SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 4 MAY 1965

Created: 5/5/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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smtATIOH APPRAISAL AS OF 5

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FOR DELIAS) DATE MAY 1U1

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OTm-ALI. SITUATION IN BURMA TODAY IS ANUNHAPPY ONE FOR THE PEOPLE OF BURMA, IN CONTRASTU WAS PREMIER OF BURMA AND HIS GOVERrWENT WASOF MAKING ITS PRESENCE WIDELY FELT, THFOF THE UNION OF BURMA (RGUB) PERVADES EVERY FACETIN BURMA TODAY, THE POWER CENTER IS THE ARMY, LED BY NENE WIN IS THE RGUB, ALTHOUGH THE BURMA ARMY HASOF BEING THE GROUP THAT BROUGHT INDEPENDENCE*'

TO THE PEOPLE OF BURMA, AS NE WIN'S INSTRUMENT THE ARMY HAS BECOME THE ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS ESTABLISHED ITSELFEW CLASS, ACTING AS THE VANGUARD OF THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM, REGULATING THE DAY-TO-DAY LIFE OF ALL STRATA '" OF BURMESE SOCIETY,

WIN'S POWER STEMS FROM BURMA ARMY SUPPORT,IS PRINCIPALLY WITH THAT SUPPORT THAT HE STAYS INHE DOESERSONALITY IGHTERINDEPENDENCE, CONVERSELY, THE ARMY IS DEPENDENTWIN (ITS LEADER AND OBJECT OF ITS LOYALTY) FOR ITSCOHESIVENESS. NE WIN IS AS ESSENTIAL TO THE ARMY ASIS TO HIM,

m. GIVEN THE SUPREME POSITION OF NE WIN AND HIS ARMY IN BURMA TODAY, IT IS NECESSARY TO ASSESS THE PROBABLE EFFECTS ON THE ARMY OF ITS POLICE STATE ACTION IN ARRESTINGUDDHIST MONKS AND SECOND-LEVEL POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS

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BETWEENND THE MONKS AND THE GOVERNMENT

HAVE BEENOLLISION COURSE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THE BUDDHISTS

HAVE BEEN DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN WHAT THEY CONSIDER

A RIGHTFULLY INDEPENDENT POSITION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS IN

BURMA, BUT THE RGUB HAS HAD AN EQUALLY STRONG DETERMINATION

TO FORCE THE MONKS TO PURIFY THEMSELVES, CONFINE THEIR ACTIVITIES

TO RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS^AND TO LEAVE POLITICS ALONE. THE ROLE

OF THE ARRESTED POLITICIANS IN THE RECENT MONK AGITATION IS

NOT COMPLETELY CLEAR,ENIOR

HAS SAID THAT THE RGUB HAS EVIDENCE THAT SOME xx POLITICIANS, ahm-fascist people's lkaous

mostly/afpfl) IN THE MANDALAY AREA, WERE COLLABORATING WITH

m ANDALAY MONKS IN THEIR *wi GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES. WHAT THE MONK LEADERS WERE UP TO WAS CLEAR AND WELL PUBLICIZED. THEY OPENLY CHALLENGED NE WIN, CALLEDOMMUNIST MILITARY DOG, AND DISPUTED THE RIGHT OF HIS GOVERNMENT TOAJOR RELIGIOUS ORDER OF.THIS COUNTRY. IN ADDITION,the MONKS HIT THE RGUB AT ITS MOST VULNERABLE POINT WHEN THEY OPENLY QUESTIONED THE RGUB'S ABILITY TO OPERATE AN EFFICIENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN BURMA. NE WIN'S SWIFT CRACK-DCWN ON the BUDDHISTS was PROBABLY PARTLY BECAUSE HE REALIZES ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE THE MOST SERIOUS ISSUES HE FACES TODAY.

HE RGU8 MUST BE GIVEN CREDIT for REALIZING ITIGER BY THE TAIL AND THAT WHATEVER STEPS WERE TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THE BUDOHISTS HAD TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED, ELSE THERE

COULDACKFIRE. CERTAINLY THE LESSON OF ARMY PERSONNEL FIRING UPON BUDDHIST MONKS IN HUE, SOUTH VJETNAM, INAS NOT IGNORED. THE RGUB HAS BEEN WISE ENOUGH TO SIDESTEP SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHEN SERIOUS CONFRONTATION APPEARED LIKELY, PUBLICLY IMPLORING THE ELDER BUDDHIST LEADERS TO THROW CUT THE FALSE (POLITICAL) MONKS. THE MANDALAY MONKS WERE ASKING FOR TROUBLE AND PROBABLY EXPECTED THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT. SOME OF THEM OPENLY BOYCOTTED THE GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ALL-SANGHA CONFERENCE IN MARCH AND SUBSEQUENTLY THEY ATTACKED POLITICAL SYMBOLS OF THE RGUB, PEOPLES STORES AND THE OFFICES AND HOMES OF BURMESE SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY OFFICIALS. THESE PUBLICGUB ACTIVITIES BY THE MONKS INCREASED IN FREQUENCY IN APRIL AND GOT ONE THING THE MONKS WANTED: THAT ARMY FORCES WOULD BE CALLED OUT TO ASSIST THE POLICE TO MAINTAIN ORDER. THERE WERE MONKS WHO HOPED THAT SOME MILITARY WOULD FIREROWD OFUT FORTUANATELY FOR ALL, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT WHO FEARED JUST SUCH AN UGLY INCIDENT, THIS DID NOT HAPPEN. WITH THE MIDNIGHT ARRESTS OFONK LEADERS, THE GOVERNMENT PUT ATEMPORARY LID ON THEIR ACTIVITIES.

THE BUDDHIST MONKS MUST NOW REGROUP, BUT THE SWIFT RGUB ACTION WILLETERRENT. IF THE MONKS FAIL TO RESUME THEIR AGITATIONEW WEEKS, THEIR DISSIDENCEIGNIFICANT FORCE MAY BE FINISHED.

6. THE ARMY CANT WAS WTH JUSTIFIED IN

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TAKING THE ACTION IT DID, ALTHOUGH CERTAINLY THE EFFECT IT COULD fAVE ON THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE ARMY WAS WEIGHED CAREFULLY BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN ARRESTING THE MONKS. THE ARMY MOVEDELIGIOUS GROUP WHICH GENERALLYLOSE BOND WITH BOTH PEASANT AND WORKER IN MUCH OF BURMA. NOW THAT THE DEED IS DONE, NE WIN HIMSELF MUST EVALUATE WHAT EFFECT THIS ACTION WILL HAVE ON HIS OWN PERSONAL POPULARITY, PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE ENLISTED RANKS OF THE ARMY: THE COMMON SOLDIER OF THE ARMY HAS BEEN LONG SAID TO HAVE GREAT ADMIRATION AND LOYALTY FOR THE GENERAL, BUT THE AVERAGE SOLDIER ALSO COMES FROM PEASANT STOCK AND HAS/TAUGHT TO RESPECT THE MONKS.

7. NEVERTHELESS, NE WIN HAS MADE IT CLEAR THISHE HAS DONE BEFORE, THAT HE WILL NOT GIVETHOSE WHO STAND IN THE WAY OF ACCOMPLISHING HISTHE BUDDHIST ISSUE WILLCHISM WITHIN HISCOUNCIL/BEARS CLOSE WATCHING. IT APPEARSHAS ALREADY BEEN SOME DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS ON HOW TOMONKS. NO ICATE GENERAL LUN TIN,

OF THE NORTHWEST COMMAND WITH HEADQUARTERS IN MANDALAY, RESISTED USING THE HEAVY HAND. LUNEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, IS BELIEVED TO BE UNDER DETENTION IN RANGOON. SOME MEMBERS OF THE RC MAY BE TEMPORARILY UPSET AT LUN TIN'S MISFORTUNE, BUT IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THESE DISAGREEMENTS WILL BE TEMPORARY AND THE DIFFERENCES SWALLOWED. ALL MEMBERS OF THE RC OWE THEIR EXISTENCE IN POWER

