THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM (NIE 11-1-65)

Created: 1/27/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

5

5

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Supersedes)

The Soviet Space Program

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

SatWnWbrDIRECTOR OFNTEUIGENCE

Coxtvrrod in by lhe UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCEndiiotad overleaf5

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The Soviet Space Program

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE PROBLEM 1

CONCLUSIONS 1

5

I. THE SOVIET SPACE 5

Unmanned Scientific Satellites

Lunar and Planetary

Manned Space Flight

Strategic

II. FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE PROSPECTS 10

Booster Capabilities and10

Scientific and Technical Considerations11

Other Indirect Evidence of Future12

III. OUTLOOK FOR THE PROGRAM13

Probable

Unmanned Exploration of Near

Lunar and Interplanetary

Manned Space

Possible Soviet Military Uses of

Table I: Estimated Timing of the Soviet Manned Space Flight

Tablestimated Timing of Soviet Unmanoed Space Projects22

ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARIES OF SOVIET SPACE

Tableoviet Launchings of Non-Recoverable Earth

Tableoviet Launching* of Lunar and Planetary

Tableoviet Manned Srmoeflight Projects27

Tableoviet Launchings of Photo-reconnaissance2S

- .

ANNEX B: PRINCIPAL TYPES OF VEHICLES AND TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED IN SOVIET SPACE4

Figureamily of Soviet Space VchtdaW Figure iSoviet Planetary Probe Operation

Sovie* Lunar Probe Operation Figure

Figurearth Trace of Coverage of US by Soviet Pboto-reconnaissance Satellite launched onegree Inclination

ANNEX C

Soviet Scientific and Technical Capabilities for Space Flight

New Propulsion Systems

Cuidaoce

Tracking and Communkatrooi Systems

Figurep-Spaoe Tracking Stations at38

Spacecraft Power Supplies

Facilities for Stimulating Spaoo Environment

Life Support Systems

Data Processing

Orientation and Stabilization of Space Vehicles

Maneuver. Rendezvous and Decking

Ro-eotjy and Recovery

i.Lcni i

THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable accomplishments in space over the next five to ten years.

CONCLUSIONS

USSR's space program hasey clement inprestige. Space remains the major area in which thestillredible claim to world primacy. The USSRconcerned to explore the military implications of spaceat least one military support system is already operational.that the Soviet space program will retain its priority, thatwill continue to be impressive, and that ft willgoals for which the USSIt can most favorably compete.

Soviet program has been focused so far on four mainof activity:

a lunar and interplanetary probes project which scored some initial successes but has been consistently unsuccessful

a manned space flight project emphasizing biomedical research, which hasotal of morean hours in seven launches;

a strategic photo-reconnaissance project which began in2 and now apparently is perfonmng its mission sucx*ssfully;

unmanned scientific exploration ofroject recently plagued by numerous equipment failures. (Paras.)

launchings have sharply increased in the past year.been due almost wholly to tho reconnaissance project- whichtoigh priority. umber of satellites recently

1

Launched by new and diversified techniques could be precursors to meteorological, communications, navigation, orsystems. (Paras.)

Soviet space effort has been characterized by repeateda few components and techniques,otal reliance onand an extensive sharing of other equipment andthe ballistic missile program. This practice has kept downthe space effort lias been expensive and it now appears toa stage where new and more cosily systems will besustain the previous rate of progress. Like Khrushchev, theleaders will balance economic and other considerationsdecisions about future space projects. ,

missions will include unmanned space vehicles forof near-space, the moon. Mars, and Venus. Theprobably continueake advantage of each opportunity forof probes to Mars and Venus to analyze the atmosphereof the two planets. Lunar probes will be equipped forthe lunar surface. )

the near lerm the Soviets will probably scolc todock two or more vehicles in earlh-orbit and thereby tofor the assembly and resupply of spat* stations. Ifuse current spacecraft, initial docking experiments couldpace station to accommodate two or threebe achievedc have no evidence, however, thatSoviet manned spacecraft are suitable for this mission. If aspacecraft is required, rendezvous and docking is unlikelya small manned space station could probably be placed ina year later. )

believeew large boosterhrust on thetwo million pounds Is under development in the USSR, and thatbe available for manned operations as earlyearafter its first manned flight, the Soviets will probably use itspace hardware toarge manned spacea station might weigh as muchounds anda rotational crew of five to ten persons for extended.could be created in about the same time frame, by multipleoperations using existing boosters, but wc consider this

H. The propaganda valueanned circumlunar flight, and its simplicity and low cost relativeanned lunar landing, lead us to consider thisrime Soviet goal. If the USSH is not seeking to beat the USanned lunar landing, this project would probably be timed to precede the Apollo mission in an attempt to detract from the US achievement and to identify the USSR with mannedof the moon. Use of the present space booster for tlie circumlunar mission is possible but unlikely. Using the new, large booster noted above, the mission could be accomplished as earlyutthe problems of technology and cost, we think it more likely that the flight would not occurnd it might be evenespecially if the project is planned to incorporate advanced hardware requiredubsequent manned lunar landing project)

I. We do not beheveanned lunar landing competitive with the present Apolloimed ateriod,oviet objective. The apparent status of Soviet space technology,considerations, statements by the leadership, and continuedto other major space missions all lead us to this conclusion. It seems certain, however, that the Soviets intend toan on the moon sometime in the future, andffort toward this goal is almost certainly in progress.

J. We estimate that another, very large boosterhrust on the order of five million pounds is under development and could become available for manned space flight as earlysing this booster and an earth-orbital rendezvous technique, andery high degree of success in all phases of the project, the first Soviet attemptanned lunar landing might occur as earlyn view of the magnitude of the technological problems and the level of resources which the Soviets are Likely to commit to this project, weore probable date for such an attempt toew years later.,

K. If the Soviets choose to direct their efforts toward even more extensive manned exploration of space, they may develop very large, quasi-permanent stations for tho assembly and launching of spacecraft from near earthuitably large space station could be created in Uiesing the very large booster discussed above. If so, a

manned lunar landing mission launchedpace station could occur in the.

L. We believe thai the Soviets will experimentariety of space systems for military purposes, that ihey will employ thosewhich can be economically and militarily justified, and thai some military role for man in space may emerge by the end of the period, particularly as the ability to operate manned space stations grows. Within the next five to ten years, additional mditary support systems will probably become operational. Considering the capabilities of current boosters and other available indicators, wc think that themost likely to be deployed in the next few years are those for communications and TV relay, weather forecasting, geodesy, andA maneuverable satellite for electromagnetic andreconnaissance may also be developed. Penetration aidwith electronic payloads could be operational laic in this decade.)

M. We do not estimate that the Soviets will deploy offensive or defensive weapons in space within the next five to ten years. This conclusion is based upon our judgment that such systems wiH notfavorably in cast and effectiveness with ground-based systems and,esser extent, upon our view that the Soviets would seedisadvantages in deploying weapons in space. Soviet technology applicable to this field, however, will improve in the normal course of development of nuclear technology, ICBMs. and space projects.we recognize that the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to relative cost, effectiveness, and political impact. Even if they should elect to deploy space weapons, however, we believe that they would regard them primarilyeans of supplementing existing forces, of introducing additional complications into US defenseand of supporting Soviet claims to strategic parity or even superiority.' )

' Voifuller ducuulm of poesOtle Soviet cVvetopmetl and dVployment af spm wMpoat u* NIE"SovietlaMabourbit NsaVs. tadtectku* ofSoviet Capib&Oa let Suetrrtc Attack'tt-I.) aad. "Sovte AM ft Mtu.le Mere O, paOTO" (Top Secret. Ill.

DISCUSSION

I. THE SOVIET SPACE RECORD

n the seven years since Sputnik I, the Soviet space program has come to encompass four main categories ol activity:

a Unmanned, scientific erploration of near space;

and planetary probes;

space flight; and

reconnaissance.

Some of these efforts have been spectacularly successful others consistently unsuccessful The program has expanded in scope and complexity, and recently has accelerated. Of the slightly moreaunches to date, almost ooe-third took place

oviets have focused, at* least until recently,ew well defined objectives. Whileumber of spacehe program has been characterized by the repeated useimited number of proven techniques andt has made maximum use of boosters and other hardware developed for military purposes and has relied hr-viiy on military facilities for the launch, tracking, and control of space missions. Moreover, theand engineering base for the space piogram. while characterizedery high competence, appears to have been concentrated for the most part in existing Institutions. From al] these indlcalJoni. we infer that the Soviets have been attempting to carry out an ambitious programemarkable economy of means.

From the begmning. the mainstay of the program has beta thefin! generation) ICBM booster which has been used lor somepace launches. The Soviets regularly have launchedound thrust booster from Tyuratamew seconds of pre-determinod llmos, after periods of ompad preparation as shortay nr two, even for manned missions.he Soviets began toecond military booster, theftBM, to launch from Kapustin Yar small satellites into Dear-earth orbits. This very much loss expensive booster has now been used more thanimes.

Theooster is combined with an upper stage to increase its payload capacity for space mission*. The fiisl such upper stage, the Lunik, was intro- -duoed8unar probe- It has also been used in the launching of recoverable satellites weighing0 pounds, Including all six of the one-man Vostok and most of the reconnaissance vehicles. uges upper stage,

' Fee ctwoooloflvn]el eae cevera] categortn ot bowtuap ka tbe Sunt space program to date. Me Araex A.

' Foidlurmting thetypo of vehicle.lorluUouci amplovcrf tonno II,

ECCfluT

SEGflET

the Venlk, lias been usedariety of missions in (lie past four years. The SS-bVVcnik combination has been used wilh an additional stage to launch all lunar and planetary probes since the fallincehisalso has been used to launch recoverable satellites weighing0 pounds, including four reconnaissance vehicles and, most recently, the new three-man spacecraft, Voskhod. Full utilization of this combination could resultayload weight on the order0 pounds.

Unmanned Scientific SatoUites

The first Soviet scientific satellites were Sputniks I,ndaunched from Tyuratam in the periodhese were instrumented satellites weighing upounds, designed to collect astrogoophysical and biological data at altitudes up. Data collection was fairly limited and selective and there was subsequently an apparent lack of systematic and comprehensive measurement of the space environment needed for future space ventures.

ong pause in thb project, the Soviets initiated inew series of satellites from Kapustin Yar using theRBM booster. Theseidentified by the Soviets as part of the Cosmos scries, arc spin-stabilized, spacc-orieiitcd, and

"^analysis indicates that

they are not highly advanced technologically and thatthe program is limited in scope relative to comparable US projects: all have been launched on an inclinationrom the Equator; numerous failures have resultedontinuing inability to develop useful, reliable equipmentayloadounds; and orbital altitudes have been concentratedangerobably the maximum achievable with this booster payioad

our scientificI throughlaunched in pairs aboardrom Tyuratam. They appear to be similar in design and purpose to some of the Kapustin Yar Cosmos satellites. Use of theooster permitted the orbits to extend out.

A number of non-recoverable satellites launched in4 from Tyuratam andhroughdescribed in Soviet announcements as additional scientific satellites in the Cosmos series. Wc are unable to gauge die purpose or degree o! success of all the sateUites in this scries. However, the available evidence leads us to believe that several were to conducl radiopropagadon experiments and thai others were precursors ofor communications-relay systems.

In the launching of all diese satellites, the Soviets tested new aod varied orbiting techniques suitableariety of specialized space systems. In one instance, three satellitesere placed into orbitingle booster launched from Tyuratam, Similarly, two small satellites (Cosmos

S6CRM-

eir. Inunchod from Kapiitliu Yaringle booster. This tcchntqun is useful to (tatend the coverage of scientific payloads or to launch navigation, communication, or ELINT collection satellites. In another instance. Cosroosas infectedarking orbitighly elliptical orbit; this technique is adaptable to placing vehicles into syneJaonous or bin useful for conununkationi systems or possibly for an advanced FLINT collection system. Finally, Cosmosas placedigh circular orbit, which would bo suitableolaran FLINT collector,eather satellite.

I uncr and Planetary Probes

rom8 tohe Soviet space, program concentrated heavily on the moon, with an estimated nine firings. These early probes, of lessCO pounds, were launched by direct ascent using theunikThree were successful. Includinghich in9 passed behind the moon and later transmitted photographs of tho hidden side. But after two apparent failureshe USSR abandoned the direct-ascent technique,

IL lohe Sovietsew technique to launchheavier probes toward Man, Venus, or the uoon. Tbe SSC/Vcoik combination places the probe and its own propulsion stageow parking orbit around the earth, after which they coastoint where the probe can be ejected and put on the desired trajectory. Someaunchings have beenwith this technique During each opportune timehe Soviets have launched at least one and sometimesound probes toward Mars and Venus. The launching of lunar probes, weighingounds, was resumed in

ince the fallhis project of lunar and planetary probes has used an average of fouroosters per year. Tbe total ofccounts for about one-third of alloosters allocated to the space program.t least two probes wein launched to Venus, two to die moon, and one to Mars. The project, however, ha* been marked by failure since Lunik IIIf theubsequent launches, none lias been successful enough to collect any significant scientific data, or even to provide the Soviets with continuation of the payload's ability to perform its mission Our evidence indicates that the most recent planetary probe.hich was launched toward Mars onv. the planet byiles. The many persistentparticularly with the ejection stage, may handicap or modify Soviet plans for lunar and planetary exploration in the future.

Manned Spacer Flight

he Soviet manned space flight project has accomplished significantwhile proceedingautious and methodical pace. No undue risks have been taken, and no human bring has been committed until thereigh degree of confidence that all equipment would function to complete the Bight without the participation of tlie cosmonaut The Vostok spacecraft, first Hown

Will- I

as tested extensivdy before initial manned me, and probably the Voskhod a*asurements of the space radiation hazard have been made within tho unmanned craft piior to manned flights. In the case ofailure in any project using the same hardware was followed by two successful unmanned missions before the neat manned flight.aunched one week before the three-man Voskhod.ress rehearsal complete within the spacecraft.

ound Voskhod has retained many of the technical features of0 pound, one-man Vostok, Including an essentially similar life support system. Separate automatic and manual systems for spacecraft orientation were retained, as welllobe device permitting the cosmonaut to ascertain bis position and orientation without the aid of ground stations. Soviet cosmonauts have used the manual systems sparingly during flight, and de-orbiting has been accomplished by the automatic system under ground control. No out-of orbit maneuvering has taken place and no attempts at rendezvous and docking have been made. However, some preliminary experience of value to those ends was obtained in the two dual Vostok mbsioni2

In the seven manned flights thus far (including one of fivean hours have been amassed. The Soviet project hat emphasized biomedical experimentation, and these flights have given rise to serious Soviet concern about tbe possible effects of space flight of several weeks or more on human bcings-The inclusionoctor aboard Voskhod was an effort to acquire first-hand medical data.

Strategic Keconnoissonce

V Soviets began toew series ofrecoverable earth satellites from Tyuratam. They described these asthe scientific Cosmosesignation which they have appliedariety of purposes. Tlie rate of launchings has incrcasodin the firs! year of the project to eight In the second andn thethehich have achieved orbit, all bnt one were successfullytheke the lunar and planetary program, this project hasone-third of theoosters allocated to space.

"Tmost if not all of these recoverable vehicles havehoto-reconnaissance mnsionlear from tbe pattern of launch times that the Soviets desire the perigee of these satellitesm) to occur over North America during prime daylight hours. This is probably dictated by photographic rctruirenionts, but we cannot exclude the possibility that other data, such as Comint, Elint, and infra-red, are also being collected.

he majority ol these satellites weigh0 pounds and have conducted strategic reconnaissance missions over land targets. The bestfrom these satellites would probably be adequate to detect and Identify most military installations, aiictaft and major naval vessels, industrial Installa-

Hons, ami lines of communication. Beginning with Cosmosnowever, four hive weighed0 pounds and appear to perform aresolution mission The beat photography horn these satellites may be comparable to good World Warerial photography, which would be adequate for detailed analysis of targets located by the system of lesseror by other means.

We do not know what success the Soviets have actually achieved with photo roconnaissaoce satellites. Whatever the degree of success, tlie project clearlyigh priority. The paca of bundling* and the liming of4 suggest that the system is considered operational and is performing routine missions satisfactorily.

We have no direct information on why the Soviets arc conducting tills extensivesance project or what their objectives are. P

^the Soviet program probably was undertaken to accomplish the following;

a to target as precisely as possible US nuclear strike forces, especially ICBM silos, to monitor Iheir operalional status, and lo detect new deployments;1

b. to map areas of military interest, especially in the area from Turkey cast through Afghanistan;

c to monitor the development and test of new military systems, oot only in tho US but probably also in Communist China, and

d. to monitor large-scale military and naval activity.

Satellite pboto-recoonaistance probably also provides the Soviets wilh several other types ot information, including an evaluation of the US potential for satellite reconnaissance. In any case. Iheir satellites give theollection mechanism which is subject to their own control and quicklyast area of tho world.

Costs

direct Information is available on tbe USSR's actual expendituresspace program. Our calculations derive from indirect data, primarilyand our cost figures reflect tlie costs of tho Soviet program aswore incurred in the US. These figures do not Include lhe costs offacilities and developing hardware used in the space program butprimarily for military purposes.

estimate that throughhe Soviets had spent6 billion for those space projects which resulted in launchingscan be identified. (About onc-lbird of this total was probably expended

We eurreattvtkat (be Sonet geodetic errorlocettoo of OS made bunchm the woceen We believe lhal. hv rang altme.ni.ce latallilftt. the USSR will be able to t'duc* tho geodetic error toeet by ibe end ol ibe decade.

on lhe lunar and planclary probe project, while lhe strategic reconnaissance project has absorbed aboutdditional expenditures for programs that are underway but not yet identified by means of launchings may be on the order of4 billion. Thus, we estimate that total Soviet outlays for space through4 lieangeillion. We believe that annual expenditures have steadily increased over the past seven years, and recent indications of increased activity Indicate that they will continue to grow as the result of new projects evidently programed for the next several years.

II. FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE PROSPECTS

major space missions to be undertaken in this decade willmade during the last several years. These decisions werea time when the economic constraints normally operative on Sovietbeen accentuated, consumer and defense industries have given riseincreased demands for scarce, high-quality resources, andstrategic weapons programs are underway. Even so, all recentthat the Soviets have decided to enlarge and diversify theA number of techniques not previously attempted by therecently been usetj in the orbiting of earth satellites. Morehave evidence that new. more powerful boosters will become availablelaunchings. However, evidence of the nature of new space projectslate in the development cycle; thus we can not yet determine whathave been planned for the new boosters.

Booster Capabilities and Costs

payload capacity of thes substantial enough to permit aof significant new missions in near space. Thesearietysupport missions, manned and unmanned rendezvous and dockingand the creationmall space station. With thisit would also be marginally possible toannedThe payload limitations evident in the Kapustin Yar Cosmosuses theooster, probably can be overcome. Other currentlymilitary boosters also could be adapted lo space missions.

We believe lhat the Soviets soon will begin Bightonsiderably larger booster which could be usedglobalarrier forT warhead, orpace booster. This booster, which we associate with the SS-largc ICDM, mayhrust on the orderillion pounds, roughly equivalent to that of the US Saturnooster probably will be available for unmanned space launchingst could be available for manned launchings as earlyut wcore likely dote. This new systemuitable upper stage probably will be able to place payloads of as much0 pounds into low earth orbit. Along with appropriate manned spacecraft, it could be used to create andarger spacemore efficiently than thend would offer more realistic prospectsanned circumlunar flight. The costs of these projects, if purchased in the

10

US, would bo6 billion, not Including ihe cost ol development of the booster.

e estimate that the Soviets also have underery large boosterhrust on the order of five million pounds. Wc believe it unlikely that this vehicle will bo Sight-testedut it is possible thatest could occur in the latter halfhus,ooster could be ready for initial manned missions as earlyut we think it more likely thai they wouldear or so later.arge booster would be unlikely for ICBM application; in this case, the cost of itserhaps on the order5 billion, would be chargeable lo the space program.

hould this new booster prove tohrust of some five million pounds, it probably would be able to place payloads weighing on the orderounds into low earth orbit. This would be adequate forarge manned space station. Considering tbe variety of techniques open lo the Soviets foranned lunar landing,ew booster also could be used for this mission.

Scientific and Technical Considerations"

We believe that Soviet capabilities in the basic and applied sciences will be adequate throughout the period of this estimate to support an ambitious space program. Difficulties in the program are more likely to arise fromthan from scientific limitations. While current Soviet space technology can be extended with comparative ease to meet tbe requirements for atmall manned space station, requirements considerably more complex andmust be met in such missionsanned circumlunar flightanned lunar landing and return.

The Soviets probably now have sufficient biomedical data to plan withanned flight of one to two weeks; this would be more thanforircumlunar or lunar landing mission. From all indications, however, they appear to be more concerned at this time with the eHocts on human beings of considerably longer missions, such as manned vehicles in earth orbit forays or so. There arc few indications of how the Soviets will solve the biomedical problems now believed lo be associated with missions of such duration, but we see no reason why practical solutions should not be ready in time for projects late In the decade.

Soviet engineers may already be working on other problems of manned lunar flight, such as parabolic re-entry into the earth's atmosphere and aero-dynamically-maneuverable spacecraft, but we have no evidence lhat this is the case. Some limited success is evident in solving other problems related to this mission, such as light-weight power supplies, spacesults, and space-rcstartable motors, but much work apparently remains to beomparison of Vostok and Voskhod indicates thai Ihe Voskhod life-support system Is similar to Ihe earlier system. It will require modification for inclusionpacecraft which

* Fordetailed dlictmSoo of thli topic, see Annei C.

EEC.U1

could meet (lie rigid weight restriction* which would he imposed by the manned lunar landing mission.

he USSR's lack of sites outside Soviet territory lur tracking and data acquisition has imposed limitations on several of its space projects, particularly the bunching of lunar probes. At present, the principal facilities for tracking and communications in lunar and planetary operations are located in the Crimea. The Soviets probably will not undertake manned lunar flights until they can establish the additional sites necessary to maintain continuous contact. To achieveapability, they would need to establish two additional major sites, which ideally should bo spacedegrees apart, and located near the equator. One ol those new sites could be located in the Soviet Far East; this would improve iholr capabilitiesoint which Ihey might consider sufficient toanned lunar mission.

Other Indirect evidence of future Prospects

n sum. the Soviet space program appears to betate of transition. While we can estimate technically feasible extension of all current projects, we believe that the Soviets do not have in hand Ihe necessary economic andresources for undertaking all such projects simultaneously. Wc therefore believe that some potential projects will not be undertaken, others will be slowly paced, and substantial resources will be committed toew. The expansion of the reconnaissance project over the past year shows lhat projects ofstralegic value can and will be funded. Moreover, other useful missions can still be accomplished with existing boosters and hardware. Beyond these activities, Ihe Soviet leaders will have weighed the costs of various projects which could be accomplished with the advanced boosters under deveJopmeot and the other hardware likely to be within the capabilities of their scientists and engineers. They probablyanned lunar landing as the mostspace venture that could be undertaken In the next five to ten years.

Soviet statements relating lo tbe manned lunar mission can be traced backhen President Kennedy challenged the USSRpace race with this as tbe specific goal. In considering how to respond to the US challenge, the Soviets would have had to assess carefully die benefits fromroject against those to be derived from otherspace, andthe same resources. Equally important would be the Soviet leaders' view of their ability to compete successfully and their assessment of tlie coasequenccs for Soviet prestige should disaster resultroject wliose liming was dictated by the US.

Some ambivalence in public statements by Soviet leaders suggests that tbey may be trying to keep tbeu options open, but during the past year or so tbey have shown increasing caution, implying that the USSR has not in factunar race. Thus, Khrushchev voiced both deep concern alwut the technical difficulties of such an undertakingillUignesi lo profit bom US experience and possible US failuies. Mo and others expressed concern over the high cost ofanned lunar landing. His remarks in the past year clearly

fatten

were intended to convey the impression that the USSR was not competing with

the US in any race to the moon and to lay the foundation in the minds of the Soviel people tliat the US might be first. The new Soviet leaders have made

public statementsimilar vein. After the flight of Voskhod, Brezhnev slated: "We Soviel people do not regard our space research as an end in itself,ind

ofhe spirit of frantic gamblers is alien tot the Kremlin reception for the Voskhod cosmonauts, Kosygin pointed out that the economic needs of earthly projects must not be forgotten In the rush into space,

For politics] reasons, however, the Soviets could ill afford to slacken in the space race and from all Indications they have no intention of doing so. The USSR's space program hasey element in Soviet world prestige. Space remains the major area in which the Soviets can stillredible claim to world primacy. We expect that tho Soviet space program willange of undertakings which in their overall impact will be strongly competitive with the US program during the next five to ten years. The world reaction to the flight of Voskhod (the first "manned spaceas againto the Soviet leaders the value of scoring spacehe Soviet desire totrong national image, in conjunction with the other considerations wc have mentioned, makes it likely that they will continue to endeavor to focus the space race on goals for which they can most favorably compete

Available evidence does not of itself indicate whether or not the Soviets now have programs for the military use of space, apart from the military support capability provided by the Cosmos satellites. The limitations of tliis evidence, however, are such that our chances of identifying military programs are poor. Soviet decisions to develop military space systems will depend on their expected cost and effectiveness as compared with alternative systems, the political and military advantages and risks which could he esmected, and the Soviet estimate of US intentions and capabilities in comparable fields. We believe that the USSR will produce and deploy those military space systems which it finds to be feasible and advantageous in comparison with other types of weapons and military equipment

III. OUTLOOK FOR THE PROGRAM Introduction

USSR's Chief Designer of Spacecraft, in an interviewpoke about likely space missions for theto five years. Commenting on "near space" (La, short of the moon),Soviet objectives:

satellites, with special emphasis on the study of radiation;

satellites;

satellites for radio and TV relay;

vehicles for transport of mall and later of passengers;

orbital space stations, to serve as bases for servicing systemssatellites for scientific research.

Aste it Mod that research in (he immediate vicinity of the moon and on its surface could be accomplished only with the aid of small, automatic vehicles in this time period.

learly, the foregoing represents at most lhe unckiiified portion of the Soviet space program. The strategic reconnaissance project, for example, is Dot mentioned. Aside from classified reconnaissance and other possible military support projects, however, the Sovietonsistent with what we know of the USSR's activities and capabilities, and it gives some guidance cooccnung Soviet expectations over Ihe neat several years.

n estimate of Soviel goals for the nextears, however, must be based on additional evidence. The pattern of Soviet technological Becomplisbments to date, as well as Soviet statements on the subject, lead as to believe that their present priority efforts Involve an ambitious project for unmanned lunar and planetary explorations,roject to establish manned, earth-orbiting stations with increasingly longer and more complex missions. In addition. Khrushchev, despite his open pessimism as to the near-term feasibilityanned lunar landing, stated as recently as4 that tbe USSR did in fact haveroject, and we believe that work to accomplish tins mission is underway.military space projects probably will also be undertaken.

consider It unlikely that the Soviets will seek loargeand toanned lunar landing concurrently. We estimatefirst of these projects would cost on the order6 billion, includingof booster development. The costanned lunar landing project,the cost of booster development, might be on tho orderhrough the first landing and recovery, for several years preceding thispeak expenditures would probably run5 billion per year.the two projects wouldumber of common developments,cost of attempting both would be less than the sum of these But it would be considerably more than the cost of either single project

Probable Timing'

estimate of tho dates by which major goals might be achieved isat best, since our sources of space intcUigenoe provide definitea new project only late in Ihc development cycle, usually not untilreach the flight test stage. In our estimates ol timing,consider official statements and other indications of Soviet priorities,in the program to date, the current Soviet slateof-the-art, and tbeto undertake projects of more demanding sopluiiicatioti. Inlikely dates for specific missions, wc haveigh but notof successharing of priorities among several categories ofgeneral, the likely date for any given mission wouldear or so laterwe consider to bo the earliest practicable dale. We note that delays and

'raphic summary of tkli aubject, tee Tables on luge* JJ-ftV.

failures have occurred and have sometimes plagued the Soviets for long periods. Such difficulties can recur at anyupon tlie introduction ofbased on new and more complexcouldYpccific missionear or two.

Unmanned [xploraiion of Near Space

Soviet scientists haveide range of scientific problems to be studied by means of satellites and space probes during the International Year of tl* Quiet Sun4S* Soviet plans for the IQSY include rockets and satellites for observing solar electromagnetic radiation, corpuscular streams, cosnMc rays and radiation belts, magnetic fields, and the upperMany of these objectives may be carried out by the small Kapustin Yar Cosmos satellites. Other IQSY objectives suggest that additional Elektjonwill be launched from Tyuratam. In connection with the Soviet Cloud Year, which runs concurrently with the IQSY, the USSR is also likely to launch satellites to aid cloud research.

the US-USSR bilateral agreement on scientific cooperation2 and since amended, the Soviets have agreed to exchangedata and cloud pictures from satellites beginning earlyagreement called for the exchange of data to commence inoviet hedging on this agreement and the absence to date ofSoviet meteorological satellite suggest that tbe Soviet projectdifficulties. Nevertheless, we beheve that Sovietwill be operational within the next few months.

Lunar ond Interplanetary Probes

Soviet statements and recent attempts to launch Instrumented lunar and planetary probesontinuing interest in deep space exploration. As part of the IQSY, the Soviets have also announced plans to monitor interplanetary magnetic fields both by piobes and satellites.

We behove the Soviets will launch probes to Mars and to Venus when periods of opportunity next occur, for Venus, the (allud for Mars.robes to Venus probably will investigate the planet's atmosphere and may attempt to penetrate it Soviet probes to Man arc likely to attempt high-resolution photography, spectre-graphic analysis of the planet's atmosphere and surface, and investigation of magnetic fields and any radiation belts.

The Soviets almost certainly will hunch additional unmanned lunar probes within the coming year. The precise tiroes chosen for the launch of five such probes since3 suggest one of two objectives either tounar orbiting vehicle for lunar mapping or to obtain data on the

'Solarin th* form of *otu flam and suiupotiai cyclic in nature.4cll.lty will be at use bottom olyear cycle. By tho. solar activity wll! rise to minimum leveli. dealing increased cosmic ray and other radiation hauidl for man

III 1JI.IV

16

properties of (lie lunar surface by meansoil landing. Tlir precise coudi-(ions requiredepeat these missions were passed up In4 andut will recurew days in February and March and again late in the year.

hroughout the decade, we expect the Soviets lo continue to launch lunar and planctaiy probes. Despite tlie poor record to date, the Soviets will come to achieve some success. More sophisticated missions probably will beas new and more powerful launch systems become available.

Manned Space Flight

e ice no indication thatSoviet space technologists arc likely tofrom the orderly, evolutionary development which has characterized thcir manned space project thus for. The evident Soviot concern with the biomedical problems of prolonged flight probably will have considerable Influence on manned flights scheduled for the near future. The Soviets will probablyshortdays orconcentrate on engineering advances and somewhat longer flights designed to explore further the effects ofand solar radiation and to evaluate potential countcrmcasurni.

Rendezvous and Docking. Soviet statements for several yean hovean Intent to rendezvous and dock two or more vehicles in earth or bit. Docking experiments involving manned vehicles probably will await further flight testing of the new Voskhod space craft and of necessary propulsion and control systems. According lo reliable Soviel sources, the Voskl>od possesses no capability for out-of-orbit maneuvering. The only Soviet vehicle which hasaneuver capability to date has been the unmanned 1'olyoL In3 andhe Soviets placed two ofouod vehicles in orbit, each as the sole payload aboard anooster. Theseincorporated restartablc engines, and Polyot II successfullyodest, one-degree change of its orbital plane some hours after launch.

If the Voskhod is suitable for docking tho first manned rendezvous and docking operation could occiue do not know, however, whether this is the case, and wholly new manned spacecraft may be required forand docking. If so, Ihe mission wood be unlikelynmanned flight testsew spacecraft would require about oue year, and we have no evidence suggesting that any have begun.

anned Space Sttiion. The Soviets have expressed much interest in space stations duiing the past few years and arc doing considerable research in long-duration life support systems. We believe that one of their goals is lotation tn operation within the next several years. The Soviet press has carried numerous articles describing the advantages of earth orbiting space stations for future progress in space exploration and linking the dual Vostok, Polyot, and Voskhod missions with this goal. Dockinganned spacecrafttation moduleapability for extended life supportractical and economical approach for tho USSR.

bLGflLI

An catty spaceion cons ii ting of two vehicles would probably weigh on the order0 pounds,rew of two or three persons, and have an orbital lifetimeew weeks. If the requisite rendezvous and docking operation is demonstrated successfully earlymall space station utilizing the Vent ok/ Voskhod technology and currently available boosters could be assembled in orbithe mission could be accomplishedholly new spacecraft design about one year after successful rendezvous and docking. We do not believe multiple rendezvous and docking operations for purposes of resupply would be attempted with such an early station.

Establishmentarger manned space station could be accomplished by multiple rendezvous operations using existing booiteis. However, we think il more likely that tho Soviets wouldarger booster, which we estimale could become available for manned operations as earlyll things considered, we think it probableear or two after the initial manned flight with this booster (the SS-Large) tbe Soviets will use it and appropriate space hardware toarge manned space station in earth orbiLtation might weigh as muchounds,ingle rendezvous and assembly intation of this sizeotational aew of five to ten persons could be maintained for extended periods with repeated rendezvous and docking operations for purposes of re-supply.

Manned Circumfunar Flight. There are no specific Indies boos of Soviet intent to carryanned circumlunar project, bul its relative simplicityto the manned landing mission, as well as its propaganda valueajoread us to consider it (along with earth-orbiting space statious)rime Soviet goal. If tlte USSR is not seeking to beat Ihe USanned lunarthis project probably will be timed to precede tbe Apollo mission in an attempt to detract horn the US achievement and to identify the USSR with manned exploration on tho moon.

Chief prerequisites for the manned circumlunar mission are very precise guidance systemsechnique for re-entry into the earths atmosphere al parabolic, on lhe order0 ft/sec. Recovery problems would be greatly simplified if the Soviets were to develop systems for recovery of the spacecraft at sea, but this is not absolutely essential. There are two basicby which thu Soviels could carry out the manned circumlunar mission. The first would call for rendezvous and docking in earth orbit before embarking on the lunar trajectory. The second would involveufficiently large vehicle so that rendezvous and docking would not be required. Total flight time in either case would be about one week.

he manned cOcumluuar mission could be accomplished as earlyumber of substantial technological problems, indicating those we have cited above, would have to be solved in the next two years. By resorting to rendezvous and docking the Soviets theoretically could accomplish the manned circumlunar mission with the SS-tS booster. For example, wilh as few as three launches and two rendezvous and dockings. Ihey might assemble in earth orbil

SEC BEE-

a vehicle adequate lor lhe mission. We believe tho Soviets will have acquired sufficient experience to permit them to solve the rendezvous and ducking aspect of the problem in time for an attempt, but wc consider this approach unlikely.

We estimate tliat the SS-Large booster, which will probably be available in the same period, will be adequate to accomplish this mission without docking. The Soviets are more likely to select this alternative, primarily because it avoids the risks inherent in the multiple rendezvous and docking operations. With the SST-arge booster, the Soviets could accomplish the manned circumlunar mission as earlyutumber of reasons we consider it unlikely to occur8 or later.

It is possible that the Soviets will seek to reduce the competition for funds and technological resources by phasing their manned projectseriod of several years. Stretch out could also occur for technical reasons, especially if the project is planned to ^corporate advanced hardware requiredubsequent manned lunar landing project. Finally, deliberate delay could occur if the Soviets perceived lags in tlie US Apollo project aod wished to time theirattempt to precede it.

Manned Lunar landing. It seems certain that tbe Soviets intend toan on the moon sometime in the future, but there are at present no specific indications of any such project aimed,ntended to bewith the US Apollo project.D effortanned lunar landing is almost certainly in progress and we note that considerable preparatory work could have been going on without as yet providing firm indications of ils nature. Although many of the critical prerequisitesanned lunar landing have not been observed in Soviet space operations, we would not necessarily see them this early.

Wc have estimatedery large booster (about five million poundsould become available for manned space Bightc doubt that tbe thrust of this booster would be sufficientanned lunar landing mission without earth-orbit rendezvous Or the USof lunar-orbit rendezvous. If the earth-orbit rendezvous technique were used, some one to three rendezvous probably would be required, depending on the actual thrust of the booster and Soviet success in reducing the weights of structures and components below present levels.oviet attemptanned lunar landingeriod competitive with the present US Apollo schedule cannot be roled out

To compete in this fashion, however, the Soviets would have had lo make an initial decision to this effect several years ago and to haveigh priority for the project in the ensuing period. This would have required them tourdensome and rapid extension of their space technology and to reconcile the heavy demands of this project wilh those of other important space ventures and military programs, all with no clear assurance that they would triumph. The appearance and non-appearance of various technical dc-

10

siicni:T.

vclopmenls, economic considerations, leadership statements, and continuedto other major space missions all lead us to the conclusionanned lunar landing ahead of the present Apollo schedule probably isoviet objective.

ery high degree of success in all phases of the project, the first Soviet attemptanned lunar landing might occur at earlyn view of the magnitude of the technological problems and the level of resources which the Soviets are likely to commit to this project, weore probable date for such an attempt toew years later.

