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STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collection of aibclcs on lhe historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol Intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
ihe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of ihe Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the conienis should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual stalements and interpretations
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE New Light on Oldeview of Recent Soviet Intelligenceeeded by these ttho prepare foe attack, foe aggression. The^Sm^Un^on^it deeply, dedicated to thacause of peace and does not intend to attack anyone. it has no intention of engaging inKhrushchev to Saneo Nozaka, Chairman of the Japanese Communlit
Until recently the average Soviet citizen, had he been asked, would have denied that his Government engaged in espionage against other states.irty practice, he could have added if be faithfully followed tbe official propaganda line, was employed only by the imperialists, with the USSR as their target. Had not the Soviet Union been compelled to create andtate security service to protect itself from just such imperialist machicationi?
The average Soviet, if he was ever so naive, is now disabused of his illusions. His government hasolicy in force since Lenin's day to admit that ft has been practicing espionage abroad all tbe time. For reasons not yet clear, it batew hero: the intrepid intelligence agent spying abroad in peacetime for the Soviet fatherland at great personal sacrifice and danger.
is, action tbe Soviet regime has in effect surfaced tbe military intelligence service (GRU) to its own citizens. The hero thlelllgence operative has joined the hero Chekisl in the Soviet pantheon.the hero Chekist, hitherto portrayed at the valiant defender of the regime against foreign and domestic enemies, has now become an aggressive collector of mtelUgence abroad. For the first time since the Revolution the espionage exploits of tbe Soviet militaryservice and state security have been officially acknowledged. True, the official accounts of these exploits must seem inadequate to any Soviet mind bold enough to reflect on the matter, but their quality is not the point at issue. The crucially significant fact Li that Soviet espionage activities were surfaced at alL An official policy
dating back to the Bevolutioo has been chamotically and unaccountably revised.
Richard Sorge
When surfacing the CRU. the Soviet authorities chose to highlight Richard Sorge, the German citizen whose exploits for Soviet military intelligence in China and Japan before the second world war. although never revealed in the Soviet Union, have been known in the West for almost two decades, Sorges career In espionage, aod especially his penetration of the Japanese government and the German embassy In Tokyo, had been earlier examined in detail by General Charles Willoughby, Hans Otto Meissner, and Chalmersheir works, although differing In detail and interpretation of events, are largely based on reports of the Japanese invertigation of the Sorge network and certain memoirs and secondary publications. All arcarying degrees. The Japanese mvestigation, thenon-Communist source on the case, was wadequatcly handled and left many unanswered questions but did supply the broad outlines of the affair. David Dallin, it should be noted, has barely mentioned tbesittle had been added to our knowledge of the operation.
Richard Sorge has been surfaced in the Soviet Union by meanseries of newspaper articles and popular books. His glorification was begun inith an article by Viktor Mayevskiy in Ptaoda* Writtenisit to Sorges grave in Tokyo, this article is an unrelieved panegyric on its subject Other articles on Sorge in the Soviet central and provincial press quickly followed. Ya. Corcv. who is said to have served in the CRU with Sorge in Berlin, pre-
General Charles Wflioughby, Shanghai Co-ufXracy. The Sorge Spy Ping (New; Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of T'teton (Stanford,: Haw Otto Meiasner, The Man WbA Three Facet (Newerman edition of Metsroer's book, the title of which Inclicates Us partially ficOooal character (Ow Faff Sorge: ftomon Sach TaUaehta) wastn Munich during the same year. Several short accounts of the Soige case have appeared in espionage aotholoriea. Brsnkoember of Sorge's network in Japan, bat beea tbe sub|#et of Yugoslav nc^ipapcr articles. See Dmhan Cvebc, "Ko Je Brankc- Vokelkhr in Tctaika0
'David J. DsHlD. Soviet Espionage (New.
