SUBJECT! Possible Closure of U. S. Consulate in Surabaya
The Department of State, elegram datedeptember) to Djakarta has stated its intention to close the Surabaya Consulate during the weeknless effective guarantees are received from the Indonesian Government ensuring the safety of U. S. personnel and properties and has instructed the Aabassador to start bringing dependents and employees who can be spared from Surabaya to Djakarta within the next few days. Thetelegram bases its Justification for this moveon considerations of personal safety ofnd dependents and on the thesis that vigorous action with respect to Surabaya may result in the Indonesiantaking effective action to protect the Medan Consulate and Djakarta Embassy.
It is believed that both arguments are weak at best. While the personal safety of U. S. personnelituation such as exists in Indonesia isey factor inetermination of this nature. It is not believed that there is any evidence to support the conclusion that Indonesian mob action against U. S. installations and/or residences is likely to result in personal injury to On the contrary, the Communist action squads whichthe British Embassy and personal effects of staff personnel in3 were particularly careful not to injure personnel. In fact, one group of arsonistsritish female clerk to the American Embassy for her personal safety after burning her possessions. In Medan,ob attempting to burn the British Consul's home and office was successfully turned away by the Consul armedhotgun and he was not further molested. The sacking of the Indian Embassy5imilar pattern. Indian Embassy personnel were overwhelmed when they attempted to block entry to the mob but without injury to anyone. The pro-sent pattern of demonstrations against U. S. installations In
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Indonesia is obviously more intense and sustainod than that encountered previously but sight should not be lost of the fact that at various times over the past five years these saae installations have been physically attacked by Conmunist-led sobs,eavy stoning of the Embassy over the death of Lunuaba in1 which resulted in virtually all its windows being broken. No serious effort to enter thehas as yet been made, however. In all these cases, there was,of course, the danger of accidental injury from flying rocks or broken glass, but no evidence that the mobs intended injury to personnel.
3. The second argument in favor of closing the Surabaya Consulate,. forcing the Indonesians to take measures to ensure the future protection of other D. S. installations or face their closure with concoauiitant closure of equivalent Indonesian installations in the United States, is notin view of the fact that the Indonesian Government clearlyajor reduction, if not elimination, of U. S. in Indonesia. There is little evidence to suggest that Sukarno would be particularly reluctant to give up some or all of his diplomatic and consular representation ln the United States if this were the only price he had to pay to drastically reduce the U. S. presence in Indonesia. Sukarno is well aware that the U. S. would lose more than would the Indonesians io such an exchange.
A. Despite the burning of their Embassy and harrassment of their personnel the British haveresence in Indonesia, including an Embassy offficers in Djakarta and two-man Consulates in Medan and Surabaya. based on4 diplomatic list, believed still accurate.) This is consistent with British actions in other areas where they have been subjected to similarraq, where their Embassy was burned in thes and in Greece, Israel, Hanoi, etc. Despite the very evident desire oi the Indonesian Government that the incumbent Britishough, outspoken Scot, leave the country, the issue has not beer, forced in the face of Britishto keep him on nor has he or his staff been subjected to any form of continuing deliberate harrassment.
5, Tho recent mob actions appear to be deliberately aimed at intimidating or. sensibilities to the point where some, if not all, of tbe installations will be closed. It is debatable to what extent the Communists are seeking to go further in this regard than the central government, but there is little doubt that the government condones, if not encourages, the basic thrust of the efforts. Closing of our installationsesult of this pressure will be interpreted in Indonesia, and presumably in other areas where Communists or ultra-nationalist forces seok the removal oiU S influence, as indicating that. Government is susceptible to intimidation and that mob action against our installations is an effective means of effecting such intimidation. The line that the treatment accorded our installations prevents the normal conduct of foreign relations is not likely to carry much weight with listeners in Indonesia or elsewhere, particularly with the British example at hand. Ve nay expectommunist success in Surabaya will be followed by similar activity aimed at the Medan Consulate and Djakarta Embassy and may well encourage similar attempts ln other
countries.
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Original document.
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