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TS
LBJ liij-;ary
Mandatory Review
CjBaa#NlJ_jVJE Document *
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
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Reactionsertain US Course of Action in Southeast Asia
Sxbmrflvd by It* DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
in byUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD At <ndic0>ad ovwUof5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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The Control Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organization* of the Oepart-mants of State, Defense,.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Deportment of Slate Director, Defome Intelligence Agency Director of Iho National Security Agency
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Thli material contalnt Information affecting iho National Defenie of tho United State* within the meaning of the oipionageSC,, the (ran.-miuion or revelation of which in any manner to an onauthorfied panon I* prohibited.
i EidudadsmoHc
ENSIIIVE
sensitive
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
5
Reactionsertain US Course Action in Southeast Asia
sensitive
EgtETTSENSITIVE
REACTIONSERTAIN US COURSE OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist and other reactions to the use of US forces toarrier across Communist supplv lines in the Lao
ASSUMPTION
A US force of three divisions moves into Ijtos alongrom Thailand and South Vietnam to seize and hold terrain along the Route with the purpose of blocking Communist troop and supply movements.
DISCUSSION
The international react ivn lo the US action would be generally unfavorable, particularly if the action were nol undertaken al the request of Premier Sotivanm Phoumn- We believe, however, thai the chances are leas than even (hatcould be persuaded to maLi-eqiu'st. lie would recognize that the US action wouldlear and consptcuom violation of2 Geneva accords upon which lb* legitimacy of ba government rests. He would see law advantage* to Lao* and manyeployment He would tear that Lao* wouldajor ltattleground for the power* involved in Vietnam, that the Communist* would retaliate against his force* in other parts of Laos, and that the Chincie Communists might occupy the northern provinces. Souvanna has approved of US escalation of air activity, and lie would probably prefer to see this course fully exploited, including the obstruction of Hanoi, before considering involvement of LaosS Communist ground war
If the US pressedao Government request in the face of Souvanna'* opposition, he might be led to resign and return to France, as be ha* so often threatened to do. While moal other Lao leaders, including the King, would be likely to ihare Souvanna'* misgivings, Souvanna could probably be removedoalition of conservative forces. Under such circumstances, however, anv successor government would be seen by most of the worldS puppet
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If Souvanna could be persuaded to call for the US divisions, his assent would almost certainly be conditioned on explicit US guarantees of protection against DRV and Chinese counteraction In northern and central Laos. He might not request immediate deployment of US forces into these areas. lest thii precipitate the very attacks he wished to prevent, but lie would almost certainly demand some tangible evidence that substantial US forces would indeed be available quickly If needed. This would be equally true of any successor government.
The Thai would be concerned about havingarge foreign presence in their country as the assumed action implies, but their major concern would be that the action might bring Communist, particularly Chinese, attacks against ThailarsdWe believe that the Thai would cooperate with the US plan if given specific- commitments on defense measures to protect Thailand in such aThe Thai leaden would also almost certainlyubstantial increase in US aid At least sporadic sabotage effort* against the lines ofacross Thailand to theegion of Laos would be likely, and their protection wouldairly large-scale Thai or US effort. In short, the US would almost certainly be called on to provide substantial forces, in Thailand as in Laos, over and above those which would be required to seal off the Communist supply routo through Laos.
In Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk's (ear of US-supported attack* from South Vietnam or Luos would probably Iw increased. He would vociferouslythe US action and would probably reiterate in some form his demands for international guarantees of hist the same time, however, he would probably be impressed with this new evidence of US determination not to be driven out of Southeast Asia. Until he Isad some clearer view of the outcome of the US effort, he would probably be reluctant to see any ex-pan the use of Cambodiaupply route and safe-haven for Communist forces in Vietnarn.
fi. The North Vietaemeae would almost certainly learnajor USwas being planned; they already seem to suspect that something of the sort may be under consideration A* US intentions became clearer, Hanoi and the PatbetuH seek to discourage Souvanna* concurrence and to deter the US action by propaganda and by actions designed to demonstrate their ability to threaten areas about which the Leo and Thai governments axey troophe north and central areas- At the same time they would send some reinforcements into southern Laos and attempt lo stockpile supplies. As the dimension* of the US lHilld-up in northeast Thailand became more apparent. Hanoi might undertake limited offensives to bring PL/PAVN forces close to the Mekong along the Thai frontier. All this wouldigorous propaganda campaign designed to heighten fears in Laos and abroad of an ever-expanding conflict.
