STUDIESM
INTELLIGENCE
A collection ol articles on tho historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence.
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The importance of anachronistic Intelligence to supplement that on advanced weapon systems.
YESTERDAY'S WEAPONS TOMORROW Dwayne Anderson
The great emphasis thatacelllgerjc*place on advanced weapons. In accordance with their strategic significance, may leave the casual reader with the impression that the Sovietmachine li made up of ICBM and ADM force* backedonderous but ineffective mishmash of traditional components armed with elderly weapons. His familiarity with Soviet military sites may include Tyuratara and Sary Shagao but probably little else. He knows the Soviets still have some tube artillery, bombs, aod torpedoes but believes these will sooo be ia museums alongside crossbow
Such 1mpresslom can result from rigid application of the reporting priority accorded dei rlopments involving missiles andenera) assumption that the importanceeapon is tn direct ratio to its complexity. Thus superficial indications that some missile may be propelled by solid fuels would make the intelligence front pages, whuc good evidence that the Soviets were reequlpping ground forcesew and better rifle would be lucky to get th at all
Certainly Soviet silo digging must be carefully watched so that we can adjust our own strategic stance accordingly, and the Soviets* success or lack of success with antimissiles could have as great an impact on our defease budget as on theirs. But preoccupation with these unquestionably important matters may have become so greatto skew our appreciation of over-all Soviet capabditie* Factors operatirig to degrade the theoretical capabilities of modern weapons have been ignored, aod important capabilities of older weapon systems have been overlooked or forgotten.
Weaknesses in Complication
The very complexity of advanced weapons Is their majorThey depend on highly trained personnel for maintenance and operation. They must have back-up stocks of precisely manufactured parts. They are almost useless if eountermeasuxes
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interfere with the functioning of any of their many components. In many instances they can operate only under carefully controlled temperature and humidity conditions, and they must have exactly regulated power supplies available at all times.
Often tbe retire function of sophisticated systems Is limited,and slow, rendering them vulnerable to saturation tactics. Equally often sensor capabilities lag far behind the capabilities of other element* and so lower .tieectifthe entire systarLf. These can also be adversely affected by phyricain auroral display can blankadar,chool of fish canonar.
Elaborate check-out systems to check out the check-out equipment, all of which must function perfectly, have added to the bulldnesj of many of the newer weapons. This may be of no great importance with ICBMs, but in mobile combat units it can beostly antiaircraft missile had to be abandoned recently when the system was found to be so bulky it could be carried only by ships of cruiser size.
Bombers have frequently been relegated to the strategic intelligence boneyard on tbe assumption that modern air defense has done them in despite the development of stand-off missiles, electronic counter-measures, and low-altitude Bight profiles. Even if this assumption were correct with respect to conditions in non-nuclear general war, it bat do validity for nuclear war. Tbe electromagnetic effects of thermonuclear and fission weapons, tbe clouds of radioactive debris, and tbe resultant ionization of the atmosphere would hamper the air defense's command and control communications and greatly reduce radar effectiveness. The defensive forces might have to rely heavily on tbe human eye for warning and fire control. The bomber, then, shouldeasonable life span.
Seed for Versatility
Complexity is not the only drawback of newer weapons. In some instances the weaponry they replace Is better suited for certain types of missions. The high speeds and limited loiter time of jet aircraft have ledew appreciation of propeller planesariety of attack and reconnaissance roles. The elderly bolt-action Springfield, long after it had been phased out of production, continued to performharpshooter's rifle because it was superior to its successors for this purpose.
Weapons
History Is replete with examples of weapons abandoned too scon or with too hitJe consideration. Tbe bow. phased out by lhe Creeks in Homeric limes, was winning battles centuries after tbe city-states had been destroyed as political entities. Spanish commanders of tbeh century armed their tcrcios with Ihe long-abandoned armor and short swords of tbe Roman legions and did quite well ag*init their progressive arquebus- and pike-armed opponents. In the Korean war carefully organized and, amphibious operations were hamstrung'h?'the North Kc-reari"eipcdirnt of dropping obsoletemines In coastal waters from Junks and sampans. The. Navy had lo activate World War II minesweepers and crews to cope with this obstacle. Mosthole array of obsolescent weapons have been dusted off and adapted to the needs of the unconventional fighting in Vietnam.
During Taiwan Strait air operationsflbattled Communist MIGs with overwhelming success despite the fact lhat the MIGs wero faster and could climb moreew of the Nationalist aircraft were armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and the actions were studied to determine the effectiveness of this missile But the post morterns showed that allew of tbe Communist losses resulted from tha Nationalist pilots' gunfire. Subsequently some USAF officers, noting the difficulty of maintaining the mis-tile in ready condition and the limited refire capabilities of aircraft fitted with it, recommended that rrussue-carrylng fighterbe recquipped with automatic cannon for at least part of their armament
Defensive systems are particularly vulnerable lo saturation effects. In antisubmarine warfare teams of aircraft, surface ships, andbacked with ibore-based sound lurveillance rystems, can present formidable opposition to one or two conventional submarines;rge number of lubtnarines scatteredew hundred miles of coastline would currently pose an extremely difficultField and shipboard air defense missile lystems can in general attack very few targetsime. Their major limitation lies in the guidance radars which direct the rnlssilei during their flights. An installation with two guidance radars can attack only two targetseriod of several minutes. During this time other enemy aircraft or cruise missiles can cany out their missions without
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Weapons
The Inflexibility of many advanced weapons, particularly those of mass destruction, is clear. Essentially, they can apply force on one scale only, andule only to certain pre-selectedm howitzer can fire one roundarget to draw attention or to press complianceemand. Ifecond round can be fired into the target to indicate that the demand will beand this can be followed, again if necessary, by twenty rounds to put enemy personnel in the face-saving position of having offered token resUbsnck Fmally the target can be reduced byounds, or whatever number Is needed.
Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, offer only one option,of the. preparations for action during tho Cuban crisis were slowed by having to weld conventional bomb racks on aircraft which could otherwise have delivered only nuclear weapons. The presence of Minutcman and Polaris missiles of course greatly affects the basic rules under which engagements such as that in South Vietnam are carried out. Nevertheless they cannot play any active role in thcrn,
A Range of Wan
Present mutual deterrent "policies of the United States and the Soviet Union are unlikely to be affected by less than extreme changes in the relative numbers or capabilities of ICBMs or other major weapons. This being the case, ft may be more important to learn how quickly and in what numbers the Soviets can send heavy infantry weapons to the Congo than to know the vernier characteristics ot theropulsion system. It may even be more important to know Soviet capabilities for low-altitude conventional bombing than the precise yield of certain Soviet fission weapons.
Finally, it may be more useful to know the quantities and types of equipment that have been stockpiled or mothballed than to know every detail about the first-line hardware. The scrapping of theBeet and near elimination of eight-inch guns on cruisers had lederious decline. capabilities for giving fire support to amphibious operations. Recently, however, the Navy pulled rocket-equipped LSTs of World War II vintage out of moth balls to rectify this defidency. Knowing whether the Soviets could similarly remedy certain weaknesses on short notice may prove critical in ourof Bloc courses of action in Africa and Asia.
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In sum, the whose gamut of wars that may occur,ungle msurrectionrolonged broken-hack nuclear struggle,ariety of military hardware, much of which may be primitive in design. National military capabilities can therefore not be measured just by counting mass destruction weapons or assessing the complexity of weapon systems. Weaponry must be evaluated according to its probable performance under fire, in the face of countcrmeasures, under conditions of limited logistic and maintenance support. It must be evaluated in terms of the environment and kind of war In which it may be used, and the attention it Is tontelligence reporting should be deterrnined accordingly. At the present time intelligence should be devoting more effort to the evaluation of Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities with respect to support for the kind of fighting being done, for example, in Vietnam.
Original document.
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