onrirnwrnrrT
114
CIA/RRS
CM HJSTOmCAL REWEMOGRAM RELEASE IN fUU lS
REPORT
ROLE OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT FLEET IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE
1 O' INTELLIGENCE Office oi Research and Repcucs
FOREWORD
The So/iet maritime fleet is ir. the midstigorous expansion program involving the acquisition of large numbers of fast, efficient tankers iind dry carfio ships. This program has created considerable alarm in shipping circles of the Free World and has led to claims, particularly by US and British shipbuilders and shipowners, that the growing Soviet fleeterious threat to the shipping of the Pree World. The alarm has been heightened by reports of rate cutting on the part ofEuropean Satellite liner services, by chargese maritime policy of the USSR is influenced more by political considerations than by economics, and by statements from the Soviet press incorrectlyto mean that the USSR will be able to carry its entire seaborne foreifin trade in its own ships The purpose of this report is to place in perspective the threat that the growing Soviet fleet presents for shipowners in the Free World by reporting an Lhe role cf Lhe USSR as bothhipperhipownerYO.
COHTEWTS
I. First Three Years of the Seven Year . -
II. Developments2 and
Soviet Shipping Activity Under Revised Plan Goals for
nd
IV. Prospects for the Soviet. Merchant Crowing Soviet Merchant Fleet,hreat to Free World
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical
Appendix B. Source References ,
rat Los
Seaborne Foreign Trade Carried by Soviet and
Foreign0
of Soviet Seaborne Foreisr. Trade and the Role
of Soviet-Chartered Vessels in That
J. Soviet Imports of Petroleum by Sea,
of the Soviet Merchant
and Plan for
of Tankers and Dry Carno Vessels in the Soviet
Merchantnd Plans45 .
Interport Cargoes Carried by Soviet Ships Return-
ing to the USSR froto the Delivery of
Interport Cargo Carried by the Soviet Merchant
t rr1
Page
Cargo Lines Operated Unilaterally by the
USSR, as Ofune .
Cargo Lines Operated Jointly by Soviet
and Foreign Steamship Companies, as ofU .
i
LO. Merchant Fleets of the USSR and the
0
11. Seaborne Foreign Trade of the USSR arid the world,
0
Illustrations
Figure L. Soviet Seaborne Foreign Trade Carried byForeign0
Figureontrol of Soviet Seaborne Foreign Trade andof Soviet-Chartered Vessels in0 (Chart) following sage
Figure 3. International Cargo Lines of che USSR,
^ (Map) followinj
Figure li. Merchant Fleets or the USSR and the Morld,
0 (Chart) following
Figure 5. Seaborne Foreign Trads of the USSR and the World,
0 (Chart) foiiowr-n
- vi -
HQLK OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT FLEET IS IHl'KKNATIOWAL SEABORHE TRADE'
Summary
3ion of it indicate t
ihc USSR has embarked on an ambitious program for thefleet, there la no evidence available at present to the Soviet program, even if fully implemented,hreat to shipping interests in the Free World. 3 the Soviet fleet'madeercent of the world fleet in terms of deadweight tonnuge, and Soviet seaborne foreign trade madeercent of the world total. 0 these percentages are expected to be no higher thanndercent, respectively.
The USSR is increasing Lhe size of its mercnant fleet in order to reduce the number of foreign vessels that it is required to charter in moving ita seaborne foreign trade. The chartering of these weaselsa drain on the foreign exchange resources of the USSR because, in the majority of cases, the fees for chartering these vessels arein convertible currencies.
Even though the USSR Is acquiring increasing numbers of modemdry cargo vessels and tankers, Soviel seaborne foreign trade, until recently, has grown faster than the fleet. During theears of the Seven Year, Soviet seaborne foreign trade Increased faster than planned, largely because of increased quantities of petroleum available for export and because of Soviet Involvement in the foreign trade of Cuba. esult, the percentage of Sovietforeign trade carried in Soviet snips declined fromercent8 toercent1 and This trend was reversed3 when the percentage carried In Soviet ships Increased lo hit percent. At the same time, the volume of trade In Soviet.-chartered foreign ships began to drop off, partly as the result of an increasing volume carried by Soviet ships and partly as the result of sn increasing volume carried by foreign ships at the expense of the foreign buyer or seller.