nce the US operation was under way, the North Vietnamese might choose to engage US forces at specific points where the PL/PAVN units would have local advantage, but ttte normal pattern probably would be vigorous harassment and ambush. Though (he PL/PAVN would probably exert strong pressures in north and central Laos, we believe the chances are less than even that they wouldajor cotmtcr-offeiuilve against the US forces in the south. For at least some rime, the Communist* would be likely to feci that they could maintain the insurrection In South Vietnam, even If the US interdiction reduced the levels of activity. Hanoi and (he Pathet Lao would call for condemnation of the US action under the Geneva agreement The North Vietnamese might setival Lao "government of Nationalarticularly if Souvanna were no longer in power. They would at least withdraw iheir diplomaticfrom Vientiane, have the Pathet Lao sever all contacts with the Lao government, and threaten to renounce the Geneva agrecntents-
& Even after the US forces had occupied the lengthoutee believe that the North Vietnamese would continue efforts to infiltrate some cadres through Laos. At the same time, Hanoi would increase its reliance on sea routes directly to South Vietnam or via Cambodia, at least for arms, equipment, and supplies. If the US effort, including not only the action assumed here but other actions against Communist lines of communications, succeeded in seriously restricting the supply of men and materiel to the insurrection in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese would have to decide whether to reduce sharply the level of that insurrection, loespite through political means, or to attempt to break the blockade through military action against the US forces in Laos or elsewhere. Which course they would choose would dependumber of circumstances of ihe moment, such as conditions In North Vietnam. Chinese pressures, Hanoi's reading of the US domestic situation, and. probabk most important, the strength of the VC and the state of its morale.
fl. The Chinese Communists, as well ns the DRV, have been anticipating US intervention in the corridor and have already made propaganda attacks and threats aimed at blocking such action, including private warnings that they mightto send troops into Laos if the US commitment in Vietnam were greatly increased- We believe, however, that so long as the US forces had not crossed the Laotian frontier in strength, Peking probably would not lor its-part send Chinese combat forces in any strength into Laos, although It might order tlireatening troop movements along (Ik border. It might also increase its assistance lo the Pathet Lao fat northern Laos by introducing some speeiajixed personnel to support the PL/PAVN.inimum. Peking would Increase its propaganda attacks and threats of intervenlion. and step up aid andof support to the DRV.
owever, once the US had crossed into southern Laos in force, the Chinese Communists almost certainly wouldhe northwest by supply, ing personnel and equipment to augment Cosrrmuntot capabilities there end
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expand Communist control Into areas close to the Thaihis would be designed to facilitate infiltration of Thailand, to intimidate Lao and Thai leaders, and to raise international and domestic pressures on the USio avoid expanding the war.
As long as the Chinese Communist leaders estimated thai the US forces would remain in therea of south Laos, large-scale intervention by Chinese forces would be unlikely. However, an imminent Communist move against north Laos would lead the Lao government to demand US forces for protection of this area. If the US responded by introducing US ground forces into northernthe royal capital at Luangwould in itself sharply increase the risk of Chinese entry.
The principal Soviet ipactions would be political. In the initial stages of the US deployment, Moscow would probably use its position as Geneva co-chairman to reinforce other diplomatic and propaganda efforts to block the US action or cause abandonment of the project. Moscow almost certainly would like to see another international conference on Laos. However, its actions would be strongly influenced by the course ol events and by theof Hanoi and Peking. For example, if Hanoi and Pekingommunist-domuia led government in Laos, Moscow would probably do so as well. At some stage, the USSR might renounce its role as co-chairman, on the grounds (hat the US had destroyed2 Geneva agreements
On the military plane, tlie Soviets wouldirect comrnttment of forces, but they might provide logistical and material support to Cornmu-nist operations tn Loos as they didL This would require Peking's cooperation, however, and the US action in Laos would probably not cause the Chinese to drop their opposition to any significant Soviet role in Indochuia.
S-Soviet tensions would sharpen, both because the Soviets would be under heavy pressure from the Asian Communists, and because the Soviets would regard the US actionepudiation of agreements worked out with the USSR1he Soviets might iiKTcase their own defense spending and even abiogate some US-Soviet agreements or understandings. We doubt tliaf the USSR would retaliate against the US In Berlin simplyesponse to the US action in Laos. Some carefully controlled harassments in Berlin are, of course, possible in any case.
he British, too. would be faced with difficult problems. As one of the two co-chairmen of the Geneva conference on Laos, the UK would find it somewhat awkward, though of course not impossible, to support US violation of the accords. Furthermore, US policy in Vietnam Is not popular with the British public,ajor extension of the Vietnam conflict into Laos would excite considerable opposition. Prime Minister Wilson would be under severe
' The Director of Intelligence and Unearth believes that iho oitimotr riviiiid stale specifically thut "personnel" piotuiMy would include some regular Chinese Communist combat units, sioceti lie Intrrpteted eaning only limited numbers of tpet-lnltird cadrr.
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attack from his own left wing and from much of the public and press.be would not want openly to oppose the US on this issue. Although lie might be restrained from strong public support, he would probably give private assurances and try to avoid public criticism of the US action.
France would see the US actionajor extension of erroneous US policy in Vietnam, and would strongly condemn it. Even if the action had the blessