THE COMMUNIST ROLE IN THE DOMINICAN REBELAY *
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Current Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligenceay5
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Communist Role In the Dominican Rebel Movement, ay
Introduction and Conclusions
Communists continue to play an important role in the rebel movement, althoughay their part has not been an obviousominant one. Theirln the rebel camp at present comes ln part from the fact that they are still in command of most of the paramilitary units defending the rebelln downtown Santo Domingo. But their greatest strength comes from their real or potential Influence on the non-Communists who are currently holding office ln the Caamano government.
It is also apparent that tbe Communists are looking toward tbe future and to a time when they might not have as greata leverageominican government as they now have on Caamano's. They bave beenmen out of the rebel stronghold ln downtown Santo Domingo since early ln the month. They have also been moving into the countryside, taking small quantities
of weapons with them, reconnoltering for suitablebases and, in general, lying low and waiting. In short, they are making sure that they do not have all their eggs ln the Caamano basket,
militant, disciplined Communists lnremain relatively few in number. Theirand their strength comes from the facthave convinced many Dominicans, particularlyyoung, to make common cause with them. with guns" do, in fact, predominatearmed commando groups guarding the rebel But these youths are beingmature Communist and pro-Communist
Background
Communists did, in fact, clearly dominate the rebel movement betweenprilay. They were in obvious control after having filled the vacuum created when moderate non-Communistleaders who had been ln control lost heart for the fight and abandoned it. The moderate-led rebel government of Rafael Molina Urena collapsed onpril and most members of Juan Bosch'sRevolutionary Party (PRD) went into hiding or took asylum in Latin American embassies. Most of the rebel military officers who had initially sparked tbe revolt also went into biding. Even Colonel Caamano was briefly in asylum. Tbewas brought on largely by the movement of loyalist army troops toward the rebel strongholds and recognition on the part of the non-Communist rebel leaders that their forces could not haveover the superior military power then moving toward them under Generalessin and other loyalist commanders.
The Communists and their extremist allies had no place to hide and they prepared onndpril to defend the rebel stronghold to the Last ditch. The Communists, in short, upheld rebelwhen it otherwise would have completely collapsed. This is what they are unlikely to permit the non-Communist rebel leaders to forget. This
is an important source of their present strength and their influence in the Caamano government.
the Communists were notthe ultimate test. The expected loyaliston the city did not come during theofndpril. The "gutless generals"
on the loyalist side were unable or unwilling to bring their well-equipped forces into action against the rebel stronghold. The much-vaunted Dominican military establishment was, in fact, on the point of utter disintegration by the evening ofpril when the first US Marines landed. It was not untilay that Loyalist forces became sufficiently stiffened to take the military offensive. By that time, US troops were interposed between them and the main rebel stronghold.
pril and the first two daysthe Communists and their extremist alliesonly effective rebelnaive youths manning the barricades underleadership. ay, however, variousmoderate PRD leaders had come out of hidingreturned to rebel headquarters, andat least nominal control. The presence
of US troops and the continuing impotence of the loyalist military gave them at least some confidence that there would be no all-out loyalist onslaught on the city. ay, the non-Communists of the rebel movementovernment under Colonel Caaraano and composed of non-Communists, including some highly respected moderate leftists. Thus, the rebels were able to re-establish the pictureoderate leftist regime dedicated toopular revolution. Communists were not obvious in the rebel camp by the time the bulk of US and other foreign newsmen arrived on the scene. The Caaraano government proceeded to try toespectable front and to try toits bargaining position for the politicaland the negotiations with the UN and the OAS that were to follow. This is, in general, the situation as it has prevailed since that date,the period of the past ten days.
Communist Presence in the Rebelay
is voluminous testimony as toimportant role in the rebelthe ten days precedingay. Thisacknowledged even by Antonio Guzman, whounder considerationew president ofanti-Communist government. stressed in his conversations withUS officials that he could not afford tothe Communists in the rebel movement inmanner. He seemed to be honestlythat he would be unable to lead the kindthat would have the support of aportion of the non-Communist rebel movementwere required first to deport or take otheragainst Communists and other extremistswith the rebels. Such action, he said,have the effect of creating more Communists.
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9. The basis for Guzman's opinion comes through
1
a conversation withf
an old friondl
o his friend
under pressure, uuzntan acKnowiedf. that the Communists do, in fact plan an important role in the "constitutionalist"ebel) camp. "Thee conceded, "are the only ones who are reallynd some of them areand must be listened to." By this, Guzman again seemed to be saying that the Communists are such an integral part of the rebel movement that they cannot be Ignored and cannot be gotten rid of in any short period of time.
10. Guldo D'Alessandro, leader of theof the Social Christian Revolutionarywho has privately acknowledged thatmembers have been fighting with thethe Communists had
American tne Dominican Re-
rno nao come to
outmaneuvered the non-Communists in the rebel. D'Alessandrcj Social Christians wi
predisposed to sympathize with the rebel side, stated flatly that extremists presently dominate both sides of the Dominican civil war. (He considers Imbert an extremistifferent sort from thebut stated that Imbert had originally offered to lead thecould be true.) D'Ales-
s.ip.dm told
they are
while there reoel
are PRSC and pku memoers
in tne reoel camp, without influence; the Communists are dominant.
11. pecial emissary sent by Venezuelan President Leoniact-finding mission to Santo
told
he
now convinced that tne communists naa, 'in fact, gained an active role in the rebel movement, although this la not tbe official Venezuelan view. Thewho had served as ambassador Id Santo Domingo during the Bosch administration, added that he felt Caamano probably would be willing to agreeolitical settlement of the crisis, but that "strong" elements in the rebel camp were prepared to fight to the last ditch.
