' -a, eview
INT2LLI0ESCI AOEHCT OFFICE OF RATI ORAL ESTIMATES
SUBJECT: Proepecto for Indepeodenceaotem Europe
Since tbe publication of our lut eatimate on the subject, "Changing Patterns in Easternatedhe trend toward Independence in Eastern Europe hasthe overthrow of Knruahchev and has continued to gather noaentio. In tbe paper that follows, ve bring thle story up to dote and extend our Judgments so to Its likely outcome.
Soviet control of Eastern Europe ie gradually being whittled away. Changes within tbe USSRurge of Eastern Europeaneneral disenchantment vltb traditional forma of Karxiat economics aod harsh Soviet-atyle politics, and the growing attraction of the Vest have all combined to give tbe states of Befltern Europe both tbe incentive and the opportunity for striking out on their own. Rumania, the coat daring exemplar of the new trends, has mode especially telling uae of the force of nationalism end la feategree of independence conperable to that oejoyad by Yugoslavia. Othersxcept for Boat Germany end perhepe Bulgarialn their own way axe likely over the long term to follow suit. Tbe Soviets, for tbeir part, will find it difficult to axreet tbe process, and though crises ere en everpreeent danger, we believe that these countriea will be able successfully to assert their own
national interests gradually and vithout provoking Soviet In ways unforeseen by both the Soviet Union and tbe West, cccmunisffl is taking firmer root in Eastern Europe, but itruly national communism which Is doing so. It Is, in fact, much closer to the traditional interests of tbe Individual countries involved and ouch more remote from tbe interests and the ambitions of the USSR.
table of cowteots
Levers of Soviet
III. COUNTRY SURVEY: THE SPECTRUM OF
European Attitudes Toward
of tbe Soviet Political
1. Twenty years after the end of the war end the occupation of Eastern Europe by Soviet armies, Stalin's empire has begun to show signs of considerable dieaoray. Unlike the first national defection fron the Bloc, Yugoslavia, and the violent eruptions ln Hungaryhe current process of withdrawal from
audden political upheavals, and thus does not challenge the USSR with provocative acts sufficient to justify armed intervention. It lacks tbe finalityomplete severance of the bonds between protectorate and overlord, and thus it is aametimea difficult to know precisely where relations stand end in what direction they are likely to go. But it does not lackotential fully aa meaningful as that inherent in previous, more vivid criaea ln Soviet-Eastern European relations.
II. GENERAL TRENDS
A. Factors Leading to Change
2. The states of Eastern Europe remain generally within the Soviet sphere of Influence, and each la affectedthough not ln equal degreeby the policies and interests of Koscow, But these countries now aove in increasingly eccentric orbits around
the center, end their responses to Soviet demands and their abilities to pursue their own national Interests vary widely froa state to state.
3. Khrushchev's decisions to de-Stallnize and to improve relations with Tito's Yugoalavia were probably the prime movers in this process. The rulers of these countries Boon found that without Stalin, hia apparatus of terror, and his awesome mystique, they could no longer reign in the grand end arbitrary manner of Stalin. Even more important, the Soviets themselves discovered that, without Stalin, they could no longer operate at will within his empire. Stalin had been able to appoint the Satellite leadera, purge them at will, and control all the vital levers of power within each etate. Not so his successors.
k. Gradually, perhaps so slowly as to defy even Moscow's awareness of what was taking place, Soviet means of control were whittled away, both by happenstance and by design. The Soviets could not stop Gomulka's accession to power ln Poland, and, having failed in thla, they could cot reassert their dominance over his party. It was much the same storyime in Hungary, where the appointment of Gero to aucceed Rakoei was intended to insure continued Soviet dominance but led in fact to the opposite.
was soac recoaaolidation ia the ye are which immediately followed the Hungarian Revolution, but thisransitory phencnienon which rested as ouch on the dlapoaitlooB of the Satellite parties themselvesspecially their fears of insurrectionas on the actual instrumeots of Soviet power. But Moscow had apparently forgotten its lesson, for its crude attemptsl tooviet faction to power in Albania met with complete, humiliating failure.
It fell to the Rumanians to recognize and exploit tbe new situation. They saw the opportunity, had the motive, end gathered the neons. The opportunity vas the Sino-Soviet dispute ond tbe USSB'a growing vainness toward the Vest; tbe means
vere both economic (oil and corn and timber) and politicalnifiednd the motive was nationalism and the desire of the regime to seize this fervor to bolster its ovn position.
?. In addition to tbeee reasons underlying change in Eastern Europethe surge of nationalism, evolution in tbeumber of factors that grew of their ovn accord within the area Itself. In economics, adversity in effect bred diversity. The slowdown in growth and other severe shortcomings in the economies of most of these etatea ledeexamination of the Soviet way
of doing things sodew look at the tenets of tbe doctrine which underlay the entire economic scheme of things In each of theae countries.
8. It soon occurred to everyone but the most hard bitten and doctrinaire that Soviet methods were obsolete, especially for the more industrialized countries. It was then easy to exaggerate the degree to which theaehad been exploited by the Soviets and to blame current miseries on peat Soviet eina. It was also found that Karxiam-Leninism was slnply inadequate to show the East Europeans the way out of their troublec, and that the Soviet Union was unwilling to devote sufficient resources to ball then out. The Eaat Europeans therefore had to turn elsewhere. They looked at the Yugoslav system, whichtrange, though functioning, amalgam of socialist ownership, state direction,arket mechanism. They also turned to the West, sometimes only for the tools of better planning acd management, but ln some caaca to seek radical ways of changing the economic system.
9* Here the great successes of the Germans and the French and tbe faraway technological spectacular of the US told then that, far from collapsing from ita own crises, the capitalist world was booming aa never before. The Eastern Europeans travelled to tbe
Veat and sought information and help, end they encouragedof Weatern economic officials and businessmen to their own plants. Homegrown eccoomiata began to do without the shlbboletha of lirriec and abandoned the jargon as well. In its place they began to talk among themselves, and then to party functlonaxiea, about interest charges on capital, the market, supply and demand, and even the role of profits.
the official outlook was thua beingpopular icod was growing more restive. Years of doingpoor housing, starchy diets, few consumer gooda and offor low pay had begun to take their toll. Tbe veryin living standards merely whetted appetites forsoon public discontent transmitted itself to thegeneral and to reform-minded elements vlthln tbein particular. Clearly, if labor were to perform aaif the peoplehole were to cooperate at all withprogress, iaprovemente had to be made. .And to allowthe economies themselves had to become stronger
end grow faster.
changes in attitude led, thougharyingefforts to reform tho economies, to make them morepopular demands, and to get then on tbe move again. Doctrine
inevitably Buffered in the process, it was as if, beginning with the economy, ideology were being chipped away piece by piece. But quite dearly, Marxian-Leninite wee never meant to be applied
or even believedelective philosophy. It may change.
but it ia intended tooherent doctrine not subject to tbe erosion of its fundamentals.
12. Encouraged by Khrushchev'sy the sanctioning
of the Yugoslav "road tond by the split between the USSR andhanges were cade in Eastern Europe which ew years before would have been quite unthinkable. Some of these innovations were solely political in concept, aucb as the Hungarian regime 'a public Judgment that those not actively against it would henceforth be considered fer it. Some vera mainly economic, though with political implications, such as the spirited debate over economics waged ln official publications, especially in Czechoslovakia end Bulgaria. And some were purely economic in origin, but even hereas ie theh the turn toward "market soeialiaa" in Czechoslovakiahere will be important political repercussions.
13< Changes in economic thought and ln Ideology were parallelledelaxation of political controlaenerally more permissive attitude oo the part of the regimes. The tnock on the door ln the
early morning vas done away with, conversatlrji becane considerably freer, end barrleri)the intrusion of Waatem ideas Into the cloeed aocletiea vero penetrated, sometimes with officialsooctlBea deupite official discouragement. Europeanooks, plays, novieeeceived vldeeprcad dietributioa in most of the area. The move toward European unity appealed to many ln Eastern Europe vho flaw iaay of escaping Soviet domination. Intellectual ferment once more became vldcepread and authoro began again to write of coatee?oravy problems with more realiom than soeialiaa. Such "railed" andotalitarian authors as Franz Kafka were token off the index everywhere except in East Germany, and the population at large waa exposed to Western radio broadcasts without Jamming. All in all, the life of the average man became both more comfortable end freer; if the regimes were looked upon vlth no leas ceo tempt, they could ccoetheleaa be suffered without tbe overriding anxiety and fear produced by the Stdlnlat insistence on abaolute conformity.
B. Tbe Levers of Soviet Power
lb. The Soviet ability to help chart tbe course of history ln Eastern Europe rests ultimately on its promialty and the preponderance of its military power. The USSR's Invasion of Hungary
demonstrated forcefully for all of Eastern Europe this ultimateof Soviet control. But military power has traditionally been used by the Soviets ln quite another eer.se,rop for the local regimes against trouble at home or tareata from abroad. But time and international change have tended to diminish the value of the Soviet protective umbrella for the Individual East European regimes. Only In the ultimate sense of survival under the threat of an actual Invasion from tbe Weet or Internal insurrection which cannot be handled by local forces do theae regimes look to the USSR for support. Even in theae iostancea, the oituatlon has changed appreciably, for tbe Vest no longerolicy of rollback end "liberation" end the people no longer cocaider revolt to befeoalble or even deoirable couroe of action.
15. After tbe initial period of occupation and the establiab-ment of lines of control, Stalin did not depend heavily co the USSR's military pover. Rather, be relied principally on bis direct control of the Indigenous parties and their leaders. These organizations and these sen vara almost wholly dependent on tbe USSR for tceir very existence; certainly they bad few local strengths and fev reaourcea with which to confront the USSR. But tbia situation has
since charged radically. After sone tventy years ln power, theae
regimes bm bMB. able tc one degree or another to build upsources ofood deal of their power now reeta on the local partiea themselves.
16- con's influence on these parties now depends net on direct control but on indirect influence. It may persuade and bribe, but it can no longer merely issue instructions with any degree of confidence that they wiU be followed. as th* first governing Cotomuidst party in blntcrysat of Ccscuniet wisdom, it commandsespect and acme degree of loyalty from its former client parties. Certainly it will be listened to, if not obeyed, end in at leact one respect, the Sino-Soviethas Increased Soviet prestige and mellowed Soviet doctrinealmost all the Eastern European countries are horrified by the Chinese version of the ideology. Otherwise, however, this reservoir of respect and loyalty has been diminished by the acta of the Soviets themselves, their juggling of doctrine, their denunciation of Stalin and his works, their inability to provide firmto the international movement, and, most recently theirand criticism of Khrushchev.
Soviet foreign policies forto another means of guiding Eastern European destinies. Soviet policy toward Germany, for example, conforms veil with the fears, aspirations, and prejudices cf many of the Eastern European governments and peoples, especially those that suffered most acutely during World Wax II. Further, to the extent that disputes erupt between these atates, Moscow plays an influential role In its capacity as adjudicator and referee. It can use traditional hostilities between them for its ownand, by siding with one country or another, con use these enmities to barter and to threaten. The Rumanians, for example, are convinced that the Soviets have privately encouraged Hungary to agitate over Rumania's policies in Transylvania.
18. In more general terms, the size, prestige, and awesome political and economic power of the USSR provide it with still another lever, distinct from that provided by aheer military strength. As has always been the case ln relations between large and small states, the power of the larger can be usedorm of pressure against the smaller. This is particularly useful in seeking to curb policies which ore specifically hostile in intent, and thus helps to define the linita of independent action for the smaller states; itarrier of sorts against radical forms of defiance.
the Sovietsethod ofEuropeariety of economic devices. But,have learned their lessons, they must realize that the use
ofpressure frequently has disappointing results; Yugoslavia, Communist China, and Albania failed to succumb to ltindeed, they actually accelerated their anti-Soviet policiesirect consequence of its use. Nonetheless, the Soviets almost certainly consider it one of the major weapons in their arsenal. The Eastern European states depend for close to half their total trade on the Soviet Union, and most of them certainly realize that their industrial exports have little demand in the Heat.
of these countries are seeking to reduceon the USSR. They are trying to Improve thetha mix of their export trade, attempting vigorously towith the west, and seeking out Western creditsto improve domestic performance. It is notwith time and luck, they could materially reduce theiron the USSR and at leastotential for tradestates should the need suddenly arise.
III. CCOTRi SURVEY: THE SPECTRUMOVEREIGNTY
for most purposes the countries of Easternnot be consideredhole, should bo examined in the
of their diversity, in one important way they may now be viewed in terms of their collective impact. Froa the point of view of Moecow, and in terms of their influence on Soviet policies, these states con be seen as an autonomous political force. over the past several years, and with Rumania showing the way, the course of political action and the direction of political pressure in this area nowrom East to West. These countries are gradually chipping away at Soviet dominance, asserting individual national interests, and turning increasingly to the West as an alternative to Soviet dominance.
22. Nationalism latrong factor throughout the area, most of it strongly laced with antl-Russlanlsm, and it must appear to many of these leaderships to be an attractive prelude or even alternative to genuine liberalization. It is finely calculated to maximize popular support for otherwiae highly unpopular; by itself, liberalization appears quite unable toomparable Job. Indeed, unless its economy la able to sustain fairly consistent and impressive rises in the standard of livingas ie nowhere the case in this areathe regime which embarks on liberalization runs the risk of actually increasing popularby allowing ita more vocal expression.
23- It may be that some of theae regimesulgaria cornea immediately to nlnd are ao cccrprocleed and conditioned by their history of abject subservience to the Soviets,or so blinded by the myths of their ideology, that they will not be able toolicy designed to appeal to nationalistic But others vlll surely see the benefits ofourse, especially in terms of their ovn Interests and positions of power, and will be strongly tempted tohe Rumanian rood.
Rumania has formally declared its Independence end has acted generally ln accordance with that declaration. It has developed good contacts with other major states, has rebuffed its dominant neighbor on more than one occasion, and hasomestic program consistent with its own national interests. Economically, U> percent of ita trade is still with the USSR but it has revised the trend by expanding as rapidly as possibly its relations with non-Communist countries. Further, lt has the economic potential to resist any Soviet attempt* to arrest this trend through economic pressures. Militarily, though it Is still bound ln an alliance with the USSR, there are signs that Bucharest is intent on loosening this tie. It seems determined to play an
role within the alliance and to give lt as much or as little meaning as it wishes to, thus to place itasis common. to alliances cleewbere in the world. Psychologically, Rumania has overcome the apathy of subservience and has actively cultivated the growthull-blown nationalism which is not onlyin spirit but is even oilitantly and chauvinistically assertive. It is perhaps not too much to say that Bucharest is close toegree of independence not notably different iron that attained some time ago by its Ccmnunist neighbor, Yugoslavia.
It could be that even the Rumanians themselves were aurprised at how for and how fast they were going. The leaders, though essentially opportunistic in character, proved that they were far from immune to nationalism. Indeed, once their campaign had achieved initial success, they appear to have joined in with, and to have been captured by, the momentumweet and heady emotionalism. ense of historical identity has been awakened by the Rumanian Coromuiieta themselves, and now theyart of it and probably could not arrest its resurrection even if they were to try.
Until Rumania began its drive for independence,oovementa in Eastern Europe which preceded it, as in
and Hungary, tended to be "revisionist" acroaa the board. Factions which Identified themselves with national aspirations were also inclined to look with favoroosening of internal political and cultural reinselaxation of central economic controls. This waa not the case in Rumania. On the contrary, the Rumanian regimethough it has since modified ita positionwas one of the most traditionalist, de-Stallnlzlng onlyery limited extent. Partlyonsequence of this, and partly because the Rumanian party was the first to purge itself of "Muscovite" and "non-national"ewish) elements, the regime was not seriously bothered by the development of the left, right, and center varieties of factionalism common to moat other Eastern European parties.
37> Despite the continuing oppressive nature of official policies, the Gheorghiu-DeJ leadership was able rapidly and effectively toonsiderable measure of genuine popular support. It was not slaply that the economy was growing rapidly and that the life of the common man wooesult
being improved (though at an appreciably slower pace). More Important, through such means as the almost complete de-Russlficatlon of Rumanian culture and new attention devoted, with official encouragement, to the purely Rumanian (and Latin) roots of that
an effort vhlch worked to the detriment not only of the Russians but to indigenous ethnic minor!tlea, such aa the Hungarians, aa wellthe reg-oe was able to exploit the strong nationalist sentiments of the Rumanian people. The Rumanian "declaration of independence" issued inas greeted with great enthusiasm by the public, which was theneceptive mood for the overt anti-Soviet campaign which followed.
28. The Rumanian party, having gained this important and enthusiastic support, was then able toontrolled relaxation of political controls, through, forarge scale release of political prisonersoosening of the ban on tbeand discussion of Western art and thought. Through Bucb measures it sought to gain even greater popular favor. It can probably now countopular temper which would brand the development of any pro-Soviet opposition as an unpatriotic, even treasonous, force.
29. Tbe determination of the Rusarian leadership to pursue Independent policies across the heard and to assume its place among the ranks of fully sovereign states is much more likely to grow then to wane ln the years ahead. Tho USSR con do v little to halt thj ^roJioa of its influ^nc- in Euchcr-tft.
can with some reason hope that cocsunlsmorm of government, rather than as en extension of Soviet power, will aurvive and that Rumanianll not become any cere hostile to the lntereata of the USSR.
original program, carried out without coat at home and with signal success abroad, could not have escaped the attention of the other Eastern European regimes. Rumanian moves have revealed for all to seceasible alternative to Soviet domination existsolicy of independence backed by the moral and economic support of the West. The Rumanians have also shown thatmall country has some strong psychological weapons in Its arsenal, weapons which have already proved their effectivenessreat power. Bucharest's willingness toublic propaganda campaign against the USSR and its brazencess in opening up the sensitive issue of Besaarabla were clearly intended as trump cords in the game and as warnings to the USSR. Ac Communist China points out, terra irredenta con be on issue in most of the states of Eastern Europe. Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania all lostto the Soviets after the war and Hungary, on the basis of pre-Horldlaims, probably feels that it too has suffered. Claims between many of these countries could also be revived as contentious Issues: the Cder-Pelsse line, Transylvania, Macedonia among them.
31* Polandarge measure of freedom from Soviet intervention But it now chooses to concentrate almost exclusively on its own severe domestic problems, still without Soviet interference, but at the cost of surrendering tone of its initiative in foreign affairs. It cccasionsloy demonstrates its concern over Soviet policy toward China but does so privately and cautiously.
encouragement of naticoslisc: was adopted byrecine os en official policy, but in Poland thebeen quite the reverse. Nationalism has welled up fromhas been used as an instrument of popular pressure on Thus the regime, though Polish In character, hasin the difficult position of seeking to curb mostPolish nationalism. And, again in contrast to the situationit bad already managed to secure forair measurefrom Soviet controls which it has used to bargain
with Moscow, and thus did not feel that it needed to pressure Moscow into granting further autonomy.
fundamental difference between Polandand, Indeed, between Poland and all the other states
too area, lie* In the peculiar relationship between church and itate. Tbe Roman Catholic hierarchy In Poland cosraanda the rcipect and at least the moral supportast majority of the population, and the church believesand has always Believedthat it is inseparable from the nation and the state. It offers the people an alternative to Communist rule and constitutes, in effect, an organized political opposition to tbe regime which Is inherently anti-Communist. The strongf Polish nationalism with the church offers the leadership little choice; if it opposes the church, as of course lt does, in the minds of Polish patriots It thus Ipso facto opposes Polish nationalise.
3a. Or. the other hand, Soviet and Cccxnunist attitudes toward Go many coincide with an important manifestation of Polishatred of Germansear of German aspirations. onsiderable portion of Poland, the so-called western Territories, was formerly German, and all Polesincluding the Church hierarchyare determined that these lands shall remain within Poised. Except perhaps ln times of crisis, however, this attitude is insufficient to counterbalance the hostility of the people and tha church for communism and the USSR.
35* While thus united on questions affecting Germany, both the people and tbe party are otherwise badly fragmented. The party
consists of diffuse elements with differing backgrounds, interests, and desires. Some remain more or less pro-Soviet, others axe fiercely independent; someeneral relaxation of the regime's domestic policies, political, cultural, and economic, others ightening of the party's controls and further represalon of the populace. The people, while for tbe most part apathetic and concerned primarily with individual vell-belng, remain essentially hostile to Communism, suspicious of moot of their leader-a, and strongly anti-Russian. They neither seek norany sort of meaningful identification with the party, It may be, however, that Comulka retains some measure of grudging popular respect and he almost certainly continues to command the allegiance of meet party members. He thus is the one factor which keeps these various elements together. His death or removal might lead to great contention between the leaders end considerableand unrest among the people,
36. The Soviets ore likoly to be especially sensitive to manifestations of Polish nationalism, in large part becouso of the country's strategic position, lying as it does athwart Soviet lines of communication and supply to East Germany. To some extent, then, Poland's fateovereign state depends on the East-West struggle in general end the problem of Germany ln particular. Another leaser factor here may be the USSR's realization that Poland Is by for
largest of ell the Eastern European countriesits population la equal to that of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria combinedand should Poland desert the fold its example wouldarticularly telling effect throughout the area.
Hungary, crushed by the Sovietaas nonethe-leonegree of independence comparable to that enjoyed by Poland. Moreover, Kadar baa successfully dlsalpated the virulent hostility of the peopleombination oflmproveaenta and political concessions. It has done so without Soviet tutelage, butespite acme apparently independent effort to move more toward the US and tbe Weetas cbosed for the aost part to remain mute, or activelyn foreign affairs.
Hungary nay be the price exampleeople's coming to terms with Communist overlordship. Perhaps emotionally exhausted by the traumaonvinced that they can no longer look to tbe West for salvation, andertain degree of prosperity under the relatively benevolent hand of the Kadar leadership, the Hungarians are ln no mood to combat the
regime or to assert their nationalism. The reglsw has of course recognised all this and is In no mood to seek to disrupt teds relative tranquillity. Indeed, lt has sought to preserve it, not only through economic concessions but alsonique policy of enlisting the support of non-Ccanonists who ore regularly appointed to positions of both influence and affluence. The "popular froDt" in Hungary is, lnunctioning system, and though the Communists retain full control. Its benefits accrue to many.
39. The Kadar regime will probably strive to keep relations with tbe USSR unruffled end vill be likely to continue Its close support of Soviet foreign policies. Konetbaleas, ve expect the regime to guard its domestic autonomy zealously, and to move to reduce lte heavy economic dependence on the USSR. Further, at specific times and on specific Issues, It vlll probably move gradually to expand the degree of independence lt has already von. Before very long, for example, Kadar ia likely to preas againeduction or even withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.
Czechoslovakia has emerged gradually from tbe chrysalis of perfect subservience, fron the painful etatus of the "model
satellite." It now gives everyof preferring to strike out on Un ovn in doseBtic affaire and, since the downfall of Khrushchev, has hinted that it would like toore independent role in international affairs as well. The party leader end president, Antonln Hovotny, apparently has had to give up hla stiff-necked opposition to internal and external change ln the face of mounting presBurea from younger, more objective elements in the party. In fact, he seems to have decided, in order to preserve his own political hide, to Join with themeneral awing to the "revisionist" right.
el. Like tbe Polish, then, tbe Czechoslovak regime has had to dealationalism rising from below. Unlike Poland, however, lt seems in large measure to hove sought to identify with lt,iet in ct and essentially anti-Czech nationalism In Slovakia complicates tbe regime's task. But many in both tbe Czech lands and in Slovakia students. Intellectuals, more liberal-minded elements within the partyeem determined to push on independent line and to free the country from Soviet Czechoslovakia thus gives the appearanceountry on the move toward sovereignty; itonger way to go than some of Its neighbors, but tbe beginnings augur veil for the future.
Bulgaria la dependent for its economic well-being on massive injections of Soviet aid,0 million extended in the peat two yeara, more than any other Ccnauniat state. Economically, it has begun to experiment and to decent rail te somewhat, and politically it has purged the old Stalinist leadership. Butitackward, coercive Communist state. Further, its present regime ia divided and weak and tbe top leader, Tod or Zhivkov, can only be describedoluntary captive of the CPSU.
Alone among Eastern European states, Bulgariaong tradition of friendly feelings toward Russia and tbe Soviet Union. The concept of pan-Slovism, andGreater Bulgaria"eneral Slavic confederation of sorts, has long appealed to Bulgarian politicians and intellectuals alike. Further, Bulgaria, while having no territorial grudges againat the USSR, does have territorial claims against Greece and Yugoslavia. Thus on both current political grounds and on the basis of historical ties and enmities, the prospect for significantly greater Bulgarian independence la particularly gloccy. We cannot preclude changes over the longer term, but they do not seem likely within tbe foreseeable future.
W*. Eaat Germany is the obvious special cose. It vas tho ersatz creation of Stalin, sustained by his heirs, and its will to survive isoviet viU, buttroeoed by the presence ofoviet troops. The GZR has no fate of Its ovn, no national tradition, no nationalism exploitable by the regime. Indeed, the nationalism which does exist is unalterably Inimical to the purposes of the regime and its Soviet mentors.
Only the forces of the East-West struggle, particularly thoae related to policies toward Germany, end of Soviet policy tovord Germanyhole are likely toeaningful impact on East Germany. Changes in these fcrce* and pollclea are certainly not out of the question, If only because Ulbricht is not Immortal, Soviet designs are not Immutable, ond East Germany In many respectaoviet liability, not an asset. Moreover, in the longer term developments eisevhere are sure to have an impact in East Germany, which cannot forever remain isolated from the strong political winds bloving throughout the remainder of Eastern Europe. Signs of cultural ferment end pressures from "revisionist" elements within the SED have already appeared, and the regime has seen fit to grant some conceesiens
to toe InteUeetuele and tha praassrtietB. Moreover, trouble breaks out periodically In East Germany;3 riots, the Bchlrdevan affair1 =ore recently the Havenann affair all suggest that the regloe vUl face almllax probleBS ln the future. The erection of the Wall reinforced both the economic and political stability of the regime and haa presumably strengthened Ita hand in coping with resistance, but its ability to do ao is not ensured in perpetuity. But over the short term, as ve have estimated elsewhere, important changes in Soviet German policy do not now appear likely.*
Two Balkan statea, Albania and Yugoslavia, ere in special categories of their own and are moving in opposite directions in their relations with the USSR. They share one thing, hovevex: both have established their full Independence without giving up Communist one-party rule.
See, "Soviet Foreignated
Albania was excluded froa tbe Bloc by the Soviet Unionl. But this merely set the seal on an already apparent split which became irreparable after the failure of aeffort to unseat Hbxha. Doctrinal differences, especially
the issue of Stalin and his works, ceo ace pronouncedut the price reason for Albania's defection vas its constant end growingnd. Indeed, largely justifiedfearoviet-sanctioned absorptionreater Yugoslavia.
The Albanians have turned to Camunlst China for doctrinal and material support, but they have nonetheleeo mm aged to guide their own destinies with aof outside Interference fron any quarter. There is no prospect that relations with the USSB will be healed unless the Albanian leaderohip is aomehow overthrownand there ia almost no chance of thlaor unless the USSR revises its doctrines and ln effect capitulates to the Chinese which le even more unlikely. There is eooe prospect, however, that relations with China might become strained because cf disputes over the degree of peruiaslble Chinese influence or tbe cdeque-ry of Chinose old, and that Albania will be forced to turn more and more to the Vest, cotably Italy.
Yugoslavia has enjoyed better relations with the USSR for the past several years. Anxious for Belgrade's support in international affairs, and coating about for allies to support Soviet leadership of the Communist movement, Moscow conceded to
and hia party tbe right to Ite own road to eociali.ur. and to full national Independence. Relatione, while good, are not, however, oa clcee ae thoeo of the USSR with other Eastern European states, especially on the party level. Elements of friction as yet potentially explooive Include doctrinal issues and Yugoslavia's continued desire for autonomy for all tbe states of Eastern Europe. But Tito doea not wish to provoke tbe USSR into precipitous actions and, indeed, has apparently cautioned the Rumanian leadera to be circumspect in their campaign for independeaee.
proopecta for this relationship appear to boso long as Eiiuehchev'e successors continue to respectto honor Yugoslav pride and sovereignty. To dateindicated their intention to do so. Far Its port,likely to seek better relations with the USSR and the Bloc asthough it will remain wary of any Soviet effort atwill almost certainly seek to keep its economic andwith tbe Vest in good repair.
