DIPLOMATIC MOVES TO RESOLVE INDONESIAN CRISIS

Created: 3/10/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SU3JSCT Diplomatic Moves to Resolve Indonesian Crisis

Memorandum5

FOR RELEASE DATE: DEC ^UiC

Prceident Sukarno iaublic Ilos of sponsoringinstCraU.S. Embassy overietnam aad Malaysia Ipsucs.incident occurs, it to reconunended that. be prepared to present a

r jt-ond-ttlck propooitloa to SuVnroo, statics that lodoncBla to coniiagrascroid in its relations withand that Sukarno wlU soon ba faced wlui the choico offork bo will travel.

a epoocharch in Djakarta, rreaiooat Sukarno treatedto another dlatrlbo esainst imperisllem, linking. withand Malaysians la tiio cosfrcatation aaaaatfaa aad ccnounclnsin Asia, especially in Vietnam. Ho aleo expreeaed hlawhy die bdaooslan people demonstrated arpUast. andthem. Thla eeetna to he preparing the way for. in Djakarta. Since the PKI.atter of tacticalplaced dio clloilnation of. diplomatic oreoonce In Djakarta otof its list, wo can confidently ezpect diet Uie next demonstration willplace In Djakarta and that, given the fcollng of. Departmear of

Etria find.apture of diplomatic relations is prcooivly not fors reecTOD^cndcdthat tnfiiUKS clrcuaunancos. gcvcramaot bo prepared to follow up the Indonesian attack oa tbe fcmbaseyard diplomatic demarche, aimed atlear alejmitive ofis picecnt line, or faclngaa incrcacuvdy. which will li-ck the Sritiah and Malaysians on the confrontation iscve.. would, ofave to bo prepared to take whatever cac^eojuoncee might to*is maneuver.

first atop ln thlaml^htetter from PresidentPresident Suknrno in tbe tono of "mora in sorrow than intMln;

thatrelations haveotal lmpoocc end that day have to either 'O forwardonotrucdvo way or, reluctantly, to face the facis as

: ukarno Iins presented them anderiod ol hostility of unccruiinhe Prcsiccnt'e letter would probably naturally be accompanied by statements from. Senators on the question of Indonesia and appropriate press drumfire tiiat would bring homo to tbo lacbneelaa mission in Waslunotoa tbs point tbat. badonclusion that this state of affairs could not continue.

ollow-up to the letter, wo eucsest that Governor Harriman or Senator KoEnody bo prepared to go to Djakarta to discuss the alternates as wc sco the in. Tho first eltcraato le for fukarno to agree to tho useffices to mediate tbe Malaysian confrontation. It would bo explained to J'ukarno that the mediation offer would Include. naval elements in the Sorneo area, with plenty. aad Asian third country ground observers. Including troops if necessary, to settle tho questionree plebiscite, unhindered by Indonesian coontactics. It would also include on offer to beginagain oa agricultural andluduetrlsl projects for flat lauoacsians.. would reaffirm its Interest la the Maphulndo concept and. will bigness in the long term to support and defend that area as part of its strategic defense.. emissary would emphasise that. administration cannot maintain its domestic political position If It simply allows Tcutbeast Asia to turn Communist. Sukarno,ractical politician, would understand tbo point, which wouldinal now of realism to tha emissary's

pitch.

o. Sukarno would them bo faced with the problem of whether topresent tack or to listen to this serious proposition. It could beSubandrio and tbo PKI would pressuro him veryo resistand to stand firmly on me present coun-e. It Is also likely thatfor tbo more moderaten Djakarta la the PNI andas well as certain military figures such as Generals NasuUon,Sukcndro would urge that Sukarno take advantage ofhese moderate leaders would bo advised either by thetbothis move by. represented

tbeir last opportunity to decide whether tixty expected to participate in tbe political future of Indonesia or whether they would remain either fence-sitting or icactlve la tbe face of tbo Subandrio-PKI nuiclunatioua aad face eventual elimination.

? Yrs

ho proposed doniaacbe would createoment of decision for the Indonesians. If they decided to continue as at present, then atood number of Indouoslan officials would have known of. option and keep it in mind as events unfolded. Tho indent:rJon loaders all would leslleo

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continuing tholr present line In tho *oeo. exposition would run esrutia military and political risks. Sukarno find Hp generals still ocom to ho concerned over an overt war wltb the British In Malaysia and presumably their concern would heighten If. camo outn tba sldb of tho ^lUiih/K'alayolans. The amount of practical support dot tho Sukarno govern-stoat could muster from tba Chlneao Inltundoa would be minimal endoenlans would,ilitary point of view, be quite isolated.

butanes to opted for tho present course,. reactionouj oT slow and steady pressures sc^imo* the Sukarno rc-jlmo. ThisJxi form of oscletln^ die Malaysiansltish with militaryoinjj dioin with specialized ccpUpraeat and perhaps some advisors In1-urthcrmorc,. would strensthonioj alreadyla theipplncs, including tbo build-up of tbo defcnslvo andof die Kbndaaao area. Tbese pressures would create otralnn onia, which robjjit cause the moderates to connive with. tocourse of die regime. The preseuro would, la our judgment, moredte polarization of tbo Cocnniunists and non-Co. .muauctsltoscthcx, eldiougb at tbo Qrst bluah die whole country mlc>.iunited la the face. pressure.

tlie above. If the mdoncolans continued their aggression

ulayuln, they could bo faced widi eiiectlve sir strikes on their air force and navy and, contrary to Uva Vietnam -Laos sltuatiou,. air and nam power on the extended and fccblo lndonoolan supply lines in drelr vast island efaatn would bo qulto effective. This could be accomplishedc dually esceZatcd basis, on the North Vietnam pattern, which would fall shortNTtexcdwar sltuntlon.i

Soviets would no doubtactor to consider, but if dieany indication, they would probably not got heavily engagedt

distant port of tho world. Their position in mdoneaia lias already boon seriously uncVirmlnod by tire Pia-ChiCom collaboration. action nipiinet Indonesia would not j'ffoct any basic Soviet natior.nl fairoxoat.

sum, prcsenflnf; Sukarno wbh clear siternativea should do ato dear die political situation in Lactones la and to clarify laa Southeast Asia. If the policy la to prevent dm takeover cc"Southeact Asia by overtepression or by subversion, this move

Mould be caitircly cosslstgct with ocx proclamations Ia South Vietnam and la. In ouruatczlc necessity. If mo maintainingosition in Southeast Able . bos any real validity,

it tba policy consideratloos ln icutiicr-it Asia are not as have aaXaTasd, then we can continue alonjpresent couree, and prodictnbly allow tho';uiruv. unlets to dominate the Indoaoalon pollUcal econo and to continuedusll7 more effective way their cdlsboratlon wuh die Chinese Cortmiunlsts in Jlouha-ift Asia at tho mutual expenso of tha DritUh end. IftLs JrJiT.-isian leadership is not facedlear choicelear chance, die nso^oacW tire mat das tnoderato IeadcruUlp will either rutionalize Itself into

o tutaroo alignment with the PK1 and tho ChtComs or begovernment.

Original document.

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