INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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5
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SUBJECT: Soviet Tactics Concerning'
The new Boviet-DRV economic and military aid agreement oviet ones shipments and vill have the effect of deepening the Soviet commitment in Vietnam. Partly in order to contain the rlaka of thla commitment, the USSR has of lateprivate approaches to the US, Indicating continued Interestegotiated settlement. At the same tine, it has threatened in lov key to make trouble in Berlin if the US rcaalni unyielding in Vietnam. We believe that this combination of tactics Is intended to deter further US escalotioo in Vietnam. It is also meant to prepare for the time vhen negotiations might become feasible and, the USSR canarger role in Vletnaa.
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USSR seens to have agreed to step up Its arcsto the DP4/. As arrcunccd by Hanoi onewmilitary aid agreement vas recently signed ln Koaeov;things, it calls for the "strengthening of the TSV'apotential" end specifies the additional aid to he provided.
signing of this agreemententh or more
of public Soviet hints that something of this nature vas legending. Departing from the usual formula on tha subject, Prevda in eld-June, for example, declared that the USSR would give "the DRV government and the republic's armed forces all the assistance considered necessary by the DRV for the defense of the achievements of peoples rule and the rcpulae of aggression."
Chinese sees to have agreed to the transshipmentSoviet eras. The Soviet ambassador in Peiping,is reported to have told the Cambodian ambassadorhad recently given its agreement to let tbe USSRmaterial destined for Horth Vietnam across China. have been attributed to other Soviet sources. public emphasis on the failure of the Chinese toVietnamese policies with the Soviets suggests, however, that
a permanent solution to tbe trancshitmmt problem has yet to be found.
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Thooviet Aid
u. The extent of Soviet military aid program for the DRV is not, of course, spelled out in announcements of the new agreecent, end it is not entirely clear to us what the Soviets have in mind. In general, however, ve think the Soviets are likely to provide weapons of an essentially defensive nature. Specifically, under the terms of the nev agreement, we think further deliveries of Soviet air defense equipment are likely: SAMa, AAA, radar, and fighters. Tbe SAM system will probably be extended to cover more than the Hanoi area.
5- Tne USSR apparently agreed last spring to strengthen the DRV'a coastal defenses; thus fox, it does not seem to have done so. The new agreement may spell out this ceenitment, and for example, provide for the strengthening of the MTB fleet and perhaps the delivery of Kooar missile boats and coastal defense missiles.
6. It is possible that moreill be delivered. The lackpecific response to the delivery of eight of these aircraft in late Kay, together with the public airing of the Issue in the US, may have convinced the USSR and the ERV that more of these aircraft could be safely delivered.
sstict approaches toi;
?. Voile Increasing their involvement in the Vletnamcae crisis, the Soviets have madeoint to keep in touch with tho US. Oromyko told Ambassador Kohler ln Moscow last month that it was "fundamental Soviet policy" to seek an improvement in US-Soviet relations. He also seemed to aay that further overtures to the DRV should be made, Kosygin, ln rejecting the British Commonwealth mission, was careful not to rule out negotiating and merelyany author!ration to negotiate for the DRV or Vietoviet official ln Vienna, who expected that his remarks would reach Washington, claimeduly that Ma government foresaw an armlatieeossible basis for Vietnam negotiations. Most recently, the Soviets have agreed to early resumption of disarmament talks ln Geneva, abandoning the line that Vietnam made aucb tolks useless* This could have symbolic import as the first positive Soviet cove in East-Vest relations after many months of deterioration.
6. In addition to these approaches. Ambassador Kohler baa reported that onoviet official, privy to high level policy, told one of Kohler's diplomatic colleagues that the US and USSR had the seme strategic aim in Southeast Asiato prevent the area from falling under Chinese domination. He said the most
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feasible solution would be an independent, neutralised Vletnaa, guaranteed by tbe US and USSR as in Laos. Be added that negotiations were exceedingly difficult for the Soviets because they could not be kept secret and, if they become known, the Chinese would lambaste the Sovietsellout.
this same Soviet official also stated that thefor the USSR were beconlng Increasingly painful; ifcontinues along presenthe said, the Sovietsforced to "counterattack" in the area of the greatest USGermany. This pointedly declared warning is theits kind. Previous East Gemae coves affecting Vesthave been portly intended to convey the same warning,officiala on the scene disavowed any intention ofBerlin crisis.
continue to think that the Soviets want tocrises on two fronts simultaneously. The new leadersthemselves willing, however, to put some pressure onwhile the wax continues in Vietnam. We believe thatfurther develop the line that the US faces trouble In Berlin
if it remain* unyielding in Vietnam, perhaps underscoring it from time to time with controlled hnrossments falling shortajor challenge to the Allied position there.
theBe recent Soviet moves, in our view,are explained by the major dlleosas of Soviet policy. naturally desires the victory of communism in Vietnam, yet
it does not want to seeictory as would magnify the prestige and power of Communist China. At the same time, in theof the Sino-Soviet controversy Moscow cannot afford to appear laggard ln supporting the TfCV and the Viet Ceng. Yet it ia highly apprehensive of the consequences of expanded war in the Farajor military confrontation between the US and Communist China, and the extremely dangerous world criaia that would result therefrom. Finally, the situation la one over which Moscow has little control; it cannot manage the DRV, or the Chicese Communists, or the US.
feaalble options open to Moscow are thus limited It la giving mora aid to Horth Vietnamspeaking. It cannot avoid giving such aid andwishes to strengthen its presence and influence in Hanoi.
It Is putting scoc pressure on thelow-keyed threats about Berlin. Yet it is also keeping open its lines of cctaunication with the US, endeavoring somewhat to soften the crisis, to keep alive the possibilities of negotiation at some future time, and to persuade the U3 not to carry military operation!egree of extreme severity. We continue to believe that the Sovietsegotiated settlement, becauseettlement would bring least profit to the Chinese, would dampen the dangers of extended war, and yet would not necessarily surrender Ccurxintat objectives in Vietnam. At the mccrent there is little the Soviets can do to bring about negotiation. They can only temporize, and lay what fovadatiors they may for the time when negotiations become feasible and they can hope to influence them.
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FCR the boaiu)ational estimates:
Original document.
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