ET.
5
special
national intelligence estimate
Short-Term Prospects for
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concvrrod io by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As indicated5
/sill
fin- following inlelligence organizations participated in fhe preparation of thit estimate;
The Control Intelligence Agonct ond the inlelligcKeof tho Oopail-menn of Stale. Defense, and NSA.
Director ot Intelligence and Research, Dcpafmem ot Stale Direcior. Defense Inieliigeruc Agency Director ol ihe Nationol Security Agency
The Atomic Energy Coniroisiion Repfejentatire lo lhe USJB ond lhe Assistant lo Ihe Direcior, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of iheir jurisdiction.
or revelation of
this material conloinsTrrfff^eliaa^flccimgi llS|alci within the meaning of theM^Sg^ck7Q3, the irons-
ly manner toMil pi mum I' prohibited.
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR LAOS
scope note
laos continues to Heeater in llie shadow ofThis estimate surveys the local Lao scene and evaluate* the prospects for serious trouble arising from local political or military developments during the next few months. Extension of major ground operations of the Vietnam conflict into Lao territory would, of course,undamentally new situation.
summary
A. During the next month or so. the formationewwillciiixl of some tension in Vientiane and will present problems in relations with theolthough the PL will launch propaganda attacks on anv new arrangements madeesult of the recent elections,licvc the chances are better than even that they will not setival government. Considering the cliaractcristic volatilityooup is an ever-presentbut we sec no major threat at this time to Souvanna'sin office.
Ii. Whereas we are fairly confident in our judgment that theprobably do not intend to initiate any major military action in Laos in the next few months, we are certain that they would react vigorously to any offensive in Ijios which they felt seriously threatened the infiltration route to the Viet Cong or moved into the territories Ixirderiiig on the DRV and Communist China. Despite someino army in the past year or so, wc believe lhat anyo offensive into these sensitive areas would be repulsed with great damageevere setback to general military morale.
I. POLITICAL SITUATION AND PROSPECTS
lk' neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma was nuuli! prettier of llie tripartite regime establishedesult ofnatlon conference at Geneva. Tworince Soiiphanouvcmg andhu van, rcprcsciil'd tlie proami rightistlions respectively.pailicipa-iinn in thepractically ended in die spring3 whenampliaumivung and one of ihe FL ministers left Vientiane fur CutnminmtA It lion git<nl>inet posts are still held open for lite pro Cotnrniinists.a*Iteen in effect acoalition, with rightisthimself has become increasingly
The flight ol I'tionmi Nosavan (rum Laos after his attempted coup last February eliminated oik-Ianl source of political testability andSimvanna lltoinnn's position. Souvanna has some degree of Itacking from most of lhc iion-CiimmunUt political factions in Laos. The King has supported hint increasingly, ami even such powerful conservatives as Ihe Sanaiiikone lamily, whose position win also strengthened hy Plmumi's departure, have beento "nl with him as premier. Most Lu> politicians consider it useful to eoniinue him in office because lie symbolizesneva legitimacy ol tltc Lm (Uivciomcntevertheless, distensions jumng militaryalthough nwre icUtcd to rivalries between tin- general stall and lhc Geld officers titan loole, could eruptanner that would threaten ox destnty staliibty.
Although Souvanna Leeps tight control of foreign affairs ami has increased his cumntand ol the sources of power in the government (patronage and money I. he has tended toarge part ol lite everyday management of government affairs toumber of relatively young civil servants and junior cabinet officers have reeunlly come into prominence, of whom the most important is Sistink nu Clitmpavsalno standards tlieylurd.working andhonestew have, already been accused of lining their pockets, liowever, and we cannot he confident thai increased authority or frustration will no) incline them toward llie corrupt ways of theirouvanna lias been promoting (he enusc ol Sisimkay that indicates he sees himossible
lo the premiership, hut, as Sismik himselfe has not yet
acquired the m'eevsary maturity and prestige for that difficult full.
approach of llie National Assembly elections ofulyuncertainly and considerable activity, iuchiding threats and (winery,various factions, (or whom sears in this largely rubber-stamp hutlyleast accretions ol prestige and pohtK^il influence. Theilitary officers, government lunctioilirics. and teachersAssembly gonerally younger and more energetic and capable ili.ui itsand one accordingly that is likely toore active role in
he outcome ol llie election was favorable lor the preservation ul stability-No group wfin such complete dominance that others would Iccl driven toIt, and no giuup was so badly dclcatcd thai It wouldoup was required fur self-preservation. Oil thu whole, the chief gainers were the "Youngho line up with Sisouk na Chainpassak. Since llie election enough of (hu successful candidates lutvu gravitated lo Sisouk to giveajority, which he can be expected to use in support of Souvanna. The chief losers were lhe Saiianikone family, bul even Ihey won aboutf itaeals. Tltu leading Sananikoncs. former Premier Phoui. and hi* nephew. General Koup-rasith, commander of llie military region which includes Vientiane, have both expressed satisfaction with the outcome.
