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GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS TAKE HARD LINE AS INSURGENCY CONTINUES
The actions of the strongly anti-Communistregime imposed by Col. Enrique Peralta after the ouster of President Ydlgoras ln3 have caused Guatemala's Communist Party (PGT) to alter Its tactical line. Many of the younger partyhave become more and more attracted to the idea of armed struggle and resentful of the old guard's subservience to the Russian line of coexistence and peaceful revolution. This militant element appears to have recaptured the leadership of therevolutionaries and to have made theard-line party. Continuation of the insurgency problems will adversely affect the transitional regime's planseturn to constitutional rule.
of Guerrilla Movement
Guatemalarime target for Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere. It has achieved this position as aof Communist prominencetbe Jacobo, the ability
of its small but experienced and disciplined Comatunlst party to survive In very adverseand tbe esteem gained In revolutionary circles byguerrilla groups led by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. Tbe party has been strongly supported by international Communistwhich has used tbe4 antl-Comsunlst revolution under Castillo Armasase study ln "American Imperialism."
With tbe anti-Communist 'liberation" lnCommunists were confronted with the problem of survivala regime pledged to eradicate Communist Influence and destroy the party. Throughout the
tbe PGTelativelyclandestine After the assassination of Castillo7 the PGT made considerable gains, particularly ln tbe tide of resurgent leftism that took place during theof President Miguel Ydlgoras Fuentes, This leftist revival was, however, broad and disunited and beyond the control of PGT. The guerrilla movement bad its beginning ln theof0 by agroup of young army As far as Is known, the revolturely military movement whose sole aim was the overthrow of Ydlgoras. ln this goal, the rebel officers went into exile orand continued plotting. Lt. Yon Sosa became leader of those who decided on guerrilla action, and the group organized asovember Revolutionarywith its base in thedepartment ofountainous .Jungle region well suited to guerrilla opera-tIons.
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began giving Material assistance to tbe group innd Yon Soaa himself later spent some months ln Cuba. Yon, the guerrillas scored limitedof communications lines, buses, and railroad tracks;on military supply points and plantations to acquire money and arms; assassinations of army collaborators; andattacks against commercial and official installations.
The PCT aoon established contact vltb tht guerrillas. It began supplying them with food and medicine andropaganda campaign tothe popularity andof the movement. At this point, the PGT'as vas the standard Soviet Use and the Stno-Soviet split had little effect in Guatemala. The party's main activity was ln the political realm,partisan, labor, and student organizations. Violence waa espoused only as one of many means toward revolution, andwork received onlyattention.
core of PCT members had been trained ln guerrilla tactics ln Cuba. Th* party's first use of such tactics, however, ended ln roup sponsored byformer high-rankingmilitary officer, Carlos Paz Tejada, was crushed.
PCT Split Over Use of Violence
13 the PCT leadership had little difficulty
ln maintaining ideological unity in spite of Incipientfeeling among some of the members. PGT and other leftist groups made progress underalthough they were kept divided by the President's deals, threats, and contradictory They were preoccupied for much2 and3 by the problem of selecting ato support In theelections scheduled for
The cause of tht small PGT minority in disagreement with the party's relativein the guerrillawas boosted by theousttr of Ydigoras at the end of March. Very shortlyMlniattr of refenae Enrique Peralta Imposed what tbe PGT no* calls "tht militaryparty leadersa separate militaryfor guerrilla warfart and terrorism. Intntral committee member Carlos Renealle conttnded that armed strugglety ln northeastern Guatemala; that ltt* way of lift for all party mtmbers; and that, although the usualmethods would b* usedhile, the entire party would eventually be armed. SomePGT members werewith tht organlztd guerrilla groups, but these members vtrt admonished not to hold party meetings among the otherwho were men of dlfftr-tnt ldeologlts.
6 Aug 65
GT leaders renamed divided over recourse to violence as thelorn of struggle. Hestersworking with tbeln the hills Increasingly ohampioned tho Insurrectional line and called for the party to follow their example. Partyof the day upheld armed violenceorm of struggle forced on the party but continued to enpbasize organizational work among the masses as the PGT's primary mission. Party leaders admitted that conditions forhad not completelyIn Guatemala. Thistotrong stand In favor of violence was regarded by some members as unrealistic subservience to the Sovietro-Chinese faction became more vocal and some rank and file members defected.
Tbe party had managed by3 tonited guerrilla front, called the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). FAR included three main guerrilla groups: Yon Sosa'sovemberpril" youth group,group. Also establishedore ambitiousfront to coordinate antlgov-ernment activity. This group, called the United Resistance Front ncompassed the FAR, the PGT, and two leftist parties, FUR occasionally had theof the leftist university
students, Francisco Villagran Kramer's far leftist Democratic Revolutionary Unity Party (URD) and the Communist-dominated
Autonomous Trade Unionof Guatemala (FASGUA).
