5
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
2
Soviet Politics After Khrushch
OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN fm
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DIRECTOR Of CENTRA, INTEWGeNCE
UNITED STATES INTEUIGENCE BOARD Ai IncludedUIY5
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet Politics After Khrushcri
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
HE NEW LEADERSHIP .
A. Tlie Removal of Khrushchev 3
he Character and Style of His Successor* 3
Probkm of Power. 4
II. PROBLEMS OF
A. Thc Central Problem:
H. Other Domestic
ew Departure in Foreign
0
II
Role of the Party and Non-Party Croups
State Apparatus
The Military
The People
III. PROSPECTS
A The leadership
H Policy Qiicslioiw
SOVIET POLITICS AFTER KHRUSHCHEV
THE PROBLEM
To review events on the Soviet domestic political scene since the removal of Khrushchev, to discuss the stability of the presentleadership, and to estimate trends in internal politics over the nexl year or so.
CONCLUSIONS
men who forced oul Khrushchevmoothof authority, hut they arc almost certainly engaged inpower and inumber of critical political andLike Khrushchev, they must make decisions in the facearid opposition. (Paras,)
notably, they must deal with the continuing andproblem of how best to allocate the nation's economicTheir recent Khrushchev-like emphasis on agriculture,has probably antagonized advocates of increasedheavy industry and defense, and, in fact, there have recentlyof growing pressures on the regime to ease restraints onspending. The leaders themselves probably hold differingthis and other problems. In addition they must take inlothc attitudes and strengths of increasingly importantsuch as the military, thc state apparatus and even the )
C. The new regimes most pronounced innovations have been in the field of foreign policy. Khrushchev's successors, seeking new ways to cope with the Chinese challenge to Moscow's authority, have altered their priorities. They began to do so very shortly afterpower and well before present US policies in Vietnam went into
effect. Tlie new leaders did nut sci oul deliberately lo reverse tlie course of East-West relations which had developed alter the Cuban mi-.Mii- crisis. Rather, they gave first priority to efforts to repair the USSR's posilion in its own camp and in the underdeveloped world, consciously acceptingeterioration of relations with the US.
D. Issues such as these, together with thc tendency toward political infighting inherent in the Soviet system, will subject the collegiality of the leadership to recurrent strains. Though collective leadership could endure for some time, we believe that there willtrong tendency toward one-man rule. The matter may comeead at the next party congress (apparently scheduled forr even sooner. )
SE#ET
SfwET
DISCUSSION
I. THE NEW LEADERSHIP
A. Iho Removal of Khrushchev
I. Though individual politicalarge rule
mi lo removethere wim little reason tu doubt that iimivI fil Imad bmismv genuinely disenchant til mth Khnishchev'* Mylo nfp and atwonK- ofiwdicic*- eries of
.Cuban missile iritishe marly disastrous wheat harvestltei" derating eiosiun of Sovieti- Communist movement-is Irustintiou and his propensity lo net in nn arbitrary und capricious manner. Indeed. In the fall4 Ik* wo* pursuing policies toward China which may Imvi' seemed gravely ill-advised to many of bis colleagues. Al the same time, he was apparently moving toward yet another shakeup of economic ndmfand isriorities. At thisroad agreement apparently crystallized that Khrushchev .ould neither cope cHevtively with problems of itato nor be
relied upon to heed the advke of others To hisonduct and i' mutt havr wggested growing difficulties for tbe USSH ami danger to
wasowerful consensus to this eflect among thethe paity Presidium ami probably the Secretariat as well. Their plainsecret and were carried out without apparent difficulty. It Is likelysuch agreement and careful plotting, few of Khrushchev's poteniialon tbe Central Committee had any real opportunity to oppose llierole of the military was piobably negligible, thc concurrence of somewas probably secured in advance, and, in view of chronicthe military leaders to Khrushchev's defense policies, the plotterssome assurance that he would Iiave little military backing. Thekey elements ol the secret police was almosi certainly secured ingeneral, the discontent felt by tbe ruling Presidium was by no meansway or another, Khnishchev had managed to disaftect most of tbcgroupings which dominate Soviel society.
B. Tho Character and Style of Hii Successors
men who have succeeded Khnishchev do notewSoviet leadership. With tbe exception of Kosygin and Mikoyan (whosearcll owe their careers to their ability toagility within the party apparatus with some specialised talents inor one or another economic speciality. Among tbe mostof tlse collective, Brezhnev. Kosygin. Mikoyan. Podgomy. andall overnd all had achieved high party status at ihc time ol(except Podgomy, who did noi achieve comparable rank. The
vuuitg men un Ihu Presidium. Shelipm. I'olyiiu.ky. .ind Demichcv. all dill in llirir Inrtlrs. appear in he mt tln-ir way inowor, hut had Itccn selected hy Khrushchev (or impuitaul Job* long Mute Iii> departure.
new loaders hip appcni>nti.illv agivrd that iho governmentlunger he conducted tn (lie "nihilmry" and "subjective" iiulnner whichcrhiroeteristte of Khrushchev'* luluite collective isto give the impressioncientific approach In alllielone ha* lieen set liy Brezhnev nnd Kosygin iuwhichoncentration on llie solulmn of practical problems and bynfare-brained schemes"iiikIuu dcutinm" of Khnishehev.
C. Tho Problem of Power
tramlcr offrom KIiiiivIkIicvptars Ioaccomplished in an orderly way Thr peopleUsle greeted theapparent indirference and tlie partv with alsurface calm andof change. Neverlliekm. llie( Khrushchev lias almosta new mood of uncertainty, mooting bold hope* and fears among|>arly ami stale functioimriev The falleader iv almostby political maneuvering as Ihc contending politicians seek Ioimprove Iheirnd lhe variuu* interval groupings in Sovietthc opportunity to increase Iheir influence on llie lop leaders.ajor ellori In hide unit activitiesublic mavk of unity, nsuccession in Ihe USSR is essentially fluid.
fl. The large number of top level personnelof themhave taken place sinceOctober afao suggest the existence of considerable maneuvering within tlse Soviet leadership. Thc most notable shift has been lhe emergenceircle of lop decision-makers who hold membership in both the party Presidiirm and Secretariat Brezhnev, Suslov. and Podgorny. who served on these bodies under Kluushcliev, haw now been joined by She-lepin. Demtchev. and Ustinov (the last two as (andidale members of the Pre-isdinmf. Tbe resulting coterie, with rtv combmatloii ol policy, patronage, and operational responsibilities, may now comprise an inner cabinet within the Presidium.
hile Brezhnev may merely be beiH-nling a* Vtni Sccrelary from theemolumenls of his position, he has emerged in recenl months as anactive "first amonglllioiigh there were signs last fall thai Podgomy had ensconced himself as lhc second ranking Party Secretary, there have been no indications since Ihcn thai he hav attained this status. During Hie same period. Sliolopin's areas of responsibility have been greatly Increased.
H. On lhe government side. Kosygin. an austere and capable administrator. Is charged with thc delicate task ol establishing an economic resurgence without resorting to measures too unsettling lo the entrenched powerember of thc party Presidium, has had no chance to build up
El
a following in thc apparatus, -md tin-move to be a
On" otUi ItirxT.vi-1( allows, IWm to stand back from areas of contention and maneuver
'J. Intiwiy khiIiimivi<ion of labor among llie leaders may have been worked not on thc hauv nl interests, fields of competence, and iiMiiully assignedmccniing major questions, the Presidiummeets regularly and discuvws the ivwie at hand; decisions are proliably made Iry consensusmasoniy vote. Ilnl llicuhnev, as party head, has tlse best op|Sortimity to maneuver in advance of such meetings.
II. PROBLEMS Of POLICY
hatever may be the ioIc of pcisonnl ainbition in lhe contention for power, issues of national policy exerl it considerable force of their own. ease, individual contenders must formulaic programs ofn with which fo attract supporters. esult. Ihe stniggle tends lo revolve around specific issues of policy.
IL Even at the height of hit |wwer. Khrushchev was faced with oppositWariety of sources. There were those in the party apparatus who feared the effects of hit doctrinal innovations and structural reforms, especially on llseir own positions. Some must have been disturbed by Khrushchev's approach to foreign and blocarticular by Im coexistence line toward thc US and by his increasingly pmuna) vindictive approach to the Chinese Com immut problem. Khmshchev's efforts lo revise the traditional pattern of resource allocation ehcrted the opposition of conservative elements in the party, the military, and the state apparatus On tlie other hand, there were some who were corrsiimer-oricnled and more Inclined toward innovation than even Khrushchev.
wasroup which generally favored Khrushchev'snot his style. It is this group which is slill setting thc dominanton tbe homefroiit. It still faces tho same problems Khnishchev facedslill subject to similar differences ol opinion and contradictory pressures.
A. The Central Problem; Economics
underlying domestic question facing the soviet leadership isto allocate the nations economic resources. As the rate of growth ofeconomy has slowed down, and as the Soviet military and space effortincreasing demands on the country's high-quality resources, thisproblem and controversies over ils resolution have mtensified.with the economic problems of lire USSR, and the politicalcreated throughout hb tenure in office Favoring in veil merit inthe expense of heavy industry, and attempting to restrain the demandsmilitary establishment, he was frequently balked both by dirumstancehis opponents. In tlie end, his failure lo solve the allegations problemmaterially to live decision to remove him.
Il It woukl not have brffM surprising if Krsmslscliov's vwtTtwn had sought IDBBMh raiinritie*ore conservative track; among the men who
". (O remove KhriiJutlCV WCICfavored Ir.nliti'nn
heavy industry and lhe aimed force* TV' new leadership did give mine carls hints (hat it would restore some of ihc priorities to defense and industrial dc-wlnpincut. hill sulncipM.-utly II also declared itself in favorati- ol investment in lighl industry and agricuituie. Iiulei-d, (he new program of agikulhiie investment announced hy Brezhnev in Maivh it al least at iiinhilious us any proposed hy Khnishehev.
Thc leglimr is apparently making an earnest ellort to expand Ihelyegitn undue Khrushchev, of incentive systems and structural innovations iu industry, including allowances for the role nf profits. Though the new leaders recognize lhe need for popular suppoil, particularly during the period of the succession, mid hence haw pledged increased consumer benefits, they liave not indulged in lhe grandiose promise* so characteristic of their predecessor.
Of late, however, debate over the defense issue has intnisified. andspoksmen are once more, in effect, advocating that restraints on military spending be eased. The weight ol iheir argument has almost cerUmly been strengthened by ibe Vietnamese crisis, though not all political leaden seem lo agree on this bane. Podgorny. speaking in lale May.did(ust before histhe consumer need no longer suffer, as he once did. because of thc demands of defense and bravy industry, ln contrast, only two weeks later. Suslov look the opposite tact:ilitant speech which called for maintaining defense at the "highest lewl" and which acknowledged
Ihc necessai)hun ihi- people
B. Olhor Domestic Issues
umber of olher specific domestic issues are probably now agitating the leadership. The failure of the regime toeplacement for Khrushchev at the chairman of the CPSU Bureau for RSFSR (Russian Republic) affairs probably reflects contention at thc top and the reluctance of liteto give any one man more than one of Khrmhclicvs positions in lhe party and state machinery Tlie recent gradual change in lhe treatment of Stalin may also reflect some controversy at high levels; Khrushchev's vlrulencr on the subject was In part simply an effort to improve his own image and to tarnish those of his opponents. Thc question of Stalin remains one of the most sensitive of all issues, and the Soviet press has already shown signs of the leaderships ambivalent approach to it
IS. The treatment of Khmslichev alsoroblem for (he new leadership. If his successors intended totrong campaign against him. and there were some signs of this, the adverse leaction of the Communist parties in East and West Europe may have given them pause. Moreover, it seems likely
that some within llii' present leadership would i
licii iilil mentor (Mi. i- |MilHtil.iilt Ihose who would like to reverieoi .utotlxT oljy. however, attempt Iu lurthcr Nl.i< Ii ii In- lepul.itum. Thc whole issue could comeead Ht (Ih* next Party Congress, us, indeed, the question of Stalin did
IS. The question ol how hoi to reorganize lhe state admin titration of the economy icutains underublic call for lhe abolition of lite legional economic councils appeared iu Ptaula lnvl December, but this was quickly rebuttedvpciikci nl thcacwion uf lln- Supreme Soviel. Several subsequent.ind statements by Kosygin ami otlieis have hinted at uncertainty and controversy over thb issue.
lhc regimes aditude toward the intellectuals probably remainsIssue, Though in the first few months after Khrushchev's fall (heresigns of high-level uncertainly and debate over this question, theseems now to Itave settledelatively permissive approach. Theof relaxation svill nlmost certainly remain active, however, and willreceive some ammunition fnr their cause by the provocative activitiesprotesting intellectuals themselves.
ew Departure in Foreign Affairs
new regimes most pronouncedave been in the fieldpolicy. Khrushchev's successors, seeking new ways to cope withchallenge lo Moscow's authority, have altered their priorities.to do so wry shortly after gaining power and well before presentiu Vietnam went into rffccl. Tlie new leaders did not set outto reverse lhe course of East-West relations which had developedCuban missile crisis, ft.itlier. (hey gave first priority lo efforts to repairposition in its own camp and in thc iuhUideveiopedetrriotation of reUtions with lhe US.conduct continues tooncern lo avoid high risksesire
emain in contact svith Washington, tho ni*vv leadership has narrowed the limits of Moscosv's freedom ofll areas of East-West relations.*
he altered tactics toward Peiping haw In some respects put thc Chinese on tlie defensive but liave neither silenced Iheir polemics nor halted lhe erosion of Soviet authority in (he Communist movement. Thc involvement in Vietnam has exposed the USSIt to greater risksituation over which its control is indirect and very limited. And (he adoptionarsher stance in world attain raises questions about (he continued restrain Is on miliiary expenditures ll would not be surprising if,esult of all this, some leaders may now be questioning (be wisdom of the new line.
* St*Suviel Altitudes Towircl theatedECRET.
i
he Role of ihe Port/ ond Non-Parly Groups
Khrushchev cumtanlly professed his belief that (lie party must maintain supreme power in the USSR. To tliat end, he restored Hie party apparatus to the dominant pavilion it had once held and sought lo enhance ils authority by re-staffing thc administration of non-party groiqn with reliable party workers. At thc same time, however, he undermined the party's authority by assigning to it tasks which il did not wish to accept. Tlie apparatus was neither qualified nor eager to assume the kind ot day-to-day responsibility for running the economy which Khnishchev sought to impose on it with his division of party organs into separate industrial and agricultural unils. Furtlier. he sapped the party's morale with reorganizations, diatribes, and controversial doctrinalwhile diluting the prestige of party membershipassive reftitiimciii program. He also underplayed what had long been considered paramount, thc parly's function as the engine of ideological inspiration.
While Khrushchev was thus damaging thc party, events themselvesto furtlier the process. It was difficult to maintain thc revolutionary and, later, wartime elan of the partyime of peace both at home and abroad. It was also difficult toonsistent lineime when stereotypes of the imperialists and lhe Chinese allies were being altered, with some of thc former becoming "sober" men and the latter becoming arch villains. But, most important, tlie Increasing complexity of Ihe Soviet economy and Soviet societyhole rendered the party ill-equipped to lead. Others on the domestic scene, from nuclear physicists lo literary figures, began to makeindependent contributions to Soviet life. Khrushchev's efforts to educate the party, to staff it with technical experts, were hutefforts to deal with tbis tiend.
All this docs not mean, of course, that thc party's power is in jeopardy; clearly, the party apparatus remains the primary instrument of rule. Moreover, all Soviet institutions are subject at least indirectly to party control and most of the elite in all fields of endeavor are members of the party, even if they do not give their first allegiance to it. Nevertheless, thc evolutionoviel society no longer constrained by terror from the top hasoncomitant weakening of thc party's ability to enforce its will on that society. Its leaders remain firmly authoritarian but must now consider the TOnscqucnces of thelr actsuch broader political environment and an increasingly complex society,
If the leadership decides, for example, to crack down on wayward literary trends, it must remember past failure and be prepared to weather protest, foreign as well as domestic, and toecline in the quality of literary work. The writers hove long since ceased to be completely cowed byfrom above. Similarly, if it isind toop political leader, it must concern itself with the reactions of others, most especially the military. And if the leadershipew policy for industry. It must be prepared to cope with the possible resistance of the plant managers affected and the probable
Si
reluct at icr of tin* economic ailmimvl tutors .tssigncd lo canyhmigc. 'flic longer instability in lhc lendcrship persists, tlic gmilvr llie piobablc role to he played by interested "outsiders."
Stale Apparat ui
he guvefitiiM-nl and economic apparatus though no longer quite the distinctas in Malcnkov'sonetheless icmaius an'-iiii-ti' in Soviet political life. Ils importance could increase if eventsit* members to assert thcli common interests, many of which diverge from those of the professional putty upiiamtuv. Indeed, the state apparatus may have already grown in stgnifkimcc with llie assumption nf lhe piemiership by Kosygin. whose entire career has been iu tin* government service. Kosygin give* every evidence of an intention tn perform hi* fob with vigor, seems willing to subordinate doctrine to practical necessity, and would probably resist parts interference in government. These tendencies could lead to the emergenceompetitive force in llie administration of domestic affairs and, at the same time, win for Kosygin tlie royalty of lhc slate bureaucracy.
Ihe Miliary
Tlie militaiy form an even more important grouping We do not believe that lhe high command wishes lo eaercne lhe powers of an independent political lorce. But it alight seek much greater political powers if it came to feel that military interests were in danger; the scope of tliese interests becomes larger with the increasing complexity of military requirements. Despite someon questions of military policy and strategy and despite certain per-"jii.il rivalries, the military leaders do In factroup which controls powerful asscd of its own. In general, tlie military hasorce tor conservatism.
hc rclatiouiliip between tlse Soviet military and political leadership does not appear to have dunged significantlyesult of Khrushchev's removal. Tht- principal topics of argument under Khrushchev are still insize and function of tlic ground fotces, the share ol (he military in national resources, and. in general, the role of the military iu nationalThe failure of the regime either to deny or to reaffirm Khrushchev's stated intention to cut troop strength inace of obvious miliiary opposition is perhaps thc clearest ease in point. But other instances of military opposition or concern have from time lo lime appeared in the press since the first of the year. The question of force roles, relevant to budgetary allocations,ebate. Thus, in February. Jxoesfiytr published an article with thetitle. The Queen of Battle Has Yielded Hern April. Pravdarebutted Izoctliija with an article arguing that thc ground forces remain the queen of battle.
.TO. As to the proper role ol tlie militiiry in the (oi initiation of defense poliey, lhe military point of view was picscnted again in February by thc new Chief of Staff. Marshal Zakharov, who implied that the elaboration of military policy belonged by rights to thc* professionals concerned. On Ihc question of the mililary's proper share of economicilitary theorist advocated thc line in March that, because of the danger of surprise attack, the Outcomeuture war would be decided by the foices and means available at its outset, lie implicitly cautioned against false economics which might deprive Ihe nation of the wherewithal to combat the enemy. Other spokesmen, presumably defending thc regimes position, have, challenged this view, arguing that thc interests of military preparedness demand the balanced development of the economyhole.
involvement in Vietnam has doubtless contributedecentin thc assertiveness and self-assurance of miliiary spokesmen, Anthis trendorceful article intarune arguing thatfor manpower had not only noi diminished with the adventweapons but had increased. Addressing thc sensitive question ofallocation of manpower resources between military and civilianthe article also asserted that all measures necessary to assure thethe country, including die maintenance of adequate production levelsand equipment, must be carried out in peacetime, prior to thchostilities.
Tbe People
ajor changes in Soviel society haveubstantial effect on popular moods and expectations; lhe people are noompletely docile mass. Thc most striking expressions of discontent have, of course, come from the growing and increasingly sophisticated intelligentsia. Chafing under thc controls of the party, protesting intellectuals have found for themselves aaudience among students, scientists, and other segments of literateEven among tlie people at large, svherc discontent lias mainly economic roots, the intellectuals can probablyairly sympathetic environment for some of their ideas; the de-StaliniTation campaign, and now the criticism of Khrushchev, have accelerated the erosion of popular faith in the party.
The impact of popular and intellectual discontent on the leadership and its policies is ordinarily indirect. Wc believe, nevertheless, that Soviet leaders since Stalin haveeed to take the public temper into greater account. Some policies may be repressive, but othersore positive approach. Thus thc leadership speaks more and more of lhe necessity to provide the people with material incentives, and even Ihe intellectuals are permitted to exercise some individual initiative in the arts. Like Khrushchev, his successors show signs of realizing that thc old ways of ensuring the fidelity and productivity of the people will no longer suffice for the modem Soviet stale.
III. PROSPECTS A. The leadership
Tin- uneasy tsillcgialityire Soviel leadership will be subject lo(trains llw very nature of the Soviet system eiicartirages political in-fighting. andf the men who were trained in that system, and who now direct il. (aster, distrust It is likely thai tlie unity imposed by theto remove Khrushchev wall weaken further and the ambitions of the various contcmlcTs for power willajor shakcup in lhe leadership need noi lead to comparable revisMnb of policy, but such an even! wouldinimum open up the possibility.