If the Soviets choose to direct their space station effort) toward even more extensive manned exploration of space, they may develop very large quasi-permanent stations for the assembly and bunching of spacecraft from Dear-earth orbitumber of Soviet statements suggest that they view this as an attractive approach lo subsequent manned Sight into deepuitably large space station proliably could be created in they making use of the same very large booster we have discussed above. Ifanned lunar landing mission launchedpace station could occur In the.

Possible Soviel Milifory Uses of Space

Throughout the period of the estimate, new militaiy space applications will be introduced as Soviet technology advances and as requirements for such systems are developed. Wc believe that ihey will experimentariety of space systems which could be used for military purposes, that they will employ those systems which can be economically and militarily Justified, and that some military role for man in space may emerge by the end of the period, particularly as tlie ability to operate manned space stations grows.

Military Support Si/rremr. The launching of recoverablesatellites from Tyuratam probably will continue, and this project may come to Involve missions of longer duralion as well as variousltitude andhere is also some evidencehoto-video reconnaissance system was under investigationeveral Tyuratam Cosmos satellites were orbitedholo-vjdon system. I

^ This

project has been inactive for several years, but Soviet military authors have written thaiystem is needed and it may be resumed.

high priority evident in the recoverable photo-reennnsissancewill probably be applied to other selected military support systemsSoviet leaders decide are essential. Considering the capabilities ofami other available indicators, we think that tho systems mostbecome operational in the next few years will lie for these purposes:and TV relay, weather forecasting, geodesy, and navigation.vehicles Incorporating combinations ol these missions are possible,may be that both Soviet military and nonmilitary interests in such satellites

19

ErxruT

can be accomplishedingtenancuverablc satellite forand photo reconnaissance may also be developed (using Polyolto meet military needs In tho next few years. Penetration aid satellites with electronic payloads probably could not lie operational until late in the decade because of power requirements, although feasibility demonstrations using existing hardware could occur at any time.

ffensive Weapons Systems* Although the USSR almost certainly isthe feasibility of space systems for use as offensive weapons, we have no evidence that tlie Soviet leadership seriouslyrogram to establish an orbital bombardment capability. For the foreseeable future, we think that orbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBMs In terms of eflecQvenesj. reaction time, targeting flexibility, vulnerability, average Ufe. and positive control. In view of these considerations, the much greater cost of orbital weapon systems, and Soviet endorsement of the UN resolution against nuclear weapons in space, wo believe that the Soviets are unlikely lo develop and deploy an orbital weapon system within the next 6ve to ten years.

ven without any special eflortj. however, Soviet technology applicable to this field will improve in the normal course of continued development of nuclear technology, ICBMs, and space projects. We reccgnize thai the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to cost and effectiveness, and lhat altered political considerations in some future phase of East-West relations might lead themifferent decision. Even In these circumitances. we believe that ihey would regard space weapons primarily as means of supplementing existing forces, of introducing additional complications into US defense planning, and of supporting Soviet claims to stralegic parity or even superiority.

OH. Defensive Weapons Systems. Undoubtedly, the Soviets have givento space systems for use againsts their general space technology increases, Ihey may elect lo startnroject. Booster and hardware costs would be high, and tho advantage*round-based system would be questionable. Should they elect to do so, tbey probably couldheaunch and rendezvous techniqueonmaneuvering satellite for unmanned inspectlbo. Tbe use of nuclear warheads for destruction would be subject lo tbe same restrictions cited in (he case of oQcnifve space systems- We do not expect, however, that during tbe period of the estimate any Soviet manned or unmanned vehicles already in orbit will have tbe capability to maneuver and rendezvousS vehicle for purposes of examination and neutralization because of the great costs and technicalinherent iniojcct

Forfuller ducu.Mon of pOMfblr Sovteldeploy-men! cd offensive apaco weapons, teeSoviet Capalnlluex and trtmUDu to Orbit Nuclear Weaponi" (Seem.od peroneal Mcttooi of8 Ot, -Soviet CapabOiUM for Strategic Attack" (Top Secret Limited.

"For Soviet capabilities to ccuntec enemy (aleliltea from (rouod-baied facilities, tee, "Soviet Air and Missile IMerue Cpabdiue. Tbrougb Mid-WTO" (Top Secret.

20

-fifXIMTT

TABLE 2

ESTIMATED TIMINC OP SOVIET UNMANNED SPACE PROJECTS

Mmmm [ Milncy Support Prefect* *

fcoto ITT Com)

L Norv-MwwWe

2(owed on Tolyot)

Becoiuuuiioco-COMINT. EM NT

Inftifed"

*

Communication! aod

Qvtcl-Rrapanie So-wOlaoce <

Peoetratlc*Pa yload Only

pera Banal

I.

l-ite In decade

( I'tc.lfi

oanoiLaodug

UL Interplanetary Probe* '

Man 7

February-March

October5

uary

IV. Aii'cfmiophatical

Neir-Spaec

" ContidertnB, ciuienl Snvtel oibllal-payload capabilities,ehicle! UKorpcaBcg combenaboni of these aiaaiona are pomiM"

- We came* radude the ponOAty thai urk eiVeCiomagnerk nconaafeaacealready bemg.aboard tbe IT Ccooiw photo irconnainance ut'Ui'ei

'Thedate forroeteoicfcglca)aaed on ihe US-USSR apecment to begin exchange ol data

J Tbe prefect apparently ii now toaebve.

' Sincebe USSR tat bunched atnd ta man,rabea dtutog cadi opportune launch period.an probe launched onill reach the vicinity ol lhe planet in Anput

ccrfirr--

ANNEX A

CHRONOIOGICAL SUMMARIES OF SOVIET SPACE

TABUoviet Uuochuig* of Non-Hecovarable Garth Satellite* TABLEoviel UunchinRi of Lunar and Planetary Probes TABLEoviel MannedrVojects TABLEoviet Launchings of Photo-reconnaissance Satellites

CLC.ir.T-

SSiClit-T

ToNc I

UKCIIINCSOFATP.LUTIIvS

trainik 2

Sputnik .1

<osmos 2

* Octov VI

KY KY KY KY

15

27

21

IC

6

3

Apr A2

S

May 62

fi

62

fi

Aug. 62

11

Oa 62

mo* 14

Apr 63

17

May 63

10

Aue 63

-

Oct 63

1

Ho* C3

21

Nov 63

23

Dec 63

Jan 64

Feb 64

25

Feb 61

2*3

Mir 64

2

Apr 04

-h

Jun 64

31

Juu 64

al mid c4 Mute.

WBrl<T*rtificial satellite Aolrag-ophysieal payloxl plus

perinienuiion on bjolckmcliy. tesiiug

life Mippnri system, nnimnl lolcroaee lo

fliperie ration, do. IliolOEient nsuofloophrsicBl psvload for

LG.V. launch fnilure.il urn Firsl scccuful launch. Ionospheric beacon; early failure of

system

Mnssuremcoi ol aofi eleelratu; partial

Repeat ofrilh hiftlwr apogee. Cosmic ray measurement; generally suc-cimful.

Uoknonn inApparent aralcm failure McAsiireinvnt of artificial radiation boll.

system failure. I'osnibly lo measure mierOuieioorilco;

system failure. Measurement of artificial mdiation belt KCiiCrally sueecssfulf

T (Repeal of. Connie ray measurements; geoorslly (ttcppjl ofaunch fail me. Stage intended to maneuver. Mission uoddeimined. Micrecuetterite measurement; possibly

successful. (Repeat of. Multi-jMipoac asuofieophysicftl payloads. wild emphasis on artificial and solar rndialioo; Apogees of1 and. Mission iindetertr.iucd; failed to achieve orbit.

Ccornic ray measurements; generally sue-

ecssiul. (Repeal ofndoomaeTielie field daU; parlul success. Accomplished smoll maneuvers which

chunked orbital inclination by about

Cue degree. Mission undc-lcrmined; failed lo achieve

orbil

Possible mieromcteorite measurement;system failure.

osmos 36

Con ni on 41

0

KY

uu

CosmosAug 6*

uk

ct

Dec G4

KY

KY

Cosmta 44

Cosmosiumos 51

rt

l olndosmic ray mcaaureincnti, generally (Repeat of Cosmo*od

First Soviet Oiple pnyloid, ipaced in

*.ne> erbil

IXscummd para.uooeleriWaeel. electedfc-

orbiliaSI? ctfaptmj orb* First doable nayt.ii i launched from

Kapwtie Yar. spaced in slack orbit.

(See ara.Planed into ciieassr eriMt, solar panel

supply: spin otab; hied xu.it.lc

ie Ccomaenetle Held data; generally sue

ccslfut (Itepeat of. MicromclMrllO mr.istii until, generally

sucrssful. rnd

In addition to lhe launching* noted on Llus failure io this scries, in.

k Undesignated; not announced by the Soviets

24

r.rcfin

Tum 2

rovikt launchings of lunah and planetary plloues

Note: All launching* have Loco from Tyuratum

(LBS)

4an

Mood

ut

59

Moon -Moon

*

I.OOO

Apr

Oct

Begin dip* c

4

Oei

Fab

Feb

Aui

Sep

Sep

Oct

Nov

Nov 02

Jan

3pr

63

Moon Mood

Mar7 Marpr 64

VeaBs Veoui

Mir uiM'

announced success, cinn muni call on (adore dining the interase. Unsuccessful; tumbling 4tb aUgii producing no

useful thrust. Unsuccessful;tage producing no

useful IhrssL Uutsnceatf ol. possbU partial attitude atabuisalioo

failure4to stage producing as useful; HaBl h

slag*

Soviel* announce Mara II

JeommunJcaUon failure with

tbe probe Innautcenfful^

Aobieved parking orbit^lh stage saaUi.

