ESTIMATE OF ATTITUDES OF NEWS MEDIA AND GENERAL POPULATION IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES

Created: 6/22/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SUBJECT: Estimate of Attitude* of News Media and General

Population in Certain Countries,. Policies as Exemplified by our Actions in Vietnam and Santo Domingo

TbiBarrative tabulation of the general thrust of the

the question posed:

Id

Germany. Italy. The Netherlands, Thailand andour policies, particularly on Vietnam,understanding and support. Our policies on Santoclearly of leas interest and concern. The_rninorityour policies, where it exists in these countries, takesof our domestic opposition as it finds expression innews media. (This factor is prevalent generally, inin the countries we queried.)

England, Norway, Denmark and Sweden, reactionspolicies are mixed and confused.

In England, divided opinion among the population and the major newspapers,which. policiesew months ago^has shiftedore pronounced attitude of questioning and disfavoresult of the bombings of North Vietnam and the pcsa|biUtV of,. involvement fa aconflict of doubtful outcome. Here again, interest is high on tho Vietnamese situation andow order of magnitude and declining on the Dominican question.

In Norway, which is generally sympathetic to. objectives, there is opposition to our policies both in the press and among the people, caused mostly by concern over the broader possible consequences of eacalation. with particular reference to the fact that Norwayommon border with the Soviet Union and would not like to suffer the fate of Finland.

In Denmark, while our policies in Vietnam on the whole receive general support, and are understood, our position in Santo Domingo is not adequately understood and is therefore criticiaed.

In Sweden, although there is much ambivalence of attitude and vocal criticism, the estimate is that strong moves in Vietnam or Latin America would ultimately be viewed rationally by the Swedes and receive their political support.

Japan and Finland, the press and the publicunsympathetic if not strongly critical of our policies, anda measure of public support of our firm stand inbeing eroded by De Gaulle's. position andof our policies in both Vietnam and the

Iceland, very little interest is shown in eitherDominican issues. The local government papers areto. policy and difficulties, and the Communist

highly critical.

orld-wide basis, we can draw the following general! aationa

many sectors of the populations thereasicboth Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, except asof local self-interest arc affected, in terms of localcommitments InTKe areas c'oncerned, or nationalsituation in Vietnam is far better understood and theclear, although there is doubt about the future. There isover the fact that modern technology has not prevailedjungle war. The most prevalent fearhat thefcould lead to further escalation andeneral war.

the other hand, tha Dominican questions arc intoo remote to stimulate any real concern, or areto be localised. The rationale behind. actionmisunderstood, and our "intervention" regretted or vilified.

c. Where there ii atrong opposition to U. S. policies, it it nften lead by the left-wing media and organised^ leftistorCommuniat front groups. (France is an exception, where their role isisproportionate advantage is taken. news media and news_coverage of. dissent to the Administrationja

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The tenor

policy statements, newsnciguinaffcgs to retf-ptivr journalist* and editorB,. must project the irnageation mindful_ofand willing to exercise its respons:bilitienree World lcadrr"!. must showthat we are ready to take positive initiatives unilaterally or inith other nations as time and_cir cum stances permito expose the true character of Communism, to oppose Communist subversion and aggrandizement In any form, and to employ force judiciously when the Communist slofe proves unree'eptive to negotiation and consultation and persists in its subversive efforts. The U. S. needs frequently to reiterate its objectives and to express them in terms underatandable and acceptable to_the man in die street here and abroad. . must avoid giving the impression that it is we who are afraid of the Communist bogeyman; we must make clear theof Communism and our objectives,to each country or region. Above all, it is imperative that the other nations of the Free World understand our policies, and retain full confidence in our interests and capabilities.

Original document.

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