IV. TEE CUTLOOK
A. The Growing Trend
is not possible to predict the specifics ofIn Eastern Europe. Theae will be tbe result of individual
the ccojequenee of events yet to come, the product of factors end mcveaer.ts essentially unpredictable, and, of course, the policies end actions cf the great powers. But of this ve are surehere will bo change, and it may ceme faster than we had generally anticipated and in ways ve do not expect. We have learned free experienceree, for example, Albania and Rumaniao be wary of guueralizatlc-nj about thie area. As time goes by end as the trendindependence in Eastern Europe gathera momentum, diversity will Increase end chancea for the unexpected may grow apace.
52. Tbe initiative of political movement in Eastern Europe now reeta largely with tbeoe ototea themselves, rather than with the USSB. Each of these states, with tbe exception cf East Geraany, ia ledroup of menolitical institution which new depend for their very existence primarily on domestic oourcoe of strength end domestic attitudes and traditions. In several states, communism la perhaps taking firm root, butay quite unforeseen ln both Moscow and the West. Itariety of national communism which has established itself in Rumania and bids fair to do so elsewhere.
53- We would not expect these regimes to become national Ccmmunlat ln character on similar schedules, in equal degree, or in identical form. Common to them, however, would be full control over
domestic policieseaningful degree of Independence in foreign affaira. Their allegiance to Marxism-Leninism vould probably vary but et least In scae thla voulduestion of public Image rather than true adherence to doctrine. Some mightairly unified and disciplined one-party structure; others, though operating through only one party, might see the development1 of Important and diverse political forceeommunist party framework and the gradual growth cf extra-party and even popular Influences. Nowhere, however, would ve anticipate the developmentenuine multi-party system, though almost certainly pressure for this vould grow. In tbe last analysis, each regime vould determine for Itself what in fact constituted "socialism" and each regime vould remain "communist" so long as It declared itself to be so.
ik. As its efforts to convert CEMAoviet-dominated supranational force vould seem to testify, the ussr lo almostto failure vhen lt doee seek tc innovate and expand its controls. Moreover, the failure of Soviet initiatives tends tohain reaction, for each inotence cf successful Eastern European opposition contains within it the aeedo of even stronger resistance for the next round. The ussr thus is forced to choose
between making concessions, following aore permissive policies, or finding Itself aore sod aore in tba positionower seeking to reotraio change rather then trying, oa It cnce did, to Impose it. ense then, each of these regimea can choose the time, the place, and the issue with which to apply pressure on Moscow. And nothing now seems aore inevitableradually Increasing Interest in and desire for greater Independence on tbe port of moot or all of these countries. The replacement of the preoent, aging leaderships with younger, core vigorous, and probably lesa doctrinaire officials is much more likely to hasten this process than to retard lt.
55- It ia thus possible, as lt has been in tbe past, to discern the general outlinea of this trend and to ascertain its direction. The movement la not of its own accord toward the Vest, nor does it appear necessarily to be heading toward Westernized concepts cf democracy. Rather, these states are acting in what they conceive to be their own national interests, and they look to tbe Veat principally in order to strengthen precisely thoserue, this in aany instances has the effect of moving them away from the East and ln this manner toward the Vest. It is also true that moat of these states looked westward before they wore forced by Moscow to about face. ew of these countries, notably Czechoslovakia,
esser extent Hungary and Poland, bad at least aome tradition of democracy before tbey were compelled to surrender to crnssuniea.
But, vhilo tbey may move only partway toward tbe Went and Ita ldeao, from tbe perspective of Moscow the trend Is highly dangerous. This was the greet- fear at Moscow during the Hungarian Revolution; It vas genuinely concerned that Hungary vould rejoin tbe West of Its ovn accord, vbetber the Vest desired lt cr not, and, ultimately, it vas this fear that led Moscow to intervene militarily. Tbe same concern could bringepetition of that event.
56. For the moat part ve do not foresee crises ln Eastern Europe. These reglmee ore likely to nove with relative caution, to test and probe for Soviet reactions before adopting new policies of their ovn, and, ln general, to avoid acts which might provoke tbe Soviets into intervention. But this does not mean that precipitous Soviet action can be ruled out of the question. Tbe Soviets could fear the overthrew of on Eastern European regime, or lte submission to ncn-Caxmunlst forces, end intervene to forestall It. They could, ln addition, badlyiven situation, see threata to their Vital interests where ln feet none existed, or became overly frightened shout specific events and neve accordingly. Or It is always possiblehange ln the Soviet leadership could lead to
determination to restore Soviet hegemony ln Eastern Europe through whatever aeons proved necessary. For their pert, tbe Eastern European regimes might provoke severe Soviet moves by capitulating to strong popular pressures and pursuing natlegalistic policies overtly and virulently hostile to the USSR and Soviet intcrcnta. They could also miscalculate Soviet responses to specificrovoke Moscow without actually meaning to do ao.
57- It cay be that it ie already too late to speak of the relations between Moscow and tbe Eastern European states in terms of tba formal instruments of Soviet hegemony. Tbe Comdnfcra is long gone; csxa functions, but not well.
58. Concerning the Warsaw Pact, two distinct trends are visible. The USSR has seen fit to provide these countries with at least the potential for moro independent military action. The Eastern Europeans have, in fact, assumed greater control over their ownrend consonant with developments In tho political sphere. On the other hand, tho Soviets seem to be placing greater reliance on tbe Eastern European forces in the formulation of their military strategy. It may be that the Sovleta do longer look upon the Pact as an important means to ensure political control but primarilyore or leas conventional military alliance, dominated.
of course, by tbe supplier of use, Moscow. If so, it vouldaccord with the Soviet effort to improve the military capa-billtles of these forces.
59- In any case, the Rumanians aeem to haveubious eye on the value of the Pact to Rumanian purposes, have publicly deplored all solitary pacta as anachronistic, and bare privately informeduthorities that Rumanian troops will defend only Rumania. They have also privately indicated that, left to their own devices, they vould pull out of the Pact. It ia probable that the Bumanlans are bent on reducing their role within this organisationurely formal level.
60. But these countries remain ander firm, one-party Cccssunlst control, as Hungary did not, and, ln tbe last analysis, tbey can remainleast nominal alllee of the USSR so long as they remain avowedly It is for the Soviet Union to decide whet ber thle is enough. In tbe event that one or more of these states severed even that one last tie, military Intervention would be tbe only avenue open to the USSR to enforce ita will on tbe defecting country. Whether this vould then beeasible course of action, whether tbe gains ln Eastern Europe vould balance tbe risks and lessee elee-vhere in the world, only Moscow could decide. And Moscow Is not good at solving this sort of dilemma.
B. Soviet Policy
6l. Moscow has sought In fits and starts, and for the most part ineffectually, to arrest the drive for Independence In Eastern Europe. For ono thing, the USSR does not fully understand the
to combat it. For another, the Soviets have themselves facilitated the processeneral loosening of policies toward the area, aided and abetted by their coves against China and toward the West. We believe tbat, unless tbe Soviets are willing to resort to military intervention, tbe momentum of this movement toward independence will gather force and become highly contagious.
62. Tit* USSR sees Eastern Europe as vital to its strategic needs. Not only does itorward area for defense end offense, it serves generallyuffer zone between the Soviet Union and West Germany and the other "hostile" status of Western Europe. Tbe USSR also sees in Easternindication of Communistroof of the inevitable advance of socialism; conversely, it would view the defection of any of these statesefutation of that doctrine. Finally, the USSR sees Eastern Europe en an integral part of itsource of actual and potential economic, political, and military support.
All three of these concepts are, of course, subject to change. The strategic eonslderatioa la perhaps the least susceptible to modification, but even here the facta of the nuclear-ml as lie age render tbe concept considerably less valid than lt once vas. Nonetheless, long after strategic factors make the area relatively useless for the defenae of the homeland, Soviet thinking ie likely to reflect more or less traditional military concepts of Eastern Europe's value to the USSR.
&*. Greater change may take place in the area of doctrine. The evolution set off by de-Staliaisstion, end further shaped by the Sino-Soviet conflict, has already altered the conceptonolithic bloc. As the Eastern Europeans increasingly depart from Soviet practice, as Yugoslavia is welcomed to the club, and as the Soviet definition of "socialism" is further diluted both by domestic changes and by the inclusion of more and more countries, such as the UAR, into the "progressive" camp, tbe requirements cf the doctrine for the individual Eastern European etates become vaguer and more permissive. What vllloyal member of the bloc in terms cfecade hence can be but dimly perceived.
nevitably, this sort of ideological erosion viU also have an effect on the Soviet concept of empire. The dreamoightly
organism foilingle eccieomic plan, with national boundaries turning Into unimportant anachronisms, have surely faded. If this is indeed the way in which the USSR'a attitudes and policies toward Eastern Europe ere likely to evolve in time, it will beto define tbe Bloc in the usualloc. like CEMA and the Warsaw Pact might be retained only on the basisenuine partnership end only to tbe extent that they served some specifically worthwhile purpose, something comparable, for example, to the European eteel ccemainity. Or they might become moribund, be scrapped, and then superseded eithereries of bilateral treaties or by an amorphous regional pact of only symbolic Import. Some of these states might form various regional associations with each other and even with nco-Communiat neighbors. Under all such arrangements aa these, each comber state vould be largely free to pursue its ovn Interests at vlU, presumably so long as these did not involve policies actively hostile toward one another.
6c. If the USSR were to recognize clearly the trends in Eastern Europe ynd to Initiate forward-looking policies which sought toand to influence the process, the formationarmonious Soviet-Fast E" trope alliance vould be greatly eased. Tbe history of their relations to date, however, does not suggest that the Soviets arc likely to do this. Tbe Soviets will find it bard to accept a
loose confederation of sovereign countries bound together Inways of alliance and cooperation. Tula strikes at the Russian sens* of great-pcver status, and herein lie numerous posalbllltleaimed Muscovite beavy-handecneos. They are apt to fight the problem aa they have In the past, hoping to halt or at least delay the proceeaariety cf email meaeures and perhaps large threats, ultimately discovering that they must givo in with as much ealvaged grace as possible. This, of course, usually has th* opposite effect from that intended; not only doee it incur the ill vlll of these countries, which does not surprise Moscow, but lt also frequently stimulates further effort* to Increase sovereignty, end to Moscow this apparently does come as somethinghoes.
C. Eastern European Attitudes Toward Specific Soviet Policies
of, Tbe Eastern European states are not enthusiastic supporter* of many facets of Soviet foreign policy. Except when Internal exigencies require it, for example, most of these regimes are reluctant to express full-thr coted Communist hostility toward the We*t. On the contrary, because of burgeoning copes for expended economic rela-tioa* with the advanced Western countries, the Eastern European countries would Use to Improve their relations with the West. Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have made this Intention quite clear in
recent months. So lone aa the USSH'o own policy Includes anf detente, lt vill be difficult for tbe Soviets to reetrsdn Eastern European movement tovard tbe West. Should Moscow reverse itself, it could expect resistance on the part of itsactor to be taken into account in the formation cf Soviet policy.
the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Eastern Europeanwith the Soviet doctrinal position ond some ofaa Czechoslovakia end East Geraany, have been quick topublicly to the Soviet side. But Poland has soughttbe dispute and has counseled the USSR to act cautiously,
and Rumania has gone even farther end publicly dissociated itself from the Soviet point of view. In general, the Eastern European regimes have been given added leverage with the USSR because of the dispute end, though none wouldhinese victory, or even Important Soviet concessions, they welcome tbe increased maneuverability they have been granted by default and are probably not anxiousinal settlement of tbe problem.
yet another area of Soviet policy, tbe Eastare important contributors to the Soviet Bloc's programand military aid to underdeveloped nations, adding some
illion to the Soviet totalillion. Czechoslovakia end
play by far tha aoat Important rolehe Czechoslovakla much larger per capita than the Sovietbut the other countries aleo participate. At lta inception, theae states had no choice but to carry out tbe Soviet vill, and they often were used to promote strictly Soviet Interests. There are signs, however, that the Eastern European aid programs now are being manageday that Is more consistent with national interests. Recently, these states have participated only rarely ln Soviet economic programs, relying Instead on bilateral arrangements, and have almost stopped extending military aid.
70. The Eastern European states, except rugoelevia, have few national political Interests in the underdeveloped countries, and they have far less Interest In expanding their economic relations with these countries than with tbe Industrial Wost. Moreover, there is videepread popular resentment of tbe aid programs In Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, these programs probably will continue, even in the absence of Soviet domination, because some prospective economic benefits ore expected from tbcm. By extending credlte on liberal teres the East European states gain access for theirgoods to markets that might not otherwise be available and to new sources of goods and raw materials. The main exception to
this general rule nay be aid to Cuba, where some subsidies may be Involved and vhere prospects for repayment of credits ore dubious.
71* Soviet policy toward Veat Cermany may also be at laaue between Moscow and some Eastern European regimes. Despite their apprehension and dislike of the Germans, the East Europeans ore particularly anxious to expand their economic relations with Vest Germany and see no good reason why tbe unresolved question cf Berlin should be imposed oc themindrance to the development of closer ties. Indeed, tba viUlngneas of some of these regimes to sign so-called Berlin clausesre-condition for trade ogreementa demcnatratee their unwillingness to allow tbe interests of East Germany to intrude. ontinuation of the Vest German policy of increasing Its presence in Eastern Europe, and of such arrangements as are now under negotiation between Bonn and Warsaw for the establishment of joint industrial enterprises on Polish soil, ve consider tho expansion of Eastern European-West German ties to be almost certain, and we would expect hostility to diminish.
D. Impact of the Soviet Political Scene
72. Tbe removal of Khrushchev from power destroyed one of tbe strongest surviving political links between the CBSR and the countrl
of Eastern Europe. Khrushchev was careful to cultivate good rela-tloce with all tbe Satellite leaders, replacing th* Iron will and discipline (and contempt) of Stalin with personal force and camaraderie, persuasion, and occasional threats. Eo developed particularly close vorkliig relationships with both Kadar and Gomulka, swallowed his dislike of Ulbrlcbt end cajoled his Into cooperation, kept the strings taut on Zhivkov In Bulgaria, and in general treated the Eastern European leaders as fellow politicians in the Bloc club. Be even introduced Tito into membership.
73- One result was the sour reaction of these leaders to hie downfall. Gomulka, Kadar, Novotny, and even Ulbrlcbt publicly indicated their displeasure by praising Khrushchev when it was quite clearly the Soviet intention only to criticize hia. Mainly, we suppose, these leaders were concerned about reactions within their own parties, but wo do not discount aome genuine attachment
over those cf tbe new leaders. In any cose, we know of no personal ties between the Eastern European leaders and hnrusbchev'a successors and we do not expect any single Soviet leader to gain the stature Khrushchev once enjoyed for some time to cone.
It seeme likely that cob: or all of theae leaders will now take the opportunity afforded by the new situation ln the USSR to press their own national Interests and to make their voices heard ln Moscow. Ghoorghlu-Dej has already begun to assert Rumania's Interests more vigorously than everho re vlll probably follow suit. In any event, should Mobcow seek to restore tighter controls over these leaders, it is likely to meet with greater resistance than ever. Only Ulbricht among them vas In the top spot at the time of Stalin's death; thus the othera have either worked successfully for their own autonomy and are by now accustomed to running the affairs of their ovn parties, or have worked only ln an atmosphere of relative Soviet permissiveness. They are surely aware that the nev Soviet leaders have no more means at their disposalnd probably fewerfor enforcing Eastern European conformity than Khrushchev had.
75- They are also acutely sensitive to the general political scene in Moscow and are almost certainly convinced that tbe present collective arrangement is inherently unstable. Tbey will probably be reluctant to support ore faction or tbe other until the outcome of such inn lability becomes clear, and tbey will be equally averse to committing themselves to policy except in a
very general way. Sone in Eastern Europeprobablor the weaker elenentamay identify themselves with one Soviet faction or the other and seek political support therefrom, but the chances of thla do not aeem as greatthey once were, for example, in Hungary where Kagy clearly identified himself with Kalenkov, Rekoei with Khrushchev. For their part, the Soviets, so long as they remain lockedtruggle for power, era unlikely to formulate new and coherent policies for the area, and disputes on this issue are likely to arise. Decisions neededrlala may thus bo hard to obtain. As with foreign policies In general, Soviet interests In Eastern Europe might be better eerved by one-man leadership.
76, Of equal import is the question Just where and when tbe USSR can now count on these states for support. Matters have already reached the stage where Moscow cannot assume in advance that its particular policies will receive automatic approval froie Eastern Europe; in order to be euro, the Soviets must sound out these governments ln advance. They must wheedle and cajole lo Instances where support ia withheld, and in cases where even this fails, they must either alter or abandon their tack or proceed alone. This is particularly true in issues related to the
dispute, vheir Ruoonlo bo* Its full rmlity
and other states, cost notably Poland, haveoluonance to adopt tbe Soviet line. Butesser degree lt also applies to Soviet policy toward the Veat; the President's state of tbe union message, for example, was blistered In Moscow but praised ln some East European capitals. Ve think the trend Is clear: the East European states are no longer willing to adopt as their own whatever foreign policies tbe USSB sees fit to advance. Before giving their full support, most of these states seem to viah to subject such policies to critical examination in the light of their own burgeoning national Interests.
ABBOT SMITH Acting Chairman
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:Original document.