Venik at-ge failed; parking orbit not achieved

IV. Passediles of mors alter oMd-ewart* correction

Vrask stage failed; perking erbtt not achieved.

Announced as Cosmosfter 4th atag* failed.

. Inrtis! trajectory -ooid have caused probe loile* of Venus. Soviets announcedinld-course conectioasprilnd; mass-distance increased and contact apparently lost before posting Veuus.

25

" I

of Parkioc-Orbli

pr 61 up- fined; perking-v-*l

ov 64 Zendaver encounteredir.day

of flight. Will vrire In the ofthe early put ofare that it will inioa theoilc*.

- All direct-ucoiil launches used6 booster sod the Lunik upper sU<o. In addition to the launch attempts rioted in this series,believe that there were three Uuoch failures, two in (he fallA and one In

eetlmnted Other peylosds were sonounced by the Soviel sod substantiated by other evidence.

All these Uurvchna have used theooster end Venlk upper stag* to place lulo earthlbr of the payload and its propuhitm suae This stag* (known na Ih* 4th or ejection ite^r) is used to eject the payload from earth orbit and to place ita Uajrrtoty toward* its Urges.

unknown. Believed to be lie same aso. snoouroed by tbt Soviet. Ik the Vcous abot of II

eflCT

6PCIKT

Table 3

SOVIET MANNED SPACEFLIGHT PROJECTS

ia tbe Soviet program, we hare do evidence supporting the fi

ulug

M

60

ug 60

DasiONAiiou

(UnannouucSputnik 5)

Korabl' 3

Dec

Dee 60

6)

nerd)

Deo

4

Mot

May 61

9)

9

Mar

Mer 61

10)

1

Apr

Apr GI

2

Aug

Aug 61

3

Aug

Aug 62

4

Aug

Aug 62

5

Juo

Jun 63

6

Jun

63

47

Oct

Oct 64

I

Oct

Oct

ma

bs. First koown Soviel use of the expression "Coomio Spacectio-rockel failure; decayed

Failure o(ooster.

0 lbs. Contained two dogs and other biological specimens. First successful recovery of Vostok-tike spacecraft. Comprehensive blotcttjnieuy experimentation; in-flight television monitoring of dog; effects of acceleration, weightlessness, radiation on animals, plants, organisms Includingmierobiologlea) andtudies.

8 lbs. Si miner to. Darned up ou rc-eotry. Two dogs.

Failure ofooster. Two dogs.

0 lbs. Conleincd one dog. Continuation of man-rating of Vootok.

9 lbs. Contained one dog. Continuation of msn-ratlng of Vostok.

5 lbs. Gagarin; first manned orbital space flight.

8 lbs. Titov; first one-day mission; demonstrated human ability to eal, sleep, and work under conditions of apace flight; vestibularsuffered by cosmonaut.

2 lbs. Nikolaycv; along with Vostokie first test of two subjects under generally sionditions of space flight.

5 lbs. Popovich.

0 lbs. Bykovskiy; further evsluation of human reactions lo extended space flight, especially caidiovasular deeonditioning.

0 lbs. Teresbkovs; along withirst test of male and female subjects under generally similar conditions, Aral flighton-pilot.

Voskhod with dummies. Computed payload same as Voskhod.

0 lbs. Col. V. M. Romarov.. Yegerov, and Eng. K. Feoktistov; Orel flight without cpaccsults; first flighl with direct in-flight observations, including sampling of body fluids.

launchings have employed theooster. Vostok-relatedmployed the Lunik upper stage. The Polyot* were launched as the solo payload aboard SS-6's. Voskhod-related flights, beginning with Cosmosnave employed tbe Veoik upper stage. Payload weights are those announced by Soviets, nod substantiated by other evidence.

days prior to the launch of Voskhod, Cosmosrovided final flight qualification of the new spacecraft. This constituted the only full flight test of the Voskhod carrying alt of lU associated subsystems. Four other Cosmos, in addition to performing their primaty reconnaissanceerved to man-rate the Venikstage and possibly provided testing of Ventk,'Va-khod competebility and of Vwkhod structural integrity.

27

1

Table 4

SOVIET LAUNCHINGS OF PHOTO-RECONNAISSAKCE SATELLITES'

Pabahbtbho

Date

ik Obsct

Dec 61

not achieve orbil)

4

Apr 82

day*

7

Jul 62

9

Sep 62

days

10

Ocl 62

days

12

Dee 62

days

13

Mer 63

days

IS

Apr 63

*

days

16

Apr 63

days

18

May 63

days

20

Oct 63

days

65*

22

Nov 63

days

Nov 63

not achieve orbil)

24

Dec 63

days

28

Apr 64

29

Apr 64

days

30

Mar 64

days

32

64

days

33

Juu 64

days

34

Jul 6*

days

35

Jul 64

days

37

Aug 64

days

45

Sep 64

days

46

Sep 64

days

48

Oct 64

days

50

Oct 64

attempt oo

52

day (ailed

Jen 65

days

All launching! hove been Irom Trurauun sod all successful recoveries have been made oo laod in the USSR, ft is clear from the pattern ol launch times that tbe Soviets desire the perigees of these satellites to occur over North America during prime daylight hours Tms point* to photographicoos. but we cannot exclude th8 posaibiKly that other electromagnetic daU such ss Coraint, Eliot, and infra-red. are alto being oolleeted.

The satellites which have operated lo what we designate aseigh0nd appear to beeneral sesreh and surveillance mistioa.atellites weigh0nd appear to be performingmission. (Set discussion)

ANNEX B

PRINCIPAL TYPES OF VEHICLES AND TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED IN SOVIET SPACE

amily of Soviet Space Vehicles

ovid Planetary Probe OperationSoviel Lunar Probe Operation

2

Figurearth Trace ol Coverage of US by Soviet rhoto-rocoiinausanceLaunched onegree Inclination

SECRET

STAGES

aslaingf

Lunik Stage Vend* Sage

<th

KY Boosln (SW)

KY SPWd Sage Colyol Stage

GROSSWOICHI lib.)

K)

SI,Ml)

(lb.)

ii.tco

O3

IN0 I1

VojAJiod or TT CdkmiJ

(liOOO- tyOOOffa)

FAMILY OF SOVIET SPACE VEHICLES

ANNEX C

Soviat. Scientific andabililici for Space Flight

New Propulsion Systems

Guidance

Tracking and CommunKaiJani Systems

FIGUREoviet Deep Space Tracking Station at Yevpatoriya Spacecraft Power Supplies Facilities for Simulating Space Environment Life Support Systems Processing

Orientation and Stabilization of Space Vehicles Maneuver, Rendezvous and Docking Re-Entry and Recovery

SECP.EL

ANNEX C

Soviet Scientific and Technical Capabilities for Space flight

Wc believe that Soviet capabilities in the basic and applied sciences will be adequate throughout the period of this estimate to support an ambitious space program. This Judgment is based on Soviet space achievements to date, andomprehensive review in the major fields of science directly contributing to the space program.ew fields, the Soviets are outstanding, notably In astronomy (particularly radio astronomy and celestialstrogcophysics, space medicine, and theoretical mathematics, Moreover, they are closelyUS developments in these and other areas. Difficulties in the Soviet space program arc more likely to arise from technological than from scientific limitations. Very complex and demanding requirements must be met in such missions asarge space station oranned lunar flight

Responsibility for the direction of the Soviet space program apparently resls with an unknown authority directly under the Council of Ministers. The program itself has been carried out, for the most part within the framework of existing institutions. The Academy of Sciences has been responsible for the scientific experimentation carried out by mosl unmanned space shots, andhas been through the Commission on the Exploration and Utilization of Cosmic Space. Basic biomedical research in support of tbe space program is the responsibility of tlsc Academy of Medical Sciences. The Soviet air forces haveajor role in physiological research, in first-generation manned spacecraft design, and in the selection and training of cosmonauts. Subsystem, space suit, and capsule development is largely tho responsibility of the State Committee for Aviation Technology. The tesl ranges are under the control of the Strategic Docket Forces, which have provided launching services. Wc think it likely that the Tyuratam Cosmos military support program is sponsored by the Ministry of Defense, buto evidence as to the operational control of such systems.

We have been unable to identify many of the individuals responsible for research and development. Technical analysis indicates that two design teams are responsible for the booslerj and upper stages in all the strategic missile and space projects which the USSR has undertaken. Similarly, the strong family resemblance evident in the Soviet photographs of scientific satellites andused in lunar and planetary probes of the last five years indicatesingle team of scientists and engineers has been responsible for this project. This and other evidence indicates lhal research and development for strategic missiles and for space has been closely integrated in the USSR.

CCCRL r

Ni'vv Piopultion Systems

c have estimated (Hat lhe Soviets me developing two now large boosters with thrusts on the order olive million pounds, respectively; the fust of these could lie available for manned operationsnd Iho other in

lWW-l'Jtf) 'Hie development of improved upper stages to capitalize on thecapabilities of these Urge new boosters is likely in the same time frame. Although there is no evidence that the Soviets have undertaken the development of high-energy upper stages. Soviet literature has reflected an interest in such propellants as liquid hydrogen and fluorine- We believe that the Soviets could begin test launches of an oaygen-hydrogen system at any time, andluorine-hydrogen system ineriod- US esperiersce with the former combination, and Soviet conservatism to date, suggest that an eilensive flight test programear or more would be undertakeri before such stages

would be acceptableanned launch combination.

