PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET AGRICULTURE IN 1970 (RR ER 65-1)

Created: 3/1/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

PROSPECT? FOJt' SOVIET^0

mHlSTORlCAlRE^ PROGRAM RHBSElNflJU.

roHriDBHTIAI.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Research and Reports

The lack ol" progress in Soviet agriculture during the pastears hasegative effect on Soviet economic growth, particularly With an increasing population 'he deterioration in the food supply hasource of considerable popular discontent in the USSR. Soviet prestigeharp setbackhen the USSR was forced to purchase grainheove thathock to Soviet vanity as wellrain on Soviet reserves of gold

In its efforts toolution to its agricultural problems, the Soviet leadership adopted inrogram callingast increase in production of agricultural chemicals0 and for major expansion In the fields of irrigation and agricultural Mechanization. This report provides estinates of the extent of implementation orachievements of this progranttempts to measure the Impact of these ac hi? verier, ts on agricultural production, and analyzes the amplications of the estimated future level of output.

The analysis contained in this report was made primarily Curing the period- that is, before the dismissal in1 of Nlkilu Khrushchevis replacement by Leonid Brezhnev as First Secretary of the Central Cocrnitire of the Co.nounlst Party or the USSR and by Alexeys Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. To date, the impact on the Soviet agricultural program of this change In Soviet leadership, which eoinclder. tally followed acrop Kjowing season, is not known.

Unless otherwise indicated, the statistics contained in this report vere obtained or derived from data In the following basic Sovietpublications: Harodnoye khozywystyog Kodu (National Economy of the USSR,id previous yearbooks ol* the same general title; 5el'akoyo khoayuyatvo SSSR (Agriculture in theoscvnyy'e ploiihchad: SSSR (Sown Areas of theI1 (Animal Husbandry In theovlya sssz 2 god (Foreign Trade of the USSR,ndprevious yearbooks of the same general. Zotov,CTysnl' frjvctskogo Soyuza (Food Industry of the SovietascojS-al' nove strol tel'SSR (Capital Construction in tbend3 godu (The USSR in Figures.V In sone cases these statistics, along with the estimates, have been rounded. For this reason, the components in some tables 'nay not add to the totnls shown.

CONTENTS

Summary and

I. Agricultural Resource Base

and

Rural

Size of the Agricultural Labor

3- Distribution of the Labor Force, by Place

of

It. Quality of the Agricultural Labor

5. Prices and

Priority of Agriculture

Collective Farm and State

3- Present Levels of.

k. Volume of Construction in Agriculture

5. Agricultural

Performance,

of Het Agricultural Production

Total Production

Methodology and Weights Used in Computing

the

of the

of Major

C- Animal

Number of

Production and Availability of

Livestock Products

li. Catch-Up

S. Feed-LivefitOCk Production

Situation in

of Diet and

IV. Why Soviet Agricultureroblea

B. For the US

A. For the

of Crops

1. Crop Pattern

68

Yields per Hectare0

Crop Production0

C. Livestock Industry0

- vl -

1 ii-.

iL'

Feed

Projection of Soviet Feed-Livestock Production

3- Production of Livestock Products0

U. Number of

D- Net Agricultural Production0

1. Index of

Increase Attributable to Crops

Increase Attributable to Animal Husbandry

I'll- Implications of Estimated Agricultural Production

0

Sate of Economic

Food Supply and

Implications for the European Satellites

Implications for the

Implications for the Lees Developed Countries .

Appendixes

Appendix A. Statistical TafclcySiO

Appendix B. Statistical Tables Concerned with theand Projection oi" ?let Agricultural

Production in the

Appes Source

Tables

Population of the USSR, Rural and

Civilian Labor Force of the USSK, Agricultural and lion-

3 and

- vil -

3. Agricultural Labor Force of the USSR, by Major Sector,

Income of Collective Farms and Peasant Income in the

Capital Investment in Soviet Agriculture,

of Tractors, Trucks, and Selected Major

Types of Agricultural Machinery in Soviet Agriculture,

nd

of Construction Work in Soviet Agriculture in

Productive and nonproductive

of Construction Work in Soviet Agriculture Per-

formed by Interkolkhoz Contract Construction

and Allocation to Agriculture of Chemical

Fertilizers in the

10. Estimated Sown Acreage, Yield, and Production of Grain

in the "Hew Lands" of the USSR,

U. Estimated Met Availability of Feed Units in the USSR,

by

12. Comparison of Official Production with Catch-Up Coopaign

Goals for Meat and Milk in the6

13 Norms ol* Oat Feed Units and Types of Feed Required

to Produce One Unit of Livestock Product in the USSR .

Availability of Food for Human Consumption

in the USSR,ear

and Estimated Production of Selected Agricul-

tural Commodities in theverage and

Planned Goalsnd

Estimates of Soviet Production and Alloca-

tion of Chemical Fertilizers to0

17- Estimated Yields per Hectare of Various Crops

in theverage0

- -

18- Estimated Utilization of Chemical Fertilizers

in the USSR, by0

Rates Of Chemical Fertilization in the USSR,

by0 and

of Crops to Fertilization Claimed by Soviet

Officials and Estimated Response0

Crop Production in v'neverage

0

??. Estimated Crop Production ir. the USSR Under Varying

Weather0

Net Availability of Feed Units in the USSR,

verage0

Net Availability and Utilization of Feed Units

in thend

25- Estimated Productionroducts ir, the USSR,

0

?6. Estimated Production of Livesnder Varyingin the0

27. Estimated Index of Net Agricultural Production in the

0

26. Estiraated Net Agricultural Production in the USSR,

29- Estimated Daily Consumption of Food Per Capita in the

verage and

30. Population of the USSR, Rural and Urban, by Age and Sex,

9

ji. Graduates of Specialized Secondary end HigherEmployed in the Civilian Economy inSelected

32- Allocation of Trucks, Tractors, and Agricultural

Machinery to Sovietnd Plans

nd

j

b-6

33. Allocation of Chemical Fertilizers to Soviet Agriculture,

by Type,

Total Cultivated and Sown Acreage in the USSR, by

2 and Estimates for

35- Sown Acreage in the USSR, by Crop, Selected years,

nd Estimates0

36. Sown Acreage in thend Estinates

0

37- Sown Acreage, Yield, and Production of Grain in the USSR,

nd Estimates0

Acreage, Yield, and Production of Potatoes in the

nd Estimates

Acreage, Yield, and Production of Vegetables in

thend Estimates0

Sown Acreage, Yield, and Production of Cotton in the

nd Estimates0

'il. Sown Acreage, Yield, Production, and Procurement of(for Processing) in thendfor

Sown Acreage, Yield, and Production of Sunflower Seed

in thend Estimates0

Sown Acreage, Yield, and Production of Fiber Flax

in thend Estimates0

hh. Production of Sugar and Vegetable Oil and Fish Catch

in the

it?. Number of Livestock in the, and

Estimates0

Estimated Gross Production of Livestock Feed in the USSR,

0

iTf. Estimated Net Availability of Feed Units in the USSR,

0

Lft. Official and Estimated Production of the PrincipalProducts in the.o .

u9. Estimated Availability of Food Per Capita for Human

Consumption in the USSR,

Indexes of Set Agricultural Production in the

USSR,L9

Used in Calculating Estimated Net Agricultural

Production in the

58- Estimated Production and Utilization of Grain in the

53- Estimated Production and Utilization of Potatoes

in the

?t. Sown Acreage and Seed.Requirements for Grain and Potutoes

In the USSR,

55- Procurement Prices in the8 and

of Weighted Prices for Vegetables in the

8

of Meat Prices in the USSR,3 .

Calculated Dressing Percentage of Livestock in the

59- Derivation of Prices per Head of Livestock in the USSR,

60. Value of Estimated Ret Agricultural Production in the

3 Base Prices as

6l- Value Of Estimated Net Agricultural Production in the

USSR8 Actual Prices as

62. Value of Estimated Net Agricultural Production in the

Calculation of Estimated Net Agricultural Production

in the0

6h. Estimated Production and Utilization or Grain and

Potatoes in the0

- xi -

1

.

65. Estimated Availability of Pood Per Capita in the USSR,

Charts

Figure 1. USSR: Total end Per Capita Net Agricultural

Output, Selected

Figure 2. USSR: Distribution of Sown Acreage, by Sector,

Figure 3. Average Diets for the US and the2

- xii -

0-0

Summary and Conclusions

Net agricultural production in the USSR0 is expected to be somewhat more than one-third above the average levelf the emphasis on agriculture as generally laid down by Khrushchev isthroughout the period. The projected increase Implies an average annual rate of growth ofercent. As indicated in Figurehis relatively high rate of growth is projected from the3 base (caused by very unfavorable weather) and is well

700

150

125

1 co

TOTAL AND PER CAPITA NET AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT SELECTED

/

/

/

/

s

X

y

OUTPUT/

OUTPUT

I

The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best Judgment of this Office as

** This estimate assumes average weather and the use ofillion tons of chemical fertilizer on crops Setter or worse than average weather conditions cOulo swing net agriculturaln either direction. An increase in the utilization of fertilizer ofoercent toillion tons, with average weather, would provide ar, addi-ional increase in net agricultural Output of only> jiercent. (Tonnages are given ina throughout. IM3 report.}

J9S3 S 7 9 1

below the annual rate of growthercent achievedurthermore, there will bemillion more Soviet citizens to feed and clotheo, if the rate of population increase estimated by the US Bureau of the Census is projected, and net agricultural output per capita will be aboutpercent above the average levelut only aboutercent above the level Thus, although agricultural output0 will be well above that in recent years, the Soviet agricultural problem will not be solved, and performance in this sector will be disappointing in relation to the overly ambitious goals.

Increased supplies of agricultural commodities in the USSR0 will provide an improved level of consumption, modest additions to state reserves, and supplementary means of payment for imports of chemical and other industrial equipment and plants. Per capitaof high-protein foods will fall far short of the levels promised by Soviet leaders, however, and dietary improvement is not expected toarked effect upon worker productivity. The US may facecompetition from the USSR in the export of wheat, cotton, andto the hard currency market as the USSR seeks to improve its foreign exchange position. Exports of agricultural products to the European Satellites and to the less developed countries of the Free World are not expected to increase significantly except whenmotivated, and then increased exports will be at the expense of domestic consumption and/or hard currency earnings.

Although the USSR nowubstantially larger economic base on which to generate agricultural growth than it hadosts of additional agricultural output will be much higher than in the past decade because the factors that produced relatively cheap gains in the past have been largely used up. Expansion in the dry "new lands"area has reached its limit, and future gains through acreagemust be achieved by the slow and expensive process of landthrough irrigation and drainage. The replacement of draft animals with mechanical draft powerwhich released substantial amounts Of feed for production of additional livestock products In the pasthas largely been completed. Procurement price levels are beginning to press against retail price levels, and future agricultural incentives Will have to be nore closely linked to increases in labor productivityno easy task, judging from past performance. because of the large increases in procurement prices and theconversion of collective faros to state farms over the pastarge part of the investment load has been shifted from the peasant to the state, which now mustarger share of the increased financial burden of the current program.

As opposed to the factors that will generate growth, certain legacies probably will inhibit agricultural growth in the USSR in the future. The present Party-dominated system of agriculturalfor example, appears to be less geared to the needs of the

complicated intensification program than it was to the needs of -he previous extensive and straightforward "new lands" and corn programs, and political interference ln farm management may leadreater waste of resources than in the past. This shortcoming probably will not be offset by improvements in the quality of the agricultural labor force, now heavily weighted with old and unskilled workers. Finally, although for the purposes of this report it was necessary to assume that Soviet agriculture will continue to enjoy its present high position in the scale of nationalealistically the duration of this priority will depend on the size of the harvests, changes in leadership, the international situation, and other factors the Incidence of which cannot be predicted.

*ist of assumptions that provide the frame of reference for projecting growthec VI,elow.

Statements by the new leadership since the dismissal of Khrushchev in4 do noteduction in the priority ofsufficient to alter significantly the conclusions of this report. On theontinuationelatively high priority for agriculture is indicated. Premier Kosygin in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in4 described the development ofasask of paramount importance" and reported that the draft of the new Five Yearrovides for investments and measures designed to overcome completely the lag in agricultural production within theears. Nevertheless, us indicated ln the analysis in this report, Khrushchev's goals for chemicaland irrigation are expected to be scaled down or greatly under-fulfilledthat is,0 only about two-thirds of the amount of chemical fertilizers called for by Khrushchev is expected to beeffectively in agriculture, and only about one-half of his goal for expansion of the irrigated area is expected to be realized.

The USSRotal areaillion hectares" comparedillion" in the US. However, the USSR does notarge agricultural base relative to the tremendous size Of Its land mass- The factors of climatic continentality impose rather severe limitations on the area base of agriculture- otalillion hectares in the USSR was classified as agriculturalillion hectares of which were arable.* These data are to bewithillionillion hectares, respectively, in the US/ Thus the USSR, withimes asand area, has only about one-eighth more agricultural land andpercent larger arable area than the US- However, the USSR, which has nothing corresponding to the most productive agricultural regions of the US, has been expanding its sown acreage in an attempt to meet, agricultural production needs, while an overabundance of agricultural production in the US hasolicy or reducing the acreage under cultivation- Consequently, the sown acreage in the USSR,to 2l6 million hectaresxceededillion hectares seeded in the US lj byercent-

The basic environmental restrictions in Soviet agriculture are low temperature in the north and aridity In the south- Thehe USSR increases eastward, radual reduction in the width of the cultivated area- The valuable "middler "fertilef Soviet agriculture extendselatively narrow base between Leningrad and Odessa in the west to on apexcast of Krasnoyarsk. The area cr greatest agricultural activity in the USSR is foundatitude comparable to areas in the Western Hemisphere north or Ottawa, Ontario, and Minneapolis, Minnesota-

The short growing season and the extremes of temperature linit the types of crops that can be grown in the USSR- Krasnodar in the fertile Worth Caucasusrost-free periodays, comparable to Omaha, Nebraska, undhe Ukraine has0 frost-free days, similar to southern Minnesota, while atrost-free seasonays corresponds to conditions ln parts of North Dakota-Stations of corresponding latitudes farther eastward in the USSR have even shorter growing seasons- hj Ihe short growing season restricts the growing of spring-sown crops, whereas the extremely lowin winter severely restrict the areas in which fall-sown and perennial crops can be grown- During severe winters, extensive winterkill of full-sown grains is experienced ever, in southern regions of the 'JSSN, where winter wheat predominut.es.

hectarecres.

serially numbered source references, see Appendix C-

land includes primarily arable and pasture land.

land includes Land that is or has been under eultivation-

Lov potential evapotranspiration* and poor drainage in the cool northern regions have resulted in the extensive development of over-moist lands in spite of the relatively lov average annual rainfall in these areas. For example, in the Kaliningrad area, the region of greatest potential drainage-reclamation, the average annual rainfall is less thannches. The excess of precipitation over potential evapotranspiration in much of the western and northwestern USSR is lessnches. However, this small excess of precipitation, combined with the lack of dominant drainage patterns in the formerly glaciated areas, has resulted in the extensive development of over-moist lands- Approximatelyillion hectares of swamp and bog lands reportedly have been drained, but at present fewer than 3hectares are being fully utilized for crop production.** One Soviet source estimates that the area of feasible drainage-reclamation is aboutillion hectares,igure that includes only Bwamps, which generally are in areas of less extreme temperatures and thus are believed to be suitable for crop production.

A deficiency in moistureandicap to agricultural production in the USSR equally as important as the long and severe winters and the excess moisture in certain areas- 'ihe southern boundary of the "fertile triangle" is determined in large part by aridity. Crop production generally is not economically feasible without irrigation in the areas south of this boundary. In the most arid lands of Soviet Central Asia,nches of precipitation fall annuully, while the potential evapotranspiration ranges fromonches, jj Even within the

fertileost of the southern and eastern agricultural regions ore in the semlorid zone. In this zone, not only is the annual precipitation light, but also it varies greatly from year to year, and its seasonal distribution is often unfavorable to crops. Spring wheat, which accounts for about three-fourths of the total wheat acreage, is grown largely in this zone. The late spring and early summer droughts that are frequent in these areas are often accompanied by scorching dry winds, the so-called sukhovev. Crop failure in the semiarid zone con be expectedear out ofr 5-

* Evapotranspiration is the loss of water from the soil byand by transpiration through plants. Estimate based on information In source

The continental influence, largely responsible for excessiveln the higher latitudes, tends to increase the aridity of the southern USSR. Greet distances from large water sources, combined with the barrier of surrounding mountains, act to reduce the moisture received in the interior. The desert lands of the USSR arc in the latitudes of the prevailing westerly winds that normally carry cyclonic and other storm activity, but by the time these storms travel moreiles inland to the southern regions of the USSR, little moisture remains to be precipitated. inimum of precipitation falls during the hottest season of the year, intensifying the adverse effect of drought on vegetation and crops.

* Long-fallow land, according to the Soviet definition, is land that has not been usedears or more.

The "new lands" program, which was largely implemented, resultedne-fourth expansion in the sown acreage of the USGIt and significantly altered land use patterns- Under this program, aboutillion hectares of virgin and long-fallow land* were brought under cultivation, largely in West Siberia and North Kazakhstan. This program brought under cultivation substantial acreages that appear to lie somewhat beyond the northern boundary or the "fertile triangle" in West Siberia and its southern boundary in Kazakhstan. Some of the land that has been taken under the plow4 receives less thannches of precipitation annually and is of marginal value for crop production. Tbe continuous cropping of the land, primarily to spring wheat, foroears has resultedecline in its productivity owingharp increase In weed infestation, the lowering of the native fertility of the soli, and the problem of wind erosion. However, with proper manage- erit, output of grain from the "now lands" probably could be moln-tained fit on economically profitable level and could account for about one-tenth of the total production of groin in the USSH.

A. Labor and Incentives

1. Rural Population

33 an averageillionrural residents in the USSR moved annually to urban areas. The extent of this migration was about equal to the natural increase of the population in rural areas, and,esult, the size of the rural populationillionas about the same3 as3 (see

Table 1

Population of the USSR, Rural and Urban

Million Persons

Year

2

Midyear data. Official estimates of the.totalhave been adjusted slightly to agree with the estimates prepared by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the US Bureau of the Census.

Although the size of the rural population remained relatively stablehole, it varied during the period in response to changes in the economic position of the rural population relative to the urban population and to changes in the regime's programs for The improvements in rural living conditionswith the "new lands" labor recruitment program, temporarily may have slowed rural-to-urban migration and may have resulted in an actual increase ln the rural population. owever, the ruraldeclined as migration accelerated, apparently because the per

, r

force3 was only slightly below its sizeears earlier, it droppedercent compared with the average levelariations In agricultural employment during the period generally paralleled the variations in the rural population. owever, agricultural employment continued to decline, although the rural population actually increased slightly. This discrepancy reflects increasing employment of rural residents In nonagricultural activities.gricultural employment remained at the level

The decline ir. agricultural employmentsmall, is not consistent with the goals of the Twenty Year, which called for identical increases in both output and productivity at farms durings with no change in the size of the farm labor force. arge drop in the agricultural labor force, however, will take place durings if planned output andgoals0 are fulfilled.) The recent decline in farm employment, coinciding with the stagnation Of agricultural production, leaves the Soviet plannersifficult choice in allocatingresources. The workers who were lured to the City and thus left the farms apparently were needed to meet plan goals in the nonsgricui--tural sector of the economy. Any improvement in material incentives for form workers might slow down or even halt the continuing decline in farm employment. In that event, the additional labor requirements ofnagrL cultural sector, which are expected za exceed the growth of the urban labor supply durings, would not be met.

3- Distribution of the Labor Poree, by Place of fcriploynent

In spite of the conversion cf many collective farms (kol-

continue to employ (or underemploy) the dominant share of thelabor force 'J the labor force at collective farms7 million persons ercent of the total farm labor force compared withercent3 (see.

* elow.

achine tractor stations (MTS's)epair technical stations (RTS's) thereafter.

shown inepresent the number of persons who worked a- such farms st any -iae during the year. They include not only persons whohe collectivized activities of the farms but also those who worked exclusively inthe private subsidiary economythe SO-called "private plots." Moreover, the estimates include persons who were engaged nagricultural activities he repair of farm machinerys well as those engaged inactivities- "he estinates ol employment at machine tractornd at state agricultural enterprises, as shown In Tableepresent attnjal averages, and the estimates of private subsidiary agriculture (except at collective farms) represent equivalent man-years

Trie resulting hybrid estimates of the agricultural labor force are intended to illustrate the size Of the manpower pool at Soviet farms rather than the actual Input of labor into agriculture. They represent an approximation of the number of persons who live on farms and are economically active and who theoretically would befor transfer to the industrial sector of the economy when no longer needed in agriculture.

4. Quality of the Agricultural Labor Force

Although9 more than one-half of the totalof the USSR lived in rural areas, onlyercent of all high school graduates andercent of all college graduates were living in those areas. The average educational attainment of form workers9 wasears comparedears for urban workers.

Intensive efforts to Increusc sharply the number ofpersonnel at Soviet fame have been only partly successful.2specialists"hat is, graduates of secondary specialized and higher educational institutionswere employed in Soviet agriculture (see They constitutedercent of ail specialists employed in the economyhole and lessercent of the agricultural labor force-

, or three-fourths, of the specialists employed in agriculture2 were agronomists, zootechnicians, and veterinarians, and the remainder were engineers,nd persons who had majored in soma other nonfarc field of study. The agronomists, zootechnlclans, and veterinarians working at farms constituted less than half of all such specialists employed in the civilian economyndCO persons trainedfor those fields were employed ln various nonagricultural branches, probably concentrated in government officcs-

As shown In the proportion Of farm specialists actually employed at farms was ss low asercentut At that time, moot of the specialists who were not employed at farms were working In government offices, although many of them were transferred subsequently to MTS's. , orercent of all agricultural specialists, were employed at farms, but the breakup of the KTS's8 reversed the upward trend in that percentage.

Appendix A,elow.

In an eTfort to maintain an adequate staff of specialists at farms and to reduce the turnover fuooiu; thea, It was decreed in2 that sjch specialists no longer could quit their farm jobs voluntarily. According to the decree the permission of the regional

production administration vas requiredpecialist could be released from his Jobollective farm. This limitation on mobility, however, may have aggravated the situation by inducing recent graduates of agricultural schools, as well as those currently working off the farms, to shun the farms in favor of factories and government offices, where such limitations on mobility do not exist.

The USSR in recent years hasimilar problem with tbe hundreds of thousands of skilled workers who have been trained at government expense in "agricultural-mechanization schools.'* Because of the generally higher pay and other advantages of urban areas, these skilled workers also have abandoned the farms in large numbers and applied their skills In more lucrative fields. The number ofmachine operators trained in vocational schools and at farme, for example, wasillion. The total number of such operators employed at farms, however, increased by73 million6 million.

5- Prices and Wages

Money incentives were prominent among the measures taken to Improve the agricultural situation following the death of Stalin. Procurement prices, which had been Intolerably low for mostproducts, were raised sharply; tax concessions vere made; and obligatory deliveries from private plots were decreased and then abolished- However, additional stimuli necessary to overcome the inertia in the agricultural economy were lacking.

There is little evidence to indicate that the reform of the procurement price syBtem8 took into consideration the full financial effects of the abolition of the MTS on the collective farms. Following the mediocre crop, the heavy financial burden that was imposed on the collective farms by the purchase of machinery from the MTS had become obvious. The increase in gross money income of the collective forma (as calculated in terms of current rubles per household) averagedercent annually forears, while the expenses of the farms had greatly increased. In contrast,oney income per household on collective farms increased an average ofercent annually.*

Peasant Income per capita, which Increased an average of moreercent annuallyncreased lesssee

- il -

Early1 the regime began to take measures to improve the financial condition of the collective farms. ecree of1 provided for an extension of the period over which the farms could pay for the machinery purchased from the MTS'b;ecrease In the prices of equipment, gasoline, and building aaterlals;eduction ofercent in the tax on Income from animal husbandry

Table 'i

Income ol' Collective Farms and Peasant Income in the tiSJi'

Gross Moneynf Peasant Incor.c

of Collective ?armsCapita b/

Year (Rubles per100

rubles expressed in current prices, including income Ironproduced by the collective farm (excluding private plots)either to procurement organizations or ir. collective farmincome must cover monetary labor payments, other currentand the bulk Of investment outlays.

5 prices, Including both raor.ey and in-kind inconeby the peasant in the form of labor payments from theand from the sale of products produced on the peasant'sas well as noney income from pensions, subsidies, and stipendsallowance for the value of state expenditures on cultural and

ecrease in the interest rate or. long-term state credits;or the assumption by the state of the transportation costs for delivering the products of the collective farms to procurement points. These measures were expected to save the collective farms5 billion rubles annually-*

One of the most important measures taken- ta stimulate the agricultural sector, especially in enimel husbandry,

* Ruble values ln this report are given in new rubles. ominal rate of exchange based on the gold content ol the0 ruble to This rate should not be Interrr'jLLd as an estimate of the equivalent dollar value of similar US goods or services.

-

vas the decree2 that raised the procurement prices for livestock and poultry obtained from collective farms and Individuals an average ofercent and the procurement prices for butter and creura byercentercent, respectively. Procurement prices for milk and eggs also were raised by pegging the year-round prices for these products at the high winter price The new prices for livestock products were expected to increase the moneyof the collective farms byillion rubles annually. Because the new prices were not effectiveune, they increased the money income of collective farms2 by" billion rubles. Money income from all sources of the collective farms increased'f billion rubles, orercent,ercent per

State purchase prices for cotton, sugar beets, and potatoes were raised significantlyut the benefits derived from these increases were largely offset by the effects of the generally harsh growing conditions The money income of collective farms Increased6 billion rubles,ercent,3ercent per household).

Yields of cotton respond to changes in procurement prices for the following reasons: (a) cotton is grown entirely underin the USSR, (b) itigh priority in the allocation or fertilizers and other inputs, and (c) all of the crop is purchased by the state. , wages on the collective farms that grew cotton failed to increase and on some farms declined. Yields of cotton per hectare dropped steadily9 In3 the utute purchase price for cotton was raisedercent for collective farms andercent for state The price increaseroduced the desired effectarly plantings of cotton that suffered damage from weather were replanted promptly, net acreage was expanded, and above-average yieldsecord cotton crop.

Unlike cotton, almost all of the sugar beets and potatoes In the USSR are grown outside the irrigated area, and yield levels have beenunction of weather. In addition,mallof the potato crop is purchased by the state, and stateprices have little effect on the money income and incentive of the potato grower. Thus, although state purchase prices were raisedercent for sugar beets and aboutercent Tor potatoes In the falldverse growing conditions reduced the harvest or thuoe crops below the average level of recent years.

* The price paid for grain procured from collective farms also was raised slightly

The USSR has not published statistics on peasant incoaw? per capita2

The increase In procurement prices for livestock products in2 was passed on to the consumer, who was assured by the

regime that, both procurement and retail prices would be lowered as soon as costs could be reduced in the livestock industry. This will be no easy task. Judging from past performanceduring, unit production costs On the collective farms were loweredercent per year for pork andercent for beef undercent for wool, andssercent for mutton and milk. Even these modest achievements are more apparent than0arge numbers of unprofitable collective farms were converted to state farms, thus raising the average level of productivity

Conversion of collective farms to state farmseans of eliminating unprofitable collective farms wus haltednd early* the leadershipew method of aiding economically weak

long-term credit program to stimulate farm construction andand by the direct state subsidy Ofercent Of the costs of the weak collective farms in the liming of acid soil, the construction of drainage systems, and thed application of peat- he weak collective farms will be granted aOfercent of their calculated income tax. These measures are expected to stimulate higher rates Of pay and investment in the weak collective/

1 ri i. z i'"1.

peasant was taken lnompulsory pension system was voted for the collective farmers- Ihe previous optional system had been unsatisfactory because only the well-to-do farms could afford tc withhold an adequate share of their incomes for pension purposes. This incentive probably will Improve worker morale at collective fares and

! Y:

younger workers, however, the lure of the city is not likely to beby the promiseension in old age. These young workers, usually with mechanical ability and training, are needed desperately at the farms ifgriculture is to be improved.

B. Investment

t- Priority of Agriculture

*rogram adopted3 when Malenkov was Premier that gavehigh priority, to industries producing consumer goods. ** elow.

During the period of the "newnd "new lands"rams the agricultural sectorigh position in the scale of national priorities. As shown in* productive agricultural investment increasedercent* andercentain of lessercent annually- The

mmm i

share of total investment* that went into agricultureeak5nd agriculture received more thanercent of the total Investment in the economy

ears of mediocre performance in thesector, Khrushchev announced in1 another era of high priority for this sector. Tn contrast to the "new course" and "new lands" programs, however, the provision of additional financial support to agriculture initially developed as an indecisive, piecemeal process. The potato shortage in the winter, the failure of the wheat cropnd the impact of consumer dissatisfactionfrom these and other shortages probably accelerated this process, and by the end3 the high-priority position of agriculture appeared to be firaly established. The duration of this priority will depend on the size of the harvests, changes in leadership, the international situation, and other factors-

2. Collective Farm and State Investment

Trends in investment by the collective and state sectors. iectnie have been affected Dy the source of invoffbrnent funds, by the conversion of collective farms to state farms, and by the MTS reform. Investment by collective farms is financed largely from the income received by the farms, which, in turn, is highly dependent on the weather, price levels, and other factors. or example, the collective farms set aside moreillion rubles in capital (to the indivisible fund) in contrastplan"illion rubles. ombination of factors produced this sizable esult of excellent weather conditions during the growing season and an increase in the level of procurement prices, the income of the collective farms rose sharply Moreover, the percentage of the income of collective farms set aside for the Indivisible fund was increased Long-term state credits are available to the collective farms, but because the loans must be repaid, investmenthese credits, at least In the long run, are also functionally dependent on savings from income. The "flexible" procurement price system,as advertisedeans of eliminating year-to-year fluctuations in the income of the collective farms. An examination of the Soviet procurement pricefor the8umper crop year)9ediocre cropowever, reveals little if any flexibility.

The growth of State agriculture at the expense ofagriculture is illustrated in* Large numbers offarms in the "new lands" were converted to state farmsT-

Kxclusive of investment in private housing.elow.

nlthough this conversion shifted the burden of future Investment to the state, the collective sector hadarge part of the "new lands" expansion, through both direct investment and payments for the services of the state MIS system. As indicated in Figure P, during the earlyf the "new lands" program the sown acreage in the collective sector grew more than ir. the state sector. The MTS reform8 reversed the situation7 byarge investment load to tho collectiveut conversionsndhifted the burden back to the state.

The net effect of these changes over the pastt- rather th'n: tin: - ir;.

the investment risk in Soviet ugricalture. f the total Investment was On the state side of the ledger compared with an average of "JO percentsee. The contrast is much greater, cf course, than is shown by the ledger.he collectiveow, unstable incane

Payments by the collective farms for KTS equipment aridd the cost of acouiring new equipment. ** bove.

a>

and high, fixed charges for MTS serviceswere financinguch larger share of state investment than they were*

3> Present Levels of Mechanization

By concentratingimited number of objectives and by making more intensive use of available equipment, the USSR hasather high level of mechanization in certain basic field operations in agriculture- Nearly all of the plowing, seeding, cultivating, and harvesting Of grain crops on collective and state farms has been done with tractor-powered or self-propelled equipment for the past several years. By contrast, only aboutpercent of the sugar beets onand state farms were harvested by combineso percent of the flax was pulled by machine,ercent of the cotton wasby mechanical pickers, andercent of the cows were milked with mechanical milkers. There was even less use of equipment in animal husbandry work in general and in the growing of potatoes, vegetables, and fruits. Nevertheless, the number of tractorsin agriculture doubled inears, fromhysical units at the beginning'"illion at the beginningU. During this decade the total sown acreage per tractor (in terms oforsepower units) decreusedectaresectares, and the acreage of grain and sunflowers per grain combine decreasedectaresectares. Inventories of ether major types of equipment in agriculture also have increased substantially, as shown in*

* Developments Ln Soviet agricultural investment since World War II arc treated In detail in. ** elow. Appendix A,elow.

-

c J .1 .

The priority for resources for Soviet agriculture asin deliveries of equipment has not been consistent in the pastears, as shown in* eriod Of relatively high priority for agriculture during the height of the "new lands" programas followedf decreasing production of agricultural machineryrop in the share of tractors and trucks allocated to agriculture from new production. Problems of falling inventories and serious shortages of equipmentedirection Of attention to agriculture, reflected in an upward trend in deliveries that began1 and has continued to the present. Production of agricultural machinery3 vas aboutercent greater than inand about double the lowAlthough the share of the tractors producedhat wasto agriculture was no greater than theercent delivered7 and less than the share delivered5he actual number of tractors delivered to agriculture3 exceeded deliveries7 byercent. Deliveries of trucks, however, have dropped far below deliveries curing the height of the "new !arnis"

Table 7

I'oluaw of Construction Work In Soviet Agriculture In Productive and nonproductive Facilities gj

Soviet Agriculture

Million. Rubles y

Share of Total Soviet Construction (Percent)

6 Lfl L85ti8

on investment input in agriculture, the volume of construction work measures the value5 prices) of construction performed- on buildings end other structuresivenalso includes the cost of Installing production equipment in buildings but not the cost of theitself. Mobile agricultural equipment, such as tractors and trucks, also Is excluded fromof construction-installation vork. Construction of private rural housing is not included in theof construction in agriculture but is Included in the total volume of construction in the USSR.

relatively small amounts of Investment by fishing collectives.

construction in the USSR had grown at an average annual rate, hut1 it showed an increase ofercent and recoveryas slow. Thus the volume of construction ln Soviet agriculture rose fromercent0 toercent of total constructionnd plansrovide for further incroasee ln its share of construction resources.

Most of the impetus in the growth of agriculturalhas been provided by state investment, The volume of construction performed by state financing3imes greater thanhereas that performed in collective farms wasimes greater (see. The state sector accounted for only one-third of the volume of construction in agriculture3 and almostercent At least two factors have contributed to this. Construction in collective farms has been directly dependent on the year-to-yearresources of the collective farms themselves, and collective farms also have been subject to conversion Into state farms.

ove to reduce the uncertainties in financing ofin collective farms, state banking organizations recently were given the right to provide long-term credits to interkolkhozand transportation equipment; Tor the introduction of new technology; for development and expansion of construction bases; and for the construction of enterprises to produce local construction

Intcrkolkhoz contract construction organizations have nscumed an increasingly important place in construction on thefarms, as can be Been ln Table 8. Granting of long-term credits to interkolkhoz construction organizations not only means that the share of work performed by them will continue to Increase but also that the role of the collective farms in the extensiveconstruction program will be more closely coordinated with state Interests.

5- Agricultural Chemicals

a- Miners'. Fertltlz.'rn

bove.

Production of mineral fertilizers In the USSR,otal nutrient basis (nitrogen, phosphorus,s only about one-half of thet ln the US, and application of fertilizers per unit of sown area is less than one-third of that in the US. Complex,or mixed fertilizers, used extensively in the US,odest scale in the USSR. Furthermore, the quality of even the simple fertilizers now produced in the USSR is often unsatisfactory; the moisture content of some fertilizers is high; and the quantity of fertilizers available in granulated form is limited. Tn spite of the

Tabic 8

Volume of Construction Work In Soviet Agriculture Performed by Interkolkhoz Contract Construction Organizations

Year

Million Rubles 9>

of theConstruction-InstallationAll Collective

8

3

j.3

uoo

*87

7B

9 35

Production and Allocation to Agriculture of Chemical Fertilizers in the USSR

Thousand Metric Tons

Agriculture

a. Including nitrogen fertilizers expressed in terms5 percent nitrogenotassium fertilizers in terms ofercentoxidehosphate fertilizers in terms7 percentpentoxidehosphorite meal in terms ofnd small amounts of boromagnesturn and boron fertilizers expressedndercent boric acid, respectively.

Appendix A,, below.

') The allocation of chemical fertilizers to agricultureercent3lthough It should be noted again that, at least in recent years, losses have accounted for aboutercent Of the fertilizer allocated to agriculture. In any case, deliveries to agriculture have risen less than total production, with trade plus industrial and military uses taking an increasing share of output. Apurt from the priority of other consuming sectors of the economy, deliveries of fertilizers to agriculture unquestionablybecause of the failure to meet production goals- Output9 million tons9 was far shortong-range goal5 million5 million tons for that year announced by Khrushchev The Seven Yearalled for production ofto increase4 million tons8 toillion tons In addition to the ambitious quantitative goal, major changes were planned in the product mix, emphasizing production of concentrated and complex fertilizerseans of increasing yields and reducing

the costs of transporting large quantities of ballast- Progress toward fulfillment of these goals has been unsatisfactory. Thein oroduetlon inearas onlyillion tons, or an averageillion tons per year- Thus, with total production just belowillion tons3 and the planit set5 million tons, an increaseillion tons would be required5 to assure fulfillment of the Seven

in view of the high priority assigned to the fertilizer industry, significant increases in production can be expected-

b. Pesticides

The USSRast growing but still relatively modest pesticide industry. Present requirements for majorare said to be satisfied by only Uy toercent, 2j/ and the statistic probably understates actual requirements- Accordingovle" report,o PO percent of the harvest is lost because of insects, diseases, and weeds- 2ji/ losses of grain and fruit crops account for two-thirds of these losses.

Production of pesticides in the USSR rose7 tons (active base)3onsurther riseons is plannedo/ By comparison, US production of organic pesticides alone amountedons In relation to plans, progress in introducing new capacities for production of pesticides htis been very unsatisfactory. , for example, onlyercent of the planned new capacity was actually commissioned. Tn addition, problems :tave been experienced in bringing newly commissioned plants to full capacity. Supplies of raw materials have been inadequate, and, in the case of herbicide facilities, severe problems have been encountered with respect to the corrosion ofequipment.

C. Administration

There have been at leastajor organizational changes in Soviet agriculture in the past deeadi*. -bring this period of change the administration of agriculture was shifted out Of the governmental bureaucracy (the managerial-specialist class) and into the morereliable anil responsive Party channels. On the one hand, the dominance of the Party in agricultural administration has ledaste of resourcestifling of local initiative. Tlie majority of the Party officials know little ci" Vrijit cen be accomplished on the farm, and the chief measure of their success has been their ability to meet onrealistic pledges for the deliv-rj arm produce to th< yfste. In many instances these officials have advanced their careers bypledges at any costby misusing fai'sti resources at theiror by falsifying records and achievements.

* Developments in Soviet agricultural administration during the past decade are treated in detail in source gf/.

On the otheresponsive, militant Party apparatusvan needed to overcome tho Inertia of the conservativebureaucracy in implementing such bold measures as the "new lands" program, which, although wasteful,ital stimulant to Soviet agriculture. The present Party-dominated system ofadministration, howevor, does not appear to be suited to the needs of the current fertilizer program. The fertilizer program is more complicated andigher level of technical and managerial skills than previous agricultural programs (the "newhe corn, and the plow-up programs). These skills generally are lacking In the Party apparatus, and implementation of the program will suffer unless the Party develops these skills or relinquishes some of its authority to the managerial-specialist class. The first alternative Is unlikely, and the second will be adopted only with great reluctance."

III. Agricultural

A. Index of Bet Agricultural Production

1. Total Production

Agricultural production in the USSR appears to have passed through two rather distinct phases3 Production of agricultural products increased by about one-half duringear This period of rapid growth was followedearuring which there was relatively little change in output. The changes in agricultural production that occurred in the USSRre shown in the following index) of net production (see

Year

962

rapid increase in agricultural production in the USSRas principally the resultapid expansion in sown acreage during the period and of good weather The total sown acreage increased by almost one-fourthillion hectares3illion hectares8 (seeood harvest of grain in the Ukrainep and record crops of grain and potatoes6 raised the index of production substantially for these intervening years. The excellent harvest for most crops8 coupled with gains in livestock products resultedarge increase in pro-

The lack of growth in agricultural output8 can be attributed primarily to weatherhat8 was an excellent crop year, whereas the succeeding years have been only average or below. Thus the expansion ofercent In sown acreage8illion hectares3 nas not beers accompaniedorresponding increase in output.

2. Methodology and Weights Used ir:he index

* Appendix B,, below. "* Other factors are discussed in II, p. Appendix A,, below.

The measure of agricultural production chosen is the sum of the price-weighted quantities of the major crops and animal products,

including changes in inventories of livestock. The crops included in the calculation of the index were grain, potatoes, vegetables, cotton, sugar beets, sunflower seeds, and fiber flax. Meat, milk, wool, and eggs were the livestock products included in the calculation as well as changes in inventories or in the number of cattle, hogs, and sheep and goats. In order to avoid double-countinghat is, to exclude those commodities used in production of other commodities and thus arrive at an estimate of net rather than gross agricultural productiondeductions were made for the amounts of grain, potatoes, and milk fed to livestock and for the amounts of grain and potatoes used as seed."

State procurement prices8 were used to weight the physical components in the index (see- These prices were established by the Soviet leaders as base prices, from which actual procurement prices would fluctuate totable income to the collective farms. In spite of its8 base price system appears to be the most serious recent attempt by the Soviet leaders toelated set of agricultural prices that would reconcile the needs of, and costs to, the state. Other recent price adjustments have been reactions to crisesuch as the price increase3 in livestock productsears of declining per capita production in this sector and the price increase3 in potatoes following the sharp decline in production of potatoes

Two additional sets of prices were used to test the basic index: (a) the actual average prices paid for state procurements in the good crop year8 and (b) the actual average prices paid Tor state procurements in the poor crop year3 (see. The use of these alternate price weights has little effect on theof the index. Although the alternate indexes resulting from the use of these prices diverge from the basic index in some years, there is close agreement among all of the indexes in the general trend and turning points of the time series.

3. Limitations of the Index

The index presented above represents an attempt toa comprehensive measure of the changesn net agricultural production In the USSR. Because of the many serious prob-

,-vr, the tin., i; io: iJovi.r.

statisticsthe results must be used with caution. The indexore reliable indicator Of the changeseriod of years than of those betweenonsecutive years. Ttore reliable indicator

* For details concerning the methodology used jr. computing the index of net agricultural production, see Tableshrough(Appendix B,, below).

** Appendix B,, See II, A,, above.

of the direction of change than of the precise amount of change. The computation ol' gueh an Index Involves problem of three; main types: (a) incomplete coverage of the commodities, (b) possible errors in the estimates of the gross and net production of the various commodities, and (c) the choiceystem of weights Tor aggregating the This index includes all tha major agricultural cocmodities produced in the USSH. soe limitation of coverage is. not believed to be serious.

Krron in the estimates of the gross and net production of the commodities in some cases, however, may be quite large. ThisIs particularly true for grain, whichtorable commodity. After seed, net exports, Industrial use. and waste are deducted from production of grain, thereesidual that must be divided somewhat arbitrarily into the categories of food, feed, and changes in stocks. Estimates of the use of grain for food were developed asIn the food availabilitynd judgments were madenet changes in stocks, leaving feedesidual In the grain balance (see. These feed residuals when checked against estimates Ofrequirements appeared to be of reasonable magnitude.

Tho valuf of changes in inventory of livestock is estimated by means of changes in the number of livestock and does not take into account changes in weight and quality of

ft. Production of Major Crons

Much of the Increase in production of crops thatn the USSR is attributable to the expansion In the aovn acreage. Thi* expansion was greatest duringear, wher. the "new lands'* were being plowed. The largest Increases in acreage were in grain and forage crops (including sown grasses, corn for silage and green feed, and sugar beets for feed). Most of thein sown acreages attributableeduction in the amount of land left in clean fallow (see Table

* See E,elow. ** Appendix, iscussion of the method of estimating the value of the change in Inventories of livestockn unusual year, seeAppendix B,, beiow).

t Appendix A,, below.

Soviet claims for production of grainre given below (in million tons, including the grain equivalent of ensiled immature ears oflong with estimates for these years:

Y'.-Lir

Claims

Based on reports on crop conditions, weather information, and grain acreage data, the Soviet claims for production of grainpublished sinceppear to be fairly reliable. There is reason to believe, however, that tbe Soviet statistics for the late Stalin yearsolitically motivated downward bias in order to show significant improvement in production of grain during the post-Stalin or Khrushchevian years. This bias, except perhapss believed to be relatively small. 6 the differencethe claim and the estimate represents an adjustment forpost-harvest losses in the "new lands" caused by an acute shortage of facilities to store and transport the bumper crop. oviet statistics on production of grain appear to be highly inflated.

The "new lands" program, launched in lS5k, has contributed significantly to the growth of Soviet agriculture. Production of grain from the "new lands" Is estimated to have averagedillion tons annually, or about lk percent of the total Soviet production of grain. The size of the harvest varies sharply In the "newspecially In Kazakh SSR, because of the extreme fluctuations from year to year In the amount and distribution of rainfall. the "new lands" haveedge against national crop failure because poor crop prospects in the traditional grain area of the European USSR frequently are offset by favorable prospects in the "new lands" and vice versa. This situation was especially true6 when the bumper crop produced in the "new lands" offset the poor grain crop produced in other areas, and the reverse was true of acreage, yield, and production of grain In the "new lands" and their contribution to the total Soviet production of grain axe shown In

Production of wheat In the "new lands" relieved the pressure on the traditional agricultural areas for production of food grains and permitted tho expansion of the area planted to corn and other feed crop as well as some technical crops in the more humid areas of the European

Table 10

Estimated Sown Acreage, Yield, and Production of Gra in the "New Lands" of the

Year

Sown to Grain (Million Hectares)

of Grain (Centners per Hectare)

.>

958

4.5

3

USSR. Inhrushchev proposed to increase the area planted to cornillion hectares4 to not less thanillion hectares The program was rapidly implemented, and2 corn acreageeak ofillion hectares (including cornain, silage, and greens shown uelo":

Corn

0

f- i

Hectares of Corn

t

-

The abnormally high corn acreages3 are th result of part of the large acreages of wheat that were winterkilled being reseeded to corn, although most of the expansion2 may be accounted for by the program to replace sown grasses, oats, and fallow with corn, pulses, and sugar beets. The sine of the corn crop (grain and ensiled immature ears, expressed in grain equivalents) hasfrom lowsillionillion tons79igh ofillion tonsI. These fluctuations in output are

attributable primarily to variations in weather from season to season. However, the inexperience of Soviet farmers in growing corn, the lack of locally adapted hybrids, and shortages of equipment have tended to hold down the yields of corn per hectare. Nevertheless, the corn program has contributed considerably to the feed supply and toin output of livestock products. On the other hand, the large expansion ofate-maturing crop, in the traditional winter wheat areas frequently has caused delays in the seeding of winter wheat, which, In turn, increased the danger and, in some years, the extent of the

The USSR has been relatively unsuccessful in increasingof potatoes {see Although the acreage planted to potatoes expanded somewhat from the low level of thes, it has declined in recent yearsevel only slightly higher than In addition, potato yields did not increasehe increase in production of other vegetables since thes is accounted for through increased yields (see.

Production of most technical crops in the USSR increased rapidlyV63. The amounts of sugar beets, sunflower seeds, and fiber flax produced in recent years are double the size of the harvestssee Tablesnd The increase in production of sugar beets is largely the result of an expansion in acreage, whereas increased yields accounted for most of the increase in sunflower seeds and fiber flax. Increases in production of cotton have paralleled the increase in the irrigated areale ltOr>.

C. Animal Husbandry

1. Number of Livestock

A,, below.

A,, below.

A,,, respectively, below.

A,, below,

A,, below.

The number of most types of livestock in the USSR hasconsiderably3 (sect). The followingshows the number of the principal types of livestock In the USSR inI1 and the percentage change since

Number as of of 4 anuary (Million Head)

which:

The rapid growth in the number of livestock4 is less Impressive when compared with the8 (precollectivisation) levels within comparable boundaries. The number of hogs regained the level8 onlyf sheep byf total cattlendcows The number of goats declined to the level88 and is nowthe level The number of horses ln3f the levelonkeys and mules probably declined similarly. Camels, numbering moreillion headow total onlyead. The present reindeer herd ofhead probubly approximates the level

The total number of livestock, aggregated Ln terms of animal units based on feedrobubly did not regain the level8he peak number in3 was onlyercent above the level8 and subsequently declined to the level6 ln The present number of livestock, in aggregate terms, and, consequently, the feed requirements are roughly at tbe levelut production of livestock products is considerably higher. Although some of the increase in production of livestock products is attributable to an improvement In the quality of livestock, much of the increase can be explained by the savings in feed resulting from the reduction ln the number of horses, donkeys, mules, camels, and cattle used for draft power.

* The number of horses and the change3 relate3 because the number of horses as4 is not available.

** Weights and animal classes used for aggregation are as follows (cows: nd

- -

The estimated total supply of feed (in terms of feedn the USSR increased by approximately one-third between the average5 andnd reached an average ofillion tons in the latter period (see. ecord level of feed productionillion tons was reached8 largely because abundant rainfall produced an excellent growth of pasture grasses, an amount believed to have been far in excess of what the grazing livestock herds could consume. The decline in total feed supply to anillion tons3 was due primarily to unfavorable weather conditions during theseason.

Of the different types of feed, the supply of succulent feeds registered the largest and most consistent increase during the period, the supply of succulent feedseing on the averageimes the average- Almost all of this increase was accounted for by corn harvested as silage and as green feed. Aboutercent of the total corn acreage ineriod was harvested as succulent feed. The quantity of sugar beets fed increased considerably5 )Aich of the increase in the feeding of sugar beets,was offsetecline9 in production of forage roots. The use of potatoes for feeducculent feed) has not shown atrend.

The increase in the supply of concentrated feeds (grain end byproducts)as not as sharp as that offeeds. The average amount of concentrated feeds available, however, was almostercent greater than the average level.

Very little change occurred in the total supply of coarse feeds (hay and straw)xcept8 The supply of hay increased aboutercentbove, but the use of straw for feed probably did not change significantly, in spiteeneral trend toward greater production of cereal groins. Although the acreage of cultivated hay land increased duringyear period, the native hay area declined.

Production of feed from pasture, with the exceptionas fairly constantecause the area devoted to pasture in the USSR was relatively stable. The degree of the utilization of pasture grasses by the livestock herds, however, is believed to haveduringyear period.

* In this report the various kinds of feed materials are aggregatedet of weights that measure their feed value relative to that of oat grain. These weights are given inAppendix A,, below).

Table 11

Estimated Net Availability or Feed Units in the USSR, by Type a/

Million Metric Tons

Type of Feed

Year

_/

_/

1/

e/

s.-

units are in termson of oat grain. oreof the estimated gross production and net availability oflivestock feeds In the USSR during the6 andAppendix A, pp.nd lib, respectively, below).

feeds are largely grain and byproducts such ssand oilseed cake or meal.

feeds include silage, potatoes, sugar beets, foragemelons, green corn, and sugar beet tops.

feeds include hay and straw.

feeds are grasses.

The composition of the total feed supply in the USSR chunged somewhat- Succulent feedsroportion of the total supply of feed increased ir. relative importance from on averageercentoercent. Theof concentrated feeds remained largely unchanged between these two periods, while coarse feeds declined fromercentf the total and pasture feeds fromercent toercent.

3. Livestock,Products

With minor exceptions, production of all livestock products in the USSR Increased annually throughouteriod (nee The total increase in this period Is substantial even after

' Appendix A, p. li'j> below.

Soviet statistics are discounted to remove the combined effectseliberate upward bias and of valid errors in estimation.

Production of meat* in the USSRillion tons and vas one-third more than that. The level of production of meat8 probably vas not regainednd the level9 not. The increases in production of meat generally paralleled the increases in the aggregate number of animals used primarily for production of meat.** The aggregate level of meat-producing animals8 vas regainedhe levels of3 wereercent3 andercentnd the levels ofI1 wereercent3 end onlyercent

The somewhat greater increase in production of meat than in the number of meat-producing animals reflects (a) fewer cattle being used for draft power, (b) the more rapid increase in the number of hogs compared with other meat-producing animals, and (c) perhaps somein the quality of the livestock herds and livestock feed. Pork comprised li2 percent, beef and vealercent, mutton and goat meatercent, poultryercent, and meat from otherercent of the total production of meat. Thepercentages8 wereeef andutton and goatoultry meat,and an insignificant amount of meat from other animals.

* Production of meat is measured in terms of carcass weight,slaughter fats and edible offal obtained from cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, poultry, horses, rabbits, camels, and reindeer. Itt include increases in the inventory weight of livestock left onarms.

** Aggregation of cattle, hogs, sheep, and goats with the same weights as used earlier. Horses have been excluded, for they are used primarily for draft Appendix A,, below.

Production of milkstimatedI million tons, wasercent higher than3 andercent higher than8 (sec Gains in output of milk89 were largely the result of higher yields per animal. Although improved feeding and breeding undoubtedly have contributed to increased yields per cow, much of the increase can be attributed to the fact that cows8 were much more all-purpose animalsraft and meat source as well as milk producers) than in more recent years. There has been little change In production of milk9 because annual increases in the number of cows have been offset by decreased yields of milk per cow. This relationship probably is due to poorer feeding practices resultingore rapid increase in the number of cows than in the supply of feed for them.

Production of wool* increasedercentndons3 was double that produced Thus production of wool has increased more rapidly than the number of sheep, Indicating an increase in the yield of wool per animal.

Production of eggs declinedercent incompared with the peak1 billion eggs producedut production of eggs3 wasercent higher than3ercent higher than Almost all of the eggs produced in recent years have been chicken eggs. Flocks of poultry in the USSR increased by about two-fifths during the past decade.

k. Catch-Up Campaign**

Inhrushchevampaign to catch up with the US in production of certain livestock products. He boasted that the USSR would overtake the US in production of milk per capita8 and in production of meat per capita0I. These goals, of.course, were not met. 6 the USSR was producingercent of the milk andercent of the meat implied by the goal (see 3 the USSR wasercent of attaining the level of production of milX per capita in the US but had reached onlyercent of the level of production of meat per capita in the US.

" Production of wool is givenrease basis; production of scoured wool probably increased less, although quality probably improved.

** Throughout the discussion of the catch-up campaign, Soviet statistics are used. For official Soviet data and estimates of production of meat and milk, see TableAppendix A,,'" elow.

Greater emphasis has been given in the USSR to increasing the number of livestockeans of expanding production than tooutput per animal as in the US. 2 the USSRreater aggregate number of cattle, hogs, and sheep than the US02 the aggregate number of livestock increased by aboutercent in the USSR compared with onlyercent in the US. Hogs in the USSR require twice as long to reach comparable weight as do hogs in the US. The official milk yield per cow in recent years in the USSR is only about half of that in the US. Production of eggs per hen in the USSR is perhaps one-fourth of that in the US. Thesecan be explained partly by climatic factors, by the different combinations of feed available, and by the different breeding programs in the two countries. The Soviet emphasis on increasing the size of herds, which apparently has resultedaster increase in theof livestock than in the feed supply, probably has resultedecline in feeding efficiency. The total production of livestock products in the USSR probably would have been higher if the available feed had been distributed among fewer animals.

1a

Table 12

Comparison of Official Production vith Catch-Up Campaign Goals for Heat and Milk in the63

Million Metric Tons

__-

Livestock

Productapg/ Goal h/ Gap 0 2

3 9

Soviet statistics.

level of production that would be required for the USSRthe US in production per capita.

difference between the official production and tho goalimplied by the catch-up campaign.

5, Feed-Livestock Production Ratios

Comprehensive data on feeding practices and efficiency in feed utilization in the USSR arc not available. The relationshipfeed used and output of livestock products achieved in the US is not directly applicable to conditions in the USSR, because the proportion of grains and other concentrated feeds in the total feed supply is much less in the USSR than in the US and because some of the feeds used in the USSR are not used in the US. There also are differences between the US and the USSR ln the types of livestock raised and in the types ofproducts produced. Errors in estimating production of gross feed as well as the extent of losses of feed crops in harvesting, storage, and feeding also affect the magnitude of feed quantities that arc related to the subsequent output of livestock products and hence the measurement of feeding efficiency.

* The USSR also expresses feed norms as quantities of feed per an-^al per year. These were used to estimate the feed required for draft thimals and for aggregating the number of livestock: The direct relationship of feed per unit of product is more relevant for estimating the feedfor livestock products.

5 the USSR published norms for feeding efficiency that expressed kilograms of oat feed units required toilogram of livestock product.* The Soviet feed norms, including the percentages

of the total feed units to be supplied by various types of feeds, are shown in* These norms were used as factors for converting estimated production of livestock products and animal draft power ino oat feed units required to produce them. The feedwere then compared with the estimated availability of feed, which also was expressed in oat feed units (seen the aversgc, the estimated availability of feed exceeded the "norm' requirements by about This excess of the availability of feed above requirements indicates that the USSR failed to meet its norms of feeding efficiency. Khrushchev and others frequently have criticized the agricultural enterprises for exceeding their feeding norms. Therefore, the norms were adjusted upward byercent in arriving at estimates of the actual feed-livestock production ratios prevailing in the USSR. The resulting feed-livestock production ratios arc as follows: ons of oat feed units per ton ofons, per ton of milk;ons, per million eggs.

D. Agricultural Situation

The USSR3 experienced an extremely poor year forproduction. Unfavorable weather adversely affected production of crops and the growth of pasture in the traditional agricultural areas of the European USSR as well as in the "new lends" areas of Siberia and Kazakhstan. The harvest of cropsroup3 was one of the worst inecade. Probablyesult, little Information has been published concerning production of the various crops In addition, the decline In the number of bogs caused by inadequate ieed supplies probably will require several years to overcome.

* , below. Appendix A,, below. Estimated availability and supply of feed as used in this report approximate consumption of feed by livestock, for deductions have been made from gross production to exclude losses and overestimation. The few statistics on feed published by the USSR indicate that the gross supply of livestock feed was substantially higher than the "norm"perhaps by as much asercent.

The acreage occupied by grain crops in the USSR3 reportedly wasillion hectares less than the recordillion hectares devoted to grain crops ecordillion hectares of winter ftrain (mainly wheat and rye) were seeded in the fall2 for harvest Unusually dry conditions, however, prevented the germination of the winter grains in some areas, and harsh winter conditions resulted in heavy winterkill. esult, onlyillion hectares were harvested as grain,illionillion hectares in addition probably were harvested as hay or were ensiled. Also, yields were low on the area harvested for grain because of reduced stands and dry weather. In an attempt to offset the adverse effects of weather on the winter grainecord area of grain (primarily wheat, barley, corn, and pulses]

8 OiSSS 3

however, the area harvested4 was reduced considerably by fall drought that prevented seed germination and by winterkill. Althoughair winter grain crop was harvostedenerally good growing conditions4 throughout much or the USSR, coupled with ample moisture in the principal "newrea,ood spring grain crop.

Levels of Diet and Consumption

The Soviet consumer, long neglected by Stalin,arked improvement in his dietesult of the rapid increase in agricultural production. he Soviet people arc believed to have had available forufficient quantity of food. The daily caloric intake per capita in the USSR Is estimated to have remained within the rangealories during this period (see Because the diet was already adequate in the number of calories, the improvement in the diet was ln terms of quality rather than quantity. Duringearhe availability of meat per capita is estimated to have been about one-fourth greater than, and the increases in availability of certain other quality foods are estimated as follows: ish, aboutercent; and vegetables (other than potatoes) and vegetable oil, aboutercent (see. esult, the so-called low-quality foods (cereal products and potatoes) ln the diet declined from almostercent of the total calories consumedo aboutercent

The Soviet consumer was conditioned to expect continuedin his lotthe period of most rapid improvement in hia diet. rime example of this conditioning was Khrushchev'sin7 that the USSR would catch up with and surpass the US in per capita production of meat and milk.

There has been little change In net agricultural production in the USSRnd the changes in per capita availability of food products (except fish and sugar)8 reflect this stagnation in agricultural output. , there were several reports of civilian unrest associated with dissatisfaction over the food supply. Shortages of livestock products and the lack of profitability in the livestock industry prompted the regime to raise the state purchase prices for some livestock products in This markup was passed on to the consumerove that provod to be unpopular, particularly with the lower income group, which undoubtedly was forced to reduce its purchases of livestock products. Shortages of food, particularly potatoes, were widespread in the densely populated northern European USSR during the winter. The very poor wheat crop3 forced tbe regime to halt retail sales of floUr to prevent hoarding, to Increase extraction rates, and to lower the quality of bread by using feed grains and other additives ln baking. Local shortages of bread and other food products occurred during the winter

A,, below.

In spite of the improvement during the period", the average Soviet diet remains high in starchy foods, vlth aboutercent of the daily caloric intake derived free grainpotatoes, and pulses compared vithercent in the US (see In addition, the absence of any sizable area in the USSR climatically suitable for winter production of vegetables, plus the lack of refrigeration and rapid transport facilities.o-notony in the diet during the winter season because of the absence of fresh or frozen fruits and vegetables. Inadequate refrigeration and transportation facilities also affect adversely tho regionaland ready availability of other perishable food items such as meat, fish, and milk.

f

IV. why Soviet Agricultureroblem Today

A. for the USSR

During theears of the Seven lear Plan, agricultural production in the USSR, by its own admission, remained at about the level Although unfavorable weather was an important factor inhibiting the growth of agricultural production during this period, other factors discussed in II, above, probably were even more For example, the sale of machinery to the collective farms was not the panacea envisioned by Soviet leaders but actuallyinancial burden to the collective farms that was not compensated for by the procurement prices set for agricultural products. Inadequate investments by the state and inadequate Incomes of the collective farms jointly contributed to the failure to provide the necessary inputs and incentives for growth. Irrational planning or the lack of planning further complicated the agricultural picture as revealed by the method of implementation of the program to shift the use of land in sown grasses, oats, and fallow to more productive crops such as corn, sugar beets, peas, and beans.

For the USSR the problems arising from the stagnation of its agricultural economy have serious implications, both domestic and Agriculture and industries based on agricultural raw materials contribute heavily to Soviet gross national product (GNP). tagnant agricultural economyignificant impact on economic growth ln the USSR. Soviet officials have pointed out that "thebetween industry and agriculture that had arisen3 could again exert its negative influence on the development of industry and the economy of the country if the tempo of growth of agricultural production is not raised

Because agricultural products and products manufactured from agricultural raw materials are primarily for human consumption, the Soviet consumer has felt most keenly the recent lack of progress in agriculture. With the gradual improvement in livine standardshe quantity and quality of foodstuffs increased considerably in the post-Stalin period but probablyeak in thes. The deteriorating food situation in recent years and the substantially increased prices for some productseat, milk, and butters veil as the slowdown in hojs- ing construction have hit the consumer hard. Shortages of food have been the source of considerable discontent and on occasion haveactor in causing local riots. The net Import Of about II million tons of wheat from the Westrobably was prompted in part, by the reluctance of the regime to risk widespread discontent, the lowering of morale,ropabor productivity.

On the international scene the image of the USSR as the chief proponent- of Marxist socialisma source of abundant life for the

peoplehas beenevere blow by the record of its sluggish agricultural economy and by the sudden and. dramatic reversal of its roleubstantial net exporter of grain. The "cup of abundance" which Communism is supposed to represent and which the Soviet leaders have so diligently fostered is cracked end leaking and is in need of repair. If the world Communist movement is to be enhanced, the Soviet leadership must viewajor goal the restoration of the image of the USSRynamic socialist economy capable of overcoming all obstacles. In developing this theme, Khrushchev in

Communism cannot be depictedable laid with empty plates and occupied by highlyand completely equal people. To invite people to such Communism is tantamount topeople to eat soupork. This wouldaricature of Communism.

B. For the US

For the US, too, the problem of Soviet agriculture takes on economic and ideological, as well as military, dimensions. From the Ideological point of view the principal challenge is whether socialized agriculture in generalbased on impersonal, large farms that are owned and operated by the statecan be as successful as agriculture based on relatively small family farm units as in Western nations. To date, Soviet agriculturehole has failed to measure up to that of the US and other advanced Western nations, and there is little to recommend Soviet socialized agricultureodel for emulation by the less developed countries.

Soviet leaders can be expected to continue in their attempts to find solutions for their agricultural problems, possibly even by modifying to some extent the ideological straitjacket in order to bring about the desired results. Technological advances that have brought large gains to agriculture ir. Western countries during tho past two decades cannot fail to become at least partially operative in the USSR, which has borrowed heavily from the West to become the second greatest industrial power in the world. Although socialized agriculture has many disadvantagesong history of inadequate success, the possibility of large increases in agricultural output, particularly given massive inputs, definitely exists. Also, one should not underestimate the potential inherent in the facts that thelevel of output per unit of land and aniaals is lowajority of farms and that manifold inefficiencies exist. The elimination ofven the crudest deficiencies would yield significant results. However, the USSR is unlikely, during theears, to he able to provide for itstandard of living comparable to the average

in the industrial countries of Western Europe, to say nothing of the higher standard prevailing In the US.

eading agricultural country, the USSR, because of its agricultural difficulties, has noterious challenge to US markets for agricultural products except in the export of grains-Soviet statistics purport to show that agricultural production in the USSH has been growing faster than in the US, but this comparison of rates of growth is not particularly appropriate, because the US has been striving to limit agricultural production while the USSR has been attempting totandard of living comparable to that in the US.

With such agriculturally productive land as it has, the USSR in years of favorable weather may seriously challenge the US position ir. world agricultural markets, especially in wheat. 'Ihe wise use of modern technology and adequate incentives to farmers could help mitigate the climatic drawbacks. Indeed, if the USSR could solve its agricultural problem, this achievement, because of the greater natural handicaps, probably1would rate an international acknowledgement as great as that for its industrial successes.

v- Soviet Goals0 and Proposed Means of Meeting Them A. Planned Agricultural Goals

The Twentyfor tne development of the Soviet

economy, adopted at the XXII Congress of the Communist Party inalled for gross agricultural production to exceed the level attained0ercent0 andercentnnual increases in gross agricultural productionercent during the decadeercent during the decadeould be required to attain these goals.

The goals for production of certain agricultural commodities0 appear to have been somewhat modified. Khrushchev at the Party Plenum on the chemical industry in3 announced the planned goals0 for grain, meat, milk, and eggs (see The lower limit of the range given by Khrushchev for production of grain0 is equal to the goal in the Twenty Year Plan. The higher figure for grain probably reflects tho benefits expected to be derived from the fertilizer and irrigation programs. The upper limits of the ranges given by Khrushchev for production of meat and milk are equal to the goals in the Twenty Year Plan. This apparent lowering of the goals for meat and mil* probably is dueore realistic (hence moreJ appraisal of the potential in animal husbandryesult of the poor performance of the Soviet livestock induetry in recent years. The figure given by Khrushchev for production of eggs0 was the some as the original goal.

In evaluating the agricultural goalst is important to note that plans for Soviet agriculture have always been of hero'c proportions. As seen inhe planned output0 of those commodities for which data are available far exceeds the average production foreriod as calculated from official statistics. Compared with the estimated output, especially for grain, the goals0 are even more remote. Production of agricultural commodities ln the past has nearly always fallen far short of planned goals. Aof the planned goals0he goals of the Sixth Five Year Planhat was abandonedith the average level of productions given in Table IS provides an example of past performance relative to planned goals. Except for production of sugar beets, which was the resultarge increase in acreage, production of all commoditiesell far short of the planned goals

There never has been any evidence that Soviet agricultural plans are arrived aterious and systematic calculation ofinputseasonable expectation of outputs. Rather, the plans generally seem to involve three elements: otion of

* elow.

Table 15

Official and Est looted Production of Selected Agricultural Ccnaodltlee

in the USSR

verage and Planned Goals0

Million Metric Tons g/

Average Annual Production

Item

Goals

Estimated

y

beets (for

to 84

seed

to 25

(billion

otherwise indicated.

on source

that is, what would be required to equal or surpass per capita output in the US or to meat "scientific norms orotion that all farms ought to be able to do aa well as the best farms;ropaganda and politics, both domestic and international. In spite of some success, Khrushchev's favorite agricultural endeavorsthe "new lands" and the corn expansion urograms and the catch-up; campaignseem to have been ad hoc, poorly planned and executed, and based on unrealistic expectations.

Even when seemingly attainable plana have been set forth, the necessary inputs have not been made available in order to realize planned goals. Furthermore, agricultural plans invariably hsve been corrupted either by the government bureaucracy or by the Party or by both in their zeal to implement centrally determined goals. Planning andat the farm level, which are so necessary In agriculture, have been largely fictional. ecree5 presumably gave the farm managers the right to plan production but with the restriction thatbe sufficient for the farm to fulfill its part of the national procurement goals. These production plans, however, were subject to review by local administrative organizations that could revise the farm

plans and, in effect, negate any planning at the farm level, ew decree adopted ins directed toward insuring that the farm will have the final decision In any differences that arise in planning between the farms and local administrative organizations. The basic antagonism between centrally directed goals and locally planned production, however, remains, and the farm, as in the past, probably will continue to have to tolerate interference, perhaps more subtle, from the state and the Party.

There is little doubt that the extremely poor performance of Soviet agriculture3 was the catalyst which triggered theby the leadership of substantial resources into agriculturally associated industries but particularly the fertilizer industry. Khrushchev's agitation in recent years for increased investments for agriculture began inhe resources were not madeto the agricultural economy in the requisite amounts to effect the planned increases in production. Plans for increasing production of mineral fertilizers and expanding the irrigated acreage are not new, but the crisis in Soviet agriculture unquestionablyore serious approach by the leadership toward the solution of theproblem.

The main feature of the new agricultural program is theintensification of agriculture." Increased productivity perof cropland is to be achieved by greatly increasing the use of mineral fertilizers and pesticides and by improved seed and expansion of irrigation. In particular, small grains,mall part of which una fertilized in the past, areertilized more heavily,in the more humid regions, where the greatest response tocan be expected. The USSR plans to increase productivity in animal husbandry not only by an improvement in the supply and quality of livestock feed but also by feeding synthesized proteinitamins, and growth stimulants. As discussed inowever, there are several factors that are expected to minimize any gain inin the Soviet livestock industry

B. Agricultural Chemicals Program

1. Fertilizers

* Plans for the intensification of Soviet agriculture are not new. For example, the Seven Year Plan relied on increased output per unit of land and livestock for most of the planned increase in production. ** elow.

The Soviet Seven Year Plan for the chemical industryby Khrushchev in3 calls for production of fertilizers

in terms of standard units* to rise from aboutillion tons3 toillion toillion tons In addition to the increase in the quantity of chemical fertilizers to be produced, Improvements also are to be made in quality. The average nutrient content of Soviet fertilizers0 is scheduled to rise by more than one-thirdwith that Also, according to plan, granulated and noncaking fertilizers are to compriseercent of the total output0 compared with 4f> percent

illion rubles, orercent, of the total direct investment planned in the chemical Industry are to be invested to achieve the goal for production of It is planned to increase the capacity of existing fertilizer plants byillion tons, anddditional fertilizer Installations are to be built, includingitrogen fertilizer plants,hosphate fertilizer plants, 6ore mines,hosphate meal

Ambitious plans also have been laid for construction of storage facilities for chemical fertilizers. Although availableon the subject appears to be somewhat inconsistent, the most recent source indicates that the program calls for construction of storage facilities for chemical fertilizersotal capacity ofillionl/ Of this amount,illion tons are to beby large regional warehouse* at central points already served by railroads. The remaining l6 million tons are to be constructed on the farms by the state and collective farms. The total expenditure of funds ineriod for this construction by both the state and the farms ia eetinatod atillion rubles.

* In converting mineral fertilizers from nutrients to standard units, the USSR uses the following factors: nitrogen,6;7hosphorite meal,ercentnd small amounts of boromagnesium and boron fertilizers expressedndercent boric ac id, respectively. ** Information on requirements for storage in the RSFSR suggested that storage capacity for aboutercent of the production goals0 for mineral fertilizers would be

A number of obstacles confront Soviet planners in their effort to expand the fertilizer industry. These include previousassociated with the lag in the development of now technology and equipment and ihortoges of technical and skilled labor and specialized materials. Construction of both fertilizer plants and storoge facilities has been lagging significantly behind plan and in spite of someprobably will continue to do so In view of theproblems of implementation, attainment of the upper limit of the present goal to produce TO million toillion tons of fertilizers0 is believed to be most improbable. Alternative estimates for production of chemical fertilizers ln the USSR based on outputndillion tons, respectively,0he likely allocation to agriculture ore shown in The level of output ofillion

Table 16

Alternative Estimates of Soviet Production and Allocation of Chemical Fertilizers to Agriculture

Estimated Production ofillion Metric Tons

Basedn Estimated Production ofillion Metric Tons

Type af Fertilizer

5ercentandcid, respectively)

a/

(Thousand Metric Tons)

aa0

Allocation to Agriculture b/ (Thousand Metric Tone)

lfi.SCO c/

/

0

300

Production a/ (Thousand-Metric Tons)

K)

2CC

:

Allocation to AgricultureThousand Metric Tons)

0

200

tons0 is considered to be the more probable of the two alternative estimates. The estimates of availability for agriculture inowever, do not include any allowances for losses incurred in handling, transportation, and storage, which in recent years have been averaging aboutercent of the total supply.

The amount of chemical fertilizers that will be lost or wasted in the USSR0 is open to serious question. It is estimated, however, that losses will amount to someoercent of the total output Thus as much asillion toillion tons of theillion toillion tons of chemical fertilizers allocated0 may be lost. The loss ofarge quantity ofis almost inconceivable, but so is the lossillionillion out ofillion toillion tons in recent years,when chemical fertilizers have been in such short supplyto requirements and when chemical fertilizers currently are being trumpeted as the panacea to Soviet agricultural problems. Although the planned warehouse capacity for fertilizers0 would reduce losses substantially, past performance suggests that construction of warehouses will not keep pace with the need. Also, if steady progress is made toward the levels of production estimated, annual increment to production of chemical fertilizers0 would be on the order ofillion tons, or about half of the total production

The amount of wastage of chemical fertilizers may become so appalling after the program has been underwayears that the leadership will decelerate the program and concentrate on achieving greater efficiency in utilization. eceleration of the program would be expected not only to reduce lossesroportion of the total output but to reduce the total amount of chemical fertilizers producedhus the actual amount of chemical fertilizers applied to crops in the USSR0 may not be very differentontinuation of thefertilizer program0eceleration of the program in the latter part of the period. The estimates of production ofillion toillion tons of chemical fertilizerso (seeontinuation of the present ambitious fertilizer program through the period under study. Thus it Is assumed for this report that losses of chemical fertilizers0 will amount to aboutercent of the total output and that anercent of the total output will not be utilized effectively. Estimates of the amount of chemical fertilizers utilized effectively are shown in* by crop, and discussed in

2. Other Agricultural Chemicals

*elow. ** P. &l, below.

Pew details are available on Soviet plans for expansion of the pesticide industry Production is scheduled to be

ons* (activeevel of about seven times thatnd the necessary investment appears to be on the orderillion/ Herbicides apparently will be given priority development within the pesticides industry. As was noted with respect topresent Soviet plans appear overly1 ambitious in the light of the present status of the pesticide industry,hortfall in plan is likely. As yet, however, information ia too scanty to permit an accurate estimate of the probable size of the shortfall. Progress of the industry, however, should be rapid in spite of the probable failure to meet the goal

Tentative Soviet estimates indicate that the generalfor chemicals used In animal husbandry0 will be in the following magnitudes: fodderillion tons;OC tons; traceynthetic amino0 tons;ons; and fodderhe lack of data precludes an assessment of these preliminary goals and the likelihood of their achievement.

C. Current Emphasis on Irrigation

The USSR has always considered irrigated agriculture as an important means of increasing production of certain agriculturaland significant expansion of the irrigation network has taken place during the course of Soviet rule. Tha irrigation networkncompassed aboutillion hectares compared withillion hectares The area actually irrigated for crop productionduring this period fromillion hectaresillion hectares.

1. Goals for Irrigation-Facility Construction

Soviet long-range plans for irrigation as adopted by the XXIT Congress of tho Communist Party inI and reaffirmed at the Party Plenum on agriculture in4 call forillion hectares of irrigated land These plans appearroad framework into which the intermediate plans may be fitted. eriod the irrigated area is to be expandedillion hectares, bringing the total irrigated area up to approximately iU million/ The goal0illion hectares of new developmentillion hectares to be used for production

According to some versions of the plan, productiono 9OO.OOO tonB of pesticides Is planned. It is possible that tho total is not. Inconsistent with the above figure ofOO0 tons but that the higher figures arc expressed in terms other than an active base. ** Presumably this would be actually irrigated land and not land with an irrigation network.

of Grain- High-value crops such as cotton, fruits, and vegetables apparently would occupy most of the additional irrigated lands to be developed. About two-thirds of the planned increase in irrigated grain cultivation is to be in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Moldavia, with the remainder to be developed in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Implementation of plans for construction of irrigation facilities toillion additional hectares of actualunder the current Seven Yearppears to have progressed satisfactorily It is doubtful, however, that plans0 for construction of new irrigation facilities will be achieved. This skepticism is based on shortcomings that can bein the supply of equipment and materials necessary for the projects being undertaken-

The Soviet construction equipment industryoor record in achieving series production of new types of construction equipment. Thus the new types of canal construction equipment that are planned for the irrigation program probably will not be available until the latter part oferiod. umber of additional factors such as untimely delivery of construction designs and layouts for design-research, extremely poor coordination of construction work in rural areas, and an inadequate supply of concrete flumes and water pipe also will contribute to some underfulfillment of the plans for irrigation construction

Inefficiency in the utilization of the land covered by irrigation networks appears at present toore serious factor limiting the benefits that can be expected from irrigation developments than the expansion of the irrigation network. To date, the utilization of irrigable land within the networks has been so inefficient that as3 about one-third of the land reportedly covered by an irrigation network was not being utilized for crop production.

The current emphasis on irrigation development isin the increase in investment in the water economy plannedillionompared with OOO million rubles/ Also, the emphasis on irrigation development is reflected in the sharp increase planned for production of earth-moving equipment for agriculture In further support of irrigation construction, the Soviet construction equipment industry plans to achieve seriesof several new types of canal construction machinerya rotary excavator for one-pass excavation ofachine for leveling the sides ofonCrete-placing machine for canals, and others.

The emphasis currently being put or: the development, of irrigation facilities is expected to resultignificant expansion in the acreage of crops grown under irrigation In the USSRlthough the area actually irrigated is not expected to reach the

CC li

ill million hectares as planned, an increase of perhaps one-half above3 areaillion hectares appears to be the most probable level of achievement

mere

Emphasis on the Growing of Grain on Irrigated

The grain crisis in the USSR3 prompted Khrushchev lo propose that the acreage of grain on irrigated land be expanded as an aid in stabilizing the grain harvest. Khrushchev's goal was toguaranteed" harvest of5 million tons of grain annually from irrigated His proposal calledhift ln crop patterns no that the area in grains would increaseectares2illion hectaresO on currently Irrigated land. From this area the USSR hoped to obtain annuallyons of grain. In addition, theillIon hectares to be sown to grnin on newly irrigated land were expected to6 mLUion tons of grain annually. Finally, double-cropping of the more favorable land in both the planned and the existing irrigation networks was expected toillion additional

Thus, if Soviet goals were achievedhectares of grain grown under irrigation would provide5 million tons of grain annually. This goal, however. Is predicated on obtaining yieldso, andentners per hectare, respectively. Of corn, wheat, and rico compared with actual yieldsndentners per hectare Although considerable increases in yields of these crops can be expected above the relatively low levels achievedhese envisioned yield responses are well above those achieved in the US, and It seems highly unlikely that the USSR will be able to surpass the yields obtained9 in the major irrigated areas in the USndentners per hectare, respectively, for corn, wheat, andS study indicatesesponseasrom irrigated landr. formerly producing dryland grain. (For an evaluation of the benefits that are likely to accrue to the USSR from the expansion of the area sown to grain on irrigated lands, see VT.*)

Mechanization

1. Planned

There have been no announcements of an officialplan for the over-all mechanization of Soviet agriculturendew preliminary estimates of tbe possible levels of production and delivery of equipment have been published. Supporting data for the official pLonsU5 also were quite meager and did not include data on the value of production of agricultural

* elow.

Coverage of theas been limited generallyiscussion of the "decisive" improvements in machinery and stech-anization thai are necessary or desirable. As expected, considerable

attention has been given to tho types of equipment required for the application of fertilizers, but quantitative data generally axe In summary, the distinct impression is gained from the materials published on mechanization that much remains to be done in theof concrete plans for production of agricultural machinery in the years ahead-

The major developments concerning the future mechanization of Soviet agriculture wore outlined at the agricultural Plenum of4. Xezhevskiy, Chairman of the All-UnionMachinery Xezhevskiy's speech,ope for the solution0 of all major problems of the past concerning Soviet agricultural mechanization. Subsequenthas served merely to emphasize the various points and proposals raised by Yezhevskiy. Achievement of the plan0 for increasing the productivity of agricultural labor was stated to be dependent on the majority of the collective and state farms putting into practice the integrated mechanization and technology at present being applied by the leading equipment operators. Yezhevskiy stated that the chief directions for the development of technological progress inwere higher powered tractors, higher operating speeds, equipment of wider working widths, and universal equipment adaptableariety of operations- An "unprecedented" speedup in creating and introducing these machines, based on the best examples of domestic and foreign machines, reportedly will be necessary. Yezhevskiy spoke also of the need to accelerate the introduction of integrated mechanization, to improve the quality of new production, to utilize the available machinery more effectively through improvements in the organization of work, to increase the number of qualified equipment operators, to increasecf spare parts and improve their quality, and to constructmore repair facilities.

As an example of the tasks lying ahead, Xezhevskiy reported that Soviet agriculture will require deliveries of moreractors annually in thes well as numerous other machines to achieve the integrated mechanization of the basic branches of agricultural production. By comparison, deliveries of tractorsnnually in thend are tonnually in thej>/ Agriculture receivedoercent of the Soviet production of tractorsejcdlanned receipt ofercent of production In connection with the plan to increase the use of mineral fertilizers in. Strokin, Chairman of the State Committee for Tractors and Agricultural Machinery of the USSR Gosplen, has Indicated that Soviet agricultureven according to modest estimates, will require an inventory ofertilizing-type grainineral fertilizer spreaders,oading and unloading machines for mineralomparedather smallinventory of these types of equipment- General guidelines for future inventoriesumber of the major types of equipment for

agriculture, without reference to year of achievement, vere provided earlier by Premier Khrushchev at the Plenum of These planned optimum inventories are presented In the following tabulation with comparative data* (in thousand units):

of

January

of Equipment

combines

combines

combines

combines

drills

plows

trailers

2. Probable Achievements

Soviet agriculture is expected toonsiderably greater quantity of equipment available0 than at present, and certain of the existing extremes in mechanization between various farm operations will hove been leveled out. Tractors are expected to bepowerful, and field operations will be carried out at somewhat higher speeds. Wheeled tractors, having usurped the lead In newfrom traeklaying modelsill be usedar wider scale in agriculture than at present. Many new and more efficient models of related tractor-powered equipment will have been introduced, including equipment for applying fertilizers. Some improvement In the general quality and maintenance of equipment probably will have been realized..