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aptain
former Dominican Army
tne na-
of the Communist control in tne rebel camp as he had observed it. Each rebel "commando" unit-militia group defending the rebel stronghold in downtown Santonow grouped around the leadership of two or three hard-core Communist
leaders who are committed to fight to the finish, he said. Re added that each commando is autonomous of the others, but that all are under theof Communist militants. He feels that the commandos are not completely loyal to Caamano. Be pointed out, as have other sources.that theare using tbe opportunity to indoctrinate the youths serving the commando units and that the rank and file Is being ordered to Hated to Radio Havana.
Leaders of the PRSC who bave talked with workers in the rebel-held area of the city have been told that there areommando unitsin rebel-controlled areas. As of mid-May, one of these was led by the PRSC and thethers were controlled by theh of June Political Grouphe Marxist-Leninist DominicanMovementnd the Dominican PopularPartythree Communist-led groups actively supporting the rebel cause. Other sources have reported that duringay loyalistoffensive in the northern part of tbe city, the MPD was charged with tbe defense of tbe north, while tbe APCJ and tbe PSPD were concentrating on tbe defense of the main rebel stronghold ln the southern part of the city.
An estimate of the strength of thecommandos ln Santo Domingo relative to the strength of former Dominican military officers now in rebel ranks
estimates come close tomaoe oy oxner sources. Jrebei strength
was eleven former Dominican military officers egulars soldiers,avy frogmen,andguerrillas averaging betweenndearshe young "guerrillas" are tbe ones organized into commandos and led by the Communists.
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JBYES ONLY
15. The Communist loaders, however, do not always stay in the background permitting their young followers to do all the fighting. Theay rebel attack on the presidential palaceood case in point. Four prominent members of the APCJ were killed in that abortivewith the presumably non-Communist rebel interior minister Colonel Rafael Fernandez Domingues (who may actually have beenby the Communists). Among the APCJ leaders killed in the attack was Juan Miguel Romanember of the APCJ central committee and one of tbe top rebel leaders. The others killed were Miguel Lopez, Ramon Tavarez, and Jose Jimenezof the APCJ. Another ranking APCJ leader who died later of wounds received in the attack was Ramon Euclides Morillo Martinez, who had traveled in Cuba and Czechoslovakia prior to his clandestine reentry into the Dominican Republic before the insurrection.
16. Other prominent Communists who have been actively involved with the rebel commandos dur-iiik 'he past ten days include Jaino DbXUrominent APCJ leader; Ana Maria Ducoudraysister of two prominent PSPD leaders; Justino Jose del Orbe, another ranking PSPD leader; Franklin Franco Pichardo, another PSPD member; Abelardo "Papo" Vicloso Gonzalez, another high-level PSPD member; Rafael Estevez Weber, memberommunist-dominated professional organization; Fidelio Despradeleading APCJ member; Manueleteran of the Spanish civil ear whoigh-level member of the PSPD; buna Tavarezanking APCJ leader; and many others.
17.
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ES ONLY
ecret-
18, Some Communists ln the rebel movementafraid that Caamano might be pressedpolitical compromise that might adverselyinterests. eeting on fMayCommunists in the rebel movement
lt vas agreed that Caamano might De "falling prey to an imperialist tactic" designed to weaken his resolve and soften him up for almost any kind
ofreport added
that the Communists at trie meeting decided to step up their propaganda among the "people" to develop sufficient pressure to discourage any "weakening" by Caamano.
19. In addition to the reports ofactivity among the rebels in theirin Santo Domingo, thereumber ofthat the Commu-
nists are tailing weapons and sending men into the countryside to establish positions there which may later be useful In developing new bases of strength.
reports that the uarxist-ireninist Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) has sent one of its ranking leaders to the city of San Francisco de Macoris, where he is to prepare for tbe developmentuerrillapatterned on the Venezuelan Communists' Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALH). DSofficials who visited San Francisco de Macoris onay were told of reportsebel band moving in tbe mountains north of tbe city. roup of aboutrmed men was reportedly seen there and loyalist Dominican military units are said to be currently searching for the band. This could be the same band of rebels that attacked the police in the nearby town of Villa Tanares one night earlier in the week.
20.
jreported on I IHay that rebels had already
by that date succeeded in smuggling "many" weapons into the countryside in the bottoms of trucks loaded with sacks of charcoal and rice. On [ ayf"
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EYES ONLY
_cift y^l jlLt^l'
T P
that even with all the loyalist roadblocks and searches on the roads into the interior the rebels hadinruckload of guns and ammunition
to the cities of La Vega and Bonao. arms
are now in the hands of partisans who are waiting for orders to begin attacking the police. |
that HPD members had dug up at least one armsweapons and bad sent its contents to SantiagoRomana sometime prior toay.
that tbe cachendsan Cristobal automatic weapons.
21. articularly revealing report May
fromthat leaders
of the MFD bad expressed gratification when they learnedell-known APCJ member had beendirector general of the land tax department of the Caamano government. They are said to feel that it is significant that tbe Caamano government, which tbeyovernment made up of non-Communists, should appoint an APCJ leader toost. They reportedly feel confident that any rewards given to the APCJ willeneficial effect on the MPD.
22.
reported onMay his views of what the CommUnlsTr strategy in the Dominican Republic is. I
that tbe Dominican rebels intend to
take advantage of the "clumsy Yankee intervention" in order to keep their arms and prepare to fight again against whatever government Is in power once the present crisis is over. This time, the formerleader predicted, they would be able to take power before there could be any international "This isrisis to be settledhe former Communist warned, "butroblem of the future."
Original document.
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