SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
5
Reactionsertain US Course of Action in Southeast Asia
SubimTfed by Ihm
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Conatnd'm byUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai ind toiod overleaf5
t.
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
5
Reactionsertain US Course of Action in Southeast Asia
REACTIONSERTAIN US COURSE OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist and oilier reactions to the use of US forces toarrier across Communis! supply lines in the Lao
ASSUMPTION
A US force of three divisions moves into Laos along Routefrom Thailand and South Vietnam to seize and hold terrain along the Route with the purpose of blocking Communist troop anil supply movements.
DISCUSSION
he international reaction to the US action would ln> generally unfavorable, parllctilaily if ihe action were not undertaken at ihe request of Premier Souvanna Phouina. We believe, however, tliat the chances arc less than even thatcould be persuaded to makeequest. Hi; would recognize lhat the US action wouldlear and conspicuous violation of2 Geneva accords upon which the legitimacy of his government rests. He would see few advantages to Laos ami many dangers ineployment. He would fear that Laos wouldajor battleground for the powers involved in Vietnam, that the Communists would retaliate against his fences in other parts of Laos, and that the Chinese Communists might occupy the northern provinces. Souvanna has approved of US escalation of air activity, and he would probably prefer io see this course fully exploited, including the destruction of Hanoi, before considering involvement of LaosS-Communist ground war.
2 If the US pressedao Government request in the face of Souvunna's opposition, he might he led to resign and return to France, as lie has so often threatened to do. While most other Lao leaders, including the King, would be likely to share Souvanna's misgivings, Souvanna could probably lie removedoalition of conservative forces. Under such circumstances, however, anv successor government would he seen by most of the worldS puppet.
f Souvanna could be persuaded Io call lor ihe USit assent would iilnxivl certainly be conditioned on explicit USrotection agains! DHV .mi! Chinese counteraction in northern and cunlrnl Laos, lit might not request inimediatr deployment uf US lorces into these uru, lent'.i'i' 'Ii- wry attacks he wLtlted to prevent, but he would almost certainly demandtangible evidence that substantial US forcesm! Ik available quickly if needed. Thh would be equally true of any inccessor gm-cnimrul.
4 TV Thai would be coiiccrncd about hatingarge Imrlgn piwticv in their omnlry u> the assumed action implies, but their major ennem would be that the ailion might bring Coinmimul, particularly Chinese, atlackv against Thailandi- believe dial ihe 'I'li.ti would cooperate with the US plan if given specific commitments on defense measure* lo protect Thailand Inon-lingerie)'. The Thai leaders would also almost certainlylnlantial UteresHi US did Al least sporadic wholagc rflorts against (he line* ofaertm Thailand tn theegion of laws would lie likely.
and thetr protection wouldairly large-scale Thai orffort.
In short, flic US would almost certainly lie called on lo provide mlnUnti.il
Iwm, in Thailand as in Laos, over and alwve those which would lie required
to seal of! the ClMWlliiiiill supply ninens.
ull..Ji.t. Prince Sihanouk's ten uf US-supported attack* from South Vietnamo* would probahly he Increased. He would vocllerotislythe US action and would piol>al)ly reiterate in some lonn his demand* lor international guarantees of his borders. At tbe same time, however, he would probably be impressed with thh new evidence ol US uVtrniunation not to be driven out of Southeast Asia Until he had some clearer view of (he outcome of the US effort, be would piobably be teluctanl to see anyin the use of <Iamlx>diaupply route and safe-haven for Communist forces in Vietnam.
fi. The Nnrlh Vietnamese would almost certainly learnajor USwas iK'ingey already .verm to suspect that something of the sort may he under consideration. As US intentions became clearer, Hanoi and the Palliel lau would seek to discourage. Souvanm's concurrence ami tn deter the US action bv propaganda am! by actions designed to demonstrate their ability to threaten areas about which the Lao and Thai government* arcy troop rucAxments in the north antl central areas- At the same time tliey would send some reinforcements into southern Laos and attempt to stockpile supplies. As tlie dimensions of the US build up in northeast Thailand lieoame more apparent. Hanoi might undertake, limited offensives to bring PL/PAVN forces close I" the Mekong along the Thai frontier. AH this wouldigorous propaganda campaign designed tn heighten (ears in Lain and abroad of an ever-expanding conflict.
Once (Im US npeiatlun was under way. tho North Vlolnnnuue mighl choose lo engage IS forces al specific points where (lie PL/PAVN units would have local advantnge, hut the normal pattern probably would lie vigorous harassment and ambush Though the PL/PAVN" would probably exert ttrong pressures in north and central liov we believe the chances are less than even that they wouldajor counter-offensive against the US foiccs iu the south. For at least wane time, ihe Communists would be bsely to feel thai they could maintain the imirrrection in South Vietcain. even if the IS mterdlction reduced the levels of activity. Hanoi and the Pathet Lao would call for condemnation of the US action under ihe Geneva agreement TV North Vietnamese might setil Lao "government of Nationalarticularly if Souvanna were no longei in power. Tliey would attltdraw their diplomaticirom Vientiane, have the i'athct Lao sever all contacts witho government, anil thicalen to renounce the Geneva agreements
Even after the US forces had occupied Ihe length ole believe lhat llie North Vietnamese would continue eflorls to Infiltrate some cadres throught thetime. Hanoi would increase its reliance on sen routes directly lo South Vietnam or via Cambodia, at le.nl foiquipment, and supplies. if the US effort, unhiding not only the action assumed here but other act Nut* against Communist lines ofieteerled in seriously restricting tV supply of men and materiel to the msurrrelfon in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese would have to decide whether to reduce sharply the level of that msurrectloti, tnespite through pnhtkalr to attempt lo break tV blockade through mihtary action agaimt tV US force* in lata* or cLewheie. Which course tliey would choose would dependumber of circuimtance* of tV moment, such asorth Wtu.nuressures, Hanoi's reading of the US domestic situation, and probably most important, the strength of the VC and the state of lis morale.
The Chinese, Communists, us well as the DHV. have been anticipating US intervention in the corridor and have already made pmpugiuwla attacks and threats aimed al blot king such action, including private warnings that they might have to send troops into Laos if the US commitment in Vietnam were greatly increased. We believe, however, tliat so long as the US forces had not crossed the Laotian frontier in strength. Peking probably would not lot it* parthinese combat forces in any strength into laos, although it might order threatening troop movements along the border. It might also increase its assistance lo il- Pathet lato in nurtliern Laos by introducing some specialized personnel lo support Ihe PL/PAVN.inimum. Peking would increase its propaganda attack* and threats of intervention, and step up aid andof nippoil lo tV DRV.
once tlie US had crossed into southern Laos in force,CoinmuiiLsts almost certainly would counter in the northwest bypersonnel and equipment to augment Communisthere and
expand Communist cOntiol intolose to the Thaihis woulddesigned to facilitate infiltration of Thailand, lo intimidate Iwio ami Thai leaders, and to raise international and domestic pressures on the USto avoid expanding tltc war.
1 The Director ol Intelligence ami Heipnrirlithatestimate sNould Mate luecificallyol>;ibtyncluderegular Ctiinweiilint imitv, *inrecan he interpreted a* mritninj only llmitcl number* of tpccialiier) culn.
As longlie Chinese Communist leaders estimatede USoukl remain in therea of sonlh Laos, large-scale intervention by Chinese force* wntdd lie unlikely. However, .in imminent Communist move against north Laos would lead the Lao government to demand US forces lor protection of this area. If the USntroducing US ground (was into northernthe royal capital at Luangwould in itself sharply increase the risk of Chinese entry.
The principal Soviet reactions would be political. In Ihe initial stages of the US deployment, Moscow would probably meposition as Geneva co-chairman to reinforce other diplomatic and piopagunda efforts to block the US action or cause abandonment of the project Moscow almost certainly would like lo see another international conference on Laos. However, its* actions would be strongly influenced by the course ol event* aud by theof Hanoi and Peking. For example, if Hanoi and Pekingommunist-dOmiuatetl governn Laos, Moscow woukl probably do so as well. At some stage, the USSR might renounce its role as co-chairman, on the grounds that the US had destroyed2 Geneva agreements.
On the military plane, the Soviets wouklirect commitment ol forces, but they might provide logistical and material support tooperations in Laos asidbis woukl reiiuirc Peking's cuoper.ition, however, and (he US actionflog would probably not cause the Chinese to drop their opposition to any significant Soviei role iu Indochina.
US-Soviet tensions would sharpen, both because the Soviets would be under heavy pressure from the Asiannd because the Soviets would regard the US actionepudiation of agreements worked out with Ike USSR1he Soviets might increase their own defense spending and even abrogate some US-Soviet agreement or understandings. Wc doubt that the USSR would retaliate against the US in Merlin simplyesponse to the US actionos. Some carefully controlled harassment* in Berlin are, of course, possible in any case.
The British, too. would he facet! with difficult problems. As one of the two co-chairmen of tbe Geneva conference on Laos, the UK would find il somewhat awkward, though of course not impossible, to support US violation ol the accords. l'liilhermore, US policy in Vielnam is not popular wilh the British public,ajor extension of the Vietnam conflicl into Laos would excite considerable opposition. Prime Minister Wilson would be under severe
attack from lii* own loll wing and from much of ihe public and pirns.he would nut wmit openly to oppose (lit US on this issue. Although he might be restrained from vlrong publie support, he would probably give private assurances and try to avoid public criticism ofS action.
wouldthe US actiona'fw extension of erroneousin Vietnam, and would strongly condemn it. Ksm if the action badof Souvaruus govemmmt, tlw Krmch reactions would bein this caw. I'aris might cut ofl its ruruining rxmouuc aid andfor Soovaima'* regime. If another regime had it-placedwould belmost a*s InS puppet. We do not believe, Iwwcvcr. that Franceaction againsi the US in tlie UN, and we canniH sec much thatdo to make ilv opposition felt practically.
reaction ol oilier members of the worldwould generally
follow predictable linespproval from Taipei ami condemnation from Djakarta) wilh an increased amount of unfavorable reaction. If the action had Souvanna's suppott. reactions would be somewhat less unfavorable than otherwise The success of ihe US action would abo have an iinportant cflect i'iiom. if the three divisions did not resultpeedv andlessening ol hmtllltm in South Vtetruun. critlthrm wmild he harsher and endorsement' less enthusiastic Even tbough Hanoi and I'eking liave cale-gorically denied that (he UN lias any jurisdiction In the Vietnam conflict,might moveN condemnation of the US aclion. Theof such an effort would be greater, of course, if the US action were taken over Souvanna's opposition.
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