5 The Soviets are actively engaged fei the investigation of advanced electric propulsion systems. They claim to have testedevice aboard Zond-II. In the near term, the Soviets could have available electric propulsion devices with thrusts1 pound, which could be used experiment ally in orientation control systems for the proper positioning of antennas or optic systems, or to prevent orbit decay of long-lived vehicles from atmospheric drag. Systems capable of thrusts up to one pound could be available late in the decade. Because of power/weight requirements, tlie probable application of these systems would be confined to missions of long duration such as deep space probes.

Guidance

Soviet space operations to date have been planned so as lo make repealed use of established ground equipment and methods foi guiding satellites and manned spacecraft into the desired earth orbit.lmost all vehicles flown from Tyuratam have been huocbed along the standard ICBM azimuth, deviating bymall fractionngle of inclination to the equator. Thus, only minor alterations in techniques and coordination of facilities have been necessary for the various types ot orbital missions The principal exception to this standardization has occurred only recently with the launching of some reconnaissance satellites with an inclination. The launching of all Cosmos satellites from Kapustin Yar at an approximateangle has also facilitated standardization of these operations.

Soviet space vehicles launched from Tyuratam have thus far used the basic first-general (onCBMradlo-inertialthe boost phase. Although tho Soviets have an all-inertial system operational with their ballistichey probably will choose to continue with the nidio-inertial system for space ventures. This well-tried system Is capableigh degree of precision. For example, the orbital parameters of Voskhod differed only slightly from those of Ihe dress-rehearsal vehicle, For future missions.

30

Midi as manned circumlunar flight, mote precision will be requited in mill-course ond terminal guidance than tlie Soviets have exhibited lo date.

Trot ling and Communications Systems

S. 'Ilii; chief limiiaiion on Soviet capabilities for tracking and communication with space vehicles is Ihe lacklobal network capable ol continuous tracking and communications with satellites ami space probes. Facilities Gist developed for (he guided missile program arc adequate to determine the initial trajectoryigh degree of accuracy; this system also provides high-quality tracking of satellites while over the USSR. The functioning of (he system, however, requires that ihe satellite cooperate;ignalre-arranged manner. In addition, the Soviets have developed large phased array radars which could be used for surveillance and tracking ol objccls in space over the USSR.

o extend Iheir monitoring capability, the Soviets relyumber of supporting techniques. Specially insttiuncnted ships have been deployed into Ihe Pacific Ocean and off the coasts of Africa. These are of principal value during (he firstlast earth orbits. Their value Is otherwise limited by the difficulty of accurately determining their positions and the more fundamental problem lhat optimum locations for some missions arc inland.

3

Special space tracking and telemetry reception stations are located in Ihe Crimea. Al Ihe principal station for lunar operations, located nearumber of multiple yagi and large helical arraysoot parabolic dish have been constructed. The primary instrumentation fadlity for planetary probes is the Center for Long-Distance Space Radio Communications, which is located near Yevpatoriya. It comprises twoa transmitter site equipped wilh single iteeiable antenna array mounting eight parabolic dishes each SO feet in diameter, and theeceiving site equipped with two of theseeep space shots appear to be under the operational controlcentral computer complex in Moscow.

Additional land-based tracking stations wouldajor aid to theo( all Soviet space vehicles and to the guidance of lunar and interplanetary probes. The Soviets probably will not undertake manned lunar Bights until they can establish the additional sites necessary to maintain continuous contact. To achieveapability, they would need to establish two additional sites, which ideally should be spacedegrees apart, and localed near the equator. One of these new sites could be located in the Soviet Far East; this would improve their capabilitiesoint which ihey might consider sufficient toanned lunar mission. There is evidence thai the USSR is seeking to

"Seef tliii Anno.

the ioiis

acquire sites for monitoring space vehicles in South America, Africa, and Far East. Communications satellites could be used to relay communicat

and data transmissioru from and to orbiting vehicles.

Spacecraft Power Supplies

major element in space tracking, control, and communications isof adequate power supplies for the space vehicles themselves.vehicles, both manned and unmanned, have not demonstrated asustained communications over long periods ofumber ofhave failed because of loss of power for communications, andwere cautioned to reduce use of their transmitters to conserve power.

c

Necessary power for the missions accomplished thus far has been provided either by chemical batteries .or solar cells, or combinations of them. Manned spacecraft have included thousands of pounds of batteries;ounds of0 pound Vostok was devoted to batteries. These sources are in-adequate for many types of long-lived, unmanned vehicles and for manned missions of moreeek or so. The Soviets are conducting high quality research and development on other energy sources such as thermoelectric and thermionic devices. Small radioisotope-powered thermoelectric generators are available now. One usingeldsatts and another usingields five watts.

Power requb-ernentspace station of several months duration are considerably higher, on the order of several kilowatts over those mentioned above. In addition to improvements likely In solar batteries and other auxiliary power sources, the Soviets probably are developing improved nuclear-power sources for future use in these space vehicles.hey coulduclear-isotope power supply with an output of several hundred watts. The Soviets couldhermoelectric device for unmanned vehicles capable of generating about eight kilowattsn contrast, in the area of fuel cell development, the Soviets have notubstantial research and development -ffort and they arc not expected to have such units available for flight use prior

Facilities for Simulating Space Environment

he Soviets announced recentlypacecraftosmonaut was testedew cloud physics chamber, operated by the Institute of Applied Geophysics of the Academy of Sciences. USSR. The chamber, completed ins roughly cylindrical in shape, with an Internal diameter of abouteet and height ofeet. Its capability to simulate an altitude of onlyeetemperature of* C. falls far short of the near-vacuum conditions of outer space. Also, the chamber has no means of simulating radiation conditions encounlercd in space. This chamber cannot approach the overall performance of space simulation chambers currently in use in the US in the development of satellites and space probes. In addition, a

6EGnr.T.

test chamber is known to existraining center (or manned space flight at Tomilino, outside ol Moscow, and another is possibly located at an aerohydro-dynamics research institute near Moscow. These also do not simulate the vacuum conditions of outer space, but are useful for evaluating subsystems or integrated human-equipment testing. We cannot exclude the possibility that smaller, mere adequate chambers exist,ack of suitable space simulation facilities could haveontributing factor in some of the Soviet satellite and space probe failures.

any case, while the chamber mentioned in the announcementlarge enough to test the Voskhod spacecraft, wearger,chamber or an extensive unmanned flight program will becertify any new spacecraft for mannedhamber for the test ofis now under construction, but wc do not know its probable datesize, or space simulation capability.

Irfo Support Systems.

In the Vostok manned spacecraft designedhe Sovietsife-support system which has tlie capability to sustain one maneriod of up toays in earth orbit. Fundamental to the design of this open-ended system is the use of an air-like mixture of oxygen and nitrogenea-level pressure of oneompressed air is used to maintain this pressure and chemical compounds (potassium superoxide and lithium hydroxide) which absorb carbon dioxide and release oxygen have served for atmosphereenerally similar cabin environment was created by the life-support system aboard the Voskhod spacecraft. The cabin pressure was again one atmosphere and other environmental parameters, such as gas composition, temperature, and humidity were also within previous limits. The COi content of the Voskhod atmosphere was about double, however, and increased during the missionercent White not outside safe limits, this and the atypical rising of the cabin temperature probablyaxing of the life-support system. This comparison with Vostok environmental parameters indicates that the Voskhod life-support system is little changed from the Vostok system.

Soviet success and confidence in this system has permitted them to minimize the problems and hazards associated with oxygen-rich atmospheres and reduced pressures both in the cabin and in the instrument compartment, They can adapt this system and their experiencemall, manned earth-orbiting station as well asanned circumlunar mission. For those future missions in which weight wouldreater limiting factor or in which flight duration would beprolonged, suchanned lunar landingarge space station, wholly new techniques probably would be required. These could be partial regenerative or closed-loop systems. The first Soviet flight withew environmental control system would be experimental and would involve limited objectives, primarily biomedical in nature.

fCiUT

oviet research and development on pressure suits has not been extensive and certain features from early US suits liavc been adopted. During Vostok missions. lhe suit was not pressurized and the face shield was open. In the event of cabin depressuiization. Ihe soil was to be pressurised automatically. While the design is adequate for safety, cosmonaut mobility would be severelyThe cosmonauts aboard Voskhod wore no pressure suits. While this undoubtedlyigh confidence in the spacecraft, it Implies that the Voskhod's construction and life-support syslem do not involve radical departure from Ihe Vostok technology. Considerable modification of the Vostok suit or one of new design would be necessary for operating outside Ihe vehicle in space or on the lunar surface. Currently, the Soviets appear lo favor the "hard suit" concept for extravehicular operations and are activelyrototype along these lines.

Our knowledge of the Soviet capability to predict solar flare events Is limited to open source literature, but we believe thai theyair capability lo forecast two or three days in advance these events, which produce hazardous levels of cosmic radiation. Their research program is expandingew, large solar observatory was completed early4 in the mountains southwest of Irkutsk. Space radiation hazards, with the exception of cosmic rays generated by solar flares, are sufficiently understood by lhe Soviets that they should present no major difficulties. These problems probably can be solved for manned orbital, circumlunar, or lunar landing missions of minimum duration by tlie use of suitable shielding or an appropriate arrangement of on-board equipment But, solar flares willroblem for nights to outer space.

A profound Soviet concern for tbe post-flight effects of weightlessness became apparent after the five-day mission ofovietbelieve that it will be necessary to provide artificial gravity to offset the deleterious effects of weightlessness in manned flights lasting over several weeks. We do not attribute any artificial gravity capability lo current mannedsystems. While incorporation of an artificial gravity system (suchentrifugal force arrangement)pacecraft or space station is theoretically feasible, it Involves serious technological problems which preclude its appearanceanned flight for several years.