Shipping interests in the Free World have beer, concerned in recent years because the growing Soviet merchant fleet .las absorbed Increasing amounts of shipping business that otherwise -ould fQ to shipowners in the Free World. Soviet competition with the Fret World will continue to grow as the USSR (l) expands its cargo'linerncreases thef foreign interport cargoes carried by Soviet vessels returning to the USSR after delivering Soviet exports,ew policy of making ships available on the world tramp Racket for limited periods when
* The estimates and conclusions In this re^rt represent the bestof this Office as
t. First Three Years of the Seven Year
9heears of the Seven Year Plan, the rapidly expanding seaborne foreign trade* of the USSR increased aore thanercent per year and rose from aboutillion8 to nore thanillion tons1 (see the chart.* and In spite of an ambitious program of expansion, the Soviet fleet
Table 1
Soviet Seaborne Foreign Trade Carried by Soviet, and Foreign Vessels
0
Tona
Total
Tons)
Tons;)
a/
Plan
a/
a/
Estimated.
* Under the accounting system Boployed by the Soviet Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, all Soviet foreign trade cargoes that move on the Danube River are included in the seaborne foreign trade of the USSR. The ministry taxes this approach partly because the Soviet steamship company that operates on the Danube la subordinate to the Ministry and partlyart of the Soviet cargo moving on the Danube Is carried on seagoing vessels and mayeaport as its origin or destination. Because of the difficulty or extroctlns purely river cargo from datab; the Ministry of the Haritlm Fleet, the statistics on Soviet seabornerade used in ihii report include Soviet foreign traa* on the Danube.
** Unless otherwise Indicated, tonnages are given in metric tons and ailcs orein nautical miles throughout this report. Following.
3 -
failed to grow as fast as did this Soviet trade. esult, the share of Soviet seaborne foreign trade carried by Soviet, vessels (which had reachedercentropped toercent The absolute volute carried in Soviet vessels1 was aboutillion tons, and that carried in foreign vessels was norc thanullior. tons.
ime when the USSR vas attempting to conserve foreignparticularly convertible currencies, this need to rely on foreign vesselstrong stimulus for accelerated expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet. Part of the cargo carried in foreign vessels was carried in vessels under charter to the USSR. Most of this cargo consisted. (coat, insurance, und freight included In the price)ituation whereby the USSR eventually was reimbursed for the cost of transport. However, because the L'iJSR had to pay for the chartered vessell In convertible currency and wasn most cases from clearing accounts, the charteringrain on holdings of convertible currency.
Soviet foreign trade cargoej thu'. are carried on foreign vessels not under charter to the USSR consist largely of cargoes under foreign control.* The foreign buyer or seller arranges shipment for thesewhich consist, by definition,. exports. imports (see the chart.nd. Bakayev, the Minister of the Maritime Fleet, openly statedI that two important goals inthe Soviet merchant fleet are (I) freeing tbe USSR fron the necessity of chartering foreign shipsarryingercent of Sovietforeign trade in Soviet
The attainment of the rirst of those ^oals would mean an end to the disbursement of convertible currencies for chartering foreignand would mean that all cargoes under Soviet control. exports. imports) would be carried in Soviet vessels. The attainment, of the second goal would mean the extension of Soviet control to all butercent of Soviet seaborne foreign trade. If at the same time theere carrying all cargoes under its control, the result wouldignificant increase In the foreign axohnng* earnings of the Soviet fleet.
* Ihe remainder consists of cargoes under Soviet control that ore carried by foreign cargo liners.
p. For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B-
- ft .
1 Hi IT I h II 11 il I 1
f r
* H
^iid1I
j
I'i j
I
111
IN>"
liil-
SS
l
Mil L
At tbe endI the USSR was far free attaining either of the above goals, and Soviet seaborne foreign trade was broken down as follows:
Per cen l
Under Soviet control
In Soviel vessels In Soviel-chartered foreign vessels
Under foreign control
In foreign vessels
100
1 the absolute volumes as well as the percentage snares both or cargoes in chartered foreign vessels and of cargoes under foreign control were rising.
Soviet shipping needsI were considerably greater than envisioned in the control figures for that year in the original Seven Year Plan (formulated. Much of the responsibility for this increase lies with two developments not foreseen ramatic increase ln lhe tonnage of petroleum available for export* and intensive Soviet involvement in the foreign trade of Cuba. These developmentsboth the volume of cargo to be carried by the Soviet rieet and the average distances over which this cargo had to be carried. The Soviet maritime fleet9 billion Ion-milesore thanillion ton-miles higher than the level set in the control figures for the plan (see.
IX. Developments25
The rate of growth in tha capacity of the Soviet merchanthich had beenercentI, increased beercent2 and tofl8 percent. Fleet tonnage increasedtlllton
r.Mial Increase 'otlmt
petroleum exports by sea vaaer-ent (see Tableppendix A,elow).
** Appendix A, The percentage incrfrtse in tne doadweigh- tonnage (DWT) ofleet from one year toext.
tons1llllon DWT2don DWT3 (aee Table host of tne vessels acquired23 were modern tankers and dry cargo vessels that vere built ln shipyards In the Bloc and In the Free Particular emphasis vas placed on fast, large-hatch dry cargo vessels for tramp operation; on large tankers in the range0WT; and on timber carriers in the range0WT.
The Soviet fleet operating out of the Black Sea on foreign trade routes vas augmented by Lhe transfer of some vessels from the Caspian Sea. Tankers0 DWT were transferred permanently. Shallow draft tankers and cotton/timber carriersWT were transferred for the winter, when operations on the Caspian arc curtailed
Soviet exports cf petroleum by sea, which hod achieved an average annual rate of growth of aboutercent, averagedodestercent At the same time, the coaait-aents of the Soviet fleet in the Cuban trade increased, partly because of the military buildup in Cuba and partly because of the US program to deny Free World shipping to Cuba. Additional demands on the Soviet fleet?3 arose froa the participation of the USSR In allltary buildups in the UAR, Iraq, and Indonesia and from the upsurge in wheat Imports that began in the second holf
In spite of the increased pace of deliveries to the fleet, large increases in Soviet seaborne foreign trade caused the share carried In Soviet vessels2 to remain atercent. At the same time, the percentage share that moved ln Boviot-chortered foreign vessels increased slightly, whereas that under foreign control decreased slightly. The situation improved The share in Soviet ships increased toercent and the shore in Soviet-chartered foreign ships decreased fronoercent. This percentage decrease was accompanied by the first significant drop in tbe absolute volure of cargo carried in Soviet-chartered foreign ships5 aillion6 allllon tons) since the advent of the Soviet foreign trade offensive in theB. At the sane tiae, however, the percentage shore of cargoes under foreign control increased again, rising fromercent2 toercent For the moment at least, the USSR was shifting froa Soviet to
The term deadweight, tonjage; refers to the total lifting capoci lyxpressed in tonsoinds. The cargo deadweightis determined by deducting the weight of fuel, stores, craw, and passengers. Deadweight tonnage is the difference between the loadedand light displacementessel. ** Appendix A, Deliverieslso includedorld War II Liberty shipson the used ship market. This purchase was unusual for the USSR, which normally buys only new vessels, and probably reflects Soviet concern with the maintenance ofervices to Cuba, which hod been restricted3esult of the US denial program.
foreign control some of the cargo that had to be carried in foreign ships. hift is accomplished by changing the terms of trade for certain goodsthat is, selling more. and/or buying more.