Mayevskiy, "Tovsrubch Zorge" (Comrade Sorgo) in.
hat seems to bo an official account of Sotge'iclainw to have helped prepare Sorge for his Far Eastand to have operated near him there Hrs use of Sorge'smessages Indicates that he had access to official files, but belittle new data on tho ease. Sorge it presented atof virtue; his weakness for alcohol and women bi version of the Sorge operation generally coaespoods toby Meissner and Willoughby. fn aQ probability heon these
Although Moscow has for some reason suppressed Cotevs account, tbe glorification campaign has continued unabated sinceersons who knew Sorge even slightly have given interviews for publication. On occasion, these Individuals have admitted they did not Itnow Sorge was engaged in intelligence work. Gcrhardt Eisler hashort.ass corrrsporrdent in Tokyo, told of meeting Sorge and Dranko Vukdic ine had no knowledge of their intelligence work at the time. Gerhard Sluchlik and Horst Pehnert, East German journalists,eries of articles drawing on those by Mayevikiy and Gorev, interviews with Max Klausen. Sorge's radio operator, and with Cerbardt Filler, and such Western sources at Meissner aodxcept for certain details on Serge's early life, these add relatively little.
Several people living outside the Soviet Union have recentlyreminiscences of Sorge. Kai McJtke and ruchard Jensen, former Communists, have written of Sorge's stay In Denmark during
Ya.Yal Zorga"new Sorga) in1bewardamphlat uodrr tha same tide ta aa editionopkn (Mokow.ut Out public*(toe was withdrawn from aala sbostlf after It appealed and has not been reiitued up to UiU Ufoe. Gerav may be identical with Pair AJeluandiovKbovwt cttlaea who wasn Cermaay3 and was bwd latwo years lats*cfcargw of attracting UM overthrow of use Wttaw rVpubbe. Stobfcvskly was btrr ennaojed for Karl SjBdem*an aad Tbaodor Wofaeht, two Carman erUUos who Lad been arrested in the USSH
'Gartiardt Easier. ^rrtDerruiurno an Richardn Neue*
'V. Kodrravtwv,itWdorn Zoiga" (Meeting wins RlcWd Snpl ka WadcJwr <TW
' Carbaid Stuckll* and Hont Pehnert, "Wit Kanntaa Ceoourn Richardn Jungt Wth,4
orges wife Chris line has publishedshort and uniiiforma-tivo memoirwiss periodical' None of these accounts makes any significant contribution to an understanding of the Sorge operation.
A popular, semi-fictional version of Sorgo's career was carried by the Soviet periodical Ogonek. beginning onts authors, Sergey Colyakov and Vladimir Ponosovsldy, fail to throw new light on the case. They present Sorge as declaringoviet citizen to his Japaneseizable paperback edition of this0 copies) was" published early
It Is dear that the Soviet authorities wish to preseot Sorgeopular hero but have no desire at this time to publish an accurate history of his intelligence operation. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,4 he was rjosthumously awarded the title. Hero of the Soviet Union. Inax Klausen was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and his wife Anna received the Order of the Red Star. Branko Vukelio was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War (Firsthe East German Government has conferred on Max and Anna Klausen the Gold Medal of Merit of the National People's Army. But perhaps the most significant honor bestowed on Sorge was the issuance, earlyoviet stamp bearing his portrait- He thus joins Nathan Hale as an intelligence agent who has been paid philatelic honors by his government No further proof is required of the intention of the Soviet authorities to add Sorge to the Soviet pantheon.'1 Other CRU Carer
Soviet authorities have also seen fit to give publicity to an obscure officer of the CRU surfaced under the name of Colonel Lev Yeftmovich Manevich. This man was madeero of the Soviet
"Ket Moltke, "Da Mertersptooen Drakobenhtvn, In PoitroVa,ichard Jensen, "JogSorgoame dale.
Sorgo. "MetoH- Sorgo" in Dfc WelrweeMcoardingewoeAe, Cbrbtlnc Sorgo* article was writtenn earner.
"Sergey Colyakov and Vladimir Ponowsldy, "Zorge. Dokumeirtalnaya Povest"ocumentedgOM*8
-1he Soviet Utuoo issued portage stamps Id various deoomloaoons with the portrait ot PeliksHe ts the only chief of Soviet stale security who has been so honored.
m
4
SoWef Spy Heroes
Union in" presumably for wartime services.redited in the Soviet press with service in tn unidentified foreign country, possibly Germany or Ccrrrum-oocupied Europe. According to the Soviet accounts he was betrayed through the cowardice of an assistant and Imprisoned in Cor man concentration camps, where be was known under the name Ya. S. Staiostin. Before his death from tuberculoris at the Ebensee camp in Austria one is said to have confidedellow inmate, one Grant Cregoryevich Ayrapetov, that his cryptonym was Eoenne.and to have asked that the Soviet authorities be notified.
Manevich is portrayedevoted intelligence agent who continued his work despite serious illness. According to Ayrapetov, Manevich compiled files on Soviets in Yiassovs unit, on followers of Bandera, the Ukrainian nationalist leader, and on other collaborators, all of which he turned over to one F. N. Dontsov for transmittal to the Soviet authorities. Interviews with Manevichs sister and Ayrapetov have appeared in the Soviet provincialhe reason forManevich in particular is unclear, unless the script called (or an intelligence agent whose activities could be related to the second world war. This criterion could also be applied to Sorge.
One former chief of Soviet militaryictim of the great purge, has recently been rehabilitated, apparently as part oi this publicity campaign. Yu. Celter hasrief account of the career of Semen Petrovkh Untskry. chief of the CRU57 until he was purged and executed by Stalin. Only the most general information on Uritskiys career is given. Ills in-telllgence work is passed over with the excuse that it cannot yet be made public, but he is credited with having directed officers of the caliber of Sorge and Manevich.1*
The Cermao portion of the loosely connected Soviet wartimeoperation now known as Rote Kapelle has been surfaced fn the
"tarda.
"uiya.
-Cellar.Voynac*desyat Ueto* ao Data rWrfcoVnrya S. P. Uritsaogo" (Ctuef of Military Intelligence Agents. On UW Seventieth Anniversary of the Buth of S. P. Unfitly) to K'ainayaan Karlovtch Benin, chief of Soviet military in tellI9U, has been mentioned as tha teacher of Sorge.illers. "Ernies Ar ftiharda Zofgrs Skoiotapi* ia DaMnahat arwipapae Is paa-lisbed io run.
guiseerman resistance niovement. Through the device of an interview with Greta (Margarets)ember of the group andanking official in East Germany, the Soviet authorities, haveorner of the veil that itill covers their wartimeintelligence operations inote Kapelle (the Nazi origin of this name is admitted by the Soviets) is portrayed as an antifascist group that began to take shape before the Hitlerwas established. Although the upper-class origin of itsrvid tiarnack and -Harro Schukr-Boysen. end of otfaer^meenbers isetermined effort is made to show that italso contained many persons of working-class origin. The espionage role of the group is presented in tather incidental fashion, without emphasis. No mention is made of the CRU networks that existed in France, flelgium. Holland and Switzerland. Greta Kuckboff presents East Germany ai the heir to the cause for which the Rote Kapelle foughL
State Security: Abel
The admission to the Soviet people lhat the state security service, long portrayedefensive, counterintelligence arm of the state, does In fact engage in peacetime espionage abroad Is equally dramatic By virtue of its internal, repressive activity, the security service is only too well known to tbe Soviet population. Few Soviet citizens can have avoided some brush with the heavy hand of tbe security component, but equally few of them have known until recently what every literate Westerner has long known, that the state security service isrincipal arm of Soviet espionage abroad. In keeping with the dogma that only aggressive imperialist states engage in espionage, the existence of the First Chief Directorate of the security service, the foreign arm, was never admitted. The surfacing of its espionage in foreign countries, therefore,ajor shift in Sovietpolicy.
Tills policy shift was signaled by an article on the career of Col. Rudolf Abel that appeared in Nedelya (Tlie Week) during"
eryrrwwfcy.ronta. Rantai CretyWpofnoi AntrfukMtskol Otgi-jitiu.uVrorsloyOn That Side at the Frail An Account of Greta Kutlhulf Concerning; the Undo ground Antt-FiKUt OrganirabOn Thai Was Active la Hitleriten Sotoyt. This interview alto appeared In lhe English-language edition of this pcriixllcal of tha tarn* date.
