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national intelligence estimate
y iht DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
i W UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai indctftd55
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Communist China's Foreign Policy
tabie of contents
L THE BASES OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY .
U. POLICY TOWARD THE CAPITALIST WORLD
IH. POLICY TOWARD THE COMMUNIST WORLD
POLICY TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD
POLICY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
VL LONG-RANGE PROSPECTS
communist china's foreign policy
To analyze the principles and forces which shape the fonnuIaKoo and conduct of Communist China's foreign policy and to estimate the probable course of that policy over (he next two or three years.
believe that the principal aims of Chinesepolicy over the next few years will be as follows: (a) toWest, especially the US. from Asia and to diminish US andthroughout tbe world; (b) to increase the rafluence ofChina in Asia; (c) to increase the influence ofthroughout the underdeveloped areas of the world;upplant the influence of the USSR in the world at large,the presently disunited Communist movement. (Pom. 1)
objectives, and the method and style with which theyare shaped by ideology, by Chinese tradition, by theof power which die present Chinese Communist leadersto bear to achieve their ends, and by the personalities andof these leaders.esult, their foreign policy inresembles an international guerrilla struggle which attemptsdown the enemy's strength by attacking the
both ideological and nationalistic reasons, ChinaUS as its primary enemy. Peiping's immediate securitythe short reach of its military power lead it to concentrateforeign policy efforts on undermining the US position in thethough in other parts of the world the Chinese Communistsusing such means as they have to weaken the US. Amongnations, which Peiping sees as in some sense victims of
US exploitation, Peiping tries simiiltaiteously to build up recognition of Chtniajor power and to weaken the US position uf)
USSR has come increasingly to rival the US as afor Chinese foreign policy. China recognizes the USSRpioneer Cornrounist ration and as the most powerful rnember ofcamp. Yet rationalistic and ideological iactoes joina strong enmity. The Chinese leaders will continue toovMthrow of the present Soviet leadership, but without greatseeing the emergence of new men who would follow theElsewhere in the Communlit world, Peiping will seek tosupplant Soviet influence and to win over or split Communisthoot movements. )
bas chosen the uirderdcrvrjoped. ex-colonial world asadvantageous arena of conflict. In this Third Wcrid,"not only aim to erode US strength but to displacethey seek to establish themselves as the championston of the underdeveloped nations. The greatest Impactpolicy is felt in Southeast Asia. The theater ofis Indochina, where Peiping isecisive anddefeat of the US. To date, the Chinese leaden Have notcountermoves to the limited US attacks in North Vietnam,almost certainly seek toider war. Nevertheless,been making preparations for at least b'mired engagement,believe that they would be prepared toajor militarywith the US should they feel China's vital securityby US actiom. )
P. In the rest of Southeast Alia, unless the situation alters sharply, Peiping Is lively to support policies designed to maintain and increase pressure against the US. Peiping seems to look on Africaecond great area of opportunity and is likely to increase both its overt and subversive efforts on that continent. )
G. As tag as the present group of leaders rernaim in control, which Is hleiy to be well beyond the period of this estimate, Pei^stag's dynamic and aggressive attitudes will persist. Moreover, though we have little Information concerning the next generation of leaders, there are many reasons to believe that China's foreign policy will be assertive and uncompromisingong time to come,
I. THI BASES Of CHINESE COAWAUNtST FOftSGN POUCY
The ultimate lira of Chines* Communist foreignocsrsmunlal world according lo rVapthg'i mflltmW rcroeatwcary brand of Marsism-Lentalim- But thoistant objective; it isopeaith than an end or aim of Immediate action The more immediate alms seem to us to he aa, (a) to eject the West, especially the US. from Asia and lo diminish US and Wcatem tnfliience throughout lhe worlds (b) to Increase the influence of Communist China In Alia; (c) lo Increase the influence ofChina throughout the tiwlerdocioped areas of the world; Id) tad to supplant the tnlneoce of the USSR int trap, eapeciaiV in the rattsttstly dsrunrted Cornmsinrtl roovernrrvr
Theae obkxtivta, and the method and style with which they are pursued, ant shaped by ideology, by Chmese tradition, by the ar>poratut of power vrhlch tbe present Chinese Communist leaders can bring to bear lo achieve their crseb, and) by Ihe pcrsonalHier and eiperience of ihese leiwlers. In tho billowing paragraphs we discuss these basic lac tort in more derail.
