TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Biological Warfare .
fc C. Titlmival RcrjuiJe-mtrntt
C -critical Warfare
D. Foreign StKirve* of Inforrrwrion, Paw Mnlari:
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LIKELIHOODROLIFERATION OF BW AND CW CAPABILITIES
To assess the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to achieve biological and lethal chemical warfare capabilities during the next three years or so.
Our consideration of BW agents includes all those suitable for. use against personnel, livestock, crops, and materiel; consideration of CW agents excludes incapacitating and riot control agents, and smoke, flame, and defoliant chemicals.
This estimate does not concern itself with BW or CW as instruments for clandestine use in assassination, small-scale terrorism, and the like.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. For any reasonably modernized state, and even for many of the less developed nations, there are few obstacles in the way of acquiring at least some BW and CW capability. The technology underlying BW and CW is widely known or easily obtainable through open
the physical facilities required to develop and producein great part quite easily adaptable from existing chemicalfacilities; the means of deliveryideconventional weapons and even non-military equipment; and,the costs are relatively small, at least forto most states' conceivable needs,
B. Yet despite these considerations, there isrendproliferation of BW or CW capabilities in the world. Suchcould occur during the next few years, notably throughprocess of mounting fear and suspicion, and ofreaction on the part of particular sets of adversaries amonganc^maliK_jjciwers, but proliferation cannot now be
umber of factors work to restrain BW and CW proliferation. The very fact that many states couldapability with relative ease gives these weapons the qualitywo-edge sword. Prudence would dictate that countries deciding to acquire an offensive orcapability should also undertake toefensive capability, and the requirements of doing so would add to the price, almostif adequate provision were made for civilian needs. Must military doctrine on CW. and even more so on BW, lays emphasis on the defensive aspects of the problem, which is some evidenceeluctance to be the first user. And finally, there exists an almostpopular moral and psychological abhorrence of these forms of is to official reluctance to contemplate their use.
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easilyor one or two quietly acquire
inability in ihe less toxic
C. Almost any semi-indu loken native capabilitiesttacks on important targets through commercial channels Worldype CW agent
H. Present evidence doesate that any nation is now determined toeaningful operational capability in either BW or CW during the next few years. We believe that most states will remain reluctant to do so. Nonetheless, some may proceed toward this goal,eterrent or retaliatory measure in case aadversaryapability,upplement tojons, or DOssiblv asoit available substitute *n'
fJefinirioei of Term.
J. In the following discussion. BW and CW capabilities are considered in three broad categories:
Significant militarywhich wouldountry to mount and sustain extensive BW or CW operationseriod of lime;
Limited militarywhich would be useful in waging war. though not great enough for sustained operations; and,
sufficient lo permit only one or twoor covert attacks on major enemyn applying these terms,been mindful lhat what might beoken or limited BW orfor one country mayignificant one for another whenthe context of its military requirements against likely adversaries.the terms "significant" ande have also taken accountBW and CW doctrine which usually requires that offensivebe matched by an adequate defense against likely retaliation by theA "token" capabilily would not, of course, necessarily includedefense.
B. Concepls and Doctrine Cltemical Warfare
doctrine of the major powers classifies lethal chemical weaponstactical weapons, suitable for theater combat as supplements toboth nuclear nnd non-nuclear. Toxic chemical munitions haveover other munitions- They canider area ofthan high explosivesraction of the logistic volume, andarc more persistent and in some respects more demoralizinghigh explosives or nudear weapons, they can destroy personnelinstallarions. They may also be more effective than oiherpenetrating structures to reach personnel protected from other types ofeven the threat of their use may lower the combat effect iver.es*troops by forcing them to carry and use encumbering protective gear.
1 CW also has its lirru'titions. Although detection systems are Kill imperfect, protective equipment coupled with good troop discipline can be highly effective
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in reducing or negating the effects of chemical munitions. Surprise, therefore, is usually an essentia! element in the tactics of CW employment, and thedvantage is likely to be temporary unless, of course, the defense, lacks adequate protective gear. In wars between approximately equal irulitary Forces, prudence would dictate that the initiator of CW guard'against retaliation by adopting protective measures at least as effective, and therefore as cumbersome, as thoie of his adversary. Furthermore, unless derisive results were expected from his initial attack, the initiator would need sufficient CW munitions to continue iucIi attacks on at least equal terms wiih his adversary. Meanwhile, the course of battle would probably turn on other factors.
