SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE - PROSPECTS FOR AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIO

Created: 9/10/1965

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

HIS ESTIMATE SUPPLEMENTS5

Prospects for and Strategic Implicationsommunist Takeover in Indonesia

DIRECTOR ^Ofjf^WTRAL INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

HIS ESTIMATE SUPPLEMENTS5

Prospects for and Strategic Implicationsommunist Takeover in Indonesia

SEjZfJtT

PROSPECTS FOR AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONSOMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN INDONESIA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the chances and implicationsommunist takeover in Indonesia within the next two or three years.

DISCUSSION

i. PROSPECTSOMMUNIST TAKEOVER

ukarno is the unchallenged leader of Indonesiall almost certainly remain so until death or infirmity removes him from the scene. He is devr lupine, in Indonesia an authoritarian government of the "national-front" type on which the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) exerts the strongest influence, though under his own continued domination. The past year or two have been charac-tcn/rd liy rapid progress toward this objective. The PKI nowemliers and is try far the best organized and must dynamic politicalndonesia. With Sukarno's support, the Comrmuiivts and their sympathizers have come toajor position in the central government and in numerous provincial and local adnunistrations. Whatever its present influence on Sukarno, it tt clear that the PKI finds Sukarno's policies, both domestic and foreign,with its own interests. It does not create these policies, but piovidcs .specific suggestion! on method and timing whieh Sukarno finds acceptable. His own predilections, skillfully played upon by tin- PKI. have brought hii foreign policy into close harmony with that of the Communist states of Asia.

ommunist fortunes in Indonesia will probably continue lo prosper so long as Sukarno stays in power. As in the past, however, he will probably move cautiously in expanding PKI participation in the government so as to avoid creating excessive domestic unrest oroalition of non-Communist elements. If Sukarno lives, it is probable that in two or tliiee years thestate will he sufficiently controlled hy tlie Communists to beommunist state, even though Sukarno remains tlie acknowledged leader. It will probably not be possible, however, to detect any precise moment at which tlie Communists "takenless Sukurno chooses to proclaim it. We lielieve

that domrstKons and hi* desire lo bequeath bis personal political coocrpt- to livdonesia will lead him lo refrain from such an announce-mint. (xdKfivahly, the PKI leaders could become powerful enough to threaten Sukarno's own dominance, but since his policies are likelyemain along lines generally favorable lo them, they are unlikely to take rir.lt in order lo seize power.

In the event of Sukarno's early death or incapacity, Ihe PKI drive to power would probably lie slowedime. Though there would be considerable political turmoil and perhaps some violence, the successor government would piobably be headed al firstoalition of familiar non-Oimmunbt mililaiy and civilian tumev The PKI could probably not denied an important share in this government, both because of its established position and because the military would probably be reluctant to risk civil war tooll back of the Communbtt. On lite other hand, tbe party would no longer benefit from Sukarno's patronage and would have to rely entirely on its own strengths and capabilities, which though considerable would probably be insufficient toan open challenge lo the rnihtary'. Hence, we believe that the PKI would not attempt to seize full power by force in the months following Sukarno's death if thai occurred at any early dale.

The longer Sukarno lives, the better will be ihe position of the PKI after his death. Another two or three years of his rule are likely lo weaken anti-Communist element* In the army and elsewhere to the point whew, at his death, the Communist't wouldood chance of taking over full power. We do nol exclude other possibilities, however, such as the emergenceoalition of anti-Communists leadingrotracted stalemate oronflict which could break up the Indonesian slate.