Latea, Sovfrakht, the Soviet ship chartering agency, was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of foreign Trade to that of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet. as thefor booking shipping space and chartering vessels for all Soviet shippers that are engaged in international trade. 3ecause it is authorized to arrange shipments on both Soviet and foreign vessels and because more efficient use could therefore be made of vessels ir. the Soviet fleet, Sovfrakht was made an Organic part of the Ministry responsible for that fleet. Soviet authorities claln thatesult of this move they were able to use the fleot more effectively3 and that they were thereby able to reduce the volume of cargo carried in Soviet-chartered ships during that year.
III. Soviet Shipping Activity Under Revised Plan Goals"?
The pace of expanding the Soviet merchant fleet, was accelerated3 because Of increased demands on the fleet owing to Soviet involvement in Cuba, increased availability of petroleum for expert, and other factors. As the rate of expansion increased, the performance of the fleet responded accordingly. The Ministry of the Maritime Fleet found it expedient to revise its plan goals?umber of Important Indexes, including theapacity of the fleet, the over-all ton-mile performance, and tne ton-mile performance in carrying foreign trade cargoes. Under the revised plan goalshich were published al the endhe cargo-carrylr.gof the fleet* is to increasehe levelo instead ofimes as originally planned. 2/ The over-all ton-mile performance of the fleet is to increaseimes the level8 instead ofimes. The ton-mile performance of the fleet inforeign trade cargoes Is to increase to times the level8 instead ofimes. 3/ evised goal for the volume of cargo in tons was published. It appears likely that the original goal of an increaseimes the level85 will not be attained, because of the increase in average length ofhat is anticipated The original Seven Year Plan specified that the average length of haul per ton ofarried by the fleet5 would be
* Equal to ths total DWT mir.us the capacity allot-ed lo fuel and Data available on Soviet contracts for deliveries fromand ontlriale* of production for Soviet shipyards
ndicate that thef :ae Soviet merchant fleet nt tlie till5 will be closerhanimes the Level The average length of haul per to^ of cargoiven period oi time is the performance of the fleet in ton-miles divided by the volune of tone carried.
autical miles (nm)tlie revised plan specifies Lhat it should be in excessm, an Increase that is reflected also in the substantial upward revision of the goal for ton-miles.
Other data published with the revised plan goals5 indicated that Soviet vessels would transportercent of Soviet seabornetrade The absolute tonnage carried by foreign vessels will exceed that in any previous year, and most of these cargoes will bc under foreign control.* The volume of foreign trade cargoes under Soviet control in chartered foreign vessels, which began droppingay fall to lessillion tonsercent of the total tonnage of seaborne foreign trade predicted for that year. The USSR has indicated tliat it intends to carry in its own ships5ercent of the cargoes under its control. 5/
IV. Prospects for the Soviet Merchant
Although it will beear before the USSR publishes details of the goals for the merchant fleet under the forthcoming Five Year, statements made in official publications of tne Soviet Ministry Of the Maritime Fleet at the end3 andUimportant insight into the status of Soviet seaborne foreign trade and the role contemplated for the fleet under that plan. During the early monthspokesmen for the Ministry appeared to be confident that the USSR would beosition6 toercent of the cargoes under its control, but an article in the official journal of the Ministry, Morskoy flot, forh states that the Soviet fleet will carry the same proportion6 that it plans to carry5ercent. The same journal forl| states that chartering of foreign tonnage to carry petroleum exports will be elininated In the near future. 6/ Whether or not the USSR carries ir. its own shipsercent of the cargoes under its controlhe increase will not have been achieved entirely through expansion of the Soviet fleet Qjz will have been achieved Ln part by the short-run expedient of shifting cargoes Irom Soviet to foreign controlhai, is, by selling more. instead. anci by purchasing more. instead. 3 'he volume ol' Soviet seaborne foreign trade under foreifji control. exports. imports) was aboutillion tons, orercent of the total. 5 this volume will have increased to more than UU million tons, orpercent of the total tonnage planned for that, year. The tonnage under foreign controlill continue to Increase althoughlower rate than that fortal Soviet seabornei*, esult, if the USSR docs not cr.rsise Us policies, share of Cargoes under foreign control should fall to approximatelyercent of the total
* Shipments of US wheat under the contracts made with Continental Grain snd Cargill would fall into this category because they. imports by Lhe USSR.
