for West German Foreign Policy
..STATES INTELLIGENCE' BOARD
ndiCq'*^1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
i
The following intelligence organization participated In the preparation of (his estimate'.
Tho Canirol Inlelligance Agency and lha intelligence orgonliotloni of the Deport-menu of Stole, Defsnia. AEC. and NSA.
Concurring)
Director of Intelligence ond Raseorch, Departmenl of Stole Olreetor. Defense Intelligence Agency
Iheaine to ll US!B
Director of the j.Il/ Audi'.,
iiiiurtgi
ssistant tooow oi Inieill^iilim,l, outside of hittit.
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This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United Slates within .the, jneanlng of the espionage laws.SC,. the. mlulon^tVlrmlatlofl of which In any manner to an cinauthorlitd parson Is prohibited.
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OROU* I
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Prospects for West German Foreign Policy
Jp<T
TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIIJCM
CONCLUSIONS
IMttTSSION
I. CEN'KHAl.
ImuMid tl. lUri tktmm
II.iii KHIKKA llll-in
ili:iin^ Hetiiiioii. uilliVYntrn AlUnmill Nik|,mi-li-liitioihiinniunisi Wnrkl I'ulicv Towiiril Other AraiH
ill. MiN'GSH iMM;i: I'ossiiiii.nits
PROSPECTS FOR WEST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
THE PROBLEM
Tn estimale tlu> principal (rends in West (leriuim foreign policy during the next two years or so.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Wesl Cui'inun lenders me hecmiting increasingly impatient tnore self-reliunl.rinaii. foreign policy. Con-scums nl their country's growing economic und military .strength, they arc eager lonure lufhienti.il posit inn within the West-em Alliancerenler slime in ihe formulation of Western defense nnd nuclear policies. Al the same lime,ey me anxious to impart momentum, if necessary on their own, lownnl the reunification ol their counlry. Whatever llic oiitconin of the niitumul election this fall, we lielicve that timing tlie next two years or so these tendencies will he roHecteilore assertive style and some differences of emphasis in foreign policy. Nevertheless. barring important external ilevelopmeiits. the Wesl ('crmau government will prohahly liehy practical consiileiutioiis-notuhly (lie rigidity of the power relationship in Europe-fmin milking any major changes in the Imsie lines of policy. l)
ifitul|y, we lielleve lliut Wesl Onnimy will retain its present commitments in Kurope imtl Ihe Western Alliance for ihe period of this estimate, mill will continue to depend on US nuclear power to protect the integrity of its borders anil those of West Berlin. Though we twpect sympathy lo grow for ile Gaulle's bleu of "Kurope for theith some accompanying interesturopean nuclear force.ermnny's strong defense ties with the US will almost certainlyignificant shift away from present defense policy during the next two years or so. 'aras. IJ-W)
policy toward ihe Communist world the new Westwill be, likely to make mure vigorous attemptspredecessor to talce the initiative. This will almost certainlvfurther efforts to expand the Went German position InIt may also Im reflected In moves to resolve theby direct discussions with the Soviet leaden andtoelations withtiany. Yetin any of these spheres is unlikely unless an importantin Soviet policy towardarked accelerationtrend toward independence or internal "liberalization" incould also open up new opportunities for West Germans'area. )
the period of this estimate, we believe theimportant changesest German foreign policy willthe event of rapid or fundamental changes outsidethe Communist world or the Western Alliance-Westmay find themselvesosition to act independently inwhich would Importantly affect the interests of theiror adversely For example, if the Soviets eventuallyby events to reassess their position in Europe, thiswayest German-Soviet agreement to resolve theat the expense of the East German regime and perhapsWestern allies. Or future West Cerman leaders mightto seek to exploit popular frustration over the absencemovement toward reunification and might thus tend tochauvinism and the appealoisterous and )
' Th- Matter of* .ml Henwd..of SUM. ImI* lUiC^idiukn. dor* nol innatelytf*MpuuihtlillMhrgmi tmn la paitlraW. tt mmaoh. BBtll poaobl. fa.mblaM-da Caalrol Franca afpaaucmran inMfMDoarrur.iBccon ,withUttrrnaYhmuHkKial rt-uasl.ndinutionlronflhe US.tht Giwhufon umiutWmlh laipmianipouihlllllM <uwnu<>ivi>il Ins major dlituibiniva Inmiom, which multlBonn toMnons at iWfenw pulley,
DISCUSSION I. GENERAL
riteriod nl growing restlvcneo user foreign policy. Increasingly. West Cerman* ,ur finding (hut the assumptions and goals ot tbe Adenauer cm are imi lunger appropriate in changing woild conditions, and thrv ore raising searihing questions about the future. In the day* nf .Adenauer the principal ob|et-tl*vs nt foreign policy wen- to contain Communistand In cooperate with ihr Western powers in (he rebuilding nf Western Europe and the creation nf an integrated drferaise alliance. Partly because Mime of Adenauer'" objectives were attained und partly hecauie the nanire of German problem* ha* changed, foreign polity objective* under Erhard are much more difficult tn define The Gerrnamgovernment and people alike, have not Miccveded in defining them. ThiseriiKl of search for new definitions and new formulas.