While wc think that the Soviet syslem still tends strongly toward one-manorm of collective leadership could endure for some time. Thc fact that Khrushchev could be removed front his party and state offices without violence, despite his presumed Isold un all thc levers of control and lite years in which he liad an opportunity to dispense patronage,onsiderable diffusion of power al thelevels since the death of Stalin. In any event. Ihe success
of tbc plot shosvs lhal the top leader is after all vulnerable. Tins demonstration may discourage aspirants, and it may abo encourage the new leaders lo unite
against auy of tlveii number svlro seems to be trying lo arrogate the group's
power to himself
leadership problem is sharpened by the approach of the nestnosv apparently scheduled fort is likely thai boihfactional snuggles will increasingly be conducted with lhal event inor more of thc top men may then be removed and his power assumedsurvivor. Older members ol lhe leadership, Mikoyan and Suslov, forbe retired to make way for such young and ambitious men as SbelepinThe member of one faction or another might be promoted inadd growing support for his mentor. Or one of thcobtical defeat and be removedival or combinationassembled essentially for that purpose. But, whether mailers come tobefore, dming, or after, the congress, we believe lhat lhe tendencyassumption of predominant power by one man is almost certain to continue
B. Policy Questions
most pressing Issues confronting the new regime are noteasy resolution. While lhe new leadership gives promise ofmore sysfemallcsilly than Khnishehev. economic problems will beif at all, and tlien only at the expense of one or another interest.political problems in general have not been eased, and the removallias created yetbest to treat his reign. Oneof ail this is simply that unresolved problems create opportunities forreaders to come forward with promises of new solutions and achange in the party line.
Foreign policy problems" alio plague the leadership, lend lo disputes, awl affeclourse of domestic policy. In lirne, as the varinii' foreign atidimplications of the prevent more militant course of Soviet foreign policy become clearer, skepticism could harden into opposition.
Various forces of change arc already at work withm Ihe Soviet party and among tlie people. Support can readily lie foundiosl of diverging policies Croups within the party, the military, and perhaps tlie stale apparatus as well, would no doti Isf relish for personal and policyeturn to tla1 simpler standards of the Stalin era This, in iIkmeed noteturn to wholesale terror, Iml wotdd result iu tougher pohciesat liorru and abroad Tlic [iriority lucoidcd heavy indnvtiy undei Slalm, for example, would be at least partly restored. On the otlier hand, lhc advocatesore liberal line would oppose any such trend and would seel lo impose iheir views on the leadership. In lhe meantime, lhe preseni collective apjiarently wishes to steer between lhc Iwo extremes, though its haishei foreign policy shows signs of limiting its freedom of maneuver on the home hunt.
the leadershipevere reverse abroad or an economichome, factionalism would be likely to grow. This, iu turn,hange in leadership and far-reaching changes in policy.Khruilicbcvhen factionalism was intense, saw fit to makebreak with lhe past and lo denounce Stalin and bis works, largely inlo discredit his opponents and lo mcrease his own power.
the Soviet system and its doctrine tend lo imposethose seeking major cliangc. The institution of the parly itself operates asforce on the Soviel political scene. Even if the party's powersreduced by events or by deliberate policy. Its overall control willnoi be Jcopardi/ed in lhe near term, llie temptation of one orcontender to gain supreme power on the basisadicalliberal orbe tempered by this factor and by aamong the leaders that rapid change endangers their own positions andregime itself.
urther, whether the present collective endures for some time or is soon replaced, domestic Soviel policies are likely to continue to exhibit certain of tlse characteristics which have been in evidence to one degree or another for the past decade or so. Tlie regimes attitude toward Ihc intellectuals, for example, will probably proceed in cycles, ranging from the relative perrrusjiveness now in evidence lo periodic crackdowns necessitated by especially strident outbursts of "hostile- activity. Similarly, tlie regime's general attitude toward the people, its approach to such mailers as material incentives vs. ideological exhortations, is likely to fluctuate. The overlapping of party and stale functions will continue tootential source of friction. Tlie dialogue between military and political leaders will probably be carried on more or less along presentconomic problems will vary in intensity but will almost cerlainly remain pressing;over tho allocation of resources wil] continue.
Over tlie long ienn, the largerork in Soviet society will eliect inaior changes on the Soviet scene- Tlie importance ol non] surly groups is likely to giuw. nut because tin* regime favors thu but liccaiisc an iiicreasingly complex society requires it. The dispute svith the Chinese Communists, and the erosion of tire USSR'she world Communist rnovemeiit. maycyclically but are unlikely to term mate The declining import ofMarxist-Leninist doctrine, both at home and abroad, is also unlikely to be reversed. Tliough tin: policies of the leadership inay liasten or retard this evolutionary process, they cannot reverse it.
SfafRET
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