The establishment of the FAR and FCRew attempt by PGT to control the guerrilla movement. Yon Sosa, while accepting material aid, had never been willing to accept PGTstand ln which he vas supported by many of tbe extremists, including some PGT members. Tbe revolutionaries resented the PGT's attempts to control them while lt wasto commit itselfto armed revolution. PGT
efforts to dominate tbealso were undercut by the guerrillas' ability to secure funds, equipment, and training from other countries. In action groups under the military commission of the PGT were ostensibly released from the control of the central committee to act aa agents of tbe FUR. The party's Intent was to gain covert control of FUR and directactivity through thesegroups.
frjiernence of "Trotskyite" Influence
The Peralta government's security forces, relativelyin tbe unconventional warfare waged ln the northeast, acted with vigor aod someagainst party installations ln Guatemala City. There the party vas demoralized, members became suspicious of one another, and the rank and file refused to carry out party tasks for fear of the police.
6 Aug 65
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onsequence, the POT presumablyood part of its Iov-level membership and was whittled down to militant,stalwarts. Feelingbegan to develop against those members of the centraland other high-level PGT members who, while livinglo Mexico, continued to emphasize work among the masses and to warn against the error of wholesale dedication to violence. At the same time, th* guerrilla bands were aided by emissaries froa Cuba and Mexico, who brought encouragement and recognition along with supplies and funds to the revolutionaries.
to
intionue nee among the guerrillas. One sourceMario Sllvaember of the central committeeeader of FAR, as leadertrong pro-Chinese faction.
, and claimed that thewere Influenced byAmado Granados, aexiled In Mexico who "took th* Chinese vie* of violent
lo July Revplucion Social-laublication purported to be the periodical ofovement, first appeared. It derided peaceful means of revo* Lution as Inadequate for tho struggle in Guatemala. This first issue did not attack the Soviet Union and tended to avoid
the Pelplng-Moscow lssu*. But it did support an uncompromising, nationalistic revolutionary creed.
Shortly thereafter, tbe PGT replied to the ovemberin an open letter. The PGT response pointed out that tb* subversive movement *aa not as successful asovember had painted lt, that revolutions took time, and that impatience could only bring harm to th* cause. PGT decried tbe divl-sionlst teodeociesod appealed for unity. The PGT letter, signed by tbeComslsslon of the central committee, was heavily larded with laudatory comments oo the Soviet Union. The polemicth* two groups continued for some months.
The party consistently praised Yonfor his lapses. It tried to convince him that his Mexican*ossibly with connections with Communist China, who intended to betray tbe guerrillas. Inth* polemic diminished and there were reportsodus Vivendi under which the PGT would accept ovember of terrorist activities and guerrilla operationa while the party publicly stuck to its peaceful coexistence line onaffairs. Yon Sosa was to command guerrillas ln the field, and Luis Turcios Lima was to operate in Guatemala City.
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Concern Over Pls^ityGuerrilla's
The Communist presses Id Europe and Latin America have given considerable attention to revolutionary forces ln Guate mala, and the guerrillas are knovn to be In contact withfroa Cuba, otherAmerican countries, and Mexico,
One such representative is Victor Ricoarx-
enaian security forcesarge amount of propaganda Including the text of an address by Rico Galan to the guerrillas* After lauding theovember movement as the symbol of the struggle forliberation of all of Latin Americat Rico said that Cuba's Ernestouevara believed that the revolutionary movement was most solid and firm in Guatemala and Venezuela and told theovember group that their difficulties were due in large measure to PGTto forsake ideas for action. He described the role of the PGT as one of support, and that ofovember as one of dragging PCTorecommitment to the struggle.
Rico accused theln Guatenala olan Ideology beyond the grasp of the masses. Themasses, he said,ery elementary understanding
of their ovn problems. Rico also chlded the guerrillas forin polemics vith the PGT. He encouraged ideological study but warned against preoccupation with intellectual matters which could not be translated to themasses. Rico then urged unity among all the
These points expressed by the Mexican journalist appear to have been affirmed by theof Communists in Havana inhich called for unity among the liberal forcesore activist stance on the part of the orthodox parties In several countries including Whether in response tonudging or not, roup and the PGTreconciled theirbut only temporarily.
PGTarder Line
Prior to the fall oftheovemberRevoluclQtt Socialistsavoidedtrongon the Sino-Soviet split. After Khrushchev's politicalthe publication labeled the ousted Soviet leader as the cause of most Communist troubles. It unabashedly praised the Chinese Communists and criticized PGT for backing international peacefuland bourgeois nationalist revolution. No mention was made of the call for unity whichfrom the Cuban Communist conference of November, and ln fact Yon Sosa withdrew his group from the FAR.
6 Aug 63
MibiMMSTrs
little Uter, the PGT began endorsing the use of force to achieve Its goals. GT Political CosailBSlon document of5 states that tbe revolutionary struggle cannot be realised by peaceful means, and that tbe party must carryrotracted armed However, because tbeand workers are notufficiently strong andelement ln the national life, the social revolution take tbe fore of immediate Insurrection. The struggle ls said to be ln its first phase, which is organizational andcalling fordevelopment of tbe masses, creation and development of tbe necessary clandestineand formation ofand dedicated cadres.
At about the same time tbe party began to implement its verbal sanction of violence. It reconstituted the FAR, which now presumably Incorporates all ideologically soundelements, and is itself in tbe process of reorganizing along quasimllltary lines.
has received word irom Fidel Castro that if it intensifies its activities and can sustain Itselfavana will give the party completesupport. Othertoo, indicates that funds from Cuba are contingent on an
increase of violence and
The soft-liners in tbe PGT no longer appear to control the party. The Influence of the exiled PGTas Victor manual Gutierrez, Jose manual Fortuny, Edelberto Torres Rlvas, and Jaime Diazdiminished and indeed may be.
Current DlvlBion of KxtrcwlstB
In December Luia Turclos Lima, chief of theband called "Edgarad written to both Yon and the PGT attacking tbe infiltration of Trotskyltes Intoovement and callingeconciliation among the Inurclos repeated his attack on "Trotskylte" control of theand announced hisfrom theovember. Turclos officially split with Yon in early June5 and was accepted into the PGT. Hisgroup ls now under the direct command of the central.
The guerrilla movement in Guatemala now consists of two groups: the FAR or "Edgar Ibarra" group led by Turclos under PGT direction, and th*ovember group headed by Yon with aid from Maoists or "Trotskyltes." There ls no way of estimating how many choae to follow Turclos or how many remained with Yon.
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harder line implicit in tbe PGT'e acceptance of Turclos' guerrillas appears to remain within the bound* of Soviet Froa what le known of the Havana Conference inoscow apparently has given the stamp of approvalarder line Id domestic affaire to the parties In Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, Haiti,and Panama. Those POTanxious to take advantage of this green light seem to have overcome the reluctance of the "intellectual" leadership. Even so, for some of the members tbe espousal of armed struggle proved too little and too late.
the
groups
Many young members of party and associated youth already had left the PGT to join Too In the hills,
that PGT members throughoutand particularly ln the zones of guerrilla activity wereand demoralized by recent PGT documents describing theovember as Trotskyite,and divisionist, andYonraitor.
Central committee member and guerrilla Ricardo Ramirez de Leon,5 meeting with PGT leaders, expressed strongwith the party**line and accused them ofin the armed struggleime when strong leadership was required. Ramirez said that he was going to Mexico to start his own group to represent PGT ln the struggle.
In5 the central com mittee wrote to exiles in Mexico
stating that certain high-level members of the party had adopted the hard line with Ramirez aod that they believed Ramirez and the others had joined forces toew party.
It is certalo that the party is badly spilt, has lost pivotal members, and has been damaged by more efficient action bysecurity forces. terrorists continue their activities, and theand purpose of their raids imply organization and discipline, assets that deny any imminent departure of the party from the Guatemalan scene*
Political Implications
The Peralta regime, in lt* more than two years of rule, has lost the political support of all partisan organizations left of center and ha* gained the avowed enmity of moet of them. The current preparationseturn to constitutionalare ln the natureguided democracy,"by institutional andassurances that only "safe" organizations willin the nationalscheduled forhe exclusion of all but those partisan groups considered "safe" by the incumbent governmentto both extreme and moderateommitment to an intolerable status quo. It has been clear to most of the liberal parties for some time that they have no earlyto achieve power through legal means.
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of 1he moderate groups, while recognizing tbat eubver-siun la tb* only path open at tbla time, have feared to engage ln aerloua plotting ln the face of tbe relative efficiency of the security apparatus. Theon tbe other band, say have painted Itself into a Renewed restriction of civil liberties under sartlal law (tba state of siege has been lifted, but probably onlymight well turn usu-
ally Moderate groups to violence. Terrorist groups, realizing this, are planning Increased sabotage and assasalnatlon attempts to force the Maintenance of the stats of slsge. Chief ofPeralta's lack ofacumen and his apparent inability or unwillingness to clarify his political intentions portend long-term instability for Guatemala. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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