i 1
OnU, Ijykayev stated that rates ol' growth lor expanding the fleet under the Five Yearould be comparable to those during recent years of the Seven Year On the assumption that the annual rate of growth for the fleets the same as that achievedhe tonnage of the fleet should increase toilliony the end Planned increases .in the volume of cargo handled by Soviet seaportsndicate that the volume of Soviet seaborne foreign trade nay beillion tons/ Allowing for likely increases in average length of haul, the USSK should be able,leet ofillion DWT, to carry two-thirds of its seaborne foreign trade
V. Pro wing Soviet Hcrcha.it Fleethreat to Free World Shipping
Spokesmen for the shipping and shipbuilding communities in the Free World, particularly in the US and the UK, have expressed concern in recent years about the threat of the growing Soviet merchant fleet to the shipping of the Free World. The exact nature of the threat seldom has been well defined. The chief cause for concern is the fact that the Soviet fleet is absorbing increasing anour.ts of shipping business which otherwise would go to Free Worid ships. The discussion so far in this report has emphasized the effect of the expansion of the Soviet fleet on the participation of foreign Ships (predominantly Free World) in the movement of Soviet seaborne trade. The expansion of the Soviet fleett least, has chiefly affected the amount of Sovietbusiness available to Free World ships, but there is now reason to believe that the USSR may begin to compete more actively In the world market for the shipping business of other countries. In the issue of Morskoy flot foriVt,t. Savel'yev, the head of SovfraKht, recommended three ways in wiilfh Soviet ships may increase their participation in the seaborne foreign trade of other nations. I: these recommendations were carried out, Soviet ships in the future might Carry greater volumes of both liner and tramp cargoes for shippers fr; the Free World. The three courses of action that Savel'yev recommends arc (l) the allocation under certain conditionsumber of vessels, to carry cargoes on tramp voyages for foreignnin the volume of foreign lnterport cargoes carriedramp basis by Soviet vessels returning from delivering Sovietii expansion of service on Soviet international cargo lines. The explicit aim of these proposals is to increase Soviet earnings of foreign exchange as well as to improve the utilization factor of the Soviet fleet.
The first course of action probably carries the greatest potential threat to shipowners of the Free World. Savel'yev's recomjusndatior; is the first indication that the USSR hasoint at vhicn if ftt*jla justified in Offering for hire to foreign charterers any ofther than those returning in ballast from delivering: exports. In recommending this radical course of action, Savel'yev made the following qualifying remark: "In spite of the fact that ar. the present time there
-
is on the worldurplus ol' seagoing tonnage, at certain times and in certain areas we can flexibly utilize our fleet in this now Savel'yev clearly implies that when freight rales arehigh and business is available, the USSR should release certain of its ships from carrying Soviet cargoes and make them avoiloble for charter to foreign shippers.
Statements by officials of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet during August anda and developments on the charter market indicate that the course of action recommended by Savel'yev already may have been incorporated into Soviet shipping policy. In August, officials of Sovfrakhtusinessman froa tne Free World tnst Soviet ships were available for charter, especially during the winter montns. In September the Minister of the Maritime Fleetest German freight forwarder that it la quite possible that during certain short periods of time as the result of seasonal Influences there will be surpluses of tonnage in the Soviet fleet and that the USSR will endeavor to obtain cargoes for such ships. wedish fins time chartered two Soviet dry cargo vessels during January through4 for voyages that required withdrawal of the vesselB from the trade routes which they follow in carrying Soviet cargoes. umber of Soviet vessels have been chartered under similar circumstances for voyages beginning inJ* and later.
