5
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact
OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
Svbmitltd bf the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAl INTELLIGENCE
Cootwred ir. b, the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai indicated cver'eof5
DISSEM
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Eastern Europe and rhe Warsaw Pact
tat Co-cmiij;.ceData "JV/f>
SECRET
TABIE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE 1
3
I. THE WARSAW PACT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY 3
Development of thr Pact .
Value ol the Pact to fhe
East Euiopean Attitudes Toward tlie
East European
U. EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY 5
Defense
Erpiipmcnt
HI, EAST EUROPEAN ARMED
Command Structure of the Warsaw Pact 7
Cround 7
Table; Easi Euiopean Army 8
Table; Estimated Personnel Strength of the East European Armed Forces .. in Ctound Force Organization and .9
Tactical Air Support 10
Nuclear. Chemical, and Biological Weapon* 10
National Air Defense 11
Table: Estimated Strength of Combat Aircraft in thc East European Air
Forces It
Naval12
Table: East European4
Militarized SecurityIt
IV. WARTIME CAPABILITIES 13
Mobilization Potential 13
V. FUTURE13
Military Capabilities 13
Coherence of the Pact
ANNEX 15
IS
Yugoslavia 15
Tabic. Armed Forces of Albania and17
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WARSAW PACT
THE PROBIEM
To estimate the significance of the Warsaw Pactilitarythe military capabilities of the iron-Soviet members' andI rends over lhe nexl five years or so.
CONCLUSIONS
years little moreaper organization, thehas become an important element in Soviet European policyplanning. In the, the USSR moved tonew militaiy relationship with thc countries of Eastern Europe,their military capabilities and to tighten the Pact as aorganization. Of late, thc East European countries havein varying degrees an Increasing independence of thelhcir polilical and economic policies. The loosening of Sovietin Eastern Europe has increased the importance of the PactUSSR as an institutional tie. For their part the Eastsec lhe Pact ns an assurance that the Soviets will continuetheir regimes and to safeguard
over the past five years have made Eastmilitaryore useful adjunct to Soviet militaryestimate thatf theast European line divisions,in quality, could be deployedew days.air defense systems are coordinated with each other and
'TV activeEuropean members ol ihr Wiruw Pic! are Bulgaria,Cennitnv. Hungary. Polnnd. nnd ltumanu. Tlie military csji" bill Hot of Albania,noi activelyugotlivia.ember, nraoviei slratefsr concepts wtth respectar an Europe aod Iht rrie.mtsWi behe forthcoovtng NIEot Soviet Ceneral
rni|inae Force*.'
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wiih the Soviet air defense organization.AM sitesighter aircraft these systemsair defense throughout the area. While we believe that the Soviets will not give Eastfoices nuclear weapons in peacetime. In thc event of war these weapons would probably be made available under strict Soviet control.)
Soviets will probably continue their efforts toWarsaw Pact. Thc growing^independence of Easternwill make it difficult lo obtain agreement on specificaction. Changes in NATO will influence developments inalliance; in particular, any substantial increase in the roleCermany would stiengthen the special lelatioruhip amongPoland. Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Rumaniaseek to minimize its participation in the Pact, but we dothat it will attempt formally to withdraw. (Paras.si
a crisis situation threatening general war. we believeEast European regimes would attempt tooderatingon Soviet policy. If the USSR ordered mobilization, theirwould probably differ, ranging from immediatethe East Ccnnans to recalcitrance on lhe part of thethc event of armed conflict, we believe that thc Eastforces could be relied upon to take part, at least initially,operations in conjunction with Soviet forces.
DISCUSSION
I. THE WARSAW PACT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY Developmenl ol the Pod
I. The Warsaw Pact was created by thc USSH in5olilical responsebe rearming and admission into NATO of West Germany. During Ihc first five years of its existence, the Pact bad liltle practical significance in lhc miliiary relationships between thc USSR and Eastern Europe Executive hodies met only irregularly, and very tittle multinational planning or training look place under Pact auspices. Actual military relationships between the USSR and other members were governederies of bilateral treaties and status-of-lorces agreements During this period thereeneral slackening in fhe military eflorls of the Easi European countries, defense expenditures and lhe strength of the East European armed forces gradually declined. Byhe Soviels evidently concluded that these forces had to bein view of growing NATO strength.
2 At about the same time thereefinite shilt in Soviet policy; Ihe USSR began toew military relationship wiih the countries ofEurope. Soviet propaganda and doctrinal statements began lo stress thc probability that any future war wouldar of coalitions and to emphasise the importance of close military collaboration within the Bloc. Al the same time, ihe Soviets began to take concrete steps lo build up thc miliiary capabilities of their East European allies and to stiengthcn thc military organization of the Warsaw Pact. In the last five yean, modernization o( equipment and weapons has been stepped up. command and control arrangements have been improved, and large-scale multinational training exercises have taken place
Value of the Pact lo lhe USSR
These improvements have occurrederiod in which the East European countries have manifested, in varying degrees, increasing independence of the USSR in their national policies. On the surface there is apparentin thc USSR's policy of strengthening its East European alliesaf thc very time when they are becoming less tractable politically. But Ihe Soviets probablyumber ofmilitary, andfor selling this new course.
Problems in thc allocation of resources and manpower in the USSR led Khrushchev in 1'JGO to institute largo-scale force reductions, chiefly at fhe expense of thc general purpose forces. If is possible that thc Soviels sought
i
i'i olhet these reductions to some degree hy improving (lie military capabilities ol" Eastern Europe. At the timeebate in the USSR over military sliategydoctrine ledc-examinalion of pieviuus assumptions nliont the probable 'haraiteiuture war. Crowing doubt? concerning thc possibility ofIn the European area under conditions of general nuclear wari..ii.ii. thatar might have to be fought largely withlace may have influenced the Soviet decision.
Tlie Soviets probably also expected political returnshangewhich would counteract, to some extent, centrifugal lendeneies inThey probably hoped to arrest or at least slow die trenddiversity by exploiting both lite fear of war and llie rseceisityplanning to meet this danger. In any event, the loosening ofEastern Europe has increased the importance ol lhe Pact as an
insiitiitionalor rumple, (he Soviets have been trying to rrrrtve ihe Poliiical Consuliaiise Committee to serveormal mechanism for foreignconsultation. As the Sino-Soviet dispute hasthe USSH has turned increasingly toward its East European allies for political support.
the Soviet point of view, Eastern Europe adds coniiderably topower. The Soviets have long regarded the regionne, and probably consider thateneral svar il would bear someinitial impactestern attack. They piobably also consider lhalof Easi European national forces reduces the reipiirement forin the area.
Eost European Attiludes Toward the Pad
Although the East European countries had no real choice about joining the Pact, they have derived some benefits from il. The collective securityof the Pact givereater measure of defense than ihey could ever obtain with their own resources. In their view, the Warsaw Pactoviet guarantee to support the continuance of Cominunist regimes and existing boundaries in Eastern Europe. The Utter connder.it ion is particularly weighty in the cases of East Cermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia, which consider aWesthreat to their national security. This commonhas ledpecial relationship among these three countries ind the USSR In the cases of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, their governments must balance the general security offered by the Pact against possible involvement In Cerman issues which they do not regard as directly affecting their national Interests.
In spite of thc increasing independence of theiopean countries, their national policies still generally coincide with those of the USSR. But cooperation nnd coordination can no longer simply be dictated In Moscow. Many decisions must now be reached on the basisonsensu* among countries svhich are no longer willing to subordinate completely their national interests
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he dcnwu.lv of Moscow. Concern (hat Soviet prolccliori carries with it the risk of ilivolvcm.-u!uclear war is likely lo increase, and Pact mcml>ers may begin to demand moreoice in divisions which might involve their nalional survival.
Eosl European Reliability
responsiveness of East European countries to Soviet direction andof their forces would depend primarily on thc nature, causes,of the conflict. In any crisis situation which carried the threat ofwe believe that tbe East European regimes would attempt to exertinfluence on Soviet policy. If the USSR should orderresponses would probably differ, ranging from immediate complianceEast Germans to recalcitrance on the part of the Rumanians. Theastride the line of communications to Soviel forces in Germany,reluctantly lo Soviet demands, reasoning lhat it would be impossibleto avoid becoming involved.uld probably followmuch Ihc same reason.articularly threatening situation,possibly others mighl procrastinate iu an attempt to remain neutralcommunicate privately with lhc other side.
In general, we believe that Easi European forces would fight wiih far more determination in defense of their own territory than as partoviet offensive operation against NATO. Tlie nationality of thc opposing forces would also be an important factor. For example, lhe Poles and thc Czechs would probably fight well against anything which they regarded as Cerman aggression, and the Bulgariansongstanding antagonism toward Creeks and Turks.
Because of strict discipline, party indoctrinalion, careful screening of officers and ley troops, and thc very nature of military organization, the belter East European divisions could probably be relied upon Io take part, al least initially, in military operations in conjunction with Soviel forces.ast moving situation the East European forces, including the East Germans, would probably continue to function ai long as command channels remained intact and Ihe forces involved did not suffer any serious reverses. If, however, major reverses should occur and victory of the NATO forces appeared imminent, the reliability of the East European forces would probably deteriorate rapidly, and some troops might even seek to shift sides.
II. EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES Defense Budget
the armed forces of the East European countries have fewweapons systems and are not involved in the development of costly
ollciuivc forces, (hey .ire auk'aintain their Armed forces with relatively small defense budgets. East European expenditures on defense amount tn nltout A$ percent of their CNPs. Tliisuch smaller relative clfort than is made by either the US or the USSR and is about the same as that of thc European NATO counlries.
Die defense expenditure* of the East European Pact members, after falling. rose sharply. Only Poland and Easthowever, have substantially increased tlscir defense expenditures5 levels. All these countries are probably capablereater military effort. However, any increase in military spending would have to be at the expense of economic growth or consumption. Both alternatives are politicallyUnder present economic and political conditions, it is unlikely that the East European countries wouldubstantially larger military efiort without Soviet assistance. Indeed, some of these countries planned reduction* in ihcii defense expenditures4
Equipment Procurement
The miliiary equipment of the East European armed forces is primarily of Soviet design and manufacture. During the, relatively large calamities of Soviet military equipment, mostly of World War II vintage, were shipped into Eastern Europe. Lale model equipment began to arrive in the, but in general tlie quantity of these newei items remained relatively small until the. In the last few years, the East European countries have beenteady flow of modern Soviet equipment. Initialof new Hems have generally arrived some two to three years afterinto the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, but in the past year or so the lag in providing new equipment has been reduced.
Snviel statistics on exports lo Eastern Euiope include unspecified goods which we believe represent predominantly weapons shipments. These figures indicate more0 percent increase in total Soviet military exports to Eastern Europe0lie little evidence available suggests that the East Europeans pay about the same prices as other countries for similar types of Soviet equipment.
Tne East European countries produce limited quantities of small arms and ammunition, and some produce larger items such as trucks, tanks, small ships, armored personnel carriers, field artillery, antiaircraft guns, andreconnaissance vehicles. Poland and Czechoslovakia are thc majorof this heavy equipment. Poland also produces tank landing ships for the Soviet navy. There is some arms trade among the East European countries, but even Poland and Czechoslovakia import some items from the USSR and the others are largely dependent on imported Soviet equipment
ower
e etlmutc tli.ii storing (lie pas! several years total strength of (Ih' East Euiopcan fold's, includingd securityas remained relatively slnhlc .ilillion men. However, lliere whs evidencem.il! reduction in live tftr of live Bulgarian armed form, and Rumaniai ntry rediiced (lie lerm of service for conscripts. Labor shortages in Czechoslovakia. Hnngnry. and East Cermany will undoubtedly exert pressures for manpower icdnctioiis Moreover, (lie acquisition of advanced weapons in quantity has increased live ivecd for more highly qualified technicians, imposing new icrpurements on (be limited supply of skilled manpower in Eastern Euiopc
III. EAST EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES
Command Structure of 'he Worsaw Pott
lse supreme command of the W,
irsaw Pact organization is vested in Ihe Combined Armed Forces Coinmand. located in Moscow. This command is composed of militars officers fictn all (lie Pad countries, and is headed by Soviet Marshal Andrvy A. Crcchko, who appears to be thc second-ranking officer in (hc Soviet Ministry of Defense We believe that (he East European
officer! serving on lhe Combined Command are little move lhan liaison officers.
and thai all important plans and policies relating to Pact forces are formulated
iu the Soviet general staff
he formal chain of command runs from the Combined Armed Forces Command in Moscow, through Ihe East European defense ministers (who are titular deputynd then down to thc various miliiary districts and field commands. In peacetime, the main (unctions of the Combined Command appear to be to coordinate development and training of thc East European armed forces and to plan for the integration of these forces Into (he regular Soviel command structure in (he event of war. In wartime, (he Combined Armed Force* Command and lhe various national Ministries of Defense would nl moil certainly be bypassed, and lhe chain of command would run from Mowow through the Soviet Fronl commanders to the commanders of Ihe East European field armies.
Ground Foreti
he East European ground forces generally follow Soviet organizational paliems. We estimate (hat in East Cermany. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania the TOE strengthenank division0otorized rifle division. In Bulgaria (he TOE strengths are believed to be slightly0ank division, with two instead of three tank regiments,otorized lifehile in Hungary ihey are slightly0 menank division0otorized riflehe quality of our evidence varies with reipect lo both TOE and actual
tr
strengths, but in general our information on llie East Cerman. Polish, and Czech armies iv better than for tlic other East European countries. We helicvc that tin- larger units o( the East European ground forces generally are not ai well trained a* their Soviel counterparts.
s
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ll uf Ihc East European ground forces have army level support units ucli as surface-to-surface missiles, field and antiaircraft artillery, engineer, igiwl. ami chemical units. In general, however, ihey arc light in combat and service support even by Soviet standards, and it is doubtful whether theyfunctiim effectively in sustained, combat without either mobilizingl units or receiving direct support from Soviet units.
criteria for assessing the icadiness of East European divisions Thev include peacetime manning levels, training, and equipment.
would pi. There an
- Ihey also Involve Ihe pidgment thai the Emi Europeano commit their better division* promptly il-mld the need arise, ilverefore wide variations among the divisions whichclaiufy a* rvmJV lot eatly rouunilinent. ie,ew days For example, the maiming level of these divisions langcs from about TO toercent of TOE strength, and most of these forces fall short of Soviet standards of equipment, particularly in armored personnel carriers.
all these factors, we believe thatf theastand Czech divisions can be considered available for earlyterms of manning, training, and equipment, llie East Ceiman divisionscomparable to the Soviet divisions stationed iu East Germany,ready Czech and Polish divisions are somewhat below that standard.ihai tlie armies of these three countries would be considerabl*than those of thc other East European counlries. Wc estimateof theulgarian and Rumanian divisions and none of the siiare available foi early commitment. Tlie numbers and types ofline divisions are shown in the following table.
KAST EUROPEAN ARMY DIVISION'S *
CAVWVC
Ceunaiiy
)
)
)
)
)
)
. *
in parentheses arc those estimated available for early commitment, but even among these divisions Uiere are wide variations In manning and equipment.
airborne and one assault landing diviiion. The airborne unit, which lit, an citimsled strengthivbion by the Poles, but in temii of capabililiei more nearly crtiuteirigsde. Al present llie sjnull landing divisionnoloiircd rifle division in which one of Die three rifle regiment* is composed ol naval infantry.
SE^IcT
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KNTIMATM) PmKMMH. JiTIIKNl.-TIITIIK KAKT KUHOI'fcAN AHalbO r'OHCEs
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In Comliet
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Poiccb
A
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I
Security- Forces
Trends in Giound Forte Orgonirolion and Equipment
llie appearance ol foul European field anniei In exercises indicates that time forces are acquiring the experience and equipmenterale in large uniu. We previously estimated lla.it the East European divisions would be integrated mlo Soviet field armies during wartime, but we now believe that these divisions lor the most part would serve in iheir own field armies, which In turn uuuld be integrated into Soviel Fronts. This development implies Increasing Soviet confidence in tlie military capabilities of these lorces
The Easi European lorces. like lhe Soviets, have increased lhe number of tank divisions in recent years. Poland and Czechoslovakia now have lour and live Unk divisions, respectively, and appear lo be developing lhe capability tn field lank armies. Airborne and amphibious training has received increased nttenlion. although lilt capabilities are limited to small-scale operations. In the, lhe Poles created an airborne unit ol brigade size which theyivision, nndegan toechanized division Into an "assault landing" division. Czechoslovakia, East Gennany, Bulgaria, andhave each created small airborne units. Some ol these units have probably received training in unconventional warfare.
he East European armies are significantly improving lhe quality of their land combat equipment4 medium tank has replaced the World War4 In East Cerman tank divisions, and is appearing In Increasing numbers In lhe armored units of the other East European countries- Armored personnel carriers are also being introduced in greater numbers than In previous yean. In addition, the Soviets have begun to supply theireguided antitank missile, to their Warsaw Pact allies.
he equipping of East European armies with tactical missiles and rockets is well underway. On the basis of past Soviet practice, we eilimate that one
..IT-'
battalion ol two Fiog launchers per division ond one bngade of siiper field mmy have been cstahlislicd as the standard lotforces We believe that Poland. East Germany, andhaw tlicir full complement ofnd Scuds Bulgaria, and Itmiiama probablyufficient
uf6ul have no! received their full complement of Frogs. All the East Euiopcan countries will probably receive additional tactical missile launchers in the neat few years.
Toclical Air Support
bc primary mission of all of the East European all forces is national air defense. Nevertheless, the Polish and Czech air forces and possibly the Bulgarian and East Cerman air forces as well bavr been reorganized so that, while most of tlie fighter regiments perforin the air defense role, others functionactical force Howoer. all East European fighter units, whether air defense or tactical, are trained in both air Interception and in ground attack techniques East European tactical air capabilities are improving with llie introduction of current model Soviet aircraft. Tlse MIGFishbed) has been supplied to all East Eiiropcan aii forces, and the Czechs and the Poles have received thel) of these countries except Hungary have obsolescent II,Beagle) light bombers, but only Poland and Czechoslovakia have them in any significant quantities: these are employed both in bombing and reconnaissance roles. It is likely that these air forces will increasingly emphasize the ground attack mission.
Nuclear. Chemical, and Biological Weapons
umber of years, East European forces have participated in field trainingimulated nuclear environment. More recently, these forces have simulated their own delivery of nuclear weapons. This development, together with the acquisition of nuclear capable delivery systems, (Scuds. Frogs, anduggests that East European commanders expect to have access to such weapons in the event of war While wc believe that the Soviets will not give East European forces nuclear weapons in peacetime, in the event of war these weapons would probably be made available under strict Soviet control.
he East European form have trained extensively in defense against chemical and biological weapons. All the armed forces have the capabilily of delivering CW agents by artillery, aircraft, and missiles. Tbc Czechs. Eait Cermans. and possibly the Poles have tbe capability to manufacture CW tone agents but we have no evidence of stockpiling. We believe thatar the East European armed forces would be dependent on thc Soviets for lhe bulk of Iheir chemical munitions and that these forces would not employ such agents except upon Soviet directive or authorization. All of these countries
10
c-uiiltj produce UWmall scale, hoto evidence lli.it any af themn offensive btnliigii.il warfare devetopmcn( prngiam
Notional Air Defense
AW defense ol (he East European imintnitomposed ol sciuralcsystems They are. nunilnln. (ootdinatid snth cadi other and with (lie Soviet ait defense Ofganiialton. and llicre axe increasing signs of closer cooperation tn lhelo*mancc ol theirov Aklanigh Ihese systems arc not formally subordinate to Soviet art defeme, lliey comlilute lor movl practical purposes an extension nl it East European aii defense systems are equipped ahnosl exclusively with Soviet materiel. Tlie Wat equipped, and probably tlse most effective, are the nil defense forces of East Cermany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Early warning (EW) and ground controlled mlciccpl (CCI) radar sites aie densely deployed inl areas and provide overlapping coverage. The density of coverage provides good detection and tracking capabilities, and frequency diversification provides some defense against electronic counter-measures. Tlve Sovieis have been improving the EW-CCI capabilities of (he East European systems in recent years by supplying some of the best radars in thc Soviet inventory and semi-automatic data (rantmission equipmen( for vectoring fighter aircraft against targets However, aroundercent of theighter aircraft are older model Rgh(er*.
iles have been deployed largely in defense of the capita! cilies and other key urban-industrial areas In addition to theites in Easi Cermany. Poland, and Hungary svhich the Soviets operate in support of llicir own forces, there arcites in Eastern Europe. Present deployment pal-terns suggest thai an addilionaloites will be deployed. There arc at present noites, defense against losv altitude attacks is provided by light and medium AAA.
The combination of area and point defenses piovided by the present force of fighters and SAMsair defense throughout (he area againit medium and high altHudcacks; in East Cermany lhe concentration of SAMs and interceptorselter defense tn their area. However, the Eastair defense systems have limited low allitude and all-weather capabilities, and special difficulties are posed by Western supersonic aircraft and standoff weapons We bebrve that over (he next lew years, these capabilities willwith the wider deployment of new EW and CCI radars andcontrol systems and with the acquisi(ion ol more advancedsuch as lheow altitude SAM syslem may beduring tlie period of this estimate. We do not believe lhal the East Europeans will acquire any anliballistic missile defenses during this period.
SEJRET
or COMBAT AlKCHArT IS THt KAST KUKOPCAN rOHPKs IIS**
IM (larn.-rl (Filhij
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10
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74
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Mule-its Caechoslumkia ICa.il Ui-nuaiiy It linear y
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15
Poland (titcludiits; naval) llumniila
Tolal by Type
manydditional Fiahbril-IH may beIn CuehMlo vakil, East
Total by Coo it Iry
M
Naval Forces
he East European naval forces arc organized and equipped for limilcd naval operaUons: coastal patrol, mine warfare, and short-iange airroh,Uous operations The East Cerman. Polish, and Bulgarian navies are continually adding newer smpj. and ships in the curreni invenlory arc beingh MoWMl electronic gear and improved armament. These ihree forces are deploymg coastal defense missile sites, and Poland and East Cermanv have recentl* acquired guided missile motor boats Tlse Pol.ih Navymall an arm. which includes aboutlder model fighters.
EAST EUROPEAN NAVAl. SHIPS lUkUtRI
Detucnert Deitroyei escorU Submarines Motor torpedo boats Guided missile FPHt Coaxal cscoru Fleetther minesweepert Amphibioui types
Security Forces
ast European countries maintain large militarised security forces^ frontier guards and internal securily troops Most of these forces have received basic military training They are armed with light infantry weapons, and in some cases have limited combat support element* In wartime ihese forces could partscipate in limited military operations or performed functions such as rear area security and traffic control
Si |
SfWET
IV. WARTIME CAPABILITIES Mobilizolion Potential
IT 'i't'i traditional European military couui iplum ivvtcm is in .il.il through-itiii Eastern Europe. Almost all fit maineriod ol active military service, nnd (licit remain in lite reserve" mtiilei ified age In time of war ltie East European counlries could drawanpower pool of several hundred thousand innt. all of whom have had recent military experience. ThereySstON of periodic rcficsher training llieve set up mobiliration systems which provide for trie augmeiilaliun of existing forces and the cieation of new units
Tlic major limiting (Actor on inohihiAlitm potential is the availability of equipment fnr newly created unils. Poland anil CrcehnvlovaVi* probably have sufficient stoxls of obsolescent equipment to equip come additional divisions. Tlte ntlicr countries have smallf dpnpnuiitvc. Almost all tlie uvwlv cieated units would Ih- poorly equipped by modern standards. We do not lielievc that in the event of mobiliration llie USSR could supply muchequipment to Eastern Europe forcreation of new units.
n the event of tnobi lira lion. East Germany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia could deployeekivisions, organized into as manyicLJ armies. Poland and CaechcsslovstVaa could bring up to full strength and prepare for combateeks an additionaldequately equipped divisions which ate now in existence. Because olir and sea lift only small elements ofpecialized Polish divisions could be committed in their piimary role. Withinoays after mobilization. East Cermany, Poland, and Chechoslovakia could probably put together another dozen poorly equipped infantry divisions out of their own resources In addition,ountries could suppoit military operations with moreombat aircraft.
n the event of hostilities, Bulgaria and Rumania could probably fieldeekivisions, which would be organizedield armies. These forces could be reinforced with anulgarian divisions and anumanian divisions within another week or two. Bulgaria and Rumania can currentlyampaignotalombat aircraft, mostly older ntodels. We do not believe lha! lhe Soviets consider the Hungarian armed forces sufficiently prepared or reliable lo take part in offensive operations.
V. FUTURE TRENDS
Military Capabilities
e believe lhal rnodetntration of lhe East European armed forces will continue at about the present rale. Allhough manpower levels of thc East European armed forces will probably remain aboul the same, the militaryof these forces will increaseonsequent* of the continuedof more modem equipment. hc tolal number of divisions avail-
SWET
able fo* immediate commitment will probablylighl increase, nndrcntcr propoiltun of tank divisions Additional airborne and amphibious units may be organized, and lift capabilities almost certainly will improve. We also believe that combal support will (outinue to improve and that the East European forces will receive villn.ni tactical missiles lo bring their inventories up toSos'iet slandaids.
he total number of aircraft in (be Warsaw Pact air forces will piobably dedute slightly. However, tlie rtpainbtivs of (he forces will increase as the share of new generation combat aircraft grows to about half of (he total0 Theomber, and then all-sveatlierinterceptor, will probably be introduced into tlie East European air forces during the period of this estimate. Naval forces in thc Baltic and Black Seas svill probably continue to improve svith the introduction of additional ships and improved armament and electronic gear.
Coherence of liso Pad
We believe lhat Ihe Warsasv Pact svill continue in esivU-nce for the period of this estimate. Soviet Interest In lhe alliance and Soviet pourr in the area will probably of themselves be sufficient lo secure its continuance. In addition, the colledive security provided by live Pact and the general community of interest among Communist regimes will continue lo be cohesive fadors in the alliance. Changes in lhe struduie of NATO probably would have some influence on thc Warsaw alliance Most important, any change which ledubstantialin the role of West Cermany svould strengthen thc special rctatronship among East Cermany. Poland. Czechoslovakia, and the USSH. Any form of nuclear sharing wiih West Cermany would impel ihe Soviets to respond, perhapsarsaw Pad atomic command; sve believe, hosseser, lhat they svould retain strict control over nuclear weapons.
The trend toward political divergence in Eastern Europe will piobably continue, and the Interplay of national interests will become increasinglyin Pact decisions. Tlie political and economic effects of continued espendilures to fulfill Pad commitments may lead to disputes over the real requirements of Pact foices and the proper size and character of individual contribulions. Humania will probably seek lo minimize its participation in the Pad, but we do not believe that it will attempt formally lo withdraw
We believe that thc Soviets will continue their efforts lo strengthen the Warsaw Pad. However, thc growing independence of Eastern Europe will make it difficult to obtain agreement on specific courses of action. For example, thc Soviets may seek to place some national units directly under the Padin peacetime, bypassing the national ministers ul delense. There are indications that Rumania, for one. svould strongly resistove. Another possibility which may nosv be under discussion is thai East European Pactrs station token units on one another's territory as evidence of closer ties. Wc believe, however, that tiaditional antagonisms would make some Padunwilling to participate in this type of reciprocal arrangement.
sestet
ANNEX
ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA
Albania
I Although i( is stillember of llw W'arsass Pact. Albania takes no pail in Pact Activities andact invitation to send Albanianto (he PoliticalCouncilithoutieconcili.ition betsveen Albania ami the USSR. Alb-mia probably svill not renew military relationships with the Warsaw Pact. In .vent of svar. the Albanians would nor necessarily follow Pact leadership, butbe guided by their view of then national interests.
Albania has received no Soviet equipment sinsc diplomatic telations were Severedince tliat time Communist China lia. piovtded small amounts o' ammunition, small arms, and electronic equipmentew motor torpedo boats. Consequently,0 ground force troops0 frontier and security troops are poorly equipped and have had title experience with modern materiel. Six infantry brigades are the basic lactical uniu of (he ground forces. While (hesc brigades are bclosv strength and poorly (rained, (hey could be brought up to strength from internal Albanian resources. Weapons andconsist principally of Soviet World War II types, although some postwar equipment was furnishedhe ground forces arc severely limited as to equipment and training; theyigh potential for gucirilla fighting, hosvever, and ate capable of svaging determined ressiancemall-unit basis from isolated mountain areas.
Tlie small air and naval forces arc also primarily defensive in character. Thc air force is organizedegiments,quadrons equipped with (heighter, whichimited all-weather capability. The navylass submarines, wliich seldom exercise at sea. and somether small coastal defense boats-Yugoslavia
Wliile Yugoslavia has been grosvjng increasingly close to (he Warsaw Pact countries during the last four years, the Yugoslav regime has been careful to avoid any military relationship which would lie llie country to the Waisaw Pact
oignnizaliun. Belgrade has inlignment wiih mililnry or poliiical blocs, anil has de-emphasl/cd lhc military aspect* of its policy.visits of militnry delegations and purchases ol Soviet equipment have been no more extensive than those engaged iu by many other "nonaligned" countries. Moreover, the Yugoslavs continue to express an interest inmilitary items from the West. Itcports of more detailed military cooperation and combined planning cannot In supported It is unlikely thai Yugoslavia's policies toward tbc Warsaw Pact will change in Ihu near future.
The Yugoslav military establishment is roughly equal in personnel strength to that of Czechoslovakia or Poland' Thermored divisions.ndejieiKlcnt brigades,irborne, and other supportdeployed throughout the countryanner calculated to support either general defense of the country or possible guerrilla warfare. These units, some of which are maintained at onlyercent of full strength, could be brought up to stiengthew days. The field units are controlled byubdistrict headquarters andrmy district head-quartert These territorial commands exercise boih administrative andfunctions. Individual and small-unit training is especially intensive, and guerrilla training continues to bo emphasized
The Yugoslav ground forces are equippedariety of Soviet. US. and other conventional equipment. Thc US has not made any significant deliveriesnd theanks, self-propelled artillery, and antiaircraft guns received1 are probably noi sufficient toingle division. Yugoslav production of ammunition and small arms is large enough to permit export. Hosvevcr. production of artillery upmis not likely lo Increase sufficiently lo solve current deficiencies in quantity and standardization. Yugoslav doctrine calls for (he use of chemical sveapons in support of Small guerrilla operations. bu( the ground forces have yet to develop any significant CW offensive or defensive capability.
The Yugoslav Navyubnjarines, andmaller craft is well adapted to its primary mission of coastal patrol. Although the level of training of0 personnel is adequate, current naval forces are insufficient for effective defense of the entireradual strengthening of the navy is eipected, csoecially through addition of mine, warfare and smaller ASW ships with tbe helpiowing (hip building industry.
8 The US aircrafl delivered up to ISS7 have given (he Yugoslavs relatively superior tactical air support for (heir ground forces,omewhat lessair defense. In the laj( lew years (he ground support capability has been reduced by thc fact that a(uarter of lhe total jet inventory oflanes has not been operational because of the lack of spare parts. During this time the USSR has sold Yugoslavia aboutishbed Cs but has furnished no all-weather intercepter aircraft. Tlie USSR has also sold the Yugoslavs
SEJTET
associated ladar cfluipiueiit toperational
sires in (lie vicinity ofthers arc scltcdiilcde constructed.
tt. Yugoslavia's military forces vould defend well agaius( attack and could conduct efleclive guerrilla operations. Yugoslavia has no significant offensive capabilities except against Albania, but could organize and suppoit guerrilla operations in neighboring countries.
n the eventeneral war, Yugoslavia would try to remain neutral, coops-rating with the USSR only if the war should progress favorably for the Soviet Bloc. Tlie overriding.consideration would be to maintain the regime in power,
Yugoslavia
230
ARMKD FORCES OP ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA
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ites
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Destroyers and DrsXOver Escorts Motor Torpedo Boats MlMtv.ecpcn
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