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than sein are devout budohi st b,irmly believe army rule under ne win is what burma needs.

the lower levels in the military, amongand enlisted men, it would seem that the jailingcould have an adverse effect on the morale of thewin is supposed tohe friend of all the people ina police officer, for he has emphasized the army must beof the worker and peasant. in the dayu,clergy wielded significant influence inbut under the rgub thereifference in themonks. the rgub expects them to support, not lead, the rgub made it clear in august thatmust confine themselves to religious affairs,they could not succeed by meeting the governmentthe 3udohistsew course designed to enlistand support of people and conceivably some members

of the military. the monks obviously stirred up widespread interest among the people because they were willing openly to criticize the rgub. however, the lack so far of any overt popular reaction to the arrests of monks appears to mean that the monks have failed to win the popular support and sympathy necessary to restore their past position of influence or even j to keep it from eroding further.

this time information is lacking which would indicate

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of the buddhists* arrests to consider seriously challenging ne win's decision. were there attempts outside of rangoon, for example in manoalay, by rebel military officers to setoint of challenge to ne win, it is believed ne win can and

will move swiftly to put down a COUbtehrevolution. in rangoon, he can rely upon the loyalty of vice chief of staff san yu, who has OVER-AJX command of troops, and upon colonel tin u, commander of central command, whose headquarters and troops,

including those of the rangoon garrison, are nearby.

10. in the spring ofthe internal critics of this government and western observers believed the course of ne win's revolution was directed straight for an erratic, but pragmatic, brand of communism. the government was, and still is, heavily pebmeated by "former" communists ano communist sympathizers, the majority of whom are pro-soviet and who exert considerable influence in matters of internal policy and administrative management. many of these "former" communists have been given official and important appointments in most ministries and departments,as well as in the government's burma sccialist program party. the government's revolutionary program is heavily dosed with marxist leftism and the determination with which ne win and his advisers have attempteo to speed the achievement of their social and economic revolution may put them

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H/THE DEPTHS OF ECNOMIC CHAOS BEFORE THEY REACH THE" MILLENNIUM ENVISAGED IN THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM PHILOSOPHY. EVEN SOVIET DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS IN RANGOON HAVE SAID NE WIN WAS PUSHING HIS REVOLUTION TOO FAST. MANY

ASPECTS OF SOCIOECONOMIC LIFE IN BURMA HAVE BECOME SEVERELYTHE RGUb,ESULTANT EFFECT CB SOCIAL PATTERNSSTANDING. THE FARMER, WHO MAKES UP THE BULK OFAND BY NATURE IS INDEPENDENT, HAS BEEN UNHAPPYTO GROW MORE RICE IN ADDITION TO OTHER CROPS. HISLIFE, HE HAS HEARD, IS TO WORK HAROER FOR THE BURMESESOCIALISM. (BICERIME SOURCE OFARE REPORTED TO BE DWINDLING). INDUSTRIES ANDBEEN NATIONALIZED BY THE RGUB. INCLUOED IN THISCONTROL WERE SMALL STORES AND SHOPS, WHICHHAS RUN WITH RED TAPE AND INEFFICIENCY. SHELVESFULL, SOMETIMES BARE, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME PEOPLETO GET LITTLE OP NOTHING. HOUSEHOLDERS SPEND HOURSDAY-TO-DAY NECESSITIES. FOR THE WORKER OR EVENCIVIL SERVANT, THE OLD INSTITUTION OFIS NOW CONSIDERED ECONOMIC SABOTAGE. FACTORY WORKER OR COMMON LABORER FINDS THINGS IN SOMEUNDER THE RGUB BECAUSE GOVERhWENT WAGE BOARDSACT IN THE. WORKERS1 BEHALF. ALTHOUGH THERE AREBELIEVE THEIR RIGHTS HAVE BEEN IMPROVED BY THISHAVE GIVEN ONLY PASSIVE SUPPORT TO THF RGUB, now rur

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EMPHASIS IS SHIFTED. EAR AGO, THE RGUB PROMISED TO ESTABLISH WORKERS' COUNCILS TO INSURE FAIR TREATMENT OF WORKERS. HOWEVER,5 NE WIN SAID THAT WORKERS1 COUNCILS HAD NOT BEEN ORGANIZED BECAUSE WORKERS HAD FAILED TO ACHIEVED UNITY.

HE CRITICIZED THEIR APATHY AND SAID THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION DEPENDED ON THE WORKERS UNDERSTANDING FULLY THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO INCREASE NATIONAL PRODUCTION. HE SAID THAT IF THE WORKERS WERE TO HAVE THE RIGHTS TO WHICH THEY WERE ENTITLED ANDETTER STANDARD OF LIVING, IT WAS THE WORKERS'TO INCREASE PRODUCTION. IN EFFECT, THE ATTITUDE OF NOT

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A FULL DAY'S WORK TO THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NO LONGER/COUNTENANCED.

11, THERE IS DISCONTENT AMONG OTHER GROUPS IN BURMA BESIDE THE MONKS AND THE PEASANT FARMERS. THE EX POLITICIANS, (THOSE STILL OUT OFHE ETHNIC INSURGENTS (THE CHINS, SHANS, KARENS ANOND THE WHITE AND RED FLAG COMMUNISTS ARE BECOMING MORE ACTIVE IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE RGUB. THE CAUSE OF THE WHITE FLAGS SEEMS TO HAVE SOME APPEAL IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. AMONG THE DISSIDENT ELEMENTS IN BURMA, THE COMMUNISTS COULD PROBABLY CLAIM MORE COORDINATED LEADERSHIP ABILITY AND MAY BE ABLE TO DRAW TO THEM CERTAIN NON-COMMUNIST KX.POLITICIANS WHO LACK WITHIN THEMSELVES EITHER THE COHESION OR LEADERSHIP TO ORGANIZE SUCCESSFULLY ON THEIR OWN AGAINST THE RGUB. FURTHERMORE, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT NON-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS, INCLUDING ETHNIC INSURGENTS, MIGHT INDIVIDUALLY

AND SEPARATELY ENGAGE IN SUFFICIENTGUB ACTIVITY/CONTRIVE NE WIN

TEMPORARILY INTO COOPERATION WITH THE BURMESE COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS IS NOT PROBABLE BUT IS POSSIBLE. BUT AS LONG AS EACH OF THESE GROUPS APPEARSTO GO ITS SEPARATE WAY OR HAS NO EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THERE WILLOORDINATED MASS REVOLUTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. IT IS TRUE THAT BEYOND THE LIMITS OF CENTRAL BURMA, THE RGUB HAS PHYSICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF .ONLY MAJOR CITIES AND TOWNS. AP OF BURMESE ETHNIC INSURGENCY AREAS SHOWS THAT MUCH OF THE COUNTRY IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE AIMS OF NE WIN'S REVOLUTION; RATHER THERE IS CLEAR OPPOSITION AND MOST GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS ETHNIC INSURGENCY. HAVE SEENILITARY NATURE, AND THERE HAVE BEEN FEW INSTANCES OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTING TO INITIATE POLITICAL/ECONOMIC . ROGRAMS TO TRY TO WIN COOPERATION OF THE INSURGENTS.

12. UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ARE QUIET POLITICALLY, PRIMARILY BECAUSE STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS ON CAMPUS ARE PROSCRIBED;2 MASSACRE OP RAJ*GOOH UNXVERSTTI STUDENTS BY NE WIN'S ARMY HAS NOT BEEN FORGOTTEN. THE GOVERNMENT IS WATCHING CLOSELY FOR SIGNS OF WHETHER STUDENTS, WHO BASICALLY COMPLAIN OF GOVERNMENT' PROSCRIBED CURRICULA AND REPORTEDLY ARE MEETING CLANDESTINELY IN SMALL GROUPS, MAY JOIN THE PHONGYI AGITATIONEANS TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

13. AMONG ALL OF THESE DISSATISFIED ELEMENTS, INCLUDING THE PEASANT, NONE OF THEM HAS WITHIN ITS RANKS AN OUTSTANDING PERSON WHO COULD LEAD THEM IN AN AHPIiOVERNMENT MOVE. AMONG FORMER ARMY

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THERE IS PROBABLY ONLY ONE, AOIER AUNG GYI, WHO HAS SUFFICIENT PERSONAL APPEAL TO ACTOORDINATOR OF ANOVERNMENT MOVEMENT. ECOND, BUT NOT REAL* OMPETITOR, IS BOORMER MEMBER OF THE "THIRTY COMMANDS n, WHO IS KNOWN FOR HIS BRILLIANT RECORD IN WORLD WAR II WITH THE BURMA INDEPENDENCE ARMY. BY HIS OWN ADMISSION, HE ISOLITICIAN OR ONE WHO ASPIRES TO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, BUT HE IS WILLING TO GO UNDERGROUND TOILITARY MOVEMENT AGAINST NE WIN.

THAT AUNG GYI, ALONG WITH EX-COLONEL KYI MAUNG AND POSSIBLY EX-VICE CHIEF OF STAFF FOR AIR TOMMY CLIFT, WOULD GOTO ORGANIZE ANGUB MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT EITHER AUNG GYI OR BO YANNAING COULD, WITHOUTEXTERNAL SUPPORT, ACHIEVE SUCCESS INHANGE IN GOVERNMENT WITH THE USEHHAHiNnjEAftT FORCES. THEWOULD BE IFANNAING OR OTHERS WERE ABOUT TO ASSASSINATE NE WIN AT AN UNEXPECTED MOMENT. BO YANNAING WOULD PROBABLY ATTEMPT SUCH ACTION IF HE THOUGHT HEHANCE, BECAUSE HE IS KNOWN TO HAVE SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATED ASSASSINATION OF THE GENERAL IN

THERE IS UNREALITY IN THE PLANS OF BOTH AUNG GYI AND BO YANNAING TO TAKE TO THE JUNGLE. DESPJTE THE SUPPRESSION OF THE BUODHISTS AND THE TARNISH IT MAY GIVE TO THE ARMY IN THE MINDS OF SOME BURMESE, THE CAUSES OF AUNG GYI ANO BO YANNAING AT THE MOMENT SEEM HOPELESS; IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR EITHER OF THEM TO INFLICT GENERAL DEFEAT ON THE BURMESE ARMY. NE WIN REMAINS FIRMLY IN CONTROL

ANY AC/ION UNDERTAKEN BY

LEADERS SUCH AS AltKir. *v, CANNOT HRINfl

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ANYTHING BUT TROUBLE TO BURMA AND ITS PEOPLE. IF EITHER AUNG GYI OR BO YANNA1NG GETS AN INSURGENT MOVEMENT UNDER WAY, HIS ACTIVITY WILL PROVIDE THE EXCUSE THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CAN USE TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS, IF THEY WISH, ON NE WIN FOR COMMUNISTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE RGUB. IF THE COMMUNIST CHINESE DID THIS, OR NE WIN REFUSED THEIR PROPOSAL, THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTEMPT SOME SORT OF ACTION TO PRESERVE THEIR INTERESTS IN BURMA.

THE SHORT RUN, EVEN THOUGH THE PHONGYIS SUFFEREDBACK WHEN THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS IN MANDALAY WERE JAILED,

IT IS BELIEVED THAT THEY WILLOMEBACK, THIS WILL NOT BE IN THE SENSE OF SEEKING WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT IN BURMA FOR THEIR

' ABTKOVERNMENT MOVEMENT, BUT WILL PROBABLY TAKE THE FORM OF

UNCOORDINATED MOVES IN DESPERATION.

HAVE INDICATED CERTAIN YOUNG MONKS WERE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN SELF-IMMOLATION, BUT IT IS MORE REASONABLE TO PREDICT THAT THE MONKS WILL ATTEMPT TO BAIT THE ARMY, USING THE "VIETNAM METHOD." AS AN RGUB

OFFICIAL RECENTLY STATED, "THE MONKS WANT CORPSES." IF THIS ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT, THE THING TO FEAR IN THE NEAR FUTURE IS AN INCIDENT, FOR EXAMPLE IN MANDALAY, WHERE THE MONKS DELIBERATELY PROVOKE RGUB ARMY UNITS ON PATROL TO FIRE AT THE YELLOW ROBES. IF SUCH HAPPENS, THIS WILL CREATE VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR NE WIN AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

THE LONG RUN, NE WIN MUST FACE SQUARELY THETHAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM HAS BROUGHT TO

BURMA. NE WIN,HAS PUTATCHWORK

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THEORIES WHICH HE BELIEVES WILL WORK IN BURMA. WHETHER THEY WILL IS SERIOUSLY OPEN TO QUESTION, BECAUSE WHAT NE WIN NEEDS MOST IS TIME IF HIS ECONOMIC POLICIES ARE TO BE CONSOLIDATED ANO WORKED OUT SUCCESSFULLY. MALDISTRIBUTION OF DAILY NECESSITIES, INCLUDING RICE, HAS CAUSED DISCONTENT, IRRITATION AND DISSATISFACTION;,AMONG ALL STRATA OF LIFE IN BURMA, AND THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THESE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WILL BE SOLVED QUICKLY. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THEY ARE KNOWN TO EVERY CITIZEN IN BURMA AND THESE PROBLEMS CANNOT BE LOCKED UP IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT LIKE REBELLIOUS BUDDHIST MONKS AND SCHEMING JHPOL ITN,S. THEY ARE THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGE THAT THE RGUB FACES'NOW. FOR THE MOMENT, NE WIN APPEARS TO HAVE SUCCESSFULLYEMPORARY CRISIS CREATED BY THE MONKS WHO DID NOT GET WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT OR REACTION TO THEIR CAMPAIGN. HOWEVER WITH THE MONSOON COMING, IN JULY, AUGUST.AND SEPTEMBER, IT WILL BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THIS GOVERNMENT TO INSURE THE ADEQUATE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMODITIES.

17. AS LONG AS NE WIN REMAINS IN POWER, THERE APPEARS TOORE THAN EVEN CHANCE THAT THE RGUB WILL BE ABLE THROUGH RIGID POLICE STATE ACTIONS TO BUY MORE TIME IN WHICH TO EFFECTEASURE.OF_.SUCCESS IN THE KEY MATTER OF ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION. MOST CRITICS OF THE RGUB, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MILITANT MONKS,:APPEAR JO RETAIN RESIDUAL FAITH IN NE WINAN. THE HOPE Of..SUCH PEOPLE IS.THAT HE ISOMMUNIST BY DESIGN, AND THAT ONCE HIS REVOLUTION HAS SOME SUCCESSES AT WHICH TO POINT,ESULT ING.UPSURGE OF .PUBLIC

CONFIDENCE BECOMES EVIDENT, NE WIN WILL BECOME MORE BENIGM. PRISONERS

BE RELEASED FROM JAILEGIME MORE COMPATIBLE WITHBURMESE WAYS WILL EMERGE.. THIS HOPE DOES NOT APPEAR TO APPLY TO ANY OTHER OF THE RGUB LEADERS. NE WIN'S SUDDEN REMOVAL, THROUGH ASSASSINATION, ILLNESS OR RESIGNATION, WOULD QUICKLY THROW BURMAHAOTIC SITUATION IN WHICH CONFIDENCE IN THE RGUB WOULD COLLAPSE,OWER STRUGGLE WOULD ENSUE. THUS THE HOPE OF CONTINUED STABILITY AND EVENTUAL ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN BURMA RESTS SQUARELY WITH NE WIN AND HIS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO LEAD THE RGUB.

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