everywhere we arc forbidden to maintain agentwith members of the fraternal Communist and Workers Parties and other progressive elements.
Nevertheless It cannot be avoided that walk-Ins from these prohibited categories turn up at our missions. What should be done In such cases? It far essential to listen to the visitor patiently and attentively and then explain our position to him so thoroughly as to arrive at complete mutualand send him away satisfied. The following case can be cited as an example.
Ininnish citizen.came to the Soviet
embassy and asked for an Interview with our militaryThe military attache Instructed bis assistant to receive the Finn. The visitor, giving his name, age, andsaid that beonstruction foreman from Tampere and that until recently he bad worked In tbe constructionof the Isinistry of Defense helping buildammunition storage bunkers. His visit to the embassy was for the purpose of turning over to us the blueprints of these bunkers. He displayed one of the drawings, whichunker some0 meters in floor area and which
bore the stamp of the engineer department of the Finnish armed forces.
The assistant military attache toldthat because of
the friendly relations between the USSR and Finlandcould not meddle In the internal affairs ofand Its armed forces.our position
e? eea"nttf T* ^ cndly
heading one of the^ocal branches of
had considered It his duty to Inform the Soviet representative.
Tbe assistant attache thankedhis warm attitude
toward the USSR and for bis concern and good work on behalf of Finnish-USSR relations. On this they parted.
The above examples Illustrate that residency officers still makeot of blunders and bad Judgments In working with walk-ins. In order to avoid these and carry out such worketter planned and more effective way, some general rules which should be adhered to can be summed up as follows.
On receiving byetter with an offer of services, it is essential to note whether the sender's name and address are given, to check on the way mail is delivered to theto know whether counterintelligence In that countryail scrutiny operation, and to examineeeting as to place and manner. If the letter has been dropped Into the establishment's mailbox without going through the malls, then the situation ls simpler, but here too it ls essential to carry out the appropriate check*.
After this, the questioneeting with the writer should be settled: should he be asked to come to an official(embassy, trade delegation,rafe house? More use should be made of meetings In various pubuc places, for Instance at athletic events, theaters, and other bigin order to avoid drawing the attention offrom the beginning.
in talking to the write-in the main question should be cleared upinformation can he provide? Only later andactful way should efforts be made to get someabout him, bearing in mind thatule even awho Is well disposed toward us will try to conceal such particulars In order to avoid getting himself into trouble. On the otherrite-in bent on provocation will boast about his position and exaggerate his access, trying to make his prop-osition attractive.jsynup-alikthese questionskin should be taken regarding furtherto continue the contact and If so where to meet, or to drop It.
CaUeri tn Per ton
If someone comesission of ours with an offer to help us, in this case too It Is Important to start the conversation by clearing up the mainpotential he has formaterial ofthen only gradually toInto his motives and other matters. If In the course of the conversation It becomes clear that the visitor's potential Is limited. It Is essential to tell bim at once that we. the officials st the embassy (or trade delegation or attacheo not Indulge in such activities.
erson's offer Is of Interest and his position gives him access to valuable material, it should be determined whether he has perchance been planted by counterintelligence and briefed to arouse our interest His statements about where he Is employed and the kind of work he does should be checked by probing thoroughly his knowledge of the work andwhether he really does know all the details he should or has onlyeneral acquaintance with It from counterintelligence briefings. After this uncertainty has been resolved the question of further meetings can be decided.
alk-In brings documents along when he first offers his services It Is best for the Interviewing officer to pretend that he does not know the language they are written In or on some other pretext ask permission to show themolleague in order to determine their value; this will provide an opportunity to photograph them. Depending on their value, the Interview can be resumed with the object of determining the man'sand potential, his financial terms, etc
If It is decided to puisue the operation it is essential to give careful thought to arrangements for further meetings, the planning of dead drops, etc Personal meetings should be kept as infrequent as possible; when they have to be held the cover story for them should be carefully worked out and themade to appear casual and natural so as to avoid attracting counterintelligence attention.
Country Team Support
When walk-ins telephone to enabassy personnel -at .their beanies or come to the official embaky'bufidlngs or other Soviet establishments (trade delegation. TASS) asking to see aofficer, they should not be directed to the militaryoffice,ember of his staff should be sent to the office where the visitor has called and the Interview held there. The attaches and residents should establish close liaison with all Soviet establishments In order to be Informed quicklyalk-In appears, and our officers should conduct theon the spot In these establishments. Only the mostofficers should be given this assignment
In the event of an approach by telephone It Is generally better to arrange to have the Interviewrade delegation. TASS office, or similar installation rather than on the premises of the military attache's office or the embassy.watches the former less closely,ule, and arepresentative sent tolace can therefore hold the meeting under more favorable conditions.
Persons who come to Soviet establishments requestingasylum, however, are handled through Ministry ofAffairs channels. We should not Involve ourselves in such mattcrr.
Offers may also be made at exhibitions, receptions, andkinds of open meetings. It Is essential to treat these with the greatesterson who approaches you in these surroundings could photograph or otherwise compromise you in the course of your very first conversation with him.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized once more that work with walk-Ins Is an important part of agent operations forIntelligence and when properly planned and conducted can be very fruitful.Original document.