The Chinese leaders arc dedicated, even fanatic. Communistt. Belief in the rifheeousnets of their cause, the correctness! of their cVort toe. and the err-tainty of eventual victory nntaJoed them through the arduous andyear strurr> whkh brought thern to ccaKrol of the vast land and population of rnaso-laad China Subsequent successes In consolidating their power at home,talemate an Korea, challeargtng lhe USSR for kadcrship of Iht Cornmurail movement, and iMiroiliating India in the brief frontier hostilities! have further heightened their faith hi the soundness of their Interpretation of Conv muout doctrine. Allhough they haveumber of tertout setbacks along the way, tbey believe that as long as Ihesere correctly in-trrpreted and applied. China can br ccetldeat of eventually gaining its long-range goalcanmunfti world with Ka cento in Peiping. This doctrinal faitheasisuiie cast to Communist China's foreign policy andith great drtve and staying power
4 Peiping's world viewi large part shaped by Gnrononht doctrine, which provides tht framework lor IU appreciation of specific international sUuatSom. Communist ideology alto mftuervcet Hi tactics and provides Itarticularly effective instrument for propaganda andimportant foreign ffolicy too Itation which is notowerful on tho world scene.
ht Chinese part of the calculus brings ia psychological, cultural, historic, and geopolitical factors wbscfa make Chines* Corrirnonist foreignuite tMtaetst Using from. say. Soviei or Potash Cornsssianst foratgn pottcy. Tbe Chinese leaders look back on al lean three thousand years of cultural heritage. Theytrong lense of tbe ccntrality of their nation, history, and culture.
ant! llui feeling grrvcraler an nrrogunt and (lfltrcaitilnf; attitude, coward other naticau and peoples II abo stakes thorn highly sensitive lo any real at fancied slights or Cjrcrp-it. Those ctWact rentier, already vSsitee la Oana'i contacd with European "barbarians* Inh cmhuy, were intensified by tbecoune of thoae relations- Tho imposilion of foreign encbiver, ipherc* of Influence; and eatratcnllorlnlKy Inh andh centuries haa left seen and had led the Cbinoae to class themselves among the vkttma of colonialum and racial erplcetallai
& P'iping'ibo shaped by what the Ccronrauralatt eel "chjaettvene of thesehat Chainateriallycountry. Its armed forces cannot reach far beyond China's bound' arlee nor can they conduct the kind of technologically advanced warfare of which toe US and the USSR are capable, hence Chinairect military threat only in nearby parts of Asia- China is dependent on Io parti ofand techniques to modernize rapidly Ha economy and industrial tectusology; the virtual termination of Soviet cooperation0 necessitated increasedwith Western Europe and japan lo this end. China'shas proved Insufficient toast and expanding population, and this has forced PHplng to make extensive purchases of grain abroad. On the other band, tha very magnltuda of Chlna'i population encourages Prspiag's aspiration toominant world power and enables the regime to accept ajsjjsssjjsssj losses with limited qualnu. This, along with the geographic sUe of tha country, makes the Chinese loaders believe that China could, if necessary,reaiendous amount of military punlahment and, in the long run, still envelop aod defeat an Invading enemy. They have even Issued optimistic statements about the* ability lorclear attack.