" MaJOfCcnera) V. Droidov, "TovaruhshNevtdlmo|oof the Invisible Front) in NedVJa* b> the Sands, rupplcneot of the newspaper
According to its Author. Abel was bornity near ihe Volga,the stale security servicend worked before and during World War II as an intelligence agent against Ccnnany, being coveredember of the Cerman minority in Latvia. It isthat Abel's espionage activity after the war is shownersonal desire to neutralize the activity of "fascist crlmi-nals" who had taken refuge in the West The theme of working against Nad criminals presumably would be popular with the Soviet people and fits the time-honored portrayal of 'state security as aorganization.
Colonel Abel is also the heroovel by Vadim Korhevnikov now being serialized In Znemya. the organ of the Union ofoihevnikov's novel has not yet appeared in book form in the USSR It is also being serialired in the Yugoslav newspaper Batba.
According to the author. Abort true name is Aleksandr Ivanovtch Belov. Since the work is frankly fiction, however, none of the data it contains can be accepted withoutation. The significant fact is that the Soviet government has thus belatedly chosen to portray Abelero Chekisl employed in espionage abroad.
"Vadim Kojbevr.il.ov.Shirk) aoda Znamys (TheoV
-Cordonpied (or Russia aaheaiiti-lS
The theme of work against postwar Nazis, it Li interesting to note, also appears in the purported memoirs of Cordon Lonsdale (Cononhe state security officer who was convicted of espionage In the United Kingdom and later exchanged for devils?ritish subject involved in the Penkovsldy trial. Lonsdale claims that he wished to operate against former Nazis who were employed in the United Kingdom. The Lonsdalehich have been serialized In the British pressut not published in the USSR are dearly designedeception operation- Their accounts of his Canadianhildhood spent in Poland, and intelligence work with Colonel Abel In the United States before going to the United Kingdom are, from evidence on hand, complete fabrications. They arc designed to confuse Western intelligence services, sow dissension between the British and American governments, and denigrate both British security and British justice. Any truth they may contain is merely Inddental to these purposes.
Soviet Spy Heroes
For several decades (he Soviet regime has endeavored to (ustify the counterintelligence activity of its security service, calling it thesword of thehe defender of the Soviet nation and state against foreign and domestic enemies. Its intimateto the party leadership was deliberately blurred; its full role in intra-party struggles for power has been concealed.
The participation of the security .service mjfhese ;the purges they brought forth, events that are well remembered by the Soviet people, made difficult the task of investing it with any sort of glamour. In practice It was necessary to concentrate oo the earliest period of its history, the period of revolution, civil war, and early post-revolutionary years, when it was headed by Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy, the Polish revolutionary idealist, friend and associate of Lenin, who died before Stalin began his purges. The Dzerzhinskiy period of the service is portrayedime of higholden age.
The exigencies of Soviet internal politics have made it impossible to glorify Dzerzhinskiys successors, who were either nonentitiesere tools of Stalin (Yagoda, Yezhev) or latter-day villains in their own rightoviet party leaders will do nothing that might undermine the effectiveness of the security service as the defender of the regime, hence the history of the service under Stalins dictatorship is not likely to be revealed. Their efforts to refurbish Its image will never be allowed to endanger Its Internal efficiency. It is unlikely, therefore, that any detailed history of state security will appear in the foreseeable future.
kitter. "Recent Soviet Books on the History of the Secret Police" in Sialic.
*F. Ya. Kon, et_ aL,inna (Diary andecond revised and enlarged edition, prepared by die tans*DnesiiA.lodnyn (Diary. Utters toppeared in Moscown English translation of this second edition. Prison Dairy and LeiUn. was published in Moscow the following year.
Historical material on the service nevertheless continues to appear. As noted above, much attention is given to the life and personality of Dzerzhinskiy. so much in fact that somethingult ofseems to have grown up aroundelections of his diary and family letters, all prc-revolutionary in date, made their appearance.'0 P. C. SoGnov published during the sameopular
biography of Dzerzhinskiy that nude use of certain hithertoarchivaln the followingelection ofritings that emphasized his work in other components of the Soviet government such as the Commissariat of the Interior. Commissariat of Transportation, and Supreme Council of the National Economy made itsore rounded view of his career is thus now available*1
During recent years Soviet authors have continued to mineof DzxsrJiuxskiys life
careful biographical study of him in which he uses Wa subject's pre-revolutionary documentary files-'* On the other hand. N. Zubov has produced another popular biography repeating well-worn facts andzerrliinsfay's eighty-fifth birthday was corrunemorated by the appearanceather barren volume of reminiscences that adds little or nothing to our knowledge of the man.*1
Perhaps the most interesting volume on Dzerzhinskiy to appear in recent years is Mme. Dzerzhinskiy's memoirs, publishedhe gives the texts of letters never before published or previouslyonly in part. She also provides an interpretation of her husband's background and development based on an association of many years that should contribute significantly to an understanding of the man." It will bo interesting to see whether Soviet histoiians
.t'entfiy irieetAinstogo (Pages from.a. edPrJoaoo-a
"Institute ofhw*xnltievr. fierenMyewJA rotnaah (F. E. Dwrrhrnsfay, Selected Works Jo Twoa earlier volume of Pienhuuilyi writings, IshrentMyeelected Articles and) had been published in Moscowtranslation BMo German of tho latter lira (AwreuaAUe ArtOtel* wad Arotrn,) was atsoederlin in
" Sluaser, op. cut. Stales that rhe editors' choice of malarial indicates that theyunder caden to avoid hit work la ihe lecurity service, but he dora out prove the point.
batskevicfc, Seise* VeMtUse-iA--alageotdHe of Great Beluae. The Lac aad Activity of F. E. DorxhlmaoI.drUOneeond reworked and espai>ded edirsoo of thU volume0 copies was published In Moscow
"N. Zubov, F.F. E.iography).
dibooopies.
SXet >yv aof D'fthia&ly: For) Anniveisary
"Sofiya Sigunviindovaody VehkAuVA Boyeo (In the Yean of Greata an edition0 copies.
produce additional significant material on Drerzhinskly't career as chief of stale security. If, as one authority contends, the Cheka archives were destroyed, that task may be difficult."
Other Chekists
Few other officials of state security have beenhI. V. Viktorov's rather sparse and matter-of-fact biography of Mikhail Sergey*vich Kedrov, an old Bolshevik and assocUte of Dzeezhinskiy. is unusual in that it covers in part thereatccording to Viktorov, Kedrov's son Igorriend, one Volodya Golubcv. both employed by state security, discovered in earlyhat Benya and hi) associates were betraying tbe USSR in the Interest of Hitler. The two young Chekists, after consulting the elder Kedrov. who by then was Out of the service, decided to make the facts known to Stalin and the Party Control Commission. When the young men were arrested, as they anticipatedS. Kedrov was to approach Stalin, reveal the facts of the matter, and call Stalin's attentionetter accusing Beriya that ho (Kedrov) had written to Dzerzhinskiy
Rut Igor Kedrov and Colubev were arrested in late9 and shot. The elder Kedrov was arrested several montlis later. Despite the fact that he succeeded in proving his Innocence, he was not freed, and in1 Beriya disposed of him also. This story, which alio serves to denigrate Stalin, is reported without details or substantiating facts. Viktorov's book perhaps serves to rehabilitate M. S. Kedrov. but it adds little or nothing to our knowledge of the state security service."
An Estonian official of tbe Cheka. Viktor E. Kingisepp. has also been honoredingisepprominent part in the investigation of the attempt oo Lenin's life inemoirs of old Chekists are rare in Soviet literature. Tbe memoirs of F. T.etired member of state security, were published
- Shiuer, op.iiotes Sons NiWayevstly, the Meiwhevtk hiitorian. n* dtingunidentified emigre vaurce to the elect that the Cheka aichlvns had beenin on let to prevent historians in future from itudyfng the Cheka tenor andpart in differing; it.
