PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO DEPLOYMENT OF AN ROK COMBAT DIVISION FOR BASE S

Created: 3/19/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SPECIAL SATIOXAI. IXTBLLIUENCK ESTIMATE

PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO DEPLOYMENT OF AN ROK COMBAT DIVISION FOR BASE SECURITY DUTY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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by tha DIRECTOR Of CENltUl INTEUIGENCE

CorKU-rad in by tha UNITEO STATES INTEUIGENCE SO*""

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Submitted by tht DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The Mlou-ing intelligence ivganUatitm parlkipated in the aTthe ft!hiS eSt',mUe:nceAgeZ

Concurred in bySTATESarchwere the Director of

Intelligence and Research. Ifcpartment of Stale: the Director. Defense Intelligence Agencu. and Ihe Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commissionto the USIB and the Assislant lo the Director. Federal Bureau of Im-estigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiclion.

CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS SrCTET WHEN USED SEPARATELY

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INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUBJECT: SNIE PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO DEPLOYMENTOK

COMBAT DIVTSIOH FOR BASE SECURITY DUTY TU SOUTH VIETNAM

THE ESTIMATE

We do not believe that the introduction of one ROK combat division into South Vietnam for static defense purposes would provoke Communist China, Horth Korea, or North Vietnam overtly to invade South Korea or South Vietnam. Neither do we believe that it would in itself change Communist attitudes toward negotiations, or leadlackening of the insurrection in South Vietnam.

The main question is what interpretation the Communists would put on the introduction of the full ROK combat division. They would almost certainly estimate that it vould not in itself significantly alter the military situation. They might consider, however, that itubstantial further buildup of foreignhinese Nationalist Thai, Philippine, and USfor ground combat. Whatever their estimate

on this point, they vould try to discourageuildup. To this end they vould increase their propaganda, and again accuse the US of recklessly

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expanding the war. They would probably employ the theme of "US use of Asians to fight Asians" and attempt to stir up troubles between the ROK forces and the Vietnamese.

3- The Communists would probably supplement their propaganda with some sorts of action. The North Koreans would almost certainly attempt to arouse protests in South Korea against the export of South Korean forces. They might make threatening military movements within Horth Korea or along theesigned to reinforce any doubts the South Korean or other governments might have about the wisdom of thus diverting their troops. We think it unlikely that North Korean ground force "volunteers" would be sent to North Vietnam, though it is possible that North Korean technicians or anti-aircraft personnel (possibly SAM operators) itight be brought in. In South Vietnam, Viet Cong terrorist efforts and military harassment might be directed against the ROK forces in the hope that casualties vould cause discontent in South Korea snd also servearning to other potential foreign contingents.

]i. hina might attempt to scare off further US-initiated strengthening moves in South Vietnam by deploying Chinese forcestoward the North Vietnam border. We do not believe, however, that China would do much else. It would be unlikely to counter byhinese division to the DRV because it vould be unneeded there and

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probably uninvited. If It had decided for independent reasons, to send more or less overt anti-aircraft or fighter plane units, it might seize upon the Introduction of the ROK division in the South as further. Justification for doing so.

5. The introductionOK division would add one more conpllca-tlon to an already difficult situation for Moscow. It wouldew occasion for the DRV to put pressure on the USSR for more and quicker military aid. Tbe USSR might agree to Horth Vietnamese requests for greater or speedier assistance, although we doubt that this would take forms which substantially Increased the risks of direct Soviet It would also diminish somewhat any USSR hopes that negotiations could still be arranged.

Original document.

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