he unique eapaikiae of tho Comes* Communist Party (CCPJ In fight-arsg Ms way to power In over two decades of guerrilla warfare against vast odds has strongly conditioned the thinking of ihe Chinese leaders. Mao Tse-turg aod hb veteran coDcagurs have tooromunbm to rcfloct Chinese cxperttoee that ta practice the Chinese and Corrununbt Ingredients are tJwrougWy nansoad.cauideraeae eateot then. Petfxatgi foreignrotection into the week] arena of tha principles and concepts deiirsoped tn theof China's long elvfl war. Indeed, Communist China's foreign policy Is primarily ft strategy for revolutionary war. That is. itcroccived In terms of conflict rather than of adjusting relations with other state* by negotiations, revolutionary wars against those seho align themselves with China's ctspooeuts are encouraged and supported; and any cceBpromise or concrssion. rsreept those made expedient by some tactical Ctxralion. Is viewed as surrender. Internationaliewedreat guerrilla itruggle In which the op-pan mt is to be constantly harassed and thrrstened-
B. Tke CMncse Coarrnraralsts have amplyod their ability toon long-range goals in die face of seemrnery rspaaui odds and often at tht expense of short-term gains At tha end ui their Long March, when their forces bad dwindled fromohey kept working
low aid |he dny when they would control all Chlnn. They emphasized the concept of protracted struggle, holdingnified unci determined group farownrg correct prlnclpka could lo time wearivided and lessenemy, no mortar how great his initial iuperiorrty They believeaccession of defeats hearted at points of enemy vrpaknes will gradually erode his strength snd eventually reduce him to aheohrte InfortoiRy. This pobey of patience and long-range pmpecttve reflects both Comruuunt aad tiadirional Chinese ways of thinking.
An irnportant concept which helps sustain thewill in thr face of inderjnilely protracted struggle Is expressed in Mao'i admonition to have contempt for the enemy wrnlrgteally hut toactically. This means that the weaker torco must have complete confidence In ultimatemust have contempt for thr will ond staying power of the enemy. But in bD actual engagements wilh the enemy on the road tn tltat ultimatehe weaker forte must be constantly conscious of the immediately supcrsorof the enemy Following this line. Peipmg'i foreign policy hasand dangerous ambitionslmost always cautious and realistic fa practn.^.
Theadars occurred their present power through decades of violence, which lends them to by great stress on the efacacy aad necessity ofviolence In pursuit of national aims. They feci that ft is Ineffective to modify the present world order; It must be destroyed and replacedhmosc-stylo) world order. Moo lias said: "All power flows from the barrelaving no stake in either the We Mem or Soviet systems of world order, tho Chinese are relatively free to encoiuage and exploit chaos wherever they are able to do so. So far. they have not been able to organise much of the world on their pattern. This leaves them with limitedfree touerrillaharassing, and exploiting the ctfficutties of those who defend the testae quo. They are ia the position of political "certs* attacking thelaming them for all the evusery Imperfect world.
The Chinese Comnvnii* leaden view the nations of the world as falling into three groups: the Communist world, comrsrudng China and the otherstates; the capitalist world, comprising the US, Western Europe, the white nations of the British Commonwealth, and Japan; and tho Third World, comprising the underdeveloped, ox-colonial mostly nouwhlte mil ions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America- Eschewing traditional Ulanee-of-power polrtles, Peiping has chosen lo challenge the L'S and USSR simultaneously. Out of respect for their greatly mperlor material strength. I'rlplng strives toead-OB asdltary crsruVonUtlon with either of them, choosing rather the Third World as its primary arena of contention. This abooncept developed in the Chinese crvil war, when the Commontsti conducted their struggle in the rmderdeveloped txnmtryslde rather than In the dikes.
In the Third World, Peiping uses the full gamut of foreign policyselecting and midng thetn according to local cm .imiMni'i The Chmcse
apparently place particular hope on the use ef insurgency hi ttiU arena, holding that It la there rather than In the advanced capitalist countries that significant revolutionary pressures can be generated under present conditions. Tbey try to promote and itsdtt looal Vers of liberation wherever practicable. The Chinese have raised Mao's concept of rruerrilla warfare to tbe levelow" of the process of world reWuHon.
be erpecial virtue oi this method ks thai it can usually be pursued at low cost and attk risk to Ceo an ni test China. Il uses local tnrmprnrcr and, at far at pceatota. local or captured tqutptMttt. Priptog prosdrkt trailing,imited ttnottnl of material and rooatrve snopngaada tupport.mall tevtaMitiit, fotplng hat caused great trouble tn ami Communist forces in Africa and in Seotrseast Asia. The Chinese rose in tht Congo haa bean such that, should tho insurrection there collapse, Peiping could dlivngage with Utile loss. Inumber of other factors, including geographic proxhn-tty come rttto play, and the risks to Pdpnig arc much greater.
otalitarian nation. Communist Chinaotal foreign policy; every act is teenolitical act. At tha sameemains acutely aware erf the pluralistic nature of moat nations and uses its policy hntrumeots telecfivefy asrotast dttTrrsmt targets wRtita each country. Diplomacy, trade and aid,in many fcerna. nibvsrjSon. insurrection, iha implied threat of miiitarv force, the spectre of approruhlng nudcar wrap era cnrabfatlea all than are used satssrskaavtcasslsr and In varying proportion! as deemed appropriate Propa-ganda fa an auttruuiant particularly congtsaial to the rvrmgrJittic ssoture of Chinese rornavjrisrrn, and tt Is suitabletation wheat reattertal power ts lirnfted. Tha Chrneat uae ft wfth treat sML As one nsnreplt. tht* ability to turnpectacular reception for viatting dtgnitarMs, including marset of tppar entry enthusiastic peopla lining the streets, hatar Iced elect on even sooes! at PsJdstans Aytib Khan. Every Chinese who travels outside the country, from the urbane and subtle. Chon En-kd to the low heat acrobat, ii on active agent of Peiping's propaganda.
n tho employment of its various means of advancing Ks foreign policy, Petprog Is generally thndble, practical, aad ormortimlstlc. Although the influence cf the icsrtoeconomk- theories of oommuntsm may occrukooalry trad tht Chinese Convntrnttts toarticular situation, they do not let tbrae theories senousry Inhibit thror cshcacc of means for rrsnilerncsstsng thetr pchries. Cusdrd by the Cosnrnunht operational coda that the end JnstrBet the meant tbey readily eostsloy lacties which violate particular Comnwmest theories,hetr Buptaett presnsjtfon of racial rsresocbM agatatt th*kotosCornrrainist Russians.
y pisrswsng Its foreign policy prrsittentry and rrseesjjticslry. Communist China has had much more Impact on tbe world than its mflilary and eessravrrilc power would icem to Justify. Both Washington and Moscow aro focusing much of their attention or iheir various problems with Peiping. This results less from the potency of Chinese policy than from the peculiar vuhieraftflliy of the
interna tiorul order tn presenthe rapid dissolution of colonialfrica and Arta hasolitical vacuum, marked by uncertain and ihiftiog tajfjajjand chrarie fcnts bdSty. Tba new nitiira with their weak, tncipcrtenccd goecrnmcnts are highly vulnerable to Peiping's ItOe. With large erpevtsbons and anall capabilities, Aefr people are frustrated by the ffefus quo and naturally Inclinedlame their woes on sucli external factors as colonial in cxpWUllon and racial domination. It is not too lutrd to sell tltcm radical "solutions" fa) their problems. And not least important is thatar-;earlng world, troublemakers who want to upset the existing order can get byreat deal, not because of the* artsdeaa orecause of the reaactnace of others to take ap the chauenge.
IL POUCY TOWARD THE CAPfTAUST WOsUD
Ideological and nationalistic eompuhiotis converge to make the USChinas primary enemy. According to Communist doctrine, tha US, aa the leading "cap its Kit imperialist" power, is the devil which must be destroyed to deanonstrate the correctness of Communis* doctrine and to clear the way for Communist progress. From the point of view of Chinese nationailsm, the US Is the power which frustrates ccenplrtlon ot theof China aad Hocks Chinese amhSOcarj In Soasthcast Asia. The US presence ta the Western Pacific appears to the Chinese Comrnurustt as tie- major military threat to their security. If China Is to dominate tbe Far East, it must reduce and eventually eliminate US strength In the ore*.
Communist China's Immediate security interests and Iha short reach of Us military power lead Peiping lo concentrate its mam foreign policy efforts on charging tha balance of tor tea In tha Far EasL It worki unremittingly to stir up aatf AaMrican feehng among other Par Eastern peoples and to undermine US alliances and military base agreements. It erpects in lima to force the US lo abandon Taiwan. At tbe moment, however, Peiping's policies are undergoing their most violent and dangerous test In Vietnam.
In other parts of the world, the Chinese Coromunbti ore using whatever means they can to weaken the US. Theiro foster and support anti imperSshst trvoseono where practicable,eans of Mattering and draining US strength and aatatJshtarg tbeV eyes of Assam, Africans, and Lathi Airsisricxmi as the white tnrperiahst oppressor.
The not af the so-calledJ world ta seen by Peiping as anzone comprised of countrfcs which, while capitalist Ihcimetvci, arc alio victims of US exploitation. Among these nations, Peiping hiesto build up China's positionecognized power and to weaken tha US pesdbon of leaderrhip Peiping has been quick to exploit and toFrench actions disruptive of Western unity. The Chinese have played upon Western European interest in trade upport unities by residing wrcle-rangmg purchasing missions which have orouaed ckpoctatWru far In excess of China's
nctual ability to buy. Compctttlon for this new market lead* Western and Japanese industrialists ba pteanire their gowmmcnts for improved relations with Peiping.
III. PdlCY TOWARD THE COMMUNIST WORLD
Ia recent years, the Soviet Union hu cotnc toerewlngly to rival the USominant problem tn Chinese foreign policy. In this case, too, nabonalb-tic and ideological factors loin to create strong enmity rVlrskng now sees Moscowival for leadership of the world Communist movement,angerously clegencrate force winch threatens to lead the rnoresiienteo-bourgeois deadend, and as an unfaithful alfy who refuse* to lend proper supportbtmtc ChineseTh* Ohonene leaders are also weal imbued with traditional anti-Russian feeling, ihey are acutely conscious cf Tsarist territorial grabs, resentful of numerousrist les prrpetraled by the Cosranunbt Russians, nervously aware of their long cornmoo boundary, and on guard ngainu Russian subversion of Chine's border tribes. The bitter rivalry with tho USSR sometimes diverts Chinese energies from their locus on the US, but often the some course of action can serve both anti-US and anti-Soviet ends, as It cloes fn Vietnam. We believe that,ajor international war breaks out, Peiping will continue its attacks on Soviet leadership beyond the period of this estimate.
Nonetheless. Peiping's Ktihrdc toward lhe Soviet Union is sosnewbat ambivalent Tbe USSR ll recognized as the pioneer Coram uniti nation and the roost rsovmful member of the Cctrsrristnttt camp Tbe Chrrseae regrett beans' lad astray by ttrtistotttjti and still hope that torn* day it will be run by man who still use Soviet power to support the Chaneae sine on world Coramunbt policy. They abo cherish the great sirengthin anwork) Commun-at snovetnent Yet tbehey employ ro uader-ratne the present Soviet leadership tend to split and weaken the movement The matter It further complicated by the fact that the nationalistic aspects of China's anti-Soviet feeling are directed at the Soviet state and people, not fust the Itli i
The Chinese attack oneadership it conducted throughout the world and at all levels. Sin en athe Chinese have striven with their limned assets to prorriotc the overthrow of the Soviet Icadcrahip They probably believe thai theyarge part tn the downfall of Khrushclw-v. and they probably do not erpect Brezhnev ud Kcaygki to hut long.nlikely, however, thatrpect soon to see the USSR taken over by Soviet kntdert who would folios, the Peiping stae. Watbtn the Bloc, they tricossrage irsdecieiidcr.ee Hkr thai of FUsmonia and, where poss ible, defect von lo tbe Chinese side, as by Albania. In seme ricn-CorriTnunist, Japan and New Zealand, they hove captured the local xanmimist party; la ethers they are ftxanoting party splits.
n Communist front movtTnonti. such ns the WoiM Fixkr^tion of Trade Unions, they try to capture (ho Wodcrshlp and swing tin- organl/stlon behind Chinn'i militant policies. They Istvo had considerable success in limiting or barringkipntion fit various Afro-Asian organizations andor the lorescenble future they arc likely to continuecampaign to replace Soviet leadership in leftist movements tliroughout the world.
IV. POLICY TOWAHO THE THIRD WORLD
Aila. Africa, nnd Latin America"hrase which "court with rrsouoto-notis frcmirncy, not only inropaganda, but in its theoretical krurrtalt and domestic indoctrlnntkm programs. Tho Chinese leaders claim lhat the underdeveloped nations on these three continent* represent Ihrcv-Rfihs of the world and they rvoson thai by gelling rnost of ihcto nation* lo follow the Chinese line Peiping eon assure Ihe cvcntiial xhicvemrnt of Its goals. In thu Third World, the Chinese not only aim to erode US strength, hoi to displace Soviet leaderf leftist movements, they abo take up popular causa In the area and By to establish themseKii as the champsona and mewton of lhe ursder-devekjped nations Seeking (he broadest cornrnon dnKHtarlor. Peiping avoids emphasis on formal cisantnutshtn and Instead stresses rattt-rmrfceloUsm, rsabonal Lbrration. and km openly, onii-white fcelmg.
8ft The greatest import of Peiping's pohey, at might be etratted, is tell in nrsrby partssia, and tbe theater of piimr.ry Interest at present kt Vietnam, Although rVlptng It uiidoubtcdfy very much Interested in adding Soulh Vlctoom to tha Asian Communist bloc,srobably even more concerned about how developments In Vietnam affect Peiping's struggles ngnlmt Washington and Moscow. Indeed, many North Vietnamese leaders almost certakily have doubts thatolicici arc continently in Hanoi's best Intereit.
eeping tort th* Vietnam struggle as an oesporturilry to dirnonstrate to all doubters th* correctness of Its line that Ihepaperndroperty conducted "aar of liberation" con be brotightuccessful con. elusion. In tptte of US erppcnJlion- without bringingtatjor international war. Petptng now appears lo beecisive and barrator ting defeat of the US.eesusscmb! victory could be brought of hi South Vietnam ID the face of US military power, Peiping would haveraw* in week) affairs. Th* Chinese line In the Cornstvunht dispute would br vindicated. Soviet pretertstoni to kcadetsshtp of the world istovuiieiit wottki be discredited, US capability to counter local guerrilla Insuirrctioni would be planed in doubt throughout the world, and US prestige seriously damaged. Prtpkii'i arrogance and aggressiveness would Increase, while ib ctTorts to lake over leadership In Iho Communist rnovcmenl and In the Third Work! woukl be greatly advanced. Communist failure lo achieve their objectives in Soulh Vietnam, on the other hand, would tend to discredit the Chinese before other Communliti and In the Third World and to check their momenhim in world affain. Thus, lo the Chinese lenders the present struggle involves vastly greater stakes (ban tlte control of South Vietnam.
eiping also Is almost certainly ansloai lo avoid escobtion of the Viet-namne ibruggtvaisr Saio-US war. which might deitroy Chinaain-fulty acquired mduitrlal and advanced wropom facilttlef and prove Ibe Chinese Ihve on work! Cotnmunin policy to have been dangerously wrong. While iha Chinese may be quite conidrniider wni can be avoided, they have been making preparations lor the poaiibllily of atimited engagement growing out o( US attntki ni^nlmt North Vietnnni To date, they have not made rtskyo the limited US air strikes In central North Vietnam. Nevertheless, we believe that the Chinese linden would be prepared toajor military conflict wilh Ihe US iiv>ildeel their vital security mltreats threatened by US actions. Tha Constnuaiats almcat certainly fee! that the tide li running strongly hi their favor In South Vietnam They thrsetoro are almost certsJeuV giving tbe Vict Cong and North Vietnam every enccarrageeaent to holdhe face of US hrwwhaags aod to aaataaa or ilrrpafTC1 in the South, la the Bwaaatieae. ihey wfll coatJaua to do what they con to amnotie raternataaaal aad US damaatk uriiauiu for eeasation of US bcmbmgi and for US withdrawal from Vietnam.