iring the election campaign, minors ol coups were rife in Vientiane. Advance knowledge of what was perhaps Ihc most .serious coupfiom rivalries and antagonisms wiihin the armedUS officials lo persuade cite leaders thatove would be unwise. There will alwayshreat lo stability, however, as long as command relationships remainintention and distrust persists among lhe military leaders, particularly tatweeu Vientiane and the field commanders. However, we believe the chances are better than even that Ihe legal government wil! survive ihese clangers and lhat Souvanna will continue as premier.
ambitious General Phoumi, now in exile in Thailand, posesthreat. Although he still retains some following, particularlyranks in the mililary, he has Utile chance of recouping his positionas the present balance prevails in Laos. His diminished standing withwas further lowered by his ill advised play for power early ihis year:leaders are willing to let him remain in Thailandutcertainly liave no intention of backing Phoumi in an attempt topowei. Allhough the Thai lenders do not much care for some nf ttaleaders, they are willing to accept ttam Or any other non-leftist groupable toKxIicum of stabilityon-Communistwould remain available for the Thaick should the situationcollapse iulo chaos.
II, MILITARY SITUATION AND PROSPECTS
prccsnto Government forces (FAR) have0 in the Air Forcen the Hivcro Air Forcender the leadership of General Ma, has4J> propeller-driven fighter-homltersnd its pilots havecourage and skill in close air support action and inmovements and supply. Last summer's successful clearingthe junction ofhis spring's successful defense ofagainst an attack by North Vietnamese troops, lhe absence of aoffensive helore this year's monsoon,rhaps most important,giound attack capability of the RI.AF (plus US air actionos)
have combined to giveH improved inunila and confidence. r'AHarc prolmblyst they have been, hut this .still leaves il ashird-rate fighting force with little capability against determined opposition.
significant clement on the anti-Communist side is the large numlicrirrcgulais wIhi continue to put up vigorous defense ol theirarea, and have provided some effective haiasiment of enemy supplyneutralist force* commanded bythould also beIhe anti-Oaumuiiut side, but these largelyr soa very limited military capability.
Tlie Coiniinmist lorces in Laos are estimated to include0 Pathet uo (PL) andorth Vietnamese troopf whichre encadred in PLlH-re are. alsoather ineffectual dissident neutralists under the commands of Colonel Deuanc and General Khatnouane Ikmplia. Tlie Dcuanisls, like their counterparts under Kong Le. are ol wavering loyalty, even though encadred with PL. Il is unlikely that llirre are any organized Chinese military units in Laos, although detachments iA .nm.il guards hare probablv al times accompanied Chinesecrews ami supply convoys in Phong Saly and Nam Tlia provinces.
lite Communisttin-generally morethan the non-Communist Lao forces and retain the capability of rapidly seizing such exposed places as Thakhek or Luang Prabang. The interiortowns of Saravane "nd Altopeu are especially vulnerable to Comtmmtst attack ami could he seized by small forces. 'Ihey could not overrun KAH-held territory quite so swiftly and easily as Ihey might have in the past, however, because of tlie imiwnsetnetit of the r'AH and wpctudly because nf thr effect of mk attacks on llieir forces and supply lines. Seizure of Vientiane, Paksc, nr Savannakhct would almost certainly require the introduction of substantial additional PAVN forces.
The Communists give no sign of wanting fo stir up the military situation in bans. They already control those parts of Laos which are most im|wrtant lu them: the areas adjacent to China and North Vietnam and the part of Ihe panhandle used asupply and infiltration route into South Vietnam. No!2 have they moved to take an important town from the HAH, and this year tlicy have even passed up the usual pre-monsoon offensive against llie neutralists. *ltiey have conducted someigorous clearing actions against the anti-Communist itregubus along their supply lines in Sam Neua |iroviucc, and Aay are currently increasing pressure on tfiein llie region when- Luang Praising. Pltong Saly, and Nam Tha provinces rODM together. Thesr efforts have resulted in some Improvement of tlie seeuiity of
' In imsl huiiuihos, Hanoi tuts substantially imIikihI I'AVNin Laosiuoimooi. Mipplynml ii mayunt IrnV into account llili nmtltilr rcritaixm, nHthrr duraMoral PAVNinl VMiuuu.
llieir supply lines, but tdiit. It of the rugged country outside the roads andremains In the hand* of the tribal irregulars. Tlie result* haveGMnmuiintiind it difficult and costly to suppressnair - their supply problemowered morale.
* ui* air fairly eonfidnil in our judgment il.ii tlx- ldo iKit intend to iiiiTurr any major military' action Iu (jus in llie nestre certain that tliey would trail vigoromry to any offensiveis which (heyionsly threatened llie infiltration roulc to the Viet Cong or moved into the tmitones bordrriiig on the DHV and Commuuivt China. Any FAlt offensive into these sensitive areas would U- repulsed wiih great damage to lhe KAll lorccs involvedevere setlmek' to genera) FAH morale.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: