SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK (NIE 11-8-64 M/H)

Created: 5/10/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

MEMORANDUM

To Holders of NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack

DIRECTOR OF CENTRA! INTEUIGENCE

CAfltwrrrd in by Ihc UNITED STATES INTEUIGENCE BOARD As fndkatad ovbiIooiAY5

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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

THE PROBLEM

To review thc evidence acquired since the publication of NIEnd to assess ils implications for the Soviet ICBM forces through

SCOPE NOTE

. "Soviet Capabilities for StrategicOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA, is aestimate of Soviet capabilities in thc field of strategic attack. This memorandum has been prompted by new evidence whichus to review our judgments of Soviet ICBM programs and, in particular, the pace of ICBMew estimate in8 series, which will deal with all Soviet strategic attack systems, will be issued in

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DISCUSSION

1 In. wc estimated ilut deployment ofon ICBMs in sufl sites and three-silo lurd sites had com? tond, and that lhc Soviet ICBM program wa* movingew phase Hiaractcrtrcd by disposed single silos. Subn.ipK-ntas con filmedends, but tingle silosliavc been startedaster pace than piwiously estimated.

We have now identifiedingleil begun since about Jami-aiylic actual mini Iter under construction is probably larger. When compared to past rates of starting ICBM Uunchcts, (lie present level of activity i. high, tin- largest number of ICBM launchers previously startedingle year waslie building rate,otm it precedent nor docsm-viii whit could beailmum effort; at one point3 about HO ICBM launelicis were under constructionariety of siteand Mll/IHBM laitnclK'r construction was also continuing.

We believe that (he most advanced of these launchers will not reachstatus untilhis means (hat (heperational ICBM strength will beomewhat lower than our previous estimaten thc other hand, the pace of singlc-silo deployment could cany the luici. byeyond the high side of thc previously estimated range. Considering thc estimated lime to bring launch groups to operational status nnd making allowance for undetected launchers now under construction, our new estimate fors.

Soft Uiincbers

ldo) 78

Single

TOTAL'

'lhe number of hardened 1CUM launchers will increase from tlx1 present figure ofi inhe force will become more dispersed,eparate hardened sites inn contrast with the

1 TVeir lotah do not Iwfcnb MD laoocbtrs at TrarsUn. Tberc arc no* abnat ZSHal) launchers and we believe this number will Increase to approuuialalyye Judge thne Uunrhen "ir nut normally available lor nperjttocnl use. but varying Dumber) of (hem could be inquired to tire ICBMs at Die US depending on lhe amount ot advance notice.

'The AnlvUnt Chief of, continues to hold to lih lootootrNIE 5 figuref tbe low Hue ol ba torrcait

spreadincludingTyuratam Lauocnniiell aDoweoce for anloceted second-ernerauon operelkaslbe rnid-tMS figure -oil lo-urwftit earned (be high ride of hit (orerail inroadperationalhe need end at Tyuratam.

'This number does not Include tlie SS< large, which we estimated iaor uikl-IOM Uotnuse this mimic lins not yetCaled,no longer believe il cuuld become opciatieiial by that dale.

i ml yet dcteimim; what missiles iirc intended for the new jilos.

Tlic Soviels have tested two third guneration ICBM systems, thend thc Wc believe lhal thehich hasormal test program

will be deployed in at least some of the silos. Theas test fired eight times between April and4 but. fo, reasons we cannot explain there have heat no lest firing, since. It loo may be deployed in some of the silos.

ttW is evidence pointing to |he development of otherone which is probably small, at the test range. Thus, it is.wins- of the silos arc intended forew ICBM. which has not beenin testf so, the deplnymct of thc launchers so far in advanceflight tests of the missile wouldeparture from prcvioiisSuch an innovsliun would imply confidence that no majorthe weapon system will be rciiuirsd; it could sicmesire to reachICBM force level more quietly lliau would otherwise he possible.and successful test program would be ntccssary for this missileavailable for extensive deployment as early ashus itthat many of the new silos lilted as operational invill atlack missiles.

is not how clow how far the Soviets will push the currentor whether it will I* succeeded by follow-on programs. Thoughthe Soviels almost ceriainly svill have more thanlaunchers estimated in, it is yet too earlyevise ourthat the Soviets willorceCBM launchers overfive years. We expect, however, that evidence collected before (lieofhis far will helplarify Soviet goals.*

unable to determine, whether ihi,woald employ solkl or Iin.uk!believe that storaWeme

Arslil.nl Chief ot SUff. Intelligence. USAF. see. no basisurrent evidence foru footnote inl-ftl. tvhfrk peeled OOO-SOO vpOraliiHiat ICBM hi.ncfier* by

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE

inoi cineoanored byCant'ctl latcl^cnte Agency. Ihis copylor ihe in>Dfond toe oi lhend ol penonseed lo know bom Addisionol ritvmiol dukem-iot-on moy be ovthomad by the lollowing otTiciolt wiihin their respective departments:

a. Direcio< of Intelligence and BnMO'th. lo' Ihe Departmsnl ol Stole

h Director. Dalanve Inlelliganca Agan*y, fo* lhe Office ol lha Sanatory of

(Je'erne and the orgoniia'ion al ihe lolnt Chief* o* S'o* C- AiiUlorH Chief of S'o' *o* Intelligence. Deportr-ient ofy. (o- tbe

Depoffvenl ol the Army

d. AiWtfont Chief ol Mo^ol OpnoMo tt'MfcgenceX. lof ih* Qapanmira ol lha Novy

e Atv.tfiFi*l SfoS.F,he Deportment ol no Air force

K

D;<ecta> ol Intelligence, AEC, lor the Atomic Energy Commission

g. AiiKtorrl Director, ftl, for lhe Federol Bureau of Invoi-igoiion Direclor of NSA. lo* the Notional Security Agency

Assistant Director lor Central Reference. CIA, lor ony oiber Deportmenl Agency

ha document moy be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to Ihe Central Intelligence Agency bywith lha Ofiae of CentralA

3hrt doevmeni is dfaienir-atedf tern recipiaen. mayerod not in eacets of one year. Ai ihe end ol lha period, lhe document should either be devlroyed, returned so the lot war ding agency, or pe>-miuian should be requested ol lhe lorwording agency to retain ii in accordance with2

The lille ol Ihis document when used separately from the text should be e

DISTRIBUTION^

White House National Security Council Deportment of Stale Deportment of Defense Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation

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FTIfFL

Original document.

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