est Cerrnany has long mice passed the phase ul postwar reconstruction. It isn(or economic pnwerajor partner in the Western Alliance. Itshriving and grossingapidItargerto the conventional defensive forces ul the Western Alliance than any other European power. Conn Ions, nf this growing strength. West Germans desire more and more in exercise appropriatelv greater mfhience within the Alliance. Membersew generation are beginning to acquire position* of influence; increasingly these people, and especially the younger genrrarion after them, are coming to resent being identified wiih the Niwi regime, and feel that now. someears after World War II, they should he entitled tu look lo the future instead ol being Incessantly embroiled Ln the
t the same time, West Cermans am becoming Increasingly aware that in changing world circumstances the Interests nf their country and those of their major allies do imt always coincide. Tliere is growing Impatience over what Is regarded as exce*vive dependence on others in foreign policy, especially in ureas not of major Importance to West Germany. Indeed, whaturgeoning of nationalist feeling, nnt In the sense associated with the Nazi or even earlier periods, hut In the mam that West Germans now desire that their government shouldore self-reliant, distinctively German, policy. In this they are influenced by the example- of de Gaulle.
4 A> the Cermans look eastward, the Communbt world on longer presents so menacing an Image an it did in the Adenauer era. There Is less sense of Immediate threm. und more awareness of opportunities developing from the rifts and ferment within the Communist world. The Bonn government has
4nnniyeu!ipowth rule of lesen permit, -Hkh tiuubtertt the prrtieusFutlfct Winemm Bonnrowth rule llili >enr nluwit iia high ui luat. Weil Liriimuis linn nes-ci eiifmvil such inutnerity.
taken steps In establish ii modest position in Eastern Kiiriipe. in Ihr form ol tradtwhich it1 winlgr torin.ii. concern imf iIk- dMofcM nfiiiir>'. whichIxvn jsrm-nt from ihr lit-giiming, Im* lii'tnine iiHin* evident und increased In intensity pwt sincercctmn id tlx- Berlin Wall inhwiithmaiw RthviLi-lilxixl ntmmi isiirrs| thaitoward the ciiiuiikiii ucvil is in il lieinu shirked. Many Wrtt Cimiau* luivi- time tmieludiil thaif miilrarihvy cimUlv miallies In irulr tlx iii-*in-illiir lltrm. loll stiitihl luu- tn take steps un their uwii. Largely in response tn tlu* inltfitlivo nl WillyuiiilHT nl "small tvnu" have Ikiii taken liy ihr nonuntpriweith EastuVa Chi man* or.*of thr iieu-voty tn maintain ntovrmrnl in eastern polity, lest thrv pjm tin* impression that they atvepl thend ,irr no Iniitier purlin ilarl* Interested In the rniniflcatxHi nt
etertheless. then- atv Mill wry strong Itlftiiri which restrict West Cer-maii independent inlllattvi's. Despite the diminished sense nl immediate threat, the Westuuns it-mam .'teat's sinintix-cl mrr ihets* their eastern Imrdcr. Tlicir desire In have strong I'S military Imces statitini'd mi German soil lor prnt.-ctiun is at linnever; Indeed timereat sensimilv tn any sugge-ttMxi tli.it tlu- I'S inltthleti -nvill units nt its ftstvr* There is rxisvlose midmplex rrlatiimshlp lietween the urnied innrs ol West Germany mid the I'S which svould inhibit rapid nr radical changes In detente polity and planning. Yjiother limitation iipnii lixlepeixleut actionthe gnnving practical imulseiuent ot VVes* Crrmany in the Common Marker and iitlirr West Eurupctui coupernrlvother iuctnr* which Inhibit change in lisrciini ptmcy or divert .itt.-ntHKi frrnn it un- ilniiu-tllc prmpcritv growingand ecosininiv iiitesrratHm lis German stxtcty. andiiisciisut ot responsible leaders In Imth major political parties on tlie main outlines nl West German foreign pnllcv.
