SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CHEMICAL WARFARE (NIE 11-10-

Created: 8/19/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

to Holders of35

MEMORANDUM

To Holders of

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

3

Soviet Capabilities and Intentions With Respect to Chemical Warfare

by lit. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

n byUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD A,95

I, ii-iI

TflSLLEB OH

Memorandum to Holders of NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

3

Soviet Capabilities and Intentions With Respect to Chemical Warfare

mitr

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF

OVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TOWARFARE (Secret,

New evidenceevision of lhe discussion of the Soviel toxic agent stockpile infe have nowD depots which we believe are devoted priniariiy to the storage of toxic agents; these have an estimated total maximum storage capacity ofons. Wcestimateduch depotsotal capacityons. These estimates of total storage capacity do not take account of other possible depots or of field storage on which we do not have conclusive evidence.

Five of these depots, with an estimated total capacityons, are confirmed toxic agent storage sites. Evidence of anof facilities at three of these suggests that present storage capacity is fully utilized or nearly so. In3 we thought il prudent to assume that the total toxic agent stockpile, both in depots and available to tactical units, was altons. The new evidence, which suggests full utilization of certain confirmed storage sites, leads us to conclude that this stockpile is probably atons and could be considerably larger.

On this basis, wc would revisef3 to read as follows:

A. Our evidence indicates lhat Soviet organization, equipment, stocks, training, and research and development can support substantial toxic chemical warfare operations. There is insufficient evidence-ofntproductten-iates-orn-stock toould conduct-tlWe^poratiem. Main

tisnw

Research

and development are continuing, including efforts to develop nonlethal incapacitating agents.

e reaffirm the other Conclusions ofhich are reproduced below.

B. The Sovietsariety of chemical munitions for theater operations, but we believe that their useong-range strategic role is not now planned.

equipment for defense against chemical warfare, but they stillatisfactory means of timely nerve agent detection. Civil defense capabilities are considerably lower than those of the military.

believe that the Soviet leaders think of chemicalessentially tactical weapons, but they consistently group (hemweapons as "weapons of masshethus probably consider them subject to the sameas those imposed on nuclear weapons, and anytheir initial use almost certainly wouldmade atpolitical level.

Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize the usechemical agents by their theater field forcesimited war in which no nuclear weapons were beingwould probably not initiate the use of chemical weapons.

nrnET

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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hite Housa

National Security Councilof Statu Department of Defense Atomic Energy Commlulon Federal Bureau of

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