In view of the recent expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet and the fact that Soviet shipping requirements decrease drastically during the winter, there is good reason to believe that the USSR is now making available to charterers in tne Free Worid both vessels that arefrom delivering exports and vessels lhat ore temporarily rendered surplus by seasonal factors. Whether or not Savel'yev's recommendations extend to vessels beyond these two categories ia uncertain,umber, of reanojiu Indicate that they might. Under certain circumstances it would bo to the advantage of the USSR to make available to charterers io the Free World for relatively long periods vessels that normally are engaged Ln carrying Soviet exports, even if it meant abandoning plans to increase toercent the share of Soviet seaborne trade carried ln Soviet ships. As recentlyxports nnde upercent of the tonnage volume of Soviet seaborne foreign trade. Some of the Soviet ships delivering export cargoes con load imports for the return voyage, and others can find employmentort of the return voyage byup foreign interport cargoes,arge proportion mist return to the USSR inostly practice.
It ls possible that many Soviet ships would be employed moreif they were hirod out to foreign charterers nithcrime chart* casls oroyage charter basis on trade routes where thereikelihood of Detaining cargoes in both directions. If this were done, the USSR probably would change the conditions of sale.o.b. for the exports that otherwise would be carried by these vessels. Control over such cargoes and responsibility for their shipment from the USSR would thus pass to the foreign purchaser. It would also mean a
-
loss to the USSR of foreign exchange revenue equivalent tc the freight charges for carrying the exports in Soviet ships. This loss in foreign exchange revenue, however, would be more than compensated for by improved use of ships and increased earnings of foreign exchangefrom chartering vessels to foreign shippers. It is likely that any net increase in foreign exchange earnings would be accompaniedet increase in receipts of convertible currency. Most of the proceeds fron. Chartering Soviet ships to shippers in the Free World would be incurrency, whereas much Of tlie foreign exchange revenueby shifting exports.. would be in clearing accounts.
Estimates of the volume of Soviet seaborne foreign trade to be carried by Soviet ships0 are presented elsewhere in this report and have been made with allowances for an increase in the volume ofinterport cargoes to be carried on Soviet shipsYO. The estimates, however, do net reflect the prospect of the assignmentlock of Ships to compete on the world tramp charter market over an extended period. If the USSR were to taketep, the share of Soviet ships carrying Soviet seaborne foreign trade0 may be less than the projected two-thirds of the total.
Since the publication of Bakayev's bookl, there has been no repetition or retraction of the statement that the USSR plans eventually to carryercent of its seaborne foreign trade in its own ships. Whether or not this goal has been abandoned, Savci'yev's statements indicate that the USSR Intends to increase the share of Soviet seaborne foreign trade carried in Soviet ships above the level ofercent that was planned/
The Soviet fleetubstantial nucleus of modern dry cargoand tankers suitable for competitive tramn operationa factor that Increases the likelihood that. In the near future, certain Soviet vessels will be nade available ever extended periods for charter on the tramp market. Al the end3 the fleetWT of fast twin-decked dry cargo vessels of0 DWTWT ol" fast modem tankers ol"0WT. By the end5 these totals will have increasedillionillion DWT, respectively. Deliveries6 and later willarge proportion of vessels in these same categories. On the other hand, any Soviet attempts in the near future to enter the charter market for tramp dry cargo vessels will be confined to certain trades becauseack of large bulk carriers. Until the delivery sometime5 of annumber of Polish-built bulk carriers0 DWT, the largest bulk carriers in the Soviet fleet will be vessels of less0 DWT.
For joany years, Soviet vessels returning from the delivery of export cargoes on certain trade routes have picked up foreign interport cargo on the return voyage. Many Soviet tankers returning tock Sea from the delivery of petroleum to the Far East fall into this pattern. They frequently atop In the Persian Gulf to load cargoes for delivery
-
to Italian, French, and Greek ports in the Mediterranean. This and other situations where lt is feasible for Soviet vessels returning from the delivery of exports to carry interport cargoes on foreign account are shown in Since the beginning of the Seven Year Plan the voluee of foreign interport cargoes carried by Soviet vessels has rangedillionillionear (see Inorakoy flot announced plansharp increase in the volume of foreign interport cargoes to be carried in Soviet ships4llhough port of the Increase will consist of shipments by vesselsfrom the delivery of exports, the new role of vessels withdrawnfrom thair normal patterns of activity during slack seasons must not be discounted.
As ofoviet dry cargo vessels were operating onnternational lines. In most cases the services on these lines are more loosely organi zed than the usual services on cargo lines operated by steumship companies in tho Free World. There are few advertised schedules, specific vessels are no', always permanently assigned to the lines, and often the service consists of nothing moreuaranteeoviet vessel will calliven portonth. Without exception these lines operate on routes where Soviet seaborne trade ls already substantial or is developing. Ten of theines are operated Jointly by Soviet and foreign steamship companies on tho basis ofagreements which specify that cargoes moving on the routes ln question will be sharedasis. The regainingines involve only Soviet vessels. The unilateral and the Joint lines functioning asre shown innd the routes on which these lines operate are shown on the map, Although there have been some instances of rate cutting by Polish and East German cargo lines, there is no evidence that the 'JSSS has engaged in this practice. The USSR has announced its intention to increase its liner services, but it did not specify the areas Into which tne services would be extended. At present the Soviet fleet does not include any modern fast three-deck cargo liners constructed especially for carrying general cargo, such as those employed by many operators ln the Pree World and Scandinavia. Until this situation ls remedied, the USSR eight beisadvantage in attempting to enter some of the more remunerative and competitive liner trades in the Free World. Ir. writing his article, Savel'yev apparently had this situation in mind. He stated: "The further development of regular lines requires the creationpecialized fleet to operate on such
Some articles on the threat of the growing Soviet merchant fleet to shipping in the Free World suggest that the USSR nay some day dominate world seaborne trade byirtual rao*:opoly over shipping.
Appendix A,elow.
** Appendix A,elow.
Appendix A, pp. SOespectively, below. Following
-
Projection* of the size of tbe Soviet fleet and of the volume offoreign trade that lt could handle have been cadehe results can be compared with similar data for the world fleet and world seaborne foreign trade (see the charts.nd 'j, and Tables At the end3 the tonnage of the.Soviet fleetilliont percent of the world fleet; by the end0 it should be approximately l6 million DWT, orercent of the estimated world fleet for that year. The volume of Soviet seaborne foreign3 was aboutillion> percent oforld total;0 the Soviet volume should betons,ercent of the estimated world toial From these figures it should be obvious that it is unrealistic to suppose that the USSR could monopolize world shipping in the foreseeable future.
* Appendix A, p. 2k, below. ** Including cargoes carried by foreign ships.
'""able 3
orts ot Petroleum by"
by
Metric Tons)
a:
Increase
Baltic Sea
.6
PeiTormur.c " trie Soviet Merchant Fleet nd Plan',
Carried
gtri
Ton
Haul
Toru-
Miles
Ji';;.
Plan
*
s
These
reflect th-?
Of all
subordinp.t?
J
Ministry c: v
"arltieie Fleet,
l'F
and tha vet
ut. excli
n 1
Oarya River arid the
b- The overage length cful it estimated byg the planned fccrrt-mancri in'-fc by the planned vcl-jiitetone carried-
s
:
P II:
a! ,
SIMM
Table 6
rorelgD Intcrport Cargoes Carried by Soviet Ships Returning to the USSR froa the Delivery of Exports
Orlglr..ti nation, and Carrier
Fron Persian Gulf to Italy, Greece, and France by tankers returning from delivering POL to the Far East
India to Rumania ln dry cargo vessels tint are returning from making deliveries loand North Vietnam
Coal
Ores and phosphate
Hood
Anthracite, pig iron, and scrap
Coke
Kexico to Poland in dry cargo vesselsfrom making deliveries to Cuba
From England and Continental ports toin dry cargo vessels that are returning to the Baltic Sea froa delivering cargoes to England and Continental ports on the Horlb Sea and the KngL'.sh Channel
From Spain and Morocco to the Continent and Scandinavia in dry cargo vessels returning to the Baltic Sea from making deliveries to Mediterranean ports
From Scandinavia to the Mediterranean in dry cargo vessels returning to the Black Sea Iron making deliveries to Baltic ports
From Western European ports to the Mediterranean In dry curgo vessels returning to the black Sea from making deliveries to Baltic ports
From Polish ports to Swedish ports in dry enrgo vessels returning from voyages outside the Baltic to Soviet Baltic ports
Swedish ports to Polish ports in dry cargo vesscis returning from voyages outside theo Soviet Baltic ports
Canada to Poland in dry cargo vessels and tankers returning from making deliveries to Cuba
- IV -
Foreign Interport Cargo Carried by the Soviet Merchant
Metric Tons
LB
1.5
1-3
Estimated.
