CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF COMMUNISTS IN BOLIVIA SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 9 JUNE

Created: 6/10/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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INTELIIOINCI AOINCY

Intelligence Information Cable

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THE NATIONAL CRISES IN BOLIVIA OF4 AND MAY

AVEEVERE LACK OF ANY CAPABILITY OF THE COM-

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/PURPOSES OR TO ENHANCE THE PRESTIGE OF THE PARTYEADER OF )C, THE WORKING CLASS.

3. VERY FEW MEMBERS OF THE PCB PARTICIPATED IN THE REVOLUTIONOVEMBER AND EVEN THIS LIMITED PARTICIPATION WASERSONAL

BASIS. AT NO TIME DID THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY GIVE ANY ORDER

FOR PARTY MEMBERS OR MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST YOUTH OF BOLIVIA

(JCB) TO MUSTER IN BEHALFARTY OBJECTIVE. THE PARTY

ERSHIP REALIZED THAT THE EVENTS OF EARLY4 HAD CAUGHT THEM BY SURPRISE, AND ALSO PASSED THEM BY AND, THEREFORE, RESOLVED THAT THE FORTHCOMING MONTHS SHOULD BE DEDICATEDEORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY AND INCREASED WORK AMONG THE WORKING CLASS AND CAMPESINOS IN AN EFFORT TOTRONGER BASE OF ACTION FOR ANY FUTURE CONTINGENCY.

. k. INSTEAD OFIME OF REORGANIZATION, THE NEXT FIVE MONTHS WERE DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO THE PROBLEMS CAUSEDRAVE INTERNAL CRISIS. MANY OF THE PROMINENT LEADERS OF THE PARTY WERE ACTIVE DURING THIS TIME IN THE FORMATION OF RIVAL PARTY UNITS. THE PARTY SPLIT WAS FORMALIZED IN5 WITH THE ORGANIZATIONIVAL PCB WHOSE POLITICAL ORIENTATION AS YET IS NOT ENTIRELY DEFINED.

5. THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE PCS DEMONSTRATED ALMOST NO CAPABILITY TO COUNTER THE GROWING SPLIT WITHIN THE PARTY. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE KiEKBCMfi ERE SIMPLY DENOUNCED AS BEING OFECTHER ORIGIN AND THOSEPARTICIPATING OR

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SUSPECTED OF PARTICIPATING Ii: rtffSSOAL ACTIVITIES WEREEXP EL LEO FROM THE PARTY. ATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PCS WAS CONVOKED IN EARLY5 WHICH DID LITTLE MORE THAN REAFFIRM THE POLITICAL LINE ADOPTED AT THE SECOND NATIONAL CONGRESS OF APRILANDREATER DEGREE, THE CONTROL OF THE PARTY IN THE HANDS CF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP. NO SOLUTIONS WERE OFFERED TO THE PROBLEM OF THE RIVAL FCB.

6. THE PARTICIPATION CF THE PC3 IN THE LABOR/POLITICAL CRISIS OF5 WAS LIMITED TO THE PUBLICATIONEW niCLAa*-fXflV OF PROTEST AGAINST THE ACTIONS OF THE MILITARY JUNTA. ONLY TWO MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF TrtE PARTY WERE ACTIVE IN PROMOTING THE STRIKE. THE REMAINDER WIRE EITHER OUT Of THE CITY OR IN HIDING. AGAIN, NO ORDERS WERE GIVEN TO LO'..'CR PARTY UNITS FOR ANY ACTION . THE LEADERSHIP OF THE JCB AT THE oAN ANDRES

JH LA PAZ

UNIVERSITY/ WAS NEUTRALIZED BECAUSE OF IT'S INABILITY TO DEVELOP 'SUPPORT FROM OTHER UNIVERSITY STUDENT GROUPS.

7. THE ARREST AND PERSECUTION OF THE PCB LEADERS,WHICH BEGAN JN LATE MAY,HAS CAUSED THE PARTY TO GC LWCRGRCLKD. THE MEMSEPS OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP STILL ROAIN IN HIDING. TIM OF THE PARTY IS BEING CARRIEDNTICIPATION Cf EVEN GREATER REPRESSION. SECRET CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION HAVE BEEN ARRANGED BETWEEN THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND THE LOWER PARTY UNITS. PARTY UNITS ARE BEING COMPARTMENTED FROM ONE ANOTHER /ND PSEUDONYMS ARE BEING ASSIGNEDRTY MEMBERS.THE JCB HAS

GREATLY CURTAILED ITS ACTIVITIES AND ALSO IS FREPAR|NG FOR AN Id ILLEGAL STATUS.

8.THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT REFORM DECREES IN THE MINES WILL DEAL THEEVERE BLOW. THE MINES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE PRINCIPAL BULWARK OF PARTY STRENGTH IN THE LABOR FIELD. NOW, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE PARTY ORGANIZATION AND INFLUENCE IN THAT REGION WILLDESTROYEDESULT OF THE DISCHARGE Of THE PARTY MEMBERS. THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP PLANS TOARGE NUMBER OF THESE MEMBERS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE TO WORK WITH THE CAMPESINOS AND BUILDEW BASE OF PARTY, PARTY EFFORTS SO FAR TO WORK WITH THE CAMPESINOS HAVE PRCD'JCED NEGLIGIBLE RESULTS/AND MANY YEARS MUST PASS BEFORE ANY EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION CAN BE BUILT UP.

9- THE ONLY OTHER FIELD OF ENDEAVOR OF THE FC3 AT PRESENT IS TO ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL OF SOME LABOR UNIONS DURING THEELECTIONS OF NEW OFFICERS. THE PARTY WILLPECIAL EFFORT TO CONTROL THE FACTORY WORKERS' UNIONS AS IT IS REALIZED THAT THESE UNIONS ARE THE MOST MILITANT AND STRONGEST UNIONS IN LA PAZ. FURTHER, THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS CF THE FACTORY WORKERS HAVE EITHER BEEN ARRESTED OR EXILED, THUSACUUM C7 LEADERSHIP WHICH THE PARTY PLANS TO EXPLOIT.

10. NOTWITHSTANDING THE REVERSES WHICH THE "PARTY "HAS SUFFERED DURING THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS, THERE HAS 3EEN NO SHIFT OF POLICY YET REGARDING THE METHOD THROUGH WHICH TO OBTAIN POWER. THE POLICY OF

DISSEM

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SUPPORTEACEFUL ROAD TCTILL IN EFFECT. CM 29 MAY, MARIO MCNJE MOLINA, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THEECLARATION SAYING THAT NEW CONDITIONS HAVE BED! CREATED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENTASS FRONT AGAINST THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP AND THE REACTIONARY FORCES. THIS PROPOSED FRONT Cf ALL OF THE POPULARMPER IAL 1st FORCES IK THE COUTTRYBE ABLE TO DEMAND THE RESTORATION Or DC-CCRATIC LIBERTIES, REJECT FOR WOPKERSr* RIGHTS, THE HOLDING Of FREE AND DC4XSATIC ELECT IONS, AND THE CANCELLATION OF THE REPRESSIVE DECREES ISSUEO Bt* THE JUNTA.

PREVIOUS EFFORTS BY THE PCB TORONTNOTABLY UNSUCCESSFUL. INHE NATIONALP REALIZED THAT ITS EFFORTS TO FORM AN ALLIANCE WITH THE NATIONAL LEFTIST REVOLUTIONARY PARTY CF JUAN LECHINAILURE, THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT,WHICH THE PARTY ORGANIZED IN ^TlCI.ATICN OF THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS OF MAYJU-SO HAS BEEN LKSfCCESSFUL IN ATTRACTING ANY SUPPORT. THE FORMATIONRONT,ORKING AGREEMENT WITH OTHER RADICAL PARTIES OF THE LEFT, IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF ANY OBJECTIVES OF THE PCB. BECAUSE OF ITS SMALL SIZE, THE PCB DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT ANY FLAN OF ACTION ON ITS GVN.

THE PCB LIKEWISE HAS NO CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT ANY SUBVERSIVE ATTEMPT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE STRONG PARTICIPATION OF OTHER GROUPS- THE PARTY HAS NO STPCNG PARA-

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ACTING INDEPENDENTLY. ONLY TWC MEMBERS CF THE JCB AND ONLY TWO EMBERS OF THE PARTY ARE KNOW TO HAVE RECEIVED ANY PARA-MILITARY TRAINING IN CU3A. THE MAJORITYRTY MEMBERS HAVE RECEIVED THEIR TRAINING AT THE INTERNATIONAL .'ART* SCHOOL IN MOSCOW, WHICH IS" asYOTED PRINCIPALLY TO THEORETICAL STUDIES. UP UNTIL 1THE CUBANS, IN PARTICULAR, WERE CONCENTRATING THEIR EFFORTS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE YOUTH CF THE GOVERNMENT PARTY,THET IS ESTIMATEDAXIMUM OFOUTHS FROM THIS GROUP HAVE RECEIVED EITHER POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION Cft PARA-MILITARY TRAINING IN CUBA.

THE MEETING OF THE LATIN AMERICAN CCC-WLNIST PARTYCUBA DURINGNOT YET AFFECTED ThE SUBVERSIVE

POTENTIAL OF THE PCS. NC PLANS ARE KNOWN TO NAVE BEEN MADE AT THIS CONFERENCE TO INCREASE THE TRAININGPARTY MEMBERS OR PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR SUBVERSIVE

* . THE CAPABILITIES CF THE RIVAL PCS FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ARE ALSO NEGLIGIBLE AT THIS TIME. ARTY STRUCTURE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, ITS ORGANIZATION IS NOT COMPLETE. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL INHIBITING FACTORS TO ANYARTY tOTGKT|AL IS THE LACK OF CAPABLE LEADERSHIP. EVEN COMPARED TO THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE ORTHXOX rCS, THE FRCSCNT LEADERS OF THE RIVAL PCB DO NOT HAVE ANY ADEQUATE 'iHEORETICAL PREPARATION. FURTHER, TWO OF THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS OF THE RIVAL FCB ARE IN HIDING,AS THE FIRST SECRETARY Or THE PARTY IS IN EXILE.

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15. THERE IS NO CAPABILITYHE COMWJNIST MOVEMENT IN BOLIVIA TO OVERTHROW THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE LACK CF ORGANIZATION OF THE FC5 WILLONG TIME FOR ANY SUCH PREPARATION AND THIN IT. WILL HEZDi A) THE STRONG! PARTICIPATION OF OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS* ANDLIMATE OF VERY STRONG DISCONTENT AMONG THE WORKING CLASS AND OTHER GROUPS WHICH IT CAN EXPLOITTS SUBVERSIVE AIMS.

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Original document.

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