Implications of5 Election
fl West Germany Is iuisv preparingatliMisil rlixtion to la- held noeptemlierlie utitiomr of which couldifmriiaiil rtfevthe style unci emplwsi* of foreign policy during the nest year or two. The most likely outcome, we believe, is that tbe German electorate will return tu power on ssdminUtralkisn led lis- ther-Kratk t'nlisn (CDl'l aisd itt Bavarian iimllati'. the Christ tan Social I'ninnhich, as now. is llkely to dqsend for It* inajnrity un cnalltloii with the Free Democratic Parry (FDPi. Inbe Adeim..er-Strauss wing nl the CDC/CSC will prolsahh- renew its prrssureoreu" orientation iniilmtantlally rr-duced plurality would pmhuhly Ix- interpreted bv the purtv lender* as culllnttore ttmvttbtv leadership. Fighting far sunlvtal. tlw small FDP has ul-readyn presson* iikIicmI policy, cspciiullv toward the east, lis the main plunk oi its electoral platform.
7 IIiiwvut. h*lrM linn- lu tl. Instiirv tlx- sMiil Deir-Kruti. Pomlumvearninglurality, whichtitle it to in- in fonnmeredi-d. itullvn seek tn revituli*'Girmnnys policies. Tlu-eader* prnhnblv would Interpret mi elec-linii victorya mumlale tororeisulky toward tlu- CommmmiEvp-vulUtiru.iv. SPI> admin MruUm. pro! salK pr.-vi.-i* practkvs ami pnmiplessrlrtoe.' It pmlv.il.ls .eimk!oser lies with tlu- East
German* ami in tiim- piwsihh,ulllt tin-ii-glim-. Mam- nl the
present priihleim,rilmllMrilatiims with Wist Ormaiiv's Euiopeuu allies,. M'll leaders luv.with felloweiulh in mliiutunr..v
V II is possible, thoughs* llkriv. thatillion" "ill Ik-dinned betweenIjI'/Csl* und'l) utterlwHnn, In miuIi an event, tlie administration will1 overw Ilining piirlia.neiit.uv mn'iiritv. mi tluit thm-U-reater surface apm-aramv ol staWlltv in foreign policv.venttIsr suba-tled tn imtismsJ pre^mcew mire independent title in polkv flMUlMal ami maneuver In-tw.-en and within tin- two parties wmld continue. Ii* tVMV excluded from effective Innuimr over lutlmml pulley. It .ould Ix-coiilcncus lor.ontented radkiiU mid nationals. Suchpiwitim. wmiM pnihul.lv trv tn rallyis exliumimi ami mivlog {Utnvuihichtumulatrd ifacvWarllegeded Allied "warnd the division of Germane at Allied hands. This kind ul appeal would lie likfly to evnke some popular respuiise. hul we do nut think It would Imw an Important Hfetl on foreign pulley for the next few years.
II. THE OUTLOOK FOR FORClON POLICY
General Considerations
'J. We believe that the iiiittonie ol the election, whatever ll mav he. isto bring alhint fundamental change in U'rsl Germanlicy during the next few yrarsCetm.ii. leader* will try to adopt at least thes-orelrnti that change, in style amiam Isr 1But tin some years the- federal Hepablk- willennstrained bv pructti-itlthe rigidity .it the puwer relatlnnshlp inimtklng radical changes in thef It. poluy. Onlv in the event nf important developments outside Germany would an iinportunt shift inirsaii lorugn pnlay la- hkelyir dunn* tlsr [HtiiaJ of this Pinnate.
HI Popularin West Germany does nut now- luilvi-ly favorchanges ft,le ihe contniry. mint West Germans aresvith tl* eii|.iyinent of th.Hr -inpretedanted prihi>crity; their principal
The lUsira IksVnaUnnMi4hrt lK.n
mtnh
Ml Relation* will) the I'K will probably continue to lie hampered bvitiemu-e* onhough intermittent atmospheric improvement may be expected, since both governments have an interest In bettering their relationship, varkxu difference* Isrim-tri the two1 niriaee from time to time, the most profound of which will itsncc-rn Germany* role in Europe and in the Western Alliance. Weil Cirmaii Laden believe tbut Britain dises not support their national intrrrsts. mi reunification) andukewarm toward German aspirationsinger rule In NATO councils. In ihe event ilvut the West German election diould bring an SPD administration inlu power, relations with the Labour Government prulsahty will imprnve somesvhnl. since there are some close personal ties between individuals: in the two parties. Improvement would also mult from progressutually satislac-tiiry version of the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANFi proposed hy the British,uitable alternative.
e-ia ond i
We believe that Weit Gernuny'ssance on US protectionain the heart of its defense and nuclear policies. The West Cermaru will continue to urge, however, that the pment US stralegv nl "flexible retponse" lie interpreted to allow almost Immediate use of nuclear weapons for theof Wen German lerrttory. West Cerman leaders will also prestarger voice In the determination nf NATO defensive stralegv and in the control of the West's nuclear deterrent.
Thin continuing concern was an important factor lu thu discussion of the proposalultilateral Nuclear ForceI continue* to operate in the discuntion of nuclear defense arrangements which now centers upon the Atlantic Nuclear Forcelie outlook for agreement onorce Is not bright, pertly because of British-German differences, but particularlythe Cerrruru and others are uiuious toonfrontation with de Gaulle over the question If there ii no progress on current proposals. German policymaker* will probably look for other shoring arrangements, failure to achieve any form of sharing may lead them eventually to consider alternative nuclear policies
Some leading Westdenauer. Strauss, andexpressed themselves as favoring the developmenturopean nuclear force. Such Individuals- sympathise with de Gaulle's stated view that the US cannot be relied upon Indefinitely to come to Europe's defenserills. Thoy advance the argument that the credibility nf the Western nuclear deterrent would be enliancad by the presence In Western Europeuclear force under European control, hicsirporating the French forte He frappe. Ifesult of tha West German election the "CaullUt- wing of the CDU/CSU shouldore influential position, tha govt-rerne-nt may come under some pressure to explore the poulhlUtiei of this scheme We believe, however, that the West Cerman leadership in the mam does not regard the creation oforceealistic ob|et1ive. Perhaps more Important, most German leaden
would continue lo consider essential tlu- Intimate liivohrnnrn*he US In any nuclear arrangement.
A bilateral Frrnch-Ccrman arrangement for nuclear defensehighly unlikely during the period of thtt estimate. The Cerman* will not want to jeopardize their clow reUlkHiship with the US hy inch an arrangement, and In any catr. we helirve that de Caulk* will not permit thi* Cerrnaiui adureoint nssttreV program. Considerable c'lnprratlon already crist* hetweaa the mo ctnintrie* in various military fields (though farthan that between West Cermany and tlie USl. but we base no evidence nf any collaboration relating to nuclear weapons. Itossible that the Germans'. In return for some linportanr advantage, would tigrerrench request for financial support lor the /one aV fntpjie. We doubt this, because we see no adequate advantage which the West Germans svoidd be likely tn receive from th* French nt present that would compensate for the risk nf underminingrelations .vith the L'S.