Table c
International Cargo Lines Operated Unilaterally by the USSR an ofU
Steamship
Call
1 :;
Leningrad Tallinn
Served Sortr. Sea
West Coast Scandinavia
Foreign Ports of Call
Rotterdam
M&nchest-ir Liverpool
slo
>Oakar
'
TakoradS
Accra
Te:w
I.UI..L
Legos
-
Continued)
Steamship Companies participating
Baltic
Baltic 3altic
Black
Black Sea
Black Sea Black Sea
Black Sea Black Sea
Black Sea Black cea
Soviet. Ports of Call
Leningrad
Kaliningrad
Leningrad Kaliningrad
Odessa
TlichevsK
Zhdanov
Odessa
Hichevsk
Zhdanov
Odessa Hichevsk
Odessa
Hichevsk
Zhdanov
Odessa Feodosiya
Odessa
Zhdanov Sovorossiys's
Odessa
Hichevsk
Area Served Italy
Poland Cuba
Italy
Iraq
Southeast Asia
Srcece
Cuba
c
Africe
gn Porto
of Call
Monfalcone Genoa Savona La Speala
Gdansk Havana
Santiago and others
Haplea Genoa
Basra
Rangoon
Djakarta Haiphong
Piraeus
Havana
Santiago and others
fiuii ry ieera
Stni Jlflftil
rth Afric
xia Alexandria.
Algiers :nsablar:cv.
International Cargo Lines Operated Jointly by Soviet and Foreign Steamship Companies as of JO
Steamship Companies Participating
I'M
Bai tit'
Sulti
Baltic
Baltic
Black Sea
BlacK Sen
ast
Nationality ofarticipating
Englishman
Most German
French
Mgian
AR
Bulgarian Japanese
!cviet Ports Of Call
Leningrad Riga
Riga Klaypeda
Leningrad Riga
Klaypeda Ventspils
Riga
Ventsplla Klaypeda
IMga
Klaypeda iessa
Od* ssa
Kherson
liichevsk Odessa
; -
rn
Foreign Ports :
London Hull
Roe took Wismar
Hamburg
3reir.er.
Luebeck
Le Havre
Dunkirk Amsterdam
U'
Antwerp Ghent
Boeibsy
Calcutta
Constanta
Varna Burgas
saka Tsuruoka Hakodate
Table !0
Merchant Fleets of the USSR and the0
'itorldt/'
killion ien
Year a of wandTona^
J
2.?
V&- / <V
,
/ V
a- are of jU Ifccenber. Includingss.-IsCO gross registerRV) and abovee subordinate to th" Ministry ofitine Flee'- tut cxcludir^ne-ElKBcd to the Cuapihl.Cwipany. b- iudlr* US Reserve ricpt. p. mscd on Soviet plan dalo-d. Eslmnted.
Table 11
Seaborne Foreign Trade of the USSR and the';*C
USSf"
Total
"
IMI Of
Total
ai)
2/
w
ej
t/
2/
b/
Including foreign Crocs csrftotK corrled on b. EBtlnaiid.
Based onplan daw-
uue
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: