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SPECIAL REPORT
STATES OF SOVIST AND CHINESE MILITARY AID TO NORTH VIETNAM
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STATUS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE MILITARY AID TO NORTH VIETNAM
The Soviet Union and Communist China aeem to have staked out certain areas of specialization ln their military support programs for the North This does not appear to be the result ofbut rather is symbolic of the competition that has become endemic in their relationship. Each power is supplying those elements which it ia best able to provide, but neither is supplying all lt could, as fast as it could, and the North Vietnamese apparently feel that more can and should be done.
Soviet military aid is mostly for air defense, principally the surface-to-air missile (SAM)that has appeared in North Vietnam in the past two The Soviets have also suppliedweapons, sophisticated radar equipment, some all-weather MIG fighters, and eightet light bombers, and have apparently taken over from the Chinese the training of North Vietnamese pilots. It is not known whether tbe Soviets Insisted that ln their role as supplier of air defense materiel thuy also replace the Chinese in the training of pilots or whether the Vietnamese requested the shift. The fact that Soviets now are training the pilots is indicative of their Increasing involvement in the war and their Improved position in the eyes of the North Vietnamese, who have traditionally relied on the Chinese for military aid.
While the Soviets are furnishing this relatively sophisticated equipment, which only they amongsuppliers can provide ln adequate quantities, the Chinese are also continuing and increasing their more routine assistance. They remain the chief source of small arms and most equipment for the North Vietnamese ground forces. Recently, moreover, their role has expanded. Chinese ground troops, probablyogistic or construction support role at least for the moment, have appeared in Northin the past two months. So far there is nothat major Chinese combat forces have been deployed there oruild-up of ground forces on the Chinese side of tbe border has taken place, but ground combat support is the role tbe Chinese can best play If the Communists decide that foreign troops in force are required for the defense of North Vietnam.
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demonstrated that the mobility of tbe equipment can complicate It* detection and destruction. Tbe sites involved in the shoot-downs ofndugust have not yet been detected, and noted at SAMugust by photoreconnalssance had been removedtrikeconducted against the siteours after It was spotted.
The Soviets apparentlytbe Chinese in theof Vietnamese sometime around late march,instructors werein this roll
The arrival of in the DRV was first noted Id early May. The Soviets are believed to haveaboutll-weather jet fighters as well as tbe eight. Like theJet aircraft, all these planes are now at Phuc Tenjust north of Hanoi.
There hasecentincrease in the number of North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns, and two sitesm. AAA guns have recently beenfor the first time. It is likely that this AAA equipment was provided by the USSR, although it appears to be under Vietnamese operation and control,
A totalooviet military personnel may be in North Vietnam now. Although North Vietnamese are beingtrained to man airequipment themselves, the number of Soviet militarymay well increase to bridge
the gap until the Vietnamese are fully trained.
The bulk of Soviet military personnel in Vietnam are SAM operators. If one or tworegiments in Vietnam are manned and supportedormal complement of troops, they wouldersonnel.
In addition to missilethere are some Soviet training and support experts in the country, Logic andwith Soviet operationssuggest that there areoviet pilots andpersonnel in the air training group andechnicians engaged ic administrative, communications, and logistic support activities. Soviet pilots have not been noted taking part in combat operations.
Chinese Assistance
Tbe Peoples* Army of(PAVN) was built up to its present size largely through Chinese material aid. the US air strikes ineking responded almost immediatelyet fighters to North Vietnam. In5 tbeyeight more.
Peking apparently began stepping up its militaryto North Vietnam about the same time that Soviet aid was becoming evident. There is little specific evidencethe types of equipment and materiel being furnished, but the Chinese are probablymost of the small arms and ammunition and individual
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The Orowing_ Soviet Presence
The Soviet militaryln North Vietnam isreflected by the growing quantity of SAM equipmentln the country. of the first missile sites began about late March, and by nowites have been identified. The first missile equipment was detected ln July, The equipment apparently Is constantly being shifted, and tbe total number of missiles now deployed ln tbe DRV is not known. Photographicand elint intercepts of SAM radar systems indicate, however, that one to two SAMare there. Each regiment normally consists of four firing battalions. It takes one firing battalion to operate one launch Bits.
Confirmation that SAMwaa being manned by Soviet personnel was obtained onuly
This situation wouldthe experience in Cuba where,3omplete Soviet crewull Cuban crew were at each SAM site forear of operational training. Some reports state that tbe Horth Vietnamese are not expected to be able to operate tbe SAM units independently until this winter.
Tbe demonstrated mobility of tbe SAM units and theof their fire when they have gone into action is further evidence that at least some of them are Soviet manned. This performanceegree of training and efficiency which could not be expected of recently trained North Vietnamese
Thus far four US aircraft, including one drone, have been Bhot down by SAMs. Tbeahantomdowned onuly. It was followed two days later by the loss of thedrone. Both were shot down aboutiles west of HanoiAM unit apparently firingemporarilysite. The area of the shootdown, which was well west of the then known SAM sites, now is known to contain two sites.
OnS Navy A4 Skyhawk was downedissile aboutiles south of Hanoi. This also occurred outside the range of known missile sites. The most recent shootdownonugustS Navy Phantom II was destroyedissile not far from where the A4 was shot down two weeks
Soviet SAM equipment has never before been used underof continuing combat. There is little doubt that the Soviets are gaining usefulwith lt in Vietnam. ^They have already effectively
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a speech ln Tokyo onuly Liuenior Chinese Communist Party spokesman, sneered at "certain people" who "are making gestures of support for Vietnam,ew anti-US imperialist tunes, andsome little stunts" while at the same time secretlywith the US to promote "peace talks" and to "exchange information."
Moscow apparentlyits Increasingly obvious and effective military aid to the DRV and its claims of-DRV unanimity on measures to repulse "US imperialism"weapons to undercut Chinese charges. RecentSoviet editorials have implicitly rebuked Chinese leaders for the failure to take "coordinated action" against the "US aggressor." successors havepleaded for "bloc unity" on Vietnam in an attempt to
"prove" their charges that Peking is willing to sacrifice theof the DRV in its drive to capture leadership of the world Communist movement and to discredit Soviet policy.
The Soviets have warned against "imitating thosetowardob-cow has taken great pains to avoid allowing its assistance to leadirect Soviet-US confrontation and continues to emphasize the defensive nature of its aid to the DRV. in view of the apparent determination of the Soviet leaders to make good on their commitment, Soviet deliveries of sophisticated air defense weapons, Including more SAHs and fighter aircraft, can be expected to continue, at least as long as US air strikes are. carried out in tho North.
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almost certainly seeking to ox-ploit the situation to Increase tbe level of support given the DRV by both Peking and Moscow.
The latest Soviet intrusion in an area Peking hopes toaa an exclusive sphere of influence is bitterly resented by tbemore aothey cannot match the kind of sophisticated equipment made available to the Vietnamese from Soviet arsenals. Tbe appearance of tbe Sovietissiles in tbe DRV during late July appears to mark the endongcampaign to keep them out.
In this situation Peking has been attempting to offset increased Soviet support for North Vietnam. As alreadyhinese military presence in Vietnam, probably connected with logistical matters, began to show up In mid-June and has been expanding its activities. Xa mid-July Peking made new aid commitments to the DRV. the visit to Pekingigh-level DRVoint communique" was Issued onuly stating that new granta of "gratuitous" economic and technical assistance had been made by the Chineseiew to "Jointly defeating" tbe US.
by thebrothers and neighbors" who have always stood by "through thick and thin."
These Vietnamesestatements probably reflect real appreciation for Peking's backing and probably also an effort to placate the Chinese, following expansion of the Soviet military presence. Nevertheless, they are not as warm as they could be and, taken with other indications, reveal that the North Vietnamese would like to have an even firmer commitment from Peking, andurther step-up in the flow of basic military and economic support from China.
Hanoi, bearing the brunt of increasingly heavy US air attacks in the DRV, andtha pressure of more direct US participation in tbe war against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, is clearly anxious to increase all bloc aidThus, recent effusive statements by DRV spokesmen about Soviet aid nearly match earlier commentaries onreceived from China.
next day Nhan Dan, the DRV party daily, ran1 concerning help received from Communist countries which treated tbe Chinese with special warmth. While expressing thanks forassistance" from tbeNhan Dan stressed tbecharacter of support given
Although it seems likely that the North Vietnamese would prefer to have backingnified bloc, they probably see some advantages in theSino-Sovietreflected in continuing Chinese propaganda attacks on Soviet assistance to tho DRV asand insincere. For example,
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equipment as well as certain transportation equipment.
Equally as important as the supply of arms, and in the long run perhaps more important, is the appearance of Chineseground force elements ln North Vietnam. This firstevident in mid-June
The only Chinese military unit actually Identified in North Vietnam to date is the of the 2nd Railway Engineer
Division, which moved into the DRV in late June. Anotherfirst noted onune, is suspected ofenior logistics authority. Two other elements have recently been detected ln the DRV but their identities remain obscure.
Recent photography of the Langson area near the Sino-DRV border hasigh level of truck activity and some new construction on the importantong Dang rail line. It thus appears likely that most of the Chinese units or authorities in the DRV are concerned with improving logistic support for the Vietnamese. While themay be making contingency preparations for the eventual introduction of troops intothere is no indication that major Chinese combat forces have been deployed to North Vietnam oruild-up of ground forces on the Chinese side of the border has taken place.there can be little doubt that if foreign troops in force are required for the defense of North Vietnam, they will come fromt China.
Sino-Soviet Competition
Deploymentimited but significant Soviet military presence into North Vietnam has unquestionably sharpened thebitter Sino-Sovietfor influence in Hanoi. The USSR's demonstrated willingness to make good its commitment to defend Vietnam has put Hanoietter position to take an independent stance and to play one Communist partner off against the other. The Vietnamese are
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