We believe that then- is little dlspusitluu In West Germany at present toational nuclear weapons capability. Over the nest severalo the extent that their devlreireater role appear to the Germans to In-frustrated, sentiment for an Independent nuclear capabilityohablyto some extent. But all responsible West German leaders at present rejectourse, and there continue to lie strong political factors. Including the Bonn government's treaty commitments, which dVtrr West Germansational nuclear weapons program. We believe it highly unlikely that they srll! begin to developrogram during the period oi this estimate.
Relations with tha Communist World
hatever the outcome of5 election, we bela-ve that rlw new administration In Bonn will try tn develop initiative! in eastern policy, Ifindependently nf its Western allies. It will continue to urge Its allies tn press the Soviets to abandon their rigid opposition to reunification. If the ollios prove unresponsive to this pressure, or If their efforts are blocked hy the Soviets. West Cerman leaders will Intensify their exploration of nltemative approaches to the problem. This might result in direct talks with the Soviets, further moves to improve the Cerman position in Eastern Europe, or additional moves to normalise West Cerman relations with East Germany; or It could result In all three together. There will probahlyontinuing tendency to look for practical accommodations ol policy regardless of politicalsuch as agreements for greater movement of Cerman* in both directionshe tonal border. An SPD administration would prohablv accelerate imp>-menutioo ofollcv. especially if its coalition partner svere theDP.
ut Bonn's eastern policy operates under severe constraints, and unless Important external developments should occur, see believe that prugreu will not be spectacular. undamental change In Soviet policy toward Germany
would al iuiv time Uv likely to find positiveoon, huto prospest of suchcl*rrge during thr ptrtad of ihr.M German progress toward rapprociienH-nt with East Germany probably will be limited, il least tn the extern that the Soviets regard it ax likely to endanger the nihility of tlie Communist regime We expect lurthei Wert German steps to improveespite repeatetl demonstration of tlie Communist intention tu use llirw Heps tu nnliaiur the Untnv of tlie East German regime nt Dunn's expense.
n Eastern Europe, it is cusKtivable thatarked aitrlrralion of the irend toward independence or toward internal liberaopenpportunities for enhancing West German influencethe area, which any West German irhraiiUtration would Ik; qidck to sarplolt. But in the absence of such developments, wo believe that tlie West German government will continue to improve Its relations with these countriesradual pace. Issues inch as theestion contuiue to present serious obstacles to the normalisation of Bonn's relations with Eastern Europe Tlie Impression continues to prevail in Ihr countries of this area that the West Germans still have designs cm their former eastern territories.
olicy toward China is mint her uren where Bonn will piobablyore assertive line than in ihe past The Bonn government under whatever leadership, probably will be less deterred by I'S susceptibilities tluui luIn establishing trade relations wilh Peiplng. Bonn's principal interest inie is that It may be able torade agreement with Chinaerlin clause, which Bonn could use in lis maneuvering against die L'lbrichtrade coniiderationi are secondary, but not unimportant. To somo extent Bonn will be influenced by the example of de Gaulle.er. the West Germans seem to believe that such actions will not be construed hy the USajor break in Western solidarity.
Policy Toword Othar Arias
est Cermany's national Interests arc less directly involved in other areas ot the world, and Bonn's foreign policy Is less actively engaged in these areas. But the government and West German bsiafaess Interests ore greatly interested in trade with the underdi-vrtoprd world, and the West Cermans haveairly extensive economic aid program. Bonn's major concern with respect to these areas Is to maintain Its position as the sole spokesman for the German people, and to sustain the diplomatic isolation oi the Ulbricht regime.this policy, which Is epitomised by tbe llallstein Doctrine, has become increasingly difficult to maintain as more and more nations, many of them newly uidependrnl. have been sub)ected to Communist pressure and Influence. Hectmt troubles with Indonesia. Tanzania, and the UAH have caused West German
' The Berlin lUuse retrrs to toe tncSusW ol Wen Bet.in in the enmthe treat agrertnent. Tht tost German rrglnie niauitaiiw that West Beilmno Irilllmutr lie to the Federal flsnublic.
.niKk'l smrihiiig cxuinhMtioii. Thev up
it nijin ir. dlwiKkiu k. i* modify it
toward tin- Middle hast, till Ulvtl ul mult llun fill
.11
ilrii'sl li.is Imi'U great It tiiinplkutcd In Bonus involvementmilUl. it resultit*llonslup svlllihandling n| nil the problem, arising out (it tin- Ulbricbl tisfl il Ihiiiu's luihinu nl military aid to Israel was .eklcly critici/edxinmeli inept > ssuri* UnidnliT hni auaiiist the Aralt*. It is wtdch believed
iit one of (he haste causes nl Itshe Middle East
1oi till
- : v
jBJitht nt [ulkiwing L'S polity guiduncc.liewill. hracl.rman polity In the Mkldle Easte||eet sj.eiideally (iermnuitlcul and economic interestsUrn Itrsarr. bum. is no longer likely toniform policy)iinriiM-s. and ihe complexities ot the problem may result hi at least Hidlslcin Dorfrlni'- More broadly, reci'titvill
rlness toward polltk-ai commitr
eiitons ol tension outside tlie ami ol NATOurn .IK RANGE POSSIBILITIES
s.hat no important changes in West German
i'ulc aii< likeh during Ihe next two years or so. we believe that de-
l..piK.ni. inuild situatiun will considerably increase the potentiality fur i.lies ihai Km many years Bonn's foreign policylelntivrlvI liiivh ilrjiiiulenl mi the foreign polled* of utbers. hut In recenton In move, and In stars to lornr we erpect it tu gatlsrr momentum, .hi ihe Hiliti ImikI. habits of constitutional government, which base foundn llu-ears, should tend to impede sudden shifts inmfulo considerable nationalaH.srs inliiluitiig sudden change are Wesi Germany'si-uicdi.iniii ami Its InleilW' (hive lor reioncillatlon with Western Europe.n tin- cent of rapid or fundamental changehr I'SMI. ti. Sino-Soviet or US-Suvtrt relations. Eastern Europe, the EEC.
NVIO Weslntan leaden may find tla-mselsrsosition todeiil .irtiuii in awhich woukl have an important effect on. nvis ol their allies, either fasorablc or advrrse. If the SovleU are eventually i. imiI Im iirntl In reassess their position in Europe, this might open thei Wesl German-Soviet agreement to resolve the German quclum atB-iSM' olrasst German regime and perhaps of Boon. Weiteni allir*. A
llir Diniiui olmi Rrstarik Prputtua-at ol suit IrrU that fbn leituiu -iUWiU.Isr> met lip- baqm Srmi. Ini.Iirwbk"li Caulk* .lai.'i.liir. ii* Ffi'iahml ii iiInward IiulL-iir.ii.irslhan aril ipirmalaaalinnanuiMishIi tin' alliatliuiik1lllcn)-mlblurs in- In Un- UV,
major disruption of the Westernexample, throughrenchto leaveMUM the Went Germans to reassess their entire position an defense policy. Evidence that the US Intended to bringubstantial reduction of its commitments In Europe would certainly emu? sucheassessment, and strong domestic pressure might then arisr for tlu* adoptiono"i.ile.iripum piogr.'im
xternal developments* timid also affect opinion inside West Germanyay whkh would not be to the advantugr ut the US or Bonn's other allies. Future West German leaders might be tempted to seek to exploit popular frustration over the absence of visible muirmenl towurd leunl Beat ion and might thus tend to revive German chauvinism aitd the appealwisterous and Intolerant extremism, lllso possible that external events could cause neutralist feeling in West Germanv to grow. In time, and especially If the sense of direct Soviet threat tn Western Europe continues to diminish, the West Germans' conviction that NATO Ii essential for their security could weaken. Conceis'ably even the ivecessity far tlie lonllmicd prw-ncv of Amrrican forces on Crnnan soil might eventually Isr put In ipiestlnn.
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