Data Processing

vital importance in complex space operationsigh-speedprovisions for the rapid transmission ol data from fielda central processing center where it can be evaluated and correctiveto other field stations belter located for transmitting them to theIn the Soviet parking orbit technique for launching lunar andvehicles, aboutinutes elapse from the time the launchthe last tracking station in tlie Soviet Far East before ejection stageignitedrecise moment somewhere over Africa. The sameoperative in the recovery of manned and unmanned vehicles from The Soviet data-processing accomplishments implied in successful com-

35

WCMT.

wed. Whilepropaganda film, on their earlier manneduse of vacuum-tube computers capableecond for space track computations and data handling, i, i, estim^cd WMdrecent mtiot

s(ate devices and capable ofillion operations per second.

uring the same period, the Soviets probably will continue to pressof computers with greater reliability and will seek to reduceomputers will become necessa^

guidance and other vatal operations, 'Ihey also wiU be necessary with deep spaceprobes for preliminary data processing to reduce the Sof iruW bon to bosent to earth over radio communications links having bruited capability for data transmLssron as well as to handle the severe guidance andproblem assoaaje^with such flights. While some success in micromimtWdl probably be achieved in developing computers for use in space vehicles we are aware of no practical Soviet experience to date even in the fidd of nussiie guidance.

Orientation and Stabilization of Space Vehicles

sophisticated complex of equipmcnl is required topaceand to effect changes in this orientation to accomplish theprescribed by mission objectives. The only exception occurs in some vc-

^ UeS-r spin-

s adequate to prevent tumbling. All Soviet space vehicles tosuch control have been provided will, fully automatic systems*or manual

earth orientation, at least in manned velucles. has been basedand sun and Itorizon seekers,anual capability basedvisual techniques for back-up. Luna, and planetary probes haveseekers both to orient the vehicle and to orient solar-power panels.has failedumber of probes. Less is known about theaboard reconnaissance satellitcsQ

ll known Soviet stabilization systems are believed tootd-eas jet-reaction apparatus for attitude control. Soviet annwnce.nents indicate that the cosmonauts have practiced at least some manual control. Our evidencethat during the flight of Vostok III, thc cosmonaut attempted manual coo-

f>rr

II |

trol so as to witness the launch of Vostok IV. The mission duration of the manual system apparently permitsew minutes of continuous operation. Wo have no evidence that any Soviet cosmonaut has used this manual system to accomplish orientation for recovery.

Moneuver, Rendezvous ond Docking

caith-cxWNrendezvous technique is so basichole rangespace operations that there can be little doubt that the Soviets willwith it. The paired flights ofnds well asandlthough not used toendezvous/ docking operation,an initial step in that direction. Rendezvous and docking, evencooperative target, imposes fairly stringent requirementsumber ofthe most critical of which are launch guidance, tracking,maneuver. Maneuver, as distinct from orientation control, impliespropulsive capability to permit the vehicle to transfer from oneanother.

Specific guidance requirements for rendezvous are difficult to establish because of the many modes by which rendezvous can be accomplished. The use of pre-programmed trajectories and having rendezvous occur soon after injection into orbit of the second vehicle lessen requirements for in-orbit guidance, Tbe specific Soviet approach to rendezvous is unknown but this technique appears most likely in light of theperation.

A major .problem in any case is the need for accurate orbital data, or ephemeris, on both the vehicle already in orbit and the new arrival. Tracking to determine ephemeris can be accomplished from on-board equipment, but operations can be timed so as to take maximum advantage of ground tracking to minimize on-board requirements. Current Soviet ground tracking equipment and technology are adequate to perform this function for two cooperating vehicles providing that the operation occurs over the USSR. There are no known Soviet efforts to develop an on-board capability to track one satellite from another.

The maneuvering necessary for most rendezvous schemesropulsion system Incorporating both thrust modulationestart capability. The Soviets arc experiencing considerable difficulty with the in-space ignition and operation of upper stages in lunar and planetary probes. At the same time, their retro-rocket engineigh reliability. There is little intelligence on further Soviet development of such propulsion systems. The maneuverable Polyol probably is intended for use in rendezvous,seful maneuveris yet to be demonstrated. Once developed, it could be adapted to complicate Western attempts to counter Soviet satellites.

A significant reliability problem appears in any mission requiring repeated launchings under serious time constraints, as would be necessaryubstantial number of rendezvous were intended. On this basis, the overall probability of mission success to the moment of the last required docking declines very rapidly as more than one rendezvous operation is attempted. Even with a

booster of demonstrated reliability, such as thee believe that mure than three launches (and two rendezvous) would involve excessive risk for any mission which depends mi all for its success.

Re-entry and Recovery

he final step in any manned mission is the recovery. Tlie Soviets have repeatedly shown their capability to successfully de-orbit and recover both unmanned and manned vehicles. Since its introductionhe same type of liquid-fueled retro-rocket assembly has been used to de-orbit these two types of satellites. All operations to date have been essentially the sarne.f"

1

Landing occurs in daylight in tbe central USSR, someinutes after initiation of the sequence The Soviets regularly announce that manned craft have lauded in the designated area and that the cosmonauts have been reachedew minutes. We do not doubt tbe latter point but we have reason to believe that tlir designated landing area encompasses thousands of square miles. The basic search technique for the clowned payload probably involves the Soviet HF/DF system, supplemented by aircraft. Finalccomplished by helicopters.

The Soviets have utilized an ablative-type (possibly ceramic) heat shield for protection against the heat flux brought about by atmospheric re-entry from earth orbit. We believe the heat protection material and structure on the Vostokounds) weighsounds.

For the final phase of recovery, ie, after re-entry inlo tho earth'stho Soviets have used two techniques. The Vostok, and probably0 pound reconnaissance satellites, deploy parachutes when they haveto0 feet Then, at the cosmonaut's option, he cither remains in the re-entry vehicle until impact- or ejects himself in his seat to descend separately by parachute. The seat includes equipment for an unplanned water landing. Only the pilot oflected to remain within the recovery vehicle. Seat ejection presumably would have been used in case of booster malfunction duruig the initial launch phase.

The Soviets have aimowsced that the Voskhod does not employ this technique. No provision has been made for seat ejection, but rather, after the deployment ofecondctivated near the ground to minimize impact of the spacecraft and crew. (As for an unplanned recovery at sea, the Soviets have described the Voskhod ashe reliability of the technique must have been proven during the recovery of0 pound reconnaissance satellites over the past year.

If tin- Soviets plun ii> undertake manned lunar missions, they will have to address themselves to the problems involved in reentering the earths atmosphere al parabolic velocities,hose on Ihc Older0 ft/see. While these velocitiesery significant increase over velocities of re-entry for vehicles in near-earthl appears that heat-shield problem can be overcomeurrent state-of-the-art solution, probably utilizinghe employment of thesetep beyond current Soviet usage in space vehicle applications, but Soviet workis field is going on and there are indications that charring polymer ablators have been flown on ICBM vehicles targeted to the Pacific. The problems most likely to emerge will be those of maintaining low heat-shield weights through extensive materials testing and tho improvement of bonding techniques. Testing ofmaterials by meant nf vertical firings wilh boostedractical approach to the problem of acquiring data early in any project for the designecoverable lunar spacecraft. As yet, we have detected no such tests.

A spacecraft designed to be recoveredunar mission would almost certainly incorporate some provision for aerodynamic lift after atmospheric re-entry. As the declination of the moon changes during tlie month, so does lhe location of the re-entry point of the return trajectory. This produces arange variation of0 miles from the re-entry point to an established landing area; the actual variationunction of theof the return trajectory to the equator. Aerodynamic re-entryow, rolllift-to-drag ratio ofan provide controlange from re-entry to landing points ofs well as broaden the re-entry corridor depth to manageable guidance proportions. There arc no indications lhat the Soviets have conducted aerodynamic re-entry experiments in tho manned space project.

CCGftLT

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1.documentd^mino-ed by ,he Centre! Intelligence Agency. This copy -lor henlond ol^ jo(iidl<lion ^

tolJow<ng ofncmlihelr respective deportment,;

Director of Intelligence ond Rescorrfi, for rhe Oepo.lmen, ol S'o-e

b.elcme Intake Agency, forOffice ofecretory ol

Defense ond the orgonixotion of lhe Joint Chief, of SloflMbhM Chief of Stofl for Intelligence,fy. for .he

Deportment of the Army

Chief ol Novelon,or .he Oeportmeol of the

Novy

Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF, for lhe Oeporrmenl of Ihe Ai,

Force

of. for the Atomic EnergyAhoioM Doctor, FBI, for ihe Federol Itareou ofO.rector of NSA. for the No.tanol Seevrty Agency

n"'OA',or ony

W dW"^ed *iowi,h

oppkoble seemlyor reamed to .he Cental Intelligence Agency by arrangement with lhe Office of Cenirol Reference, OA.

mino-ed ovmeo, the oversee, recipeI!enod no. ,nol one yecv. At .he end ol .hi, period .he document .hcnOdbe decoyed, reta.nedhe (eroding ogency. or

-zsizzzziot ,hc -

The Irile ofo.vmen. when.eporolely,he taxi ihcwU be etav

OlSIRIBUTION,

White House

Notional Security Council

Deportment of State

Dcportmenr of Oelenie

Aloniic energy CoimniiVon

Federal Bureou of Investigation

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA