THE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITY vcr POLITICAL SUBVERSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
f Political Subversion
Certain basic principles long stressed by theCommunists bear importantly on their efforts atsubversion. Of primary importance is the integration of both military and political forces into an interlocking whole in the conduct of subversion. As their documents put it, the insurgencythree-sidedomprising "armed struggle, political struggle, and military Each participant is expected to "fight bothand militarily."
The Communists also believe it is necessary to develop and coordinate the insurgency concurrently in the cities and in the rural areas. In general, they seek to secure the rural areas around the cities, towns and strategichamlet by hamletaunch pointinal effort in the cities. The Communists hopealance of forces will be achieved between government and insurgent military strength which will guarantee the success of the "general uprising" of both the urban and rural populace which the Communists expect will eventually occur. Within the cities, meanwhile, the Communists seek to undermine government strength and purpose, to gain control over the "masses" through subversion and terrorism, and to build in the cities the political and military forces which willthe "general uprising" and lead to collapse of the
*
Apparatus For Subversion
The apparatus which the Vietnamese Communists are using for political subversion in South Vietnam comprises several major elements: (a) the Communist Party; that is, the southern segment of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party, which for tactical purposesictional separate identity as the People's Revolutionary Party of South (b) the party's youth auxiliary, the People'sYouth Group; and (c) the National Front for theof South Vietnam and its associated web of regional.
functional, and social "Liberationllcontrolled by party cadres.
There is also an underground of covert agents andutilized by the party to gather information, to help in political agitation, and to procure supplies. Over the years the party has developed extensive and elaborate communications (courier andntelligence nets, and internal security and propaganda systems. These serve to reinforce the cohesion, direction, and unity of effort of the movement throughout South Vietnam, in its political as well as in its military actions.*
A- Party Organization and Role
"The Communist Party provides the organizational core for the subversive apparatus.** pecial department of the
"The Communist subversive apparatus has been built around several thousand members of Ho Chi Minn's Viet Minh who stayed behind in the South after the division of Vietnam4 to workommunist take-over and reunification. They have been reinforced over the years from amongembers of the Viet Minh movement who went north Many of these have returned to the South as needed in political as well as military roles. Many of the original members of this group have spent nearly all their adult years involved in or committed in one way or another to theirhich began in the fight to oust the French.
Their strength in part flows from their dedication,tight organization, discipline, andof purpose.
he Communists in South Vietnam made no effort to portray themselves as distinct from Ho Chi Minh'a Lao Dong Party. However, to give theucleus which would be moro southern in identity and orientation, Hanoi directed in1 that the southern Communists assume the mantle of an ostensibly independentPeople's Revolutionary Party. This party was proclaimed openly innd described by implication as the spiritual heir of the Indochinese Communist Party and the "vanguard" for the Liberation Front.
party in Hanoi concerns itself with the problems of the struggle in the South and with the southern partyt acts by and large through the party's Central office for South Vietnam (COSVN) locatedase area (zona C) in Tay Ninh Province. COSVN functions in many respects as afor the People's Revolutionary Party, controlling through covert party channels the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) and acting through party channels as the high command of the Viet Cong forcesLiberation Army.** (See Figure III-l)
COSVN sends directives downraditional pyramidal partyseries of regional,and lower-echelon party committees,icrocosm of the COSVN organization. The party committees of the provinces (not always identical with government provinces) appear to be the lowest echelon permitted any significant latitude in adjusting policy to local conditions.
*One overt indication of Hanoi's directing role in the insurgency is the fact that the head of thisajorice chief of staff in the North Vietnamese Army. He also heads the government's department in charge of "reunification" affairs.
is elaborately organized on the traditionalpattern. mall Current Affairscommittee of the principaldirection of all political and military actions and organs. Subsections and departments under COSVN execute policies andentral bureaucracy. In directing the Viet Cong military forces, COSVN functionsilitary affairs Committee, though some major Communist unit headquarters also have direct contacts with Hanoi. The relationship between COSVN political and military channels and between COSVN and Hanoi is not entirely clear. Allhowever, pointsarmonious command system which appears to give the Communists adequate capability and flexibility for action in South Vietnam.
The village party committees, and the village or hamlet party chapters and cells they control, provide thegrass roots. The local party chapters and theirthree-man cells provide the party members who lead the local guerrilla units, control the local Liberation
I
m i*
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Front associations, and recruit for the party, the Front or the guerrilla unit.*
If the party hasocal village orgovernmentillage "Liberation Committee"dministrative Committee" orhe partyadherence to its directives by planting its members in key positions or by ensuring that the local partymonitors village activities. In government-controlled areas and in the cities, it is the party member operating covertly who recruits and agitates and who enlists or buys agents or sympathizers.
In practice, this system has served the Communists well, giving them adequate control and flexibility. It has doubtless been strained, but certainly not critically, by the increasing demands put upon the party cadreesult of the faster pace of the war. These strains, however, are probably already severe enough to inhibit somewhat thecapability for expanding and consolidating control over insurgent assets in the rural area.
Within the Viet Cong armedandmembers occupy most if not all key command and staff posts. Political officers are assigned to every unit. Party chapters and cells within the units seek to develop and maintain political consciousness andwithin the ranks. Documents indicate that partygenerally make up about one third the strength ofunits.** Party strength in the ranks of the irregular units appears to be considerably less than in the regular units.
'Acting as much as possible through the Front party cadre disseminate propaganda, round up local labor for Viet Cong military units operating in the area, and collect taxes andmonitor or control those who do. If the village or hamlet is under firm Viet Cong control, this may be done more or less overtly in the name of the party. If it is not, there may beew party members who must attempt all thisovert basis.
document, describing the activities of the party chaptersilitary unit formed in5 to handle the processing and training of recruits en route
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Parallel to the party at all echelons, servingeservoir of new members, is the party's youth auxiliary, the People's Revolutionary Youth Group, nominally made up of young men and women In practice, particularly where the number of local party members is small. Youth Group members perform many of the functions of regular party members.
B. Party Numerical Strength
It is possible to makeough estimate of current party numerical strength in South Vietnam since the evidence on the subject, mainly in the form of capturedmembership lists, is extremely fragmentary. No data of significance, for example, are available for the Mekong delta,ommunist stronghold, where party membership presumably would be high. The problem is furtherby the covert nature of party membership, even in - some Vietontrolled areas, and by the party'sis attested in captured documents--to develop its organization and strength uniformly in all areas.
irm figure for party membership in the South at the end1 is available to usease for current estimates. It comesommunist document produced early3 which stated that the party0 members in the South at the end Thismembers in the Viet Cong armed forces. Since this document contained much other accurate information, it is probable that the membership figure is reliable.
Taking this figureoundation, we estimate on the basis of evidence contained in captured documents and
from the delta areas to central Vietnam, provides anof the party make-upnit at the main force level. Outtrengthere party menbers inarty chapters: ere Youth Group members. Ofen in seven of thearty chapters, three were members who had stayed behind1 had been admitted subsequently in the South,ere returnees from North Vietnam. No ethnic northerners were indicated, but this would not be unusualnit functioning in the southern part of South Vietnam. The proportion of party and Youth Group members is higher than thatumber of other units where figures are available; the higher the main force echelon, however, the greater the party membership.
. III-5
prisoner interrogation reports that party membership in the South had approximately doubled bynd that it stood at The documents and prisonersuggest that0 of the party members operated primarily as members of the insurgent armed forces, the bulk of them in the regular main forcehe remainder,eem to have been mainlywith political action, including subversive
footnoten Page III-4. Although party members may make up as muchhird of main force strength, their numbers appear from the documents to decline drastically in the irregular units. eneral rule, the lower thethe fewer the party members. 5 document captured inn Province, for example, indicated that theof party members in the "village guerrillas" in one district. The percentage among the On the basis of such information, we believe that party strength in the irregular forces averages less than one party member for every ten guerrillas.
Inain force strength was estimated If one third of these were party members, they would number The balance ofarty members in the military, we believe, were in the irregular units. The total number of party members in the armed forces could be raised somewhat if, in fact, USof irregular strength of the Communist forces are too low. If irregular strength were, for example,, it would probably mean that there are an0 party members in the South.
**As examples of the material from which this figure was developed, several documents which provide some fairlydata on party strengths as ofn Hoai Nhon District of Binh Dinh Province, and in Cu Chi District of Hau Nghia Province may be cited. Both districts can beas Communist strongholds, the latter of many years standing. The documents indicate that therearty members in Hoai Nhon inorking at the village or hamlet level. This was approximately one third of one percent of the population estimated by MACV at that time to be under VC control in the District. In Cu Chi District, there wereartyof the same category as in Hoai Nhon in This
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Captured documents indicate that even before the effects of the DS military buildup were felt, party leaders were not sacisfied with the party's numerical strength. Sincehey have put heavy pressure on lowerto recruit new members in all areas.* If the quotas reflected in many captured documents were applied on abasis, they could theoreticallyartygoal oft the endxclusive of party members in Viet Cong regular military units.
was approximately one percent of the population estimated at the time.to be under VC control in Cu Chi. If these two cases are averagedigure of about seven-tenths of one percent is obtained. This fits in fairly well with the average of the other samples of party membership available. Seven tenths of one percent of the population believed under VC control inould be0 party members. To this must be added the party members working throughout the country at echelons above the village level, including district, province, and COSVN cadre. Thesuggest that there are0 such cadre (This is the approximate figure also used byt would thus appear that there were0 party members working mainly at political tasks in the South in
updated document5 specified the quotas to be met during the yearoastal district in Binh Dinh It called for one membereople inareas, onen "disputed" areas, and onen government areas. The recruiting of women was to be stressed, to provideoercent of the total. this document reflected recruitment quotas handed down by the Province Party Committee and would not include the party membership in regular military units.
There are indications that in the last halfarty leadersarticular effort to speed recruitment in the cities. They directed that party members be sent from the rural areas to the cities to assist in recruiting and other tasks. One analysis indicates that the despatcharty members to Saigon may have been Another document from Binh Dinh Provinceequirement to send aboutf the party members of one rural district to the district town and to the province capital, for "activities there."
There is insufficient evidence to judge how the recruiting drive has gone. It is highly doubtful, however, that the sort of recruiting goals indicated above have been net, particularly in those rural areas where US military power is felt most. Recent documents includelow pace in party development. Moreover, party doctrine calls for considerable caution in admittingthey must be tested, checked, and investigated.
we believe that party membership in the South aa ofrobably still totals no moreoth political cadre and those in the armed forces. This would grant an increase of approximately one-third in about one year, which seems quite generous. It isto compare the estimated numerical strength of the party in the South with that of the Communists in North Vietnam. In Aprilo Chi Minh declared thatin the North, our party has more This is approximately double the numerical strength announced by Hanoi It is also approximatelyf the total estimated population of the DRV. Usingor party strength in the South at present would mean that% of the population estimated under Viet Cong control are party members.
C. Numerical Strength of the Party Youth Group
Estimating the numerical strength of the party's youth group is even more difficult than that of the regular party itself. Analysis of the few captured documentson the question, however, indicated rather surprisingly that the party youth in the South are fewer in number than full party members. It appears that the party youth group may be around three-fourths the size of the regular party. On this basis, youth group strength inight have been0 with00 of these in regular military and support units. Recruitment to expand the youth group was also stressedith indications that in some areas it was to be doubled if possible.
We believe this estimate must be treated cautiously until more evidence is available, since the apparentstrength of the Communist youth in South Vietnam stands in sharp contrast with the situation in mostcountries. In North Vietnam, for example, there are approximately five party youth for every full-time
party member. The reasons for the seeming scarcity of party youth in South Vietnam are not readily apparent, although we believe they are probably related primarily to theconditions under which the Communists must operate. They may find it hard to encourage the growth of the party youth apparatus given the covert nature of many partyand the need to engage available youth in military activities^as rapidly as possible.*
D. Numerical and Other Limitations on Party
There is no evidence as yet of any weakening in the resolve of the leading political cadres to continuethe "struggle." There are indications, however, of limitations on the total capability of the party forfurther subversion. (Some ofto -discussed at greater length in ANNEX VII of this study.)
The party is stretched thin. The effort to expand testifies to this, as well as to the increasing demands placed upon it both to enable Viet Cong military expansion and to replace casualties. The runninge factoin some regions, and particularly theof the economy of areas which must providesupportarge army, increasingly involves the party cadres in essentially logistic, bureaucratic, andtasks. Local party organs are increasingly being called on to send party and Youth Group members along with the contingents of local guerrillas ordestined for main force units. Partystaffs are pared downj documents indicate that even principal sections of the COSVN headquarters have been
*The age brackets for party youth in South Vietnam are not entirely clear. It appears, however, that youth from the ages of aboutore eligible. In North Vietnam, the age of the party youth was recently raised fromoears to enable the regime to facilitate the handling of party-associated individuals in the military. It would thus appear that the buildup of armed forces in the North has disrupted the normal procedures for party youth; the same situation in the South mayearing on the apparent sroallneas of the youth apparatus there.
There are complaints in the documents about theand inexperience of the party cadres in several areas, undoubtedly this reflects the need to reach further down into party ranks and into affiliated organizations for local leading cadres. Party members serving primarily in political capacities are suffering casualtiesesult of combat in their areas, the documents report. Moreover, there have been various directives calling for aproportion of the party membership in various rural areas to join the local guerrillas. Presumably thisthem from political tasks.
These difficulties have probably not yet developed into critical handicaps. But they are factors to which the party leaders must devote increasing attention. Thehas almost certainlyimit on the ultimate responsiveness and capability of the party apparatus toto communist needs in South Vietnam. At the present time, it is probable that any significant intensification of demands on the party political structure cannot be met as adequately as in the past.
E. The National Liberation Front
Under instructions from Hanoi, the Communists in the South put together the National Front for theof South Vietnam (NFLSV) at the endear before they announced, again under instructions from Hanoi, the formation of the People's Revolutionary party.* The NFLSV was to serveacade for Communist political and military operations,odestone to attract and organize mass support for the insurgency, and as an infrastructure for the political and economic administration ofareas (See ANNEX XIIiscussion of theposture of the Front).
"The Communists claim they are only one element in the Front, albeit the "vanguard" element. However, through the selection and manipulation of the membership of thecommittees making up the NFLSV and running itsregional and functional "Liberation Front*the party controls the Front in classic, covertfashion. The headquarters of the central committee of the Front is known to be co-located with COSVN.
On paper at least, the Front structure parallels the party structure down to the hamlet level,addering of committees at every administrative echelon, each of which is dominated by its Communist members. Aligned with the Frontumber of functionalassociations aimed at almost every aspect of life in South Vietnam. The most significant of these are theassociations for farmers, for youths, and for women.
While there was apparently some initial enthusiasm for the NFLSV, flowing from memories of the Viet Minh struggle against the French and from local grievances against the Diem government, thereo body of evidence indicating significant popular support of the Front in the areas where government control is relatively effective. In the "liberated" rural areas, however, the evidence indicates that many Front associations are operating entities at the local level.* The importance of the "liberatedto the Viet Cong in the rural areas is givenstress in captured documents.
It is doubtful that enrollment in one of the Front associations represents in manyilling individual commitment to the Viet Congprobably, for those recruited covertly in government-held or nearbyareas. Nonetheless, once enrollment is obtained, it is the Communist intention to get such commitment. In "newly liberated" areas, the Communists see theof Front associationsajor step in theof theiredge further separating thefrom the government. This appears to be one of the primary tasks for party cadres inillageamlet after government officials or troops have left.
*They serve as instruments through which to garnersupport and recruits for the insurgent armed forces. They are also useful for the political indoctrination of the populace, for the recruitment of demonstrators or troop proselytors, and for the reshaping of the economic and social patterns of the country as far as the Communists feel it is wise to go at this time. Above all, they are intended to engage and commit the populace in the over-all effort to undermine and destroy the government.
On up the line, the NFLSV apparatus does notto be wholly in operation even though Front Committees exist theoretically at every echelon. Instructions onaffecting Front elements or the component liberation associations appear to pass through party channels. Since the party is the basic control mechanism, the absence of fully operating front committees at higher levels probably has no particular influence on over-all insurgent political capabilities.
F. Numerical Strength of the Front
The problems that are encountered in measuring the numerical strength of the Communist party in the South also complicate attempts to assess the numerical size of the NFLSV. In the case of the Front, there is the addedof defining what constitutes Front "membership." some Front members carry something like acard, and others should probably be regarded aaprimarily because they at least occasionallyin the activities of some Front association.
The only hard evidence available on the numerical strength of the Front is containedew captureddocuments that list the number of "members" of various Front associations and organsew scattered areas outside the delta. We believe that the individuals listed in the documents include both the full, card-carrying NFLSV members, and those whom the Communists consider enrolled in the Front organs even though their participation may beand they may not be fully committed to NFLSV orobjectives. Occasionally some of those in thecategory may participate in Front-sponsored activities.
As in the case of the Communist party, we haveigure for Front strength in an earlier period which is probably reliable. In thisaptured document put the strength of the NFLSV in3 at* Byur extrapolations from the
Communists viewed the numerical strength of the Front at the time as inadequate. One document of theadmitted that "we stillot of weaknesses in organizing the masses, even though the Liberation bodies exert lots of effect on them."
captured documents listing Front membership indicate that the strength of the NFLSV had grown substantially. Itthat inhe Communists probably countedale and female South Vietnamese (presumably as being enrolled in one or another of theAssociations." Probably overercent of these were residents of rural areas where the Viet Cong were in firm control or where the government presence was very shaky.
Estimates at the time placed the total ruralin Viet Cong hands atillion. Withof these estimates and of the standard estimate that aboutercent of the Vietnamese population consists of persons abovet would appear that the Communists had enrolled aboutercent or so of the adults under their control in the Front or its affiliated organizations.
A number of documents of the period indicate -that the Communists were exhorting their cadres to greaterin'recruiting Front members5 and were highly critical of the cadres for their failure to use these mass organizations properly "in order to lead the population.'
*The following are several examples of regionalavailable from the documents: Inhe party committee of one coastal district of Binh Dinhclaimed0 liberation association members in eluding farmers, youth, and women. This is overercent of the then estimated population of the district. At the time, the district was reported to be largely under Viet Cong control or influence, except for the district town and its environs. The Liberation Women's Association in the Viet Cong province roughly equating to Quang Nam apparently claimed0 members in This could amount to overercent of the female population in areas under Viet Cong control. The Liberation Farmers' Association in Tay Ninh Province claimedembers This would beercent of the total estimated population not under firm government control inr aboutercent of the population estimated as being under Viet Cong control. By the end of the year, the Associationew members, an increase of overercent.
e document complained that "in many places thehas not been organized yet; some places justew cells or core cadres." Cadres in an area comprising
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Although hard evidence of the actual growth in Front membership during the lastonths is still sorely lacking, it is highly doubtful that the Communists came anywhere near meeting their recruitment goals, particularly in areas of considerable military activity where there have been indications of growing reluctance on the part of the local populace to provide labor and other support for the Viet Cong. We think it probable, in view of the difficulties the Communists have encountered in enlisting popular support recently, and taking into consideration the past growth rate of the NFLSV, that its strength ia still no highert the present time.
Numerical Strength of the Communist PoliticalUrban
A. General Position
In the towns and cities, the Communists must operate covertly. The main targets for recruitment both into the covert ranks of the party and its youth group and into the underground of sympathizers are the lower military and civil ranks of the government, the disgruntled, the poor, themanual laborers, students, and intellectuals. Documents suggest that the Communists expect few recruits from the practicing members of certain religious andCatholics, the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, and the "reactionaries" among the Buddhist*.
Fragmentary documentary evidence is available on the extent of the underground in the cities. Analysis of this limited amount of material suggests that while theis pervasive, it still falls far short of Communistln terms of the calibre of those recruited.
the bulk of the seven provinces immediately north of Saigon were exhorted to recruit until their Liberation Associations included by the end of lastercent (presumably of the population in liberated villages andercent in newly liberated villages and hamlets,0 percent in rural areas "near cities, towns andinstallations." While recruiting was not to bemembers were togoodood "struggletarget setew members in the area.
Available evidence alao indicates that the party has long regarded its over-all political apparatus as weak in the urban areas, and that it has steadily exhorted its cadre to greater recruiting efforts.* The added recruitinghave partially involved the dispatch of party members and agents from the rural areas to the cities foractivities.**
B. Numerical Strength in Saigon and Environs
In the Viet Cong'sia OinhZone which comprises the Saigon metropolitan area and its surrounding rural sectors, it appears from the documentary evidence that by0 people were controlled or primarily influenced by thehis would have meant that slightly under one percent of the total population of the Saigon metropolitan area wasin one extent or another to the insurgent cause.
*Inaptured summationigh-level logistics conference held by COSVN revealed that the Viet Cong considered the element of their apparatus which served to procure supplies in the markets of the government-heId cities inadequate. According to the summation, thismust increase "threefold"6 to7 during the rainy season." The conferencethat "we have almost no cadre operating in the cities; the purchase of goods is mostly done throughand it recommended strenuous recruiting efforts.
**Full analysis of the success of this effort must await further evidence, but there is already fragmentary material suggesting that it has been at least partially successful. For example, the party committee for the capital of Binh Duong Province, which borders the heavily populated Saigonia Dinh Special Zone to the north, reported at the end5 that it had succeeded during the year inin the urban areasew agents who had turnedntelligence reports.
ocument ofor example, consistedhart compiling the party's personnel assets in this zone, which covers an area of atillion inhabitants.arginal notation by the Communist compiler states that "several cadres have not yettbeomplete accounting. Nonetheless, it
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f theBe supporters were party and party youth, many of them in the Viet Cong armed forces ln the rural area of the Zone. In addition to partythe insurgents counted0 members of the Front in the zone in* Almost all of these individuals resided in the rural districts adjacent to
may have included most of the regularly available political assets controlled by the Party committee of the Zone; it probably did notar smaller number reportingto COSVN or to Hanoi, nor does it appear to havethe very low level agents or informants used for the gathering of intelligence. As "internal* assets (presumably those living and working, either "legally" orn the metropolitan areas) the chart lists:
Party
Youth
"Backbone Agents'
Sympathizers
"Active Agents"
Liberation Association
Liaison Agents
Analysis of the total document suggests that ofere involved in preparingere students orere government employees or were looked to for proselyting among government employees.
In addition to the party and youth members presumably operating in the Saigon metropolitan area, the documentthat in the more rural areas of the Zone at least anartyouth Group members were active. Of those operating in the rural areas, however,ere subordinate to the Military Affairsof the Zone, and most of these probably were assigned to the regular military units operating in the zone as the party's armed terrorist and "armed propaganda" muscle.
were broken down intoiberation farmers,iberation youth, andwomen.
The evidence is not adequate toumerical estimate of Viet Cong assets in the other major cities of South Vietnam. The impression conveyed by the fragmentary material, however, is that the insurgent political strength in the other cities is no stronger proportionally than in the Saigon'area and its environs, except possibly in Hue.*
Available evidence clearly indicates that the party has long regarded its over-all political apparatus as weak in the urban areas.
IV. Strength of the Political Apparatus in Ruralample-
Several captured documents of the party's districtin Hoai Nhon, the northern coastal district of Binh Dinh Province, provide some idea of the numerical strength of the insurgent political apparatus which might have been foundargely Viet Cong area outside the delta in Inhis districtopulation of. Except for the immediate area of thetown, it was in Viet Cong hands. Priorhe area hadiet Minh stronghold. Itargelyregion,atholic minorityistory of Catholic-Buddhist friction. As ofhereefugees in Binh0 of them Catholic.
Inhe District Committee reported that exclusive of any troops and cadres responsive to higher headquarters, there were slightly0 party and
*Although no numerical figures on political assets in Hue have been turned up, the success of the Communists in infiltrating and influencing the "struggle movement" there in April and May suggests that the Communists may havea better foothold in this area than in other urban regions. There are indications, for example, that aelement of Communist sympathizers exists among the student body at Hue Universityariety ofmany of them extremist in nature, operate on the students. umber of prominent politicians and teachers in Hue have been active in antigovemment, antimilitary movements in the past two years.
NFLSV membera in thehis was nearlyercent of the total estimated population of the district prior to the large outflow of refugees from the area.**
Another document indicated that the party had calledig step up in recruitment in the district by the end of the year which would, if achieved, have at least doubled party membership and more than doubled Youth Group member-ship. Later documents during the year,reoccupation with "enemy" military activities in theand suggested that development of the party was not meeting.requirements.
V. The Communist Propaganda Apparatus and Its Influence
The Communists consider their propaganda operation an extremely important part of the insurgency. They attempt to ensure that it is continuous, ubiquitous, and pervasive. It is the doctrine of the insurgency that every revolutionary, no matter what his job, isropaganda agent. to the captured documents. Communist propaganda seeks toall segments of the populace to engage in theagainst the government and eventually to "rise upeneral revolution. It also seeks to widen the
*They were composed of:
arty members {apparentlyadre and men organic to the district party4arty Youth Groupiberation Farmers Associationiberation9 Liberation Women
**The NPLSV members amounted to% of the popula tion estimated to be overn the Province. Military units under the district committeeegular uniten,illage guerrilla platoonsembers, and an additional unspecified number of smaller hamletin at leastamlets. Many of those in the military units were probably also members of the party, the Youth Group, or the Liberation Association.
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"contradictions between various groups and the Saigonto further "proselyting among tha enemy's troops andnd to eliminate or reduce the effectiveness of the US presence by creating hatred for the Americans.
A. Propaganda Apparatus
The importance the Communists attach to theireffort can be seen in the elaborate apparatus set up in the South to guide and control it. Beginning at the top with COSVN, the party structure providespecial propaganda section within its committee structure at each echelon. These sections coordinate, plan, and produceindoctrination material as well as tha curricula for the schools in Vietontrolled areas.*
The propaganda disseminated by radio and through periodicals serves largely to underpin and to provide the general themes for "face-to-face" dissemination of The documents suggest that when new policies or tactics areface-to-face" propaganda campaign to explain and justify them is mountedighlybasis. One directive outliningampaignistrict of Bien Hoa Province, for example, scheduled precisely the manner inew agricultural policy was to be read and explained to farmers in every hamlet. In addition to the propaganda work of local cadres, roving propaganda teams are assigned and dispatched by higher echelons as part of the campaign to "destroy" government control and presenceamlet or village. There arethat local party cadres are given some latitude
Communists' "Liberation Radio" produces broadcasts of news, instruction, and entertainment from several mobile sites and from the COSVN base area. There is not enough information to tell the size of the Communist radio audience, but the majority of the residents in Communist-controlled areas probably listen at one time or another.
Under the banner of the Front, the Corranunists alsoa number of "revolutionary" newspapers; they claimn the "liberated"well as periodicals andfor special audiences such as youth and women. Some are prepared clandestinely and are disseminated covertly in government-controlled areas. While much of the material is produced within Southot of it comes from bloc sources.
in adjusting the propaganda line to take advantage of local conditions and to exploit new developments. Tha Communists often attempt to follow up on their propaganda by promoting "political struggle" demonstrations in the towns andor by fostering the presentation of petitions orof grievance to government authorities.*
B. Effectiveness of the Propaganda
The US military buildup and the increased pace of military action have created significant problems for the Communists, partly because the prospects for early victory could hardly be proclaimed as convincingly following the buildup as4 and
The indoctrination line being passed down to the cadres, and thus to the people, shifted afterrom emphasis on the prospect of early victory to emphasis on the inevitability of victory. Documents suggest this line may not be going over well in those areas most affected by the war.
In their effort to ensure adequate material and manpower support for their armed forces, the Communists have found it necessary to rely increasingly on coercion rather than persuasion even in areas long under theirand to backtrack also on certain propaganda linessocial and economic goals. For example, inhey found it necessary to dampen down the propaganda directed against the wealthier farmers and landlords since the production of these people and their lands had become so essential to the Communist war effort.
Assessing the effectiveness and appeal of thelines is difficult, if for no other reason than that it is often impossible to distinguish reaction to propaganda
'Directives5 called for the organization inand hamlets, particularly those close to government-controlled areas, of "permanent political struggle groups"responsible party cadres designated as leaders. The aim, apparently, was to have on tap crowds that could mount demonstrations on short notice. Reports from lowersuggest, however, rather spotty success in theof these groups.
from reaction to other important influences of the war. It is probable that even the Communists are not certain of the real impact of their propaganda. The documents appear to reflect some dissatisfaction at the top, particularly with respect to -the impact of propaganda on the population of areas not under firm Communist control. Assessments by lower echelons are sometimes equivocal, reporting favorable sentiments among the people but implying that theseare not deep and thatpropaganda" or coercion by force is essential in obtaining their cooperation.
The anti-American line of the Communists undoubtedly has had an impact. The Communists attempt to exploit parochial and nationalist sentiments, and in particular to appeal to those affected personally by the foreignpresence. They have moved peasants to demonstrate against bombings or against displacement from their homes. Through the infiltration of agitators in the northern cities this spring, they succeeded somewhat in adding to the'anti-American cast of the "struggle movement" propaganda. there is no indication that the Communists havemanaged to evoke the "hatred" of Americans which they have attempted. efrain seen in Communist documents, in reports to higher authority from lower echelons, is that dislike and hatred and fear of Americans is growing; at the same time, however, concern is expressedfierce" anti-American spirit and an anti-American movement are slow in coming.
It is indisputable that the Communists have appealed successfully to large numbers of individuals and havewilling adherents to their cause; moreover, they have succeeded in engaging the aspirations of segments ofexample, of numbers of montagnards with promises of autonomy. But the lines on broad issues do not appear to have captured the enthusiastic support of anysection of the populace outside Communist-held areas.
The net impression of the available evidence is that Communist propaganda has served more effectively as adevice and to neutralize or to assist inbroad elements of the populace thanedium forustained political movement.
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VI. The Overall Effectiveness of the Political Subversive Apparatus
A. With the Rural Vietnamese
The net impression conveyed by the evidence de* scribed in previous sections on Communist politicalthroughout the rural areas is that the Communists have achieved the willing cooperation and participation ofelements of the populace in the "liberated" areas, but they have not been able to get the willing participation of the large* unaffiliatad, locally-oriented mass of the peasantry. The Communists must rely for continuingeven within their controlled areas,lend ofsuasion, agitation, and coercion. In the rural areas they do not now hold, but must, if they are to achieve their ultimatesurrounding Saigon, forCommunists have recruited numbers of Their documents indicate, however, that they find it necessary to rely primarily on "armed propaganda" andwarfare to achieve significant influence.
Communist reports indicate an increasing concern over inability to counter effectively the impact of large-scale allied military operations on the populace. In areas where such operations have been mounted, there appears to De increasing popular reluctance to cooperate with,to, or shelter the insurgent armed forces. The documents speak of growing difficulties in recruiting the types of people needed for military and labor-support units, particularly those units which leave their native villages or districts. Coercion must increasingly be applied where propaganda suasion fails.
Lower echelons report that even some insurgentcadres are fleeing to safe places and stayinginactive." Increasing concern is also registered in the documents over the flight of refugees to government-controlled areas, over the government pacification programs, and over government counter-propaganda. Lower echelons report that political organization and proselyting are slow.
It is impossible as yet to judge the extent to which these difficulties are hurting the Communist waror to tell whether they will grow to the point where
IIIt22
they will largely block further Communist progress inthe rural populace through political action. It seems clear, however, that Communist progress through political action in the rural areas since5 has slowed significantly, at least in these areas affected by allied military operations. {Annex III contains additional discussion of the status of the rural populace under Viet Cong control.)
It is possible tooughthe basisata base which is admittedlythe total percentage of the populace in South Vietnam which is under the direct control of the Vietnamese Communists. It would appear that atillion persons, or aboutercent of the total population ofillion (the latest US Government estimate of the total population of Southall into this category.*
Four million other people reside in areas where it is impossible to tell the exact degree of control orexercised by either the Viet Cong or the Saigon Government. This group, approximatelyercent of the population, should probably be regarded as an essentially uncommitted group in that it does not give allegiance by choice either to the government in Saigon or to the Viet Cong. The, balance of the population,illion, are considered firmly under government control.** Thissegment of the population, whichillion urban dwellers and one million refugees,someercent of the total.
Current reporting indicates that aboutercent of south0 square miles of territory is not
*For the purpose here, an area and its inhabitants are considered to be under the direct control of the Communists wherever the Communists areosition of suchdomination that they have been able to establish atemi-overt insurgent governmental apparatus.
are, for example, given relatively effectiveby government forces and are relatively responsive to the day to day dictates of government officers who reside and move freely throughout these areas.
effectively or lastingly controlled by either theor the government. Much of this area is wasteland, uninhabited or sparsely settled. The Communists are able to operate at will throughout the area, but probably do not try to exercise exclusive domination except where they have base areas.
Theercent of the population which the Saigon government controls probably occupies not more thanoercent of the total land area of tha country. Theof the population under direct Viet Cong control is situated on what is probably onlyoercent of the total land area.ay-to-day basis, then, the major populated areas of contention between the allies and the Communists constitute only about one-quarter of the land area of South Vietnam. (See figure III-2)
B. In the Cities: Saigon in Particular
The Communists realizo that it is in the cities that the greatest gains need be made if the armed forces and the government are to be riddled from within. Of the cities, Saigon is by far the most important. Analysis of captured documents and other intelligence informationto Saigon suggests that tha communists may feel that they have succeeded in winning the sympathiesotsegment of the city dwellers. The information suggests further, however, that the Communists do notthistheir influence in the citiessufficient to ensure effective support for any major overt action on their part. It is certainly clear that they do not believe they have sufficient covert assets within Saigon.
The Communists appear to see their efforts in the cities as proceeding along two mutually supporting paths-one of organization and preparation for the day when the conditions they seek will arise, and one of terrorism and agitation to help create those conditions. Inhe party's Current Affairs Committee for the capital zone claimed that terrorist attacks had "arousedamong the people" and had frightened government The result according to the document, was that the "people, especially the laborers, clearly sympathize with the Revolution" and "enthusiastically support and cover our They will be with us, the document claimed, when the general uprising occurs.
SOUTH VIETNAM POPULATION AND AREA CONTROL
IH-2
illion)
1 Million Refugees
Miles
illion)
0 Million)
Nevertheless, the document admitted that thewere not ready in5 for any majorin Saigon. It recommended that we "draft plans" for seizing control of slums in the capital and for promoting "our political movement through military activities."*
The captured documents also register suspicion of certain groups in the cities, indicating they should be watched, exploited if possible, but not viewed as major sources of support. Such groups include the Buddhists, other politicalthe progressive ones and the counterrevolutionarythe "bourgeois landlords, both progressive and
On balance, the evidence so far developed indicates that the Buddhist-backed dissidence and thein the cities this spring were not created orby the Communists, but that the Communists did move to exploit them and to manipulate them as much as they could through infiltration. There is evidence, for example, that the leadership of the "struggle" movement in the cities was infiltrated by Communists. There was apparently no overt Communist military move in direct support of the dissidents, however. The Communists probably decided that the timeajor military move was not right, since the over-all conditions were not yet favorable and their own influence and support in the cities waB too weak.
ubsequentotebook recording whatto constitute the views of the party leaders for the Saigon area at the endlaimed further progress in gaining popular sympathy, but again admitted weakness in capability. It claimed that the presence of OS troops had helped block the disruption of the "antirevolutionary" forces in Saigon, but asserted that agents were stilland that their low efficiency was leading toand arrest.
'"Another directive of the Saigon area's Current Affairs Committee spoke critically of the "intellectualt. noted thatrogressive faction has been joining the Pront and is going to be more inclined toward thebut "the majority is nonaligned and adopts theofhilemall faction becomesand more overtly reactionary by acting as imperialists'
Original document.
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