INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
REtfASE IN
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO THE KASHMIR CRISIS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Current Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current5
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Chinese Communist Intentions and Capabil-tuzz With Respect to the Kashmir Crisis
The Chinese Communists have thus far treated the situation in Kashmir with great caution, and It seems Likely that Peking will seek to avoid any major involvement. There are no indications that the Chinese are-preparing for military action anywhere along the Sino-Indian border.
Fundamental Chinese security Interests are not at present engaged in the Indo-Pakistani struggle. The successful border war with India2 gave the Chinese firm control over the frontier areas Peking apparently regards as Important. Barringwhich promise toajor hostile foreign military presence into the area, Peking would not feel threatened.
Tho Chinese have no important ideological stake in the Kashmir crisis. The conflict istwo non-Communist states, and at this point there is no clear-cut Sino-Soviet or "antl-lmperlal-ist" issue Involved.
Preservation of Sino-Pakistani "friendship Is the most concrete Chinese interest now involved
in the Kashmir crisis. This relationship, cultivated on both sides for the past several years, has been useful to China. It has helped to intensify frictions between New Delhi and Rawalpindi.It has putstrain on the SEATO and CENTO alliance It Is currently of some value to Peking in tho context of Afro-Asian affairs, where the Chinese find Pakistaniseful though'ital tool.
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Chinese behavior thus far Indicates that Peking desires to keep its close ties with Pakistan, is willing to pay something to preserve then, but Intends toinimum-risk policy consistent with the limited scope of real Chinese Interest ln Sino-Pakistani friendship and with tbe moreChinese commitments in Southeast Asia.
The Chinese response ln the currentto date is quite similar to Peking's reaction during the Rann of Kutch crisis last April. Chinese commentary at that time appeared calculated topolitical backing for Pakistan while avoiding any commitment of military support. Chineseput the blame on India but did notenacing line and was not accompanied bymilitary moves.
Initial Chinese propaganda treatment of the current Kashmir crisis was limited to reportor-lal accounts of the clashes, slanted to show that the Indians are at faelt. ress conference ln Karachieptember, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen viomewhat sharper line. He denounced the Indians for provoking hostilities, for violating tbe cease-fire line, and for "aggravating the Chen's promises of backing for Pakistan, however, were guarded. He declared only that China "firmly supports" efforts by Pakistan to strike at "armed provocations" by India.
Peking's first formal statement on the Kashmir crisis, issuedeptesber, Is more menacing and probably marks the starthinese campaign designed to frighten the Indians intoback. The statement charges India withand with enlarging border clashesgeneral conflict" whichrave threat to peace "In this part of Asia."
Peking raises the possibility of Chinese intervention by references to alleged Indianand provocations" along the Sino-Indian border. The statement notes specifically that the Indians are "still entrenched on Chinese territory" along the border with Sikkim and charges them with furtive probes and harassment of Chinese territory
in the western sector of the Slno-Jndian
10. The Chinese have avoided specific threats of action, however, and go do further thanthat Peking is "now closely following"in alleged Indian aggression and isits defenses and heightening Its alertness along Its borders." The statement declares that Indian aggression against any one of its neighbors concerns all of tbem and warns that New Delhi must accept full responsibility for its actions. It closes, however, with an assertion of confidence in Pakistan's ability to defend itself "with the sympathy and support of tbe ipeace-lovlng countries and peoples of Asia and the whole world."
11. Chinese propaganda statements can be expected to get much harder and more threatening, and it is likely that tjiey will be accompanied by warnings and threats' delivered throughchannels. Should these deterrent political moves fall in their effect, Peking might back them up by obvious military deployments near the Sino-Indian border, most'likely opposite the Nortb East Frontier Area (NEFA) where Chinese forces humiliated the Indian Army
12. If despite this the Indians pressed on with tbe war and the struggle turned sharply against Pakistani forces, tbe Chinese would come under very heavy pressure from Rawalpindi toadditional assistance, perhaps by directaction against India. This would betrue if the integrity of East Pakistan were to be threatened.
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exclude chronic trouble spots like Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch.
By initiating border clashes on the scale of those during2 Sino-Indian campaign, the Chinese could probably bring very heavy psychological and military pressure on India. However, even if such action were to be undertaken by the Chinese Communists, lt is highly unlikely that the scope of their military operations could go beyond localized border fighting primarily because of severeln tbe supply system to those remote areas.
The Chinese Communists maintain0 troops ln the entire Military Region of Tibet, as compared withroops ln the tworegions adjacent to Vietnam androops ln the military region adjacent to North Korea. Most of0 troops are concentrated ln the areas east from Shlgatze including Lhasa, Gyangtse, and Changtu. elatively few troops areoppositenot more. There are0 troops ln western Sinkiang, aome of which could be brought into the area.
The- Chinese do notactical airin Tibet proper or ln western Sinkiang. There are, however, several airfields which could be used. For operations in the Kashmir area there is little doubt thatrecently improved airfield ln western Sinkiang which can accommodate any ofChina'splay an Important role. Problems ln supplying POL and armament would,limit the effectiveness of air units deployed ln this area.
16. The most Important factors limiting Chinese Communist military operations in this area are There are no rail lines running into tbe area, and the nearest railheads areiles from either NEFA or the Kashmir-Ladafch area where operations might be contemplated. There are roads to the areas
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