II. IMPLICATIONS

Indonesia already acts in important respects like aand is more openly hostile to tbe US than most Oirnmuiiist nations.ihe damage that an avowedly Communist Indonesia could do to thein the Far East is being doneconfrontation" of Malaysiaand inflllr.it Ion In the Philippines) and neither Sukarno nor anysuccessor government is likely to abandon efforts lo weaken the Westarea.

evertheless, Ihe overt accession to communismountry likepopulous, rich in resources, and strategicallyhave an important impact on other countries in South and Kast Asia. Peking would be especially gratified Iry the triumph of one of its closest associates and.ime, would probably offer close cooperation in Ihe Malaysian area. Both Peking and Hanoi would be encouraged in their struggle with the US in Vietnam, whileorkdent* ofTluiland. and South Vietnam would beThe adventommunist state on the Indian Ocean would make India increasingly nervous.

ivenimited rnilitary capability and its many strategica Cccnrmmist Indonesia would poseotential threat to the Western position in Southeast Asia and to important world sea and air lanes, the threatommunist Indonesia would lie felt most immediately in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Australia, and would lead their governments lo make urgent demands (or substantial US and Commonwealth military support.

lie conservative Malaysian government would despairatisfactory settlement of its dispute with Djakarta. Furthermore, it would expectof Indonesian efforts to subvert the peninsular Malays, and increased cooperation between Djakarta and Peking in arming and training dissidents on the Thai-Malayan border and in northern Borneo. Singapore would face an intensified effort to subvert its Chinese population. Both governmentv would face increased pressure by all left-wing political and labor groups. Thepresence would probably make it povvibh: for moderate governments in the two states to survive for the period of this estimate, butonger period the existenceommunist Indonesia would cause their chances ot survival lo diminish.

lie Phiiippiric Government, already concerned about Indonesian infiltration of the southern islands as well as Djakarta's clandestine political activities in Manila itself, would show real alarm. Irritants in its relation; withS would probably be submergedimeense of common danger. The Aus'inlians would fear for East New Cuinea and tlieir lines of communication to Europe and the Far East.

ajor Communist state ledarkedly independent and self-reliant party. Indonesia would become tbe object of more intense Sino-Soviet rivalry. Moscow would probably lncrcaie its military' and economic assistance in hopes of encouraging the developmentecond Asian Communist power ictitiT to compete with Peking. For its part, the PKI would probablyriendlier altitude toward Moscow In the interest of material gain. Peking would, ol course. Increase its efforts to He Djakarta even more closely to Chinese policy in Ihe For East. But it Is likely that PKI foreign policy decisions. like (hose ol Sukarno, would stress Indonesian national interests above those of Peking.or international communism in general The pursuit of these national intrrrsti would be mote likely to lead to friction with the Chinese Corruniinlsts than with the Soviets. Thus. Indonesia's formal accession to communism, while immediately strengtbening tlx- Communist side, would contribute over the longer run to transforming the Communist world into- ii looser association of sovereign states.

ommunist Indonesia would probably not become of major military significance to either Moscow or Peking during tlie period of this estimate. An Indonesia openly led by the PKI might ask for security guarantees from Moscow and Peking, and such requestshe circumstances, be difficult to reject. We believe that the PKI leaders would be sufficiently nationalistic- to refuse to grant air or naval bases or missile sites to either Moscow or Peking, though it is

possible that they would permit one or both to use existing Indonesian bases for logistical purposes, thereby greatly extending the range, for example, of their submarines. In any bargaining with Moscow or Peking on the subject of bases Or missile sites, the Indonesians woulde favorably impressed by offers of nuclear weapons in exchange. It is extremely doubtful, however, that Moscow would make such an offer, and. over the next two or three years,that Peking would beosition to do so.

In the short term, Indonesia's formal accession to communism wouldeavy impact on world politics. It would be seenajor change in the international balance of political fortes and would inject new life into the thesis that communism is the wave of the future. Hut while Communists around the world would be encouraged, and their opponents disturbed, this event would not by itself cause other nations to follow suit or even necessarily to alter their foreign policies.

The longer term impactommunist Indonesia would depend primarily on the degree of success or failure which the PKI met as it moved to energize and unite the Indonesian nation. If these efforts succeeded, Indonesia wouldowerful example far the underdeveloped world andredit to communismetback for Western prestige, It is much more likely 'hat the early yearsommunist Indonesia would be occupied with consolida.ing political control and resuscitating the Indonesian economy and that, during this period, Indonesia would be more liability than asset to the Communist powers.

Original document.

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