* As As

In spite of improvements in the mechanization of Soviet agriculture, there is little chance that the mujor problemu emphasized by Yezhevskly will have been solved For example, annualof tractors to agriculture probably will averageoercent leasTO than the number that Ycthcvskiy indicated were required. It is entirely unrealistic, moreover, to Luppoae that the present level of achievement of the leading equipment operators will be typical of the average farm work

Serious problems during then theof equipment for the application of fertilizers appear to be The small current inventories of this equipment are composed mainly of outmoded equipment of low productivity. There were only0 grain drills of the fertilizing type (out of production sincevailable at the beginning4 compared with modestly estimated requirements of Soviet industrycould not increase production of these drillsnitss would bo required to achieve an inventory oft the beginningnd continue to produce drills of the nonfertilizing type in the necessary quantities. lan scheduled productionrain drills of the nonfertilizing typef the fertilizing Because the improved designs are not yet ready, much of the output for the next few years will be composed of unsatisfactory models of current design, which will add to the difficulties of fertilizer application. Faulty distribution often leads to situations inertilizer spreader is sent to one farm and the loader for use with it is sent to another form. This Kind of problem is not expected to disappear overnight.

Some Improvement in the organization of farm work, the quality of machinery, the supply of spare parts, the construction of repair facilities, and the availability of qualified equipment operators is expectedut no real solution to all these problems will be forthcoming by that date. Some of these problems are the inheritance of decades of neglect and of ingrained habits that will require moreears for their solution. It is expected that there will be as many complaints of poor use of machinery and over-long harvesting periods0 as there are now and have been for years. The single task of providing equipment operatorsormidable one, eventhe factor of quality. It will require increasing the number of operators fromillion3 to anillionillion by thes-

The USSR will have to expand its training program and train many more operators thanillion trainedf the number of equipment operators0 is to be more than doubleillion One aspect of Khrushchev's educational reform8 may contributeolution of this problem- Before the reform, many rural children left school after only '1 years, and for most ruralears of schooling was the maximum. Currently, by contrast, such children are required to complete atears of formalwith some technical training included in the curriculum. Onworking age they should be easier to train as skilled equipment operators than was the case with previous generations. Training the requisite number of operatorsowever, will be no small task.

A more formidable task is to keep the operators on the farm.72 the actual, number of operators on the farm incrcuscdan increase equal to one-eighth of the

operatora trained during the period. The USSR may provide additional incentivoo for equipment operator" to stay on the farms or even resort to some restriction on the movement of operators off the farms in attempting to solve this serious problem. Higher wages would reduce the lure of the city for the equipment operators but would have to be accompanied by more goods for sale in rural areas. The imposition of restrictiona on the movement of equipment operators would be counter to the general policy of relatively unrestricted movement of labor prevailing in the USSR In recent years and might be self-defeating becauseeluctance on the part of farm youth to participate ln the operator training program under such restrictions- Thus, in spite of some improvement, tbe shortage of equipment operators is likely to continue toroblemarticularly because the announced industrial goals suggest that Soviet industry's insatiable demand for skilled workers will continue.

K- Acquisition of Western Technology and Equipment

1. Impact on Agriculture

The role of imported knowledge and technology ln theof Soviet plans to expand agricultural production0 cannot be minimised. The range of agricultural techniques, knowledge, and technology that the USSR could borrow with considerable economic benefit ia groat, but, judging from past Soviet practice, it dependsumber of different factorsthe Incentive to utilize newthe knowledge of the borrowod technology, the need for it, and the skills and equipment needed to utilize or operate and maintain it.

In the past the USSR as one of the more newly industrialized nations borrowed heavily from the Industrial West in the initial stages of the planned Industrialization programs. onsiderable effort has been made to keep Soviet scientists and engineers abreast ofin Western countries by extensive procurement of Western technical and scientific literature- Following the development of their own agricultural machine building industry, for example, Soviet efforts have been directed toward the acquisition of prototypes that could be copied or modified to suit local conditions without having to pay the full price In terms of time and capital for research and development. In many instances, however, the USSR has experienced considerableln introducing new technology into agriculture.

Certain key elements seem to be Involved in the ability of the USSR to borrow and apply knowledge in agriculture. One factor seems to be simplicity in production, operation, and maintenance. econd factor, which perhaps ia the most Important, seems to bo the importance that Soviet leaders attach to certain knowledge and Because of the nature of the Soviet administrative system, new technology con be introduced Into Hovlot agriculture and appliedide scale. The development of hybrid seed corn points up the

advantages of the Soviet system for acquiring and introducing new technology. Because the USSR was able to import inbred lines and US technology, it was able to switch from the use of open pollinated varieties of corn to the widespread use of hybrids in aboutears, or in only one-half of the time required for the UShole.

On the other hand, it can be pointed out that the highly centralized decision-tasking process in the USSR at times can bein the Introduction of new technology. Benefits that result from the use of new technology in certain regions are offset by its general application. For example, two-phase harvesting of grain, which has certain advantages under some conditions, has been introduced all over the USSR.

2. Impact on the Chemical Industry

The USSR in recent years haset exporteret importer of other agricultural chemicals. In spite of the inadequate supply of fertilizers for domestic use, relatively large quantities of fertilizers and fertilizer raw materials have been exportedaboutercent of the total production. the supplying of Satellite countries and the need for foreign exchange dictated in part this seemingly Irrational trade. Although there are indications that the USSR may import some types of fertilizers in the short run, Soviet long-range plans for production of fertilizers and allocations to agriculture imply that continuing exports are

Soviet purchases of plants from the West for production of fertilizers or fertilizer raw materials have been quite significant in the past several years, amounting to somenstallations. 0 the estimated value of contracts concluded for such plants has amounted to0 million.* These purchases included facilities for production of urea (fourmmonium nitrate and ammonium sulfate, phosphatic fertilizers, and potash-mining equipment. The installations purchased for production of fertilizer raw materials or intermediates include five ammonia plants, four phosphoric acid plants,hosphorus plant. Major Western suppliers of fertilizer plants to the USSR have included the Ketherlands, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and the US.

The USSR will have to rely heavily on imported technology and equipment in order to produce the quantities of fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals planned The European Satellites are expected to provide about one-third of the imports of equipment for this program- Soviet interest continues in importing fertilizer plants from its sources in Western Europe and also from Japan. estimates indicate that Soviot purchases frora the industrial West

Dollar values are given in current US dollara throughout this report.

Hi

of equipment for the manufacture of fertilizers and fertilizer raw materials could amount to someillion. In view of the recent pattern of Soviet imports and negotiations, it is clear that the USSR canonsiderable amount of fertilizerand associated technology from Western Europe and Japan. Also, the USSR is interested in purchasing some very large fertilizerfrom the US, including plants for production of high-nutrient superphosphate, complex fertilizers, ammonia, and potash-mining

The total Soviet imports of pesticides2 amounted toillion, moreimes the levelith the European Satellites providing aboutercent of the imports. Asharp rise in imports of pesticides occurred In view of the continuing shortage of pesticides, however, the USSR also has been interested Tor some years in purchasing pesticide manufacturingfrom the West. Soviet interest in purchasing pesticide plants from the US appears to be very strong, possibly because the US has patent rights for production processes for some of the more effective pesticides.

3. Financing the Imports of Western Technology and Equipment

Taken by itself, the estimated Soviet need to import0 million of plant and equipment from hard currency countries for the manufacture of fertilizers and fertilizer raw materialsould not require much adjustment in Soviet trade policies. Even when possible imports of fertilizers, pesticides, and otherinputs are considered, the total amount could be managed with only moderate strain on the Soviet balance-of-payments position. These imports for the agricultural program, however, aremail part of the probable Soviet requirements for imports from the industrial West. For example, it is estimated that the USSR will have to import aboutillion in chemical machinery andillion for fertilizer equipment) if the goals of the chemical program are to be approached, and potential imports of all machinery and equipment have been estimated at more thanillionhole -

Past increases in Imports of machinery and equipment have been permittedubstantial volume of medium-terra credits from western suppliers and gold sales greater than current production. At present, new medium-term credits are almost entirely offset by payments of principal and interest on past creditsime when the USSR must use scarce gold and currency reserves to pay for imports of grain.

It appears almost certain that the USSR must have longer term credits from the West to pay for the additional capital goods required for the chemical program. Soviet, officials have beenfor long-term credits of up toears in place of the usual

contract terms calling for repaymentears for imports of machinery- The UK government has agreed to guarantee credit for up toearsaximum0 Billion In machinery and equipment for the USSR- One contractillion polyester fiber complex has been signed and willyear creditut it is still uncertain whether or not the USSR will be successful in obtaining all the new credits needed to finance import requirements. To the extent that the desired credits do not become available, planned Imports will have to he trimmed- In the process, planned imports of fertilizer and pesticide plants and equipment prob-ably would bo among the items cut, especially if the USSR is fortunate enough to have several good crop years in succession.

VI. Levels of Production0 A- AnflumptIons

All possible combinations of tho factors of production provide in theory almost an infinite number of alternatives that can influence the future development of Soviet agriculture. The number ofthat can be or are likely to be adopted by the Soviet leadership, however, estricted by the agricultural resource base of the USSR, by past developments In Soviet agriculture, and by the leaders being under some compulsion to strive toward goals established by them for agricultural production nevertheless, the number ofstill open to Soviet officials to influence agriculturalmust be reduced further If an effective, meaningful analysis Is to result. The assumptions listed below provide the frame of reference within which this study on prospects Tor Soviet agriculture0 was conducted:

Soviet agriculture will not be disruptedajor war during the.

The Introduction of Improved technology in Sovietwill continueelatively slow pace as in the past except for Increasing use of chemicals and the expansion of irrigation. Any new scientific or technological discoveries will not have aeffect on the level or quality of agricultural output during the period.

3> The agricultural program followed throughout the period will be essentially the some as that outlined at or before the4 Plenum, which placed emphasis on increasing the use of chemicals in agriculture and the expansion of irrigationhat 1b, thorn will be no new crush programs of major importance.

The impact of better than average or worse than overage growing conditions0 on agricultural production will be equal lo one standard deviation (plus or minus, respectively, which would equal about two-thirds of the estimated total deviation) in the average yields of the various crops and In the variations from the "least-squares" linear trend lines in output of the principal livestock products and in the number of livestock for the

Any changes in the management or institutional structure of Soviet agriculture will notlgniflcant effect onproduction during the period.

'Ihe rate of growth of populotion in the USSR will beercent per yearthe rate estimated by the US Bureau of the Census.

The total sown acreage in the USSRowever, is expected to beercent less than that in the paBt several years. This reduction in sown acreage is expected to result from the USSR's being forced0 toystem of dry-land farming that will entail leaving substantial acreages fallow each year in the "new lands" and other semiarid areas (see Table . Thus it isthat the total sown acreage in the USSR willecrease of aboutillion hectares compared with that

The impact of this reduction in the total sown acreage is expected to fall on the grain crops- It is estimated that the grain acreage in the USSR0 will beillion hectares, an urea aboutillion hectares les3 than the average2The acreage of potatoes and other vegetablesroup and that of the technical crops0 are expected to be about one-seventh larger than the acreages planted to these crops inwith these increases in acreage being accounted for through some reduction in the acreage of forage crops. The estimated distribution of the total sown acreagey crops, is arrayed in These estimates generally conform to those projected by Zemskiy9bove) except where Soviet cropping policy has changed9 or is expected to change, as, for example, in the case of oatB and sugar beets (sec

2. Crop Yields per Hectare0

Ihe additional resources that apparently will be allocated to agriculture during there expected to result in sharp increases in the yields of most crops. In relation toverage the estimated increases0 in yields of the crops covered by this report under the probable levels of fertilization rangeow ofoercent for sugar beets, cotton, and fiber flaxigh Of aboutercent for grains. The increases in yields for the other crops covered by this reportpotatoes, other vegetables end sunflower seedare aboutoercent (see The increases in yields with somewhat higher or possible levels ofrangeow ofercent for cotton and sugar beetsigh ofoercent for grain and potatoes-

A,

A,

A,

elow-

The expected increases in crop yields0umber of factors. These factors include much heavier rates of application of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and lime; anin the acreage of crops grown under irrigation; the use of improved varieties of seed; an increase in the practice of fallowing;

and other technological improvements. Grain is the only crop covered by this report in which the expected increase in the proportion of the crop grown under irrigation is sufficiently large for irrigation toignificant impact on yields. Tt is estimated that theincrease in the use of fallow, the better control of insects and weeds through the use of pesticides, the increased use of lime, and other technological advances such as Improved varieties of seed are expected to result in increases in yields0 of approximately one-tenth for most crops above the levels of yields obtained.

Most of the expected increases in crop yields0 will be attributable to heavier rates of fertilization. ercent forercent for ineffective usage,illionillion tons for livestockt is estimated that, of0 million5 million tons of chemical fertilizers that arc alternative estimates for the likely supply to agriculture0 (seeillion tons (probably) or kj million tons (possibly) will be applied to crops. These levels of utilization of Chemical fertilizers on crops would be more than three times as high as8 million tons estimated to have been applied to crops (Losses, estimated atercent, would have reduced the l6 million tons of chemicul fertilizers supplied to agriculture3 as given in*illion tons.) The estimatedof chemical fertilizers on crops0 is presented int

The rate of application of chemical fertilizers to most crops0 is expected to be much higher than that in recent years-Proportionately the largest increases in rates of fertilization are expected in those crops that have received relatively littlein the pastgrain, potatoes, and other vegetables. otton, sugar beets, and fiber flax already were being fertilized at about0 percent of the recommended rate (see.

* The USSR includes chemicals to be used as livestock feeds, such aw urea, in its production figures for fertilizer.

** bove, t elow, tt elow.

Soviet officials appear to be somewhat optimistic with regard to the response in terms of crop production that can befrom the use of chemical fertilizers. The estimated response Of crops to chemical fertilizers ln the USSR0 averages aboutercent of that expected by Soviet officials. For the USSR it is estimated thai0 the amount of agricultural produce that can be obtained through the applicationon of chemical fertilizers will rangeow of one-fifthon of fiber flaxigh ofons Of vegetables. Grain crops and potatoes areield

Estimated notes of Chemical Fertilization in the USSR, by00

Kilograms per Hectare

Estimated

Crop

&/

^/

$J

vegetables

beets

processing)

seed

e/

flax

from official allocation and acreage figures anda waste factor of

from data innd converted from ato Soviet standard fertilizer units to make the0 data.

on the following assumptions:

ecemmsended" rate of fertilization. By

otton already had receivedercent of the reecn-aended rate.

potatoes, other vegetables, sugar beets, sunflower

seed, and fiber flaxassuming that these crops will receive three-fourths of the recommended rate. For these crops, except nugar beets, the estimated rateill be substantially higher than the rate appliededuced rate for sugar beets is projected because it is estimated that the acreage planted to sugar beets0 will beercent larger than that projected by Zemskiy for his recommended rates.

the "possible" estimate, cotton was given the recommendedfor all other crops were Increased byercent above thelevel-

Estimated Crop Production ln theverage0

Million Metric Tons

Crop

s/

y

vegetables

beets

processing)

seed

flax

of production with

of production with the

orillion use ofon

tons ol"

chemical

technological Improvements, such no Improved mechanization and Increased use of lime (ln the northern European USSR).

Probable production of potatoes and other vegetables0 le estimatedillion tons andillion tons, respectively. These levels of output represent Increases of aboutercent forand almostercent for other vegetables above average production. The Increase in production of potatoes ia largelyto the expected increase in the use of chemical fertilizers. On the other hand, the increoae in production of other vegetables Isabout equally to the increased use of chemical fertilizers and to an expansion, estimated at about one-third, in the acreage planted to vegetables. Production of both potatoes and other vegetables is expected to benefit from other Improvements, particularly from increased applications of lime-

Production of technical crops in the USSR is expected to increased sharply It is estimated that production of cotton willillion tons, an Increase of more than two-fifths above the average level of outputut only about one-fourth larger than the record crop The probable production or sugar beets, estimated atillion tonsill be about one-half larger than the average amount of beets produced. The

-

Tt A L

increases in production of both cotton and sugar beets are expected to accrue largely from an expansion In acreage rather than an over-all Increase In yields.

The probable production of sunflover seed and fiber flax0 is estimatedillion tons, respectively. Thus production of sunflover seed Is expected to increase by almost three-fifths and that of fiber flax by one-fourth in relation to the average levels of output. Almost half of the increase inof these commodities Is expected to result from an expansion in acreage, with the remainder being attributable to heavierand expected improvements in technology.

The levels of crop production achieved0 may be somewhat higher than those discussed nbove that assume theof Uo million tons of chemical fertilizers on crops. It is possibleotal ofillion tons of chemical fertilizers will be applied to crops It is estimated that the additional fertilizers would provide the following increments (in million tons) to the probable levels of production discussed above:

beets

Weather conditions In the USSS are expected toreater impact on the levels of crop production0 than the variation in utilization of chemical fertilizers discussed above. The impact of better or worse than average weather on crops0 In compliance with assumptions estimated to be equal to one standard deviation plus or minus, respectively. In yields- The use of one standard deviation, which eneompauscs about two-thirds of the estimated total deviation in yields, in estimating the effect of weather on crop production is believed to be justified becausein weather do not have the same effect on the yields of the various crops- The procedure used In estimating the standardof the yield for each crop0 wos as follows; tandard deviation of the yields of eoch crop was calculated for thend was related to theield in arrivingoefficient of variation, and this coefficient of variation was then applied to the estimated yield of the crop under average weather conditions The resulting standard deviations in crop yieldsO are given in

The estimated variations In crop productionrom differences In weather conditions rangeow of about

" bove.

Estimated Crop Production in the USSS Jnder Varying Weather Condltloiui

ercent for cottonigh of about kO percent for sunflower seed and fiber flax. The effect of weather on production of cotton issmall because cotton is grown under irrigation. The variation in production of grein due to worse or better than average weather conditions is estimated at about 1'tO millionillion tons (see The expected variation due to weather is fromillionillion tons for potatoes and fromillionons for vegetables.

C. Livestock Industry0

1. Feed Supply

The total amount of feed available0 in the USSR is expected to be aboutercent larger than the average ofillion tons availablesee- An increase In the estimated availability or concentrated feeds accounts for aboutercent of the total Increase in availability of feed. This increase in the availability of concentrated feeds Is primarily attributableuch larger amount of grain and oilJfaed being available forfeedesult of the estimated increase in production of grain

Table ?3

Estimated Net Availability of Feed Units in the USSRverage0

Million Metric Tons

Type of feed

. Average

Succulent Coarse Pasture

Ul.O

8

8

unita arc In termson of oat grain.

Table U7 (Appendix A, p- lit, below).

from pasture8 was reduced. See Tableelow).

* bove.

-rr

The increase in the estimated amount of succulent feeds produced0 accounts for most of the remaining increase in total availability of livestock feeds* This increase in succulent feeds is attritutatir prlr-arlly to the estimated increase In the availability of potatoes for livestock feed and to the estimated Increases Inof sugar beets for feed, silage, and crops used as green feed. It is estimated that almost twice as many potatoes and sugar beets will be available for feed0 as during the. The Increase in production of succulent feeds0 is attributableto increased yields resulting from heavier rates of application of chemical fertilizers on these crops.

Relatively little increase is estimated In the availability of coarse feedsay and strawand pasture. The expansion in the total cultivated acreage in the USSR, discussed earlier in this section of thos expected to resultlight decline in the total area of natural hay land and pasture. Secause there is not expected to be much Increase in the use of chemical fertilizers on natural hay land and pasture, the effect on production of any resulting increase in yields per hectare is expected to be largely offset by theln the total area under these crops.

2. Projection of Soviet Feed-Livestock Production Ratlor.

The Soviet feed-livestock ratios, which were obtained by Increasing the Soviet "norms" of feed required per unit of livestock product byercent,onsistent description of thebetween the annual availability of feed and the annual production of livestock products, animal draft power, and Increase in livestock inventories during3 period (see

The total feed-livestock production ratios oferiod are assumed toairly good approximation of the feed-livestock production ratios that will exist ln the USSRome changes ln feeding efficiency arc no doubt occurring in the USUH. However, changes in feeding efficiency occur relatively slowly. In the US the reduction ln total feed units required per unit ofproduct has been less than might be expected. In the US the reduction in total feed units per unit of livestock product9 lo only as follows: milk,ercent; hogs,percent; beefercent; and eggs and poultry (other thon broilers ando

*bove. ** elow.

Changes ln Soviet feeding practices, however, will occur0 ln conformance with th- changes in the composition of the Soviet

Estimated Net Availability and Utilization of Feed Unite in the USSRO

Million Metric5/

Production

Horse

-

Milk

Ef

Peed

5

8

5

8

3

3

feed supply- The percent of estimated total available feed units supplied"by the several types of feeds ineriod and0 are as follows:

Total Feed Units

of Feed

ent

.-.

Thus concentrated feeds and succulent feeds will supply greuterof total feed supply0 than they did. In this decade the available concentrates were somewhat less than the requirements indicated by the Soviet feeding norms, implying that potatoes and root crops in the succulent feeds group were substitutedart of the grain needs. oncentrated feeds andfeeds will be increasingly used ir. -he place of some of the coarse feeds and posture that are not expected to increase as rapidly. This substitution of concentrated feeds for the other feeds poses no problem in feeding practice, although the reverse practice, which has been the Soviet tendency in the past, Is much more difficult. In the US the relationship of concentrates to total livestock feed fed per unit of livestock production has remained fairly constant at aboutercent0 to the present.

3. Production of Livestock Products0

* See III, C,bove. elow.

The feed-livestock production ratios in this report* were usee in conjunction with the estimated total availability of Teed in arriving at estimates of production Of the principal livestock products The utilization of the estimated total availability of feed in production of the various livestock products is shown inhe level of availability of feed estimated0 under probable fertiliser usage and average weather will permit substantial increases in production of the principal livestock products. Production of meat is expected to increase sharply0 and toevel estimated5 million tons (see, an increase of aboutercent

Estimated Production of Livestock Products in the.20

Million Metric Tons g/

i9I0

Product

Meat Milk Wool Eggs (billion units)

T1

TtcX5

5

38

Possible

6

39

Indication.

above that estimated* More modest increases are projected for the other livestock products. Production of milk and wool0 is estimated-atillion tonsons, respectively, an increase2 of about one-fifth for both milk and wool. Output Of eggsstimated atillion units, Is expected to be about one-fourth larger than

The levels of output Of livestock products achieved0 may be somewhat higher than those discussed aboveomewhat greater amount of fertilizer is utilized on crops 'Iheincrease in the availability of feed would permit anincreaseercent in Production of livestock oroducts (see.

The effect of variations in weather on feed supplytoignificant impact on the level ofthe livestock industry in the USSR As in the casethe standard deviation was used ay the statistical devicethe impact of variations in weather on animalstandard deviation around the "least-squares" linear trendcalculated for theor production of eachproduct and for the herds of each class of livestock. deviations then were related to theof each livestock product and the average Size of herds : n . Ih.v

: VI-: oV

* 2 is used In this report up the base year far livestock productsas an abnormal year in the USSH for production of these products.

formance of the Soviet livestock industry0 in estimating the

standard deviations in production of livestock products and In the size of herds (The estimated Impact of variations in weather on the performance of the Soviet livestock industry0 Is shown in Table

Number of Livestock

hereownward trend in production per head ofecause the USSR attempted to overwinter tooerd in relation to the feed supply- In estimating the number of livestockt is assumed that the downward trend in productivity per head will be halted and that the ratio of livestock to livestock product will recover0 to about the levellthough currently sooevhat more attention is being given to achieving the proper relationships between the number of livestock and theof feed, there are several factors that are expected to minimize gains in productivity per head. It will be difficult for Soviet officials to abandon the practice of using the size of herds as an indicator of success in animal husbandry- As in the past, Soviet officials can be expected to continue to agitate for increases in livestock herds in anticipation of th- achievementarger than actual fulfillment of planned increaceu In feed supplies. In view of the fact that production of feed0 Is expected to fall far short of the plannedontinuation of the emphasis on the size of herds is expected to result In livestock herds0 that continue to be perhaps somewhat too large for most efficient utilization of the available feed. Also, the Incidence of improper utilization of feed additivesa new technology In the USSRis expected to be sufficient0 to offset much or the gain that would be expected to accrue from their use.

elow.

** Calculated by dividing the annual production of each livestock product by the number of producing livestock unitsanuary of that year.

*** Appendix A,, below.

Tlie estimated production of livestock products0 will require much larger herds of livestock than those existing in the USSR in recent years- The number of cattle is expected toto Increase and to reach anillionn increase of about one-third above the size of the herd at the beginning2 (sec Table The number of hogs and cows is expected to be aboutillionillion, respectively,oth aboutercent larger than The number of sheep Is estlnatedillion, or an increase of about one-sixth. umber of horses and goats, however, Is expected to continue to decline. The estimated decrease0 of one-third in the number of horses will be due primarilyurther lncreuse in the use of mechanical draft power.

D- Bet Agricultural Production0

1. Index, of Production

Net agricultural production in the USSRithfertilizer usage and average weather conditions, is expected to be somewhat more than one-third above the average level of production at which Soviet agriculture had stagnated during thesee. The estimated probable level of net agricultural production0 will require an average annual increase above the average levelfercent. The expected increase in net agricultural production from the average level0 le somewhat below that attained3 to the average level.

Table 27

Estimated Index of Net Agricultural Production in the USSR0

3

100

96

98

Year

!0

Index

/

values Of agricultural production usedthe index were obtained fromandAppendix B,elow).

probable fertilizer usage and

C. With possible fertilizer usage and average weather.

d. With probable fertilizer usage and worse than average weather.

a. With probable fertilizer usage and better than average weather.

The level of net agricultural production that the USSH will achieve0 is dependent in large measure on weather conditions and the amount of fertilizer actually used. Under overage weatherthe larger amount or possible fertilizer usage estimated in this report would result in an estimated level of net agricultural output0ercent higher than that achieved with the estimated probable use of chemical fertilizers. The impact of variations in weather0 on agricultural production ir. the USSH will be much greater than that resulting from the variations in fertilizer usage estimated in this report. Under worse than average weather withfertilizer usage, net agricultural output in the USSR0 is expected to exceed the average levely only about one-fourth, but with better than average weather with probable fertilizer usage net production would be expected to surpass the average levely one-half.

The methodology used in computing the indexes of net agricultural output0 is the same as that described inhe components used in calculating tbe estimated value of agricultural output0 are presented in The basic stateprices published8 were used to weight the physical components in the indexes.

2. Increase Attributable to Crops

Production of crops will account for more thanercent of the estimated increment to net agricultural output between the average0 (see. The increase in production Of grain is expected to account for almost one-half of the totalin the value of crop production. The remainder of the increase if, the value Of crop production Is divided about equally betweenand other vegetablesroup and the technical crops-

3- Increase Attributable to Animal husbandry

* ?.bove. ** Appendix B,, below.

Output Of tlie Soviet livcGtock industry0 is expected to aceount for the remaining hO percent of the estimated increment to net agricultural production. Increases in production of livestock products are expected to account for aboutercent of the totalin the value of output of the livestock industry, with the value ol* increases in herds0 accounting for the remainder.

Estimated Net Agricultural Production In the0

1 ion HuhK-t;

Increment inthe Average

-

Technical crops

10

Number of

indicated, the average value of agricultural pro-

lvalues "ere obtained fromAppendixa3 vere obtained fromootnote b.

The estimated increase in net agricultural production in the USSR0 under average weather conditions and probable fertilizer usage (discussed ins only about one-fourth of the0 in the Twenty Year. However, in view of the fact that the Soviet leaders have failed to achieve planned eoals for increases in agricultural production in the past, theof the goal0 is not expected to cause seriousfor the leadership. The significant progress that the Soviet leaders are expected to make in increasing net agricultural production0 will have certain domestic and international implications.

A. Domestic

1. Rate of Economic Growth

Ineriod, agriculture accounted for slightly less than one-third of Soviet GNP. owever, the share of agriculture in GHP fell to aboutercent. In thatrop failure resultedeclineercent in net agricultural production, whichignificant factor depressing the growth of GNP to anercent. Under probable weather conditions the rate of growth in agricultureillignificant impact on the growth of GNP. Although the share Of GNP provided by agriculture will continue to decline and0 will be well below that oferiod, agriculture will stilluch greater influence on the over-all performance of the Soviet economy than on the economies of othercountries. The effect of variations in agricultural production on growth in GNP is shown in the following tabulation (this calculation of GNP assumes that industrial productionill continue to increase atercent annually and that the increase in the other nonagricultural sectors will continue atercent):

Averageof

Value of Net

0

in GHP

bove.

With probable fertilizer usage and average weather. With possible fertilizer usage and average weather.

1 With probable fertilizer usage and worse than average weather, tt With probable fertilizer usage and better than average weather.

There are, of course, alternative uses for agricultural commodities. It is expected that the increased output of agricultural products0 will be used primarily to improve the standard of living of the Soviet people. However, the reserves of someespecially grain, which Is storable, will be built up, and some expansion in exports probably can be expected.

2. Food Supply and Diet

The increased supply of foodstuffs0 will bring about some qualitative improvement in the Soviet diet, which was one of Khrushchev's important aims toward improving the well-being of the Soviet people. As seen inotatoes and cereal products will predominate at the dinner table, with almost half of the estimated daily caloric Intakealories being supplied by these two categories. Correspondingly the intake of quality foods (meat, milk, vegetables, and fruits) will have increased to more respectable levels (or good nutrition. It is estimated that the annual consumption of meat (including edible slaughter fats) and milk per capita0 will heilograms (seeespectively, compared with aboutilograms availablesee Tablehese levels of meat and milk consumption, however, are far short of theilograms of meat andilograms of milk that Khrushchev had hoped to provide

Although the improvement most certainly will be welcomed by the consumer, the Soviet diet will continue to lack the variety and qualitative composition of the advanced Western countries. For example, consumption of meat under the best conditions will lag behind suchcountries of Western Europe as the UK, West Germany, and France, to say nothing of the US, which has an annual per capita consumption ofilograms. On the other hand, the probable level of milkin all forms0 will almost equal the current level of the US, but It would still be considerably below that of the UK, West Germany, and France. Furthermore, it does not seem likely that the sharp seasonal variations in the supply of some products, especially fresh milk, fruits, and vegctnbloD, which have characterized the food supply in the USSR, will be decreased appreciably It should be pointed out that the quality of cereal products, especially bread, as well as assortment and packaging, probably will show some improvement.

Because of the alternative nonfood uses for some productsvegetable oil In paints and varnishes and grain and potatoes foralcohola considerable quantity of these foodstuffs is diverted into industry because of the lack of synthetic substitutes. At present, moreons of vegetable olL and on estimated total of 3tons of grain ore used annually lo the production of nonfood products.

Appendix B,, below. ** , above.

Although Soviet effortso decrease the use of food products for such purposes have not been very successful, expansion of the chemical industry during theears should resulteduction in the nonfood use of food raw materials. Diversion of these foodstuffs for use as food or feed (in the case of grain) would permit some additional improvement in the diet,

B. International

Along with improvement of the domestic food situation, part of the additional production to be realized in the USSR0 will be placed in state reserves or will be exported. Although little is known about Soviet grain reserves, the disastrous wheat crop3eakness in the reserves of that commodity hitherto underestimated in the Western world. Because of the reaction of Soviet leaders to the grain crisis3 and the high priority being given to building up state reserves, the possibilityomparable situation developing in the future does not appear to be likely.

At the Supreme Soviet inhrushchev spoke of the need to establish "necessary grainWot less than half or even the full annual requirement of bread grains [wheat and rye]eeded in order to be protected against anylthough "requirements" are not known, protection against "any eventuality" would eliminate the need ever again to import wheat from the Western nations on the scale ofb because of3 crop failure.

1. Implications for the European Satellites

In the European Satellites, because of the lack of adequate investment and incentives, agricultural programs hove not beenand stagnation has characterized agriculture in most of these countries. Although agriculture currently is being given more emphasis in order to stimulate production, it does not seem likely that the agricultural problems of the Satellites will be solved

The USSR, because of political and economic considerations, will continue to be an important supplier of agricultural, commodities, especially grain, to the European Satellites. owever, it may no longer be the case that the greater part, by far, of Sovietexports (chiefly grain) will continue to be oriented toward the Satellites. 0 it is estimated that the USSR should have someillion toillion tons of grain, primarily wheat, available foror for state reserves. This quantity of grain would be more than sufficient to meet the estimated net import requirements of the European Satellitesillion tons It is doubtful, however, that the USSR would be willing to satisfy all the requirements of the Satellites. Given the need to build up state reserves and to earn foreign exchange to pay for growing imports Of capital goods from the West, the USSH probably will export no moreillionillion tons of grain

to the Satellites and try to expand exports to the Vest. Also, because of tho shortage of feed grains in the USSR and the vast requirements of the Soviet livestock industry, requirements for feed grains to implement domestic livestock programs probably cannot be fullyby the USSR. The Satellites, therefore, will have to depend for the remainder of their requirements on domestic output, vhlch they are trying to expand, and on imports from the Free World.

The USSR exports some meat, cotton, and vegetable oil or oilseeds to the European Satellites. These exports, however, havo been generally at the expense of domestic consumption. In the past the USSR hasignificant importer of sugar from the Satellites. Expanded domestic production of this commodity together with theubstantial quantity from Cuba would eliminate the need for importing sugar from the Satellites. At the same time, the Satellites are attempting to expand exports of sugar to the Western countries be-cause of the need for hard currency.

for the US

In order to help finance the high level of imports ofgoods for Soviet industrialisation programs and particularly the plants and equipment needed to develop the chemical industry, the USSR undoubtedly will attempt to expand exports of agricultural commodities to Western Europe, where much of the capital equipment will be purchased.

Western Europerincipal market for US agricultural products, especially wheat, cotton, and oilseeds. With the increased production of these commodities, it can he expected that the USSR willetermined effort to market more of these commodities, especially wheat, for hard currency. Because Western Europerime hardarea and will be the major supplier of chemical plants andto be purchased by the USSR, the USSR probably will try to expand agricultural exports to Western Europe. Thus lncreaslrg competition from the USSR in Western Europeefinite possibilityU-7O.

for the Less Developed Countries

Soviet exports of agricultural products to the less developed countries probably will remainairly low level, primarily because tho leas developed countries generally ore exporters of agricultural products and Importers of industrial or manufactured goods. Selected exports motivated by political considerations undoubtedly will take place even at the expense of domestic consumption if necessary, but theirsignificance is not expected to be ereat.

The most Important agricultural commodities imported from the less developed countries include cotton, rice, and natural Soviet import requirements for these commodities probably will be affected to some extent by the expanded domestic production of cotton, synthetic fiber, rice, and synthetic rubber. However, several important considerations, financial, economic and political, probably will weigh heavily in Soviet decisions concerning the imports of these commodities.

Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan are the most important suppliers of cotton, with Egypt providingercent of total imports of cotton2 Egyptian long staple cotton, however, is of higher quality than that produced ir. the USSR and could be used in blends with both domestic cotton and synthetic fibers. Furthermore, Egypt, which is heavily indebted to the USSResult of an unfavorable trade balance and long-term credits, could be even more hard-pressed financially if the USSR reduced the imports of those commodities that Egypt can export.

Expansion of production cf rice may result In reducedof this commodity, especially from Burma, which currentlyavorable balance of trade with the USSR. Imports from Egypt,probably would be continued for the same reasons elaborated above for cotton.

Although the USSR is aiming for virtual self-sufficiency in production of synthetic rubber by ly?Q, this goal probably will not be achieved. Imports of natural, rubber, the Chief suppliers of which are Malaysia and Indonesia, declined aboutercentj from the level,urther decline probably will take place. Given the growing requirements of the Soviet economy for rubber, It seems likely that some natural rubber will belthough not on the acule. Imports from Ir.uo.iL-sia, especially,will be continued because of the heavy financial indebtedness of that country to the USSR.

* Except for rubber. Imports of products of tropical and subtropical climates that cannot bo produced at all or are produced in insufficient quantities in the USSRoffee, cocoa, citrus fruits, and the likeshould not be affected by the improvement or the agricultural Situation

Finally, for political considerations it behooves the USSR to support the less developed countries In gsr.eral but especially those countriese establishmentocialistic or corrnunistic form of governmentood possibility and where Soviet interests are challenged by those of Communist China Or 'he Western capitalistic nations.

STATISTICAL TABLES OP BASIC DATA

The tables in this appendix contain the basic data used in the statistical analysis ol" the performance of Soviet agriculture. The tables also contain estimates0 of the acreage, yield, and production of various crops; of production of the principal livestock products; and of livestock herds. These estimates were used in projecting agricultural production in the USSR

i

i

as si s*

i| i i ,

11i |j

w j

Ml

Total Cultivated and Sown Acreage in the USSR, by2 and Estimates0

Million Hectares

Total Cultivated Area

Ig/W

Republic

b/

Area

is estlmatod that the total cultivated area In the USSR will be expanded byillion hectares per year20 and will be distributed as 8, which follows th* period of intensive developmenthe average annual increase in the total cultivated areaillion For data on the total cultivated area, see Table, below).

area in clean fallow is estimated a* follows:

RSFSRthanercent of the total cultivated area will

be left fallow each year This will permit aboutoercent of the cultivated land in the "new lands" regions to be left fallow.

Ukraine 0 the area in fallow will be about the same as

Kazakhstanbout one-fourth of the cultivated area will be left fallow

Otheramount of fallow0 in these republics will he

slightly less than.

rtesi lua: .

Sown Acreage in the USSR, by Crop Selected, and Estimates0

Million Hectares

Estimated

Crop

Zemskiy a/ 0

?

e

other vegetables, and

vegetables

(residual)

crops

beets (for processing)

y

seed

flax

(residual)

crops

-

sown area

c/

cultivated area

y

. The acreage pattern probably pertainsnasmuch as the Zemskiy study covers agricultural developmentyeur period and5 data as its base.

is assumed thatillion hectares of sugarorplanned5 will, be maintained

Table, above).

- LO? -

Sown Acreage in thend Ssticates0

Million Kccttrat

1 O

7 - B 1 0

5 8 9 5 5 0

0 5 5 8 ? 2 8 It mthatUilon hectares of augar beets for proceBalng planned'^ vlll be =air. Mined throutf

jm 11

! I

m 11

i

i

Si I

mi lis it

ji

s sssss

Ii

h

Sown Acreage, Yield, and Production of Sunflower Seed in thend Estinates0

a/

perMetric Tons)

average

U

b/

average

Official data on production of sunflower seed beginning8 have been reduced byercent because of excess soisture and trash resulting free the use of the bunjeer weight in determining the size of the harvest, b. Satis* ted.

J

anuary.

boundaries.

Estimated Gross Production of Livestock Feed In the USSR0

Million Metric Tons

Type of

Year

and Pulses

ots

Roots

Melons

Corn

Beet

Tops

Hay Straw

4

b/

y

Gross production (including waste) except concentrated feeds, potatoes, and sugar beets. Quantities for tbe latter coczcodities are residual quantities after deducting waste, seed uses, industrial uses, and food uses from the current year gross production. Other concentrates are estimatedercent of grain used for food.

level of production

level of production in

Estimated Wet Availability of Feed Units in zhe USSR0

->v,

-a-

2 V

si up'

- .-

/

.-

-

e

0.1

9.1

1

heel.

I

1?

p..

0

6.1

-

ll.j

iB.i

o.*

...

lk.6

rated

fmfl"

l-;

,

3.

*

i

3

5

.7

7

ciottajtoro: "o,, ho^l

vjfi* lolloping

if

hxpnsluetn

htatoe*t room rsaatr row* fcfldar

corn

kay

sttov

fastut*

irobawcof v*c. poml&la laval ofc.

srt proluotwti

toportlos

of production for

0

1.0

'i.

cfinrt#at tiir'a

ftodasmoa mb lno-mal

lil in ihe

foll'jrfuig yen:

3

1 ic 0

fulcra for

to cwita

1-9

l.s

Ilk -

official and estimated production of the principal livestock products in the ussr

,0

Million Metric Tons */

v

production data

cf (percent}

estimate

production

c/ (percent)

e&tlaate

production data

production data (billion units)

d/

7

im

' y'o

o 10

5 l'| 13

8

?5

U

j9.2

2

;

I

t

9c

9

3

38

e/

data include small anoints of anleal fibers other than wool-

c- it lo eatlnated for thla report that the official production data or. neat and milk have to be reduced by the percentages indicated in order to arrive at eetlxatee of the asounts of neat and bilk actually produced.

pertain to production vitmn the fcetindarleB of the ussr

n n 1pli.fr

a u

a

-< o

m

(v

its'

f*nio cv jct r- o

-i

-i

IT

i i- c

APPKfOIX 3

STATISTICALCKRKK3 tflTHKD PROJECTION Of MET AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IW TKK US3H

The tables In thia appendix contain the data and nethodology used in ccmputing and projecting net agricultural production in theetalis concerning the methodology used are contained In the footnotes to the tables.

t '

Estimated Indexes of Ket Agricultural Production in tbe

otherwise indicated, index of the total values contained ln Table, below).

of the total values contained in Table, below).

of the total values contained in Table, balow).

, belov) for the derivati on of this estimate.

Table 52

Estimated Production and Utilisation of Grain in the

ql

a, uullta-.lt

v

hmu (/

m "jdtu d/

row-*/

**

7.1

ll

5.6

.

il

1/

v>1/

available forV

/

0

ao-9

.

ho

*firm pel a* feed

1

-

'afluary

jana

- a fee*

tramein-clu a. |. '

, mlow).

on tha wuhe is, eea-ie la aatloatmf production. fcv

oth-nnaf imlceted,re oalmulad fro official utpoft acd en*rt caia. (a/

g. eauaata* baaed oa. infgriav.or. la. anunta of gralr. reealred fpr food rtre ca'^ula'e] ay oultlplylng uc flovi raquimrnta parum!ttu s,fj slcycar hpimtion data found icp.bove} eal* flour lo sreda try tee aa* of wiarate*; uousrrernt;, about sj ftrrent.

1. the axaii tliat nroductloa aureolaorwae*.a,ae, and ftod. tv.la reeldual lafor uaellvanloo) faad or for loeraaair* atooa.

j. btuatat ihm baiane* ool addltlivat lo and mlbdr-weaa fra ews* for lhafran aduuoodluon tom ia ameka. of the relative neade foraa urealocx feed in tne yean coveredtfcla report.

*lia st aleuavuanam in atocka.

la aaanad ttat ane-klrd V* grain ueed aa feed fm 0crofed oaring tbe 'aienur year lait la produued or during 'Amulya* feduie foliowing ealenaar year or

aaount of grata um for feed froe7 taaiuatad at buubd tonee >aaia of informtion crtalm in aoere* jg/.

Estimated Production and Utilization of Potatoes in the

Million Metric TonB

a/

b/

c/

01

use d/

ej

for feed

when potatoes are used as feed fj

1 December

0 June

a/

consumed as feed

Table, below).

is estimated to equalercent of

or the- Industrial use for theas estimatedercent Industrial use for theercent of production.

ives per capita consumption at lUO kilograms per capita for theor the other years were estimated asilograms perilograms per capita.

distribution of the use of potatoes for feed during the calendar year is assumed to be the samegrair.. See, above).

amount of potatoes used for feed from the crop harvested2 is estimated to have beentons.

Procurement Prices in the USSR83

Rubles per Metric Ton

Used

Prices

Alternative Weights

if

f/

,

vegetables

fi/

sJ

beets (Gtate

seed

flax

t 1/

/

/

j/

(rubles per

units)

(rubles per

k/

(rubles per

k/

and goats

per head) k/

The procureinent prices in this table are the weights used, along with the data in Table,o calculate the indexes of net agricultural production. The base prices announcedare used as the basic weights for Ibis report.

otherwise indicated.

W/

for wheat.

Table, below).

to be the same as8 base price-

Table, below).

j- Prices for the four grades of wool obtained fromnd relative importance Of each grade in. total production of wool obtuincd frcsn.

k. See Table, below).

auor of Weighted Prices for Vegetables in the "JSSB a/

Type

of Sour. Area b/ (Percent)

c/ (Metric Tons per Hectare)

Weights

State Purchase Price d/ (Rubles per Metric Ton)

end garlic

e/

1

%}

f/

t'nan po^atoes-

nless othervise indicated. Expressed in new rubles.

average of the other yieldsrices in the series.

by dividing the valuey the productionnd then

rounding.

Derivation of Meat Prices in the83

lie:

j'lu>

hogfl

Sheep aM

Poultry

Other

Total

per Vetric Ton of Live Weight

ctual Price p/

.

Dressing (Slaughter Weight

ercent of Live Weight)

3'j

ctual Price

i

93o

Rubles per Ha trie Ton of Slaughter Mcight

ctual Price

h/ / c/

ClstrlcutloD of Slaughter Height e/ (Percent)

t-3

ico.c

Priceper Metric Ton)

393

5:7

79

l.iCft lj?68

1.

The average actual price for cattle and hogs3ercent of8 Ibe average actual price for cattle, hogs, sheep, and goata8 vaser-

f.

See Table,/

Eatiuatedercent of the base price base price for these types.

atf6 baseof the8 baae price for these types

to be the saae as the price for sheep and

Value of Estimated Set Agricultural Production In the USS39 Base Prices as

Value of Estimated Net Agricultural Production In the USSR8 Base Prices as Weights a/

Continued)

Ctlflalsced by anUlpirlEj the ceaqonsnte in Tebla, above? by the price* inouaan 1

b. Bm precipitous declinebe amber of hogs3 caused considerable difficulty ir. calculatingreliable value of netproduction using the established aaitbodology. very reason to believe that rheBfei In tbe number of livestock3 ehculd not be weighted aa heavily aa in other year* is the aeries. Much or the decline in the nuaber of livestock3 vas the result of slaughtering young aniael* or animals of very light weight and foregoing the breeding of livestock. Thus It la not appropriate to weight thla decline In nueiber by the usual nethod of applying tbe value of animals or average else purchased by.

the settee" of determining the value of the decline la tbe rusher of lives toe*] la asn the baa la of the pastbetween the number of aeat-Droduclr* anlamla at the beginning of tbe year end production of Mat during that year, proeuc-tlon of mt3 waa projected3 BillionillionaejBtng that tbe value of the aeat produced in excess of this ameuxt vas equal to tbe value of tbe decline In tbe herd, the following valee of net agricultural production Is derived:

ttea

components

ii fin Mill

This very Btoeual procedure, which Is aeed bee suaeery unusuala believed toore eccarate measure of the actual eecw. of change in cet agrlcullaral production than that derived thro*gti the use of the established methodology.

t

-

Value of Estimated Net Agricultural Production in the USSR6 Actual Prices as Weights a/

Value of Eitiiaated Net Agricultural Production in the USSR3 actual Prices as WelahtB

BillionDlca

Potatoes

Other vegetables

6

Technical crcpa

eeU (atateiarioveriber Tlax

7

1

7

1

1

1

3

7

2

0

prodacte

4o

m Ik

Eggf.

3

0

0

6

1

9

2

5

1

2

feed

Potatoeo

I.63

2.C8

Sheep and goat*

3

8

9

5

2

2

O.09

O

5

-

Calculates by -oultlplylng the

above; by the prices

. above*.

Calculation cf Estimated Net Agricultural Production in the USSR

HllUcn Mfrtric

Value c/ (Billion

Iter

ther vegetables

Technical crops

Cotton

sxlgor beets (etat* procurement) SunfloverFiber flax

livestock products

Meat Milk yj Wool Sfigo 1/

Lees fees a/

Grain Potatoes

^livestock n/

Cattle Rogo

* rostrateo follow on p-

Sheep and gseto Total

Probable

.

IT-71

am. ore based gondnd ol, respectively, above).

othtrwlee lndloated.

data wire obtained by multiplying volune data by the pries weight**

with probable level of fertlllier usage and average vsather.

with possible fertlllier usage and average weather. Data en crops vere obtained fromata on livestock products and nunbarwere estiaatad In proportion to the feed supply. The fesd supply figures (sralr. and potatoes) with possible fertlllier usage andfall aldway between the feed supply figure* for average and better than average veathtr conditions with probable fertlllier

vltb probable level of fertlllier usage and worse than average veather.

vim probable levsl or fertlllier usage and better than average weethsr-

stateat pricealghts are In terms of rubles per lor.or the price of eggs, waicn are in thousand units, andof llvaeuck. Which la in rabies per head.

I- Prot.ef.cn of grain lees seed and Unature corn.

Prodkctloe of potatoes less seed, k. Frodeetloe oflessereect for feed. 1. ToliAM data are la tarns of billiona. See Table t*,. Th* auafeer of llnitoek is in nil:loo head.

-4 -

Calculation of 1st!mated Bet Agricultural Production in tbe0 (Continued)

Est:

rVoductioo and Utilisation of Grain and Potatoes In the USSR

Productloa Seed d/ Waste fj

Net exports and/or stocks fj Industrial uaa Tj available for food mj Available for feed '_ One.third feed

consumed In crop year Two-thirds available feed

consumed in following year

Total feed consumed

fjcludlngcom.

of production and utilization with probable fertilizer uaaca and average weather.

of production and utilization under the following three alternative situations:a withusage and average weather;a with probable fertilizer uaage and worse than averagea with probable fertilizer usage and better than average weather,

rates are from Table, above).

Haste estimatedercent for grain andercent for potatoes. See Tablesnd, respectively, above).

elow).

nterpolationverage0 availabilities, j. Interpolationverage0 availabilities.

5

Kitlasted Availability of food Per Capita In the USSR0

aaamtL

' 1

nrnt U

veu If fleas j/

_ i

|g

,f*au**ip.

il. W

CTIjivImm>elanjalaa frcapopuiauoi. of tae tas*6 i*f foot witer iaas um slmraatlva iltjatlwj' t with poaaltl* farttlliar

ii -llh prombla familiaraaraa than averaaa Maatneri anda vltn prccama fertilisermi mul toss. availability of fool vita preaaslim'.ur.

a. traaxllaaC lui 1jalauspitar rat*.

a. inlufata sees fa* faa4 are ihuaua tofe> af am.

f. anatlamutr aa* flat tor read I* mmill kp pro"er-.uo taa treat la paat nrftnwi of flatus l antij

tnioi|ltn of |wil* i* llfl i* aallaaaad ol u0 utaaya par capita.nracaiao rota et issaaual ta eetasaesaata*. fa* sia esaamaass far insaitw afia4 far sasaaasrasetai ma*.

restss* seariswrisiitlo* of ipaseaasli alia. tfes nmiiif aotubteaaajuaiae

anf Id partem' raeatraa0 is proles the popalaltoa witfc im aailaalaa

nr capitaof flu

safal

tk*feoaals*las lo provita t>alarktfca wtol af kail sallluaal talseli latase.oi^iv.ata par capitaoo timla.

rolorlaa par :par yi.

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- -

Original document.

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