In the rest of Southeast Asia, aahraa thealter, rharpty, Peiping Is likely to ccabaue Hi current policies. Il will eonllnue lo support Indonesia! aggressive, anti-Western policies while iceklng to control the costs and risks to Communist China. It will also support the growth In power of the Peiping-oriented Indonesian Communist Party. In the Indonesia'MalaysiaPeiping aees the prospectonflict which could further undermine the US-UK postuoo ia the area at little or no cost to China. The Chinese willtrying la prrssure Thailand: ihey will encourage Increased dissident activity and from thee to time fame tkecatsntaga. They abo wiH probably coetjmtc their guarded tolerance of Ne Wei's regime in Burma. Peipingencourage Prince Sihanouk's anti-US activate* bettop abort of any Iran commirrncoti which might involve ft toe deeply. In ihaeipang wC coobnoa Ra effects to preaaaia tcitward treads andbet probably without notable aacorsa
In northeast Asks, tha bwporten* target Is prosperous, capita hat Japan. Peipingog viewapered leepine toward tha oastinl goalonsonants! Japan. Darlog the nest fewthe stress will be on disrupting Japan's relutions wUh the Republic of China oo Taiwaa by such tactics as Insisting on Japanese Government guarantees on loans fnr major Communist Chinese poreeiping will fupport and sharpenand leftist demands ior termination ol tbe US-Japan defense treaty and removal of US military bean from Japan and Okinawa, but with little prospect ol lucceis during the period of this rstimUr. Peiping will continue to be the dominant influence on the Japanrap Communist Paity and will keep striving to increase its Influence ia the Socialist Party and other leftist groups aad to sow disKuUon within the ruling Liberal Dernocratk Party.
In Soulh Asia, Chuu will continue lo woo Pakistan and lo pluy upon fnV.'run's (cot o( India and the effects of US military aid to India, ll willon Hi feud with India bul probably will not initiate hortllllk-s. ll may cncoirragn the leftwing Cornmunbti In India to increase theirovernment activity, and. perhaps, turn to vioknee. Against the small Himalayan states, wtsteh fcra an outer aoac fort will continue its steady prvsoure* to order to drew ibcm rmdrr starraaSmg Ccaarrtunttt sntTrarnca rNstptog. wtskh hod corniderable ItssVsencc tn the rUrsdasanaaVe fOvrrr.rn.-nl in Ceylon, will probably promote* strikes and other farms al resistance to tbe new government of Dudkry Scotanayakc.
In Pelping! view, Africa Is tho second grent area of opportunity. Con-aldcrfng that Peiping'* serious bid for significant inrhtence thero It only two or three years old. Hi impact has been remarkable. This is in largeunction of tho great vulnerabfJlty of the ana. nonet he less, Peiping's ftciiblhty inwidely varied oriportunities ks noteworthy In sotne cosjirrlet. such as Congo (Branavilse) and, until rtcessrry, tWundi. it used briberyeat ad-tltttasaq. ba others, at bat used ecratrsnaac aid. risanagleg to get eoeaidrrable pobttcal mileage out of Its oBm China has made thtese caterssoatrtnart basis, tome In the form of grants but most in the form of credits on cornpara-lively generous terms. Although Peiping's military aid is largely clandestine. It la known to be supplying arms lo active or potential revolutionariea tn several Ah-km nations. Including the Congoarid Mosamblcpic,
Pelping has succeeded in winning recognition from many of the new African aai Ions and will conlinue Ks efforls lo win over ethers. Sebttanllal African lanport toastsN toot (or Ccxranunrat China. Where Pelping has ertibtuatra, tt uses overt dtptbaaaey with soene success. Exchange visits of notional leaders have proved tsfecttve. Premier Ohon En-lsi has visaed Africa Iwic* aa lha paat year,surabrr of African leaden hove been thnlercd with tpeetacuUr receptions in Peiping Coevmuaurt China subssdraa several African Journals and floods the rxtviinenl with Chinese ptotsagsrida lircrarura Africans art brought to China for traintra; in subversion and guerrillaew ethers are stubsldiied for study at Omnia universities. Tho itDdeM program hot bad spotty success, wtth many of Ihe African stiidents rtturrdng disdhastoned and anllOravote. During the nest few years, Praptng is likely to Increase Its efforts fas Africa subsraofsoDy.
