SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK
To review the evidence acquired since ihe publication of NIEnd to assess its implications for ihe Soviet ICBM forces through
. "Soviet Capabilities for StrategicOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA, is aestimate of Soviet capabilities in the field of strategic attack. This memorandum has been prompted by new evidence whichus to review our judgments of Soviet ICBM programs and, in particular, the pace of ICBMew estimate in8 series, which will deal with all Soviet strategic attack systems, will be issued in
LNil*| deploymentsecond generationsoft sites .hkJ iliut-siloud cook- to anI iImI llicprogiam wai movingmru-d AantJ ha*but tingle sites ap-
(wn-.Kly hm bees, it^rtcdaster pace ikincst.rnatcd
Wv luvel.iil.tuilingle ulcn. all begun tincche actual nwnber undo conslrucfton i> probably larger. What compaicd lo past tola ol starling ICBM Ifluisclicis. the present level of activity is high: tin largest number of [com tatmchctS previously ifarlcdinglewaa about SO- Thu building rate, however, is not willioitt precedent noi doea il represent wh.it could beaximum effort, al one point3cbm tau.iclK.is Ml under const ructionariety o( site configuxa-Irtms. and mk/ihbm Urasdaa lle-atr.rr.il wai alto conli.iu.ng
Wa bdbH that the most advanced of these Uundtcrs will not reachstatus untilhis ineaitl lhal5 operational ICBM strength will boomewhat lower than our previous estimaten the oilier hand, the pace ol single-silo deployment could cany the fo.cu byeyond the digit side of the previously estimated rangeonsidering the estimated lime lo bring launch groups lo operational status hirJ making allowance fo* undetected launchers now under construction, our new otimate fors
TIh number of lundened icbm launclten will increase from (he present figure ofnhe force will become more dispersed,eparate hardened sites inn contrast with (he
' These toteb Jo oo* iaehsaW IUDt Trurstam. There sisaboutooi plrlrd ReO launchers anJ we believebrr wtil increase loid.ya judge tlwae launchers are noi normally available for opeiatroaal use. but varying numbers of tlms could be prepared re fire ICBMs si the US depending on Ihe amount ofIke.
'The Assistant Chief of Staff. IntelllBcruc. USAF, conrinues lo holdooinole estimate in. but coraKlers thevOS figure will be at the low tide of hu forecast spreadmetudins Tyuratam launchersiuU allowance (or unlocared secood-generafion operationalhe0 figureawed che high side of ha forecast spreadperal-wol Uu-chen in the feld aad at Tyuratam.
*Taa number does not rr^tuclr the SS luce,sbsasted la NIKtBciwwse this mmtaAr (us not yet been tested, we no longer trekfeouldby thai
Wc utiisut yrt determine wjut mivvln arc iiMcndcd for the no* silos.Soviets, luw tested two third gc-ucration ICBM systems, ihc SS9 andSS-IO. Wc believe that thehich hasormal test program will be deployed iii at lev.:ut1 llw ulov Theas list filed ciglit tunes between Apni andi4 Uil.cannot caplain. there have bven no test filing. mIkv It loo may Ik- deployed in some ol the silos.
Finally, there is evidence poinlitig to the development of other missiles, including otic which i* prnbitbly small, hI tlie test range. Thus, It It possible that some uf Ihc tilos lire fiilcndixlew ICBM, which has not beenin testo. Ihe deployment of the launchers so far in advance of the flight tests of the missile wouldeparture from previous Soviet practice. Such .in innovation would imply confidence that no major changes in the weapon system will he rwpur.d. it toiild stemesire tolanned ICflM force level inoretlian would otherwiseAlt intensive and successful test program would be iKcatssary tot this nCsailc to become available for extensive oVploymcnt zi early athusossible that many of the new si lot listed as opctational inill at that time lack missales.
It is not now dual how far tlie Soviets will push Use cuircnl deployment program or whether it will lie succeeded by fo!!ow-on programs. Though byhe Soviets almosl certainly will have more thanlaunchers estimated int is yet too early to revise ourthat the Soviets willorceCBM launchers over the next five years. We expect, however, (hat evidence collected before thaofG5 this far will help to clarify Soviet goals.1
' We are unable to determine wUtlwr thi. uiluilo would enintoy solid or liquid iiroprlUntt we believe that itOrable liquid, aro I-
"The Assistant Chief ol Staff.vn<e. USAF. tees no boilslee
change to tus footnote in. which prowledc-eratsxul ICBM launcher* byOriginal document.