Among the major powers, the use of chemical munitions in long-range strategic attack appears not to be contemplated Nudear weapons are rated ai far more effectivetrategic role. Moreover, thereendency among these powers to group chemical (and biological) weapons with nudear weapons as non-conventional armaments subject to file same political restraints and,there is no confidence that the employment of CW weapons would not lead eventuallyuclear exchange. Inot involving any of the nuclear powers or their military allies, there would, of course, be less concern over such escalation.
Even among countries with only it limited CW military capability oroken one, chemical munitions are more likely to be viewedeterrent to similar attacks by enemies of roughly equivalent military strength or ai retaliatory precaution! rather than as offensive weapons. Exceptions might occur. Forountry at war might bc tempted to employ chemical munitionsajor tactical breakthrough seemed possible, oreasure of desperation to avert an unacceptable setback. Chemical munitions might also be employed in remote areas to intimidate primitive adversaries, as the Italians did in Ethiopia
5 and. more recently, as the Egyptians have done In the Yemen.1 jfr^'
delayed effects of BW weapons narrow the range of theirtheore important restraint, however, is thethe initiator's own forces to retaliatory attack. or^riiDy because of theof detecting such attack in time to adopt protective measures.military effectiveness of such weapons ts problematical; they haveadequately tested. Small quantities of BW agents, however, might do a
ha UAR on wveral oewsioru dropped aerial bombsype of tear gas on roynliitn ihe Yemen. Atnce, ihii agent proved lethal In high concentrations
deal ol damage to an enemytactical situations, and might bevaluable adjunct to other weapons.
respect to strategic use of BW agentsarge scale thelies not only in the danger of escalation into nuclear war but alsodifficulty ofivilian population against possible retaliatorykind. An adequate BW defensive capability for the civilian populationextraordinarily costly and difficult to achieve and only the mostin the world could even hope to do so. Essential requirementselaborate civil defense establishment, adequate medical personnel, andhealth standards, including good personal hygiene and propersanitation systems. Even so. defection, protection, andcale required to adequately protect large populations arcto achieve. Agents designed for use against crops or livestockmore difficult to defend against, though they may not present theof escalation.
C. Technical Requirements Chemical Warfare
A country's native CWorclosely related to the level of sophistication of its chemical and conventional munitionsincluding their supporting staffs of scientists, engineers, andivilian chemical industrial and laboratory facilities are readily adaptable to the production of highly toxic CW agents. Of particular Interest in theof modern nerve agents are plants producing organo-phosphorous chemicalsertainhe output of plants engaged in production of such widely used Industrial chemicals as chlorine; phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide-all important Worldoxic CW -agents-^ould be diverted directly to chemical munitions. Hardware adaptable to CW needsariety of civilian products, such as spray equipment and thermogenerator devices, as welt as the full range oF conventional military items. The production of defensive equipment would require supplies of rubber, charcoal, and plastics, and fairly well-developed textile and electronics industries. Civil defense would also dependountry's medical resources, the general literacy and discipline of its population, and any shelter programs tlutt could be adapted to CW defense requirements.
To start from scratch toignificant CW capability would, of course, be very costly, but most modem countries already possess the basic industrial and technical capabilities upon which to build and could achieve high levels of production with relatively small additional expenditures, tn otherimited native capability could probably bc achievedew million dollars,
especially if programs are focused on Ihe less loxic. Worldype chemical agents Several thousand pounds of these agents could be produced dailyew relatively modest laboratory-typc production facilities or processing plants.
mf MT VI VI.Lii.^ 1
These agents or their major ingredients could also be purchased on the open market. oken native capability could be achievedew compet
chemical techmcans.ew months, they cot.ld secretly produce up tohousand pounds of relatively sophisticated chemical agents byethodsost of onlyer pound. Raw materials could be procured in the required quantities without arousing suspicion.
he achievementW capability present, somewhat greater problems than does CW: agents cannot be obtained commercially in quantity, delivery systems are generally more complex, and the deterioration of agents prevents storing for an indefinite period. Nevertheless, any country with goodindustriesotentially significant BW capability. To develop from thetock of agents sufficientignificant BW capability wouldajor effort involving the serviceshousand or more professionals andimited capability, based on existingand fermentation plants, would, however, requireraction of the trained personnel, and could employ, in addition to conventionalariety of civilian spray and aerosol generatingoken capability could be achieved covertlyew competent technicians under laboratory conditions and need not cost moreew thousand dollars In all cases, however, the rapid deterioration of BW agents and related storage problems would hamper the maintenance of existing capabilities.