V. ViVtotov, Podpolmehtk, Vom. Cfcetisr (Underground Worker. Fighter,oscow. IBM.
"D. Rodnav, Vtttor Eduardovich Kinginrrm.nother flc-ttonalired biographyhekahat of D. N. Mrd.edev. See A. TvasMiiky. ChekMt.
2 in an original editionopies,ery large printingook of ibisecond, revised edition appearedomin. it is interesting to note, admits that Chekists could miiuie their authority for personal goali. citing the activitiesaltic baron in the Ukrainian Cheka to prove the point Perhaps it It significant that the miscreant was of noble binh. It is alsothat Forriinighly favorable picture of V. R. Men-zhinskiy, Dzerzhmskiys successor a* chief of stateeak man whose tour at the head ofjth'eVaervice is considered anbetween Dzerzhinskiy and C. C. Yagoda. Fcenin. however, does not mention the much more significant Yagoda, whose role in state security until he was purged by Stalin was considerable.
Operations
Histories of the state security service and Its operations have been even more rare. When they do appear, such volumes cover the early period of the service, the time of the Cheka. Tbe mosthistorical study of the Cheka to appear in recent years is P. C. Sofinov's volume. Historical Sketches, published"
The Soviets have also seen fit to surface in part the highlyi operation of the mid-twenties. This counterintelligencewhich was mounted by state security, was designed to neutralize the anti-regime activities of Russian emigres and the Intelligence operations of European services. Using asationalthe "Monarchical Organization of Centralsually called trust. Soviet state secisrity wis able to deflect and control the attempts of its enemies to overthrow the Soviet regime during Ihe time of its greatestew and untested service thus succeeded in misleading the most experienced intelligence services of Western Europe and In almost completely neutralizing thework of its emigre opponents.
Not the least of its achievements was the enticement into the Soviet Union and seizure5 of Sidney George ReiUy, an able British intelligence officer who had operated in Russia with Robert Bruce-Lockhart Lev Niknlin has described the enticement and
" f. t. Fomin, ZapWkt Slaiogo CnriWa (Notes of an Old CheJtuO,nd revised edition,
C. Sofinov.Chtttityehaiaoi-
Sketches of the History of the All-Russlan Ettraordinary Commission)
CONFIDENTIAL
seizure of Reilly in an article inot unnaturally. Nfkulin shows great pride in this achievement of the security service and its younge undertakes to tmear the image of Beilly.quoting what purports to be Reilly's offer to Dzerihinslcfy to give full information on the organization and staff of the British intelligence service, members of the Russian emigration with whom he bad worked,American intelligence service.. intelligence was moribund by the middle twenties, any inrormation thereon supplied by Reilly. if indeed he wroteetter to Dzerzhinskiy. would have been historical.
Nikulln'i article was describedhapter from his forthcoming "novel-chronicle* on trust. This book, Metlvaya Zyb (The Swell) apparently has not been published up to this time.*4
Secant Aft*rue*
As is often true of Russian policy, the objectives to be served by the surfacing of Soviet espionage activities abroad are not Immediately evident Tbe reasons for the adoption ofolicy are difficult to disentangle. Perhaps the interplay of personal ambitions and Jealousies among Party and government leaders has played its part.no evidence on the point Ls available, this unusual Soviet frankness may reflect the growing influence of Alexander Shelepin, former chief of the KGB who has played an increasingly prominent role in Soviet affairs since the overthrow of Khrushchev. It may be assumed, in any case, that the decision to admit to the Soviet people that their government abo engages in actions hitherto credited Only to bourgeois and fascist states was not tightly reached on the spur of the moment Undoubtedly it was made at the highest Party levels,
after lengthy and possibly acrimonious discussion. Party leaders must have agreed that the advantages ofevelation outweighed any
ill effect on the Soviet population.
- lav Nlkullfi. "Konets Sidney. Drhoediha fUUi" (The End of SidneyAugust. Another article by Nlkulut, Istoriya
Odnogo Voyaiha" (Tha Storyoyage) appeared inhis article, preaumahly another chapter tn NlLulin'i book on TnesT. describe! the cUodestiae viwl to the USSR made by VattUy V. Shulguinder the aurpkaa of raver, that b, under state wewsty control. On bci return to Western Europe, Shulgla described thou beak, Tn SfoJrtry (There Caneeale).
urws-en and not completely satisfactory account of the raundrawn Irons Westernontained in CeoSrayew York.
Whit ere the possible advantages of the revelation?
Such foreign espionage opetatkmi as have been surfaced up to this time are related to the Germ my of Hitler and the second world war. The work of Manevich, if that was In fact his name, isas having been done in Eastern Europe, probably in Co manyerm an-occupied area, andazi concentrationeries of paperbacks on the frontier guards and wartime partisan operations continue the anti-Nazi defensebel, it is said, worked against the Germans; bis postwar activities were motivatedesire to gel at former Nazis who were active In the West Lonsdale Li made to admit the same motivation. Although Sorge's prewar operational activity cannot be denied, his intelligence targets wereGerman embassy in Tokyo and Japan. Germany's' ally. Work against the Nazi, at whatever lime it was undertaken, would be applauded by Soviet citizens. Such espfonago operations, although carried on abroad, can be Interpreted as defensive in intent and purpose. The Soviets, it must be noted, have not yet admitted lhat their postwar operations were directed primarily against the British and Americans.
Tbe Soviet authorities may believe that revelations of Western espionage against the Soviet Union In recent years call for defensive action. Operations such aslights and the Popov and Pcnkovskjy penetrations have certainly resulted in talk andwithin the USSR. The Powers and Pcnkovskry show trials must have convinced even optimistic Soviets that, despite official dis-claiiners. some harm had been done to Soviet security. Many must have asked, why don't our people do that same thing? It is possible, therefore, that several terminated espionage operations have been surfaced to assure the Soviet people that their government Is also active tn such operations abroad. The first line of Soviet defense, they are being told. Is in good hands.
Since thli article wu aunt to press enSoviet itudy of the role of the state lecurity servtea In the fighting oo tha German front has become available. By Soviet standards rather copiouslyiven thaeat ssgnifcaul part ta tha victory and reproves Stain for rot accepting: sUie security intelligence, reports on German intentions and military plans. It Is published under the tide "Sovetskiye Organy Cosudantvennoyody VeJikoy OSeelsearvennoyoviet Organ* of St.hr Security In the Yean of Aa Great Fatherland War) tnord (Problem of History).
Spy Heroes
The new publicity Is probably designed to improve the Image and rnorale of military intelligence and the state security service. The Penkovskiy case (and the Popov case as well, although it received little publicity) must have been disastrous to the morale of military intelligence officers. State security officers must have been affected adversely by previous efforts of the Soviet authorities toland image of their service. Public acclaim of service heroes, even of those who at first glance appear to have failed in their missions, has undoubtedly Improved the tone and morale of both services.
Such revelations can also be made to serve operational purposes. It will be ooted that the Soviets use fictionalized biographies toboth operations and intelligence agents. Fictional techniques permit the tellingively story without need to adhere to the facts of the case. Embarrassing aspects and significant operational details may be distorted or omitted without endangering the seeming integrity of the account. Even though not sobecause they were intended for foreignLonsdale 'memoirs" are largely fictional. The Soviets have enlisted fiction as anweapon.
Although at first glance It would seem toointless task, these Gctiortalized memoirs and biographies should be subjected to expert counterintelligence analysis. Such accounts must contain atubstratum of fact. This may be discovered through analysis.omissions and distortions may be ascertained by comparison of the fictionalized versions with data available in counterintelligence files. But the most important purpose of such analysis is the discovery of the disinformation objectives that these accounts may serve. We must assume that all memoirs, biographies, and historical studies of the Soviet intelligence services arc prepared with the aid ofexperts.
A careful watch must be kept oo this new Soviet program ofintelligence revelations. Although their goals are not yet clear, for the Soviets Itew technique and one that may do serious injury to Western morale. It must be analyzed and closely followed.
Olivia Halebian
Original document.
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