n Latin Aaterieo. Pesprng will abo trek to cause rreohle for lha US. It "ill probably abo seek to ssnptovnwith sotne existing latin American goverrnTwrrct, particularly if thiscaaetuhg of rehtsoas betwssen thetn and tbo US. In gectftaL however, rstptngnore stable social order In Lotto America than hi Africa, and there will be fewer openings to rorplodt. In further contrast, most Laet lean countries abeady have long-eilabliibed Cbrnmunlit parties with tfes to Moscow; the focus of Peiping's effort among
these panic* will probably be to gain footlwWi, to try to subvert them (torn Moscow where possible, and tu foster splinter parties where Stit has already done In Peru, Ecuador and Brazil Pespag will also continue present efforts to tneresse Hi mfiuence is Argentina's PeroolsU rnomneoL Sroo-Cubati relations appear to have deteriorated sharply in the last few months. If this trend continues, Pelplng's Latin American program may be Impeded by Caslroite opposition.
V. POLICY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
he UN at ones attracts and repels the Chinese Ccenmunijli Theylnuon lo occupyeat as one of (he big tve In tbe UN-They will ilin'.'T to seek international support for their membership, partlyatter of prestige, and partly to create problems for the US. However, they still bitterly resent the UN effort against them In Korea and are stung by tbe annua] humiliation of being rejected for mrmtxTthip. They particularly object to the UNs peacekeeping activities, which they cooaacter are pcrforracd at the beheet of the US and which are aimed at damping down the verv kind of disorders Ihe Chinese wish to promote.
eiping sets Its fundamental Interest not inart of an Increasingly effective UN, which has no part In the Chinese Communist long-range world view, but In unrig the UN ha the short run and rvenniaOy dertroying K. It is dearly ant prepared torice for adrtaaatras. On the contrary, it sots acspukuoo of Nationalist(oimng. The Chireseleaders fee) that, although they can continue to get along outside tbe UN, the UN will be hard preasnd to functionorld organisationuclear power controlling nawly one-cjuarter of the world's population remains outside Tha recent addition ofil Loo people toroup ofove Petpingstrengthens this ccesVfcece,
Tha Chinese Cornmunnl leaders view international cooferencei on nuclear disarmament with similar cynicism. While they appreciate that total nuclear disarmament wouM greatly reduce the gap between Chinese and US military potential, they alao realize that suchighly unlikely in tbe neat few yean (they would almost certainly refuse to accept meaningful Inspection of their ownhus their pnpagauda support of complete nuclear disarmamentno morenaBns of winning credit with the neutralists and have-rots who want to tee US and Soviet Mock-piles destroyed.
A ilgntiicant. longer term gambit which the Chinese may be undertakingort of estortioa aimed at ending US protection of Taiwan They have hinted that they may refuse to enter any agreement for the rmuncution of Ducleer weapons white the US stands between them and the "recovery" of the bland They hope thus to marshal increasing pressure against the US position aod to weaken Taiwan's defense.
3J. Aj long oi the present group ofeterans remains in control ol Communist China, which it likely to he well liha period of thb estimate, retptnge dynamic, aggneiive policies will be continued, poasihty even accelerated. How the lucceeding generation of leaders will act iaat we know little about them. Their lack of eiperimu in the outside world, however, and their rnanj yean of one-aidedo not give much prom Heavorable change Furthermore, there are no atari-range aofuMonj for China'i food and population problems, and such psychological tactora at the arrogance arising from tbo Chinese reuse of lupertorityeople and as the guardiana of "true" communism will inhibit the developmentpfrll of cooperation and compromiieong time to come.
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