D. Foreign Sources of Information. Raw Material, and Equipment ;
II. Any countryeasonably competent technical collection facility maintained over the past five or six years, could obtain extensive information on CW and BW research and defense efforts of the US from private and unclassified government sources. Open Soviet literature would provide useful information on CW production technology, andcine. and aerobiology programs related to Soviet BWhe Netherlands, France, and Italy also publish useful information on BW and CW defense. The utility of such information depends heavilyountry's overall scientific and technical capabilities.inimum, analysis of available information would help narrow fiields ofinto militarily profitable channels. This is especially true in the biological sphere where innumerable diseases have been studied to determine those most suitable for BW application. In the CW area, most information on militarily useful agents is available in the open literature except, perhaps, some refinements
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of manufacturing technique. Some aspects of the employment of BW and CW agents on the battlefield are covered in unclassified training and field manuals.
venountry lacked the required industrial and technologicalof the raw materia! and equipment for the production and delivery ofBW agentsnternationally obtainable. Among industrial chemicalsCW agent production, phosgene, chlorine, chloropicrin. pinacolylcyanide,hia derivative of methyldichlorophosphine areavailable. Chemical^ plantii
he USSR .ind its European allies are also capable of deliver, ing chemical plant equipment abroad, though priority domestic needs have kept and are likely to keep such salesinimum. Although BW agents cannot b* procuredirulent seed culture for the production of BW agents can cheaply and easily be obtained from any number of scientificertain vaccines useful for BW defense are obtainable in quantity commercially. Pharmaceutical plants and equipment have also been exported by the developed countries, but much less commonly than fermentation plants and refineries which might, also be useful in BW agent production.
xcluding the US and the Warsaw Pact states, there^e, to the best of our knowledge,oun tries with BW programs ind^with CW pro-gramsaW Most of these programs are matters of research and developmentplanning, training and equipping for defense, or,ew cases, very limited stockpiline. rather than ready operational caoabil
any semi-industrialized nation could easily develop token nativein either field, and any country could, of course, quietly acquire through commercial channels atoken capability in the lest toxic Worldype CW agents.
resent evidence does not warrant an estimate that any nation underis now determined toeaningful operational capability in cither BW or CW during the next few years. We beUeve that most state* will remain reluctant to do so. Nonetheless, some may proceed toward this goal,eterrent or retaliatory measure inotential adversaryapability,upr>jementtotuicleai weapons, or possibly, as the best available substitute for
uropeand the Commonwealth/ In Europe.
emphasis in research, development,
and proaucuon has been on defense against BW and CW attacks. No major change is expected for several reasons. For one thing, popular abhorrence developed during Worlderves as an effective psychological restraint on the acquisition or expansion of BW or CW offensive weapons. All European
(except Iceland) adhere to tlic Cencva Convention5 whichoffensive use of BW or CW weapons. In West Cermany. the manufacture of BW and CW weapons is prohibited by international agreement. Austria is treaty-bound not to make, possess, or experiment with BW or CW agents or weapons.
n general, so far as most Western European states show an interest inti) be focused on deferuiv- prW
i For the most part, they will prefer to courlio^lie
US capability to provide retaliation in case of enemy use in war. In most of the smaller NATO countries, higher priorities for other types of military equipment, combined with tight defense budgets have reinforced an existing disinclination to move themselves into BW and
JATO strategy should be rcvaea Icfflirmnish reliance Tear deterrence, it is possiblerowth of interest in BW and CW weapons will take place.
or East. Communist China relied almost entirely on the USSR forneedsut has since continued research and developmentits own. The Chinese are conducting research on organophosphorous(related to CW nerve agents} and have published pharmacologicaldata on nerve agents in military journals. They have somePfObably including toxic types. However, effortsmajor expansion of their CW capability wqulclbe" se^Fely* handicappedscientific and technical personnel and chemicalfthoughthe Chinese would' accordthe necessary'^ieirff ort if MnvincerJjhatsome son_ of -possible US or Chinese Nationalist attacks. It is even less likelywould divert scientific manpower and materiel to" the developmentbiological weapons; their present BW program is probably primarilyeffort on BW agents and on methods and material'to defend' " "
thers. Token BW and CW capabS might be acquired by any number of countries for usehreat oreterrentikely enemv. Conflicts between India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia, Creece and Turkey, aftd Portugal and its African colonies might lead oo. side or the other to co'tu-der the me of chemical or. less likely, biological agent,one-shof basis,these adversaries, only Turkey now possesses any sort of military program inurely defensive; none of these countries is even started in BW