NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO DEPLOYMENT OF AN ROK COMBAT DIVISION. FOR BASE SECURITY DUTY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
NOTE: This Is Iho ojBmate. Nt
> . Submitted by th* DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by theUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BE
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.V; ' . Submitted by the.. DIRECTOR OF CENTRALfollowing intelligence organizations participated inof Ihis estimate: The Central IntelligenceIhe imelligence organizations of the DepartmentsDefense, and i:
: Concurred in hyUNITED STATESoncurring were the Directorand Research. Department of State: theIntelligence Agency: and the Director oftheAgency. The Atomic Energy Commissionto thend the Assistant lo IheBureau of Investigation, abstained, the subjectof their -
SUBJECT: SNIE PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO DEPLOYMENTOK
COMBAT DIVISION FOR BASE SECURITY DUTY IH SOUTH VIETNAM
We do not believe that the introduction of one ROK combat division into South Vietnam for static defense purposes would provoke Coanrunist China, North Korea, or North Vietnam overtly to invade South Korea or South Vietnam. Neither do we believe that it would in itself change Communist attitudes toward negotiations, or leadlackening of the insurrection in South Vietnam.
The main question Is what interpretation tbe Comeninlsts would put on the introduction of the full ROK combat division. They would almost certainly estimate that it would not in itself significantly alter the military situation. They might consider, however, that Itubstantial further buildup of foreignhinese Nationalist, Thai, Philippine, and USfor ground combat, whatever their estimate
on this point, they would try to discourageuildup. To this end they would increase their propaganda, and again accuse the US of recklessly
expanding tbe war. They would probably employ the theme of "US uae of Asians to fight Asians" and attempt to stir up troubles between the ROK forces and the Vietnamese.
3- The Connnunicte would probably supplement their propaganda with some sorts of action. The North Koreans would almost certainly attempt to arouse protests in South Korea against the export of South Korean forces. They might make threatening military movements within North Korea or along the DMZ, designed to reinforce any doubts the South Korean or other governments might nave about the wisdom of thus diverting their troops. We think it unlikely that North Korean ground force "volunteers" would be cent to North Vietnam, though it is possible that North Korean technicians or anti-aircraft personnel (possibly SAM operators) might be brought in. In South Vietnam, Viet Cong terrorist efforts and military harassment might be directed against the ROK forces In the hope that casualties would cause discontent in South Korea and also servearning to other potential foreign contingents.
a. Comaunist China sight attempt to scare off further US-initiated strengthening moves in South Vietnam by deploying Chinese forcestoward the North Vietnam border. We do not believe, however, that China would do much else. It would bo unlikely to counter byhinese division to the DRV because It vould be unneeded there and
probably uninvited. If it had decided for independent reasons, to send more or less overt anti-aircraft or fighter plane units. It night seize upon tbe introduction of the ROK division in the South as further Justification for doing so.
5. The introductionOK division vould add one moreto an already difficult situation for Moscow. It vouldew occasion for the DRV to put pressure on the USSR for more and quicker military aid. The USSR might agree to Worth Vietnamese requests for greater or speedier assistance, although ve doubt that this vould take forms which substantially increased the risks of direct Soviet It vould also diminish somewhat any USSR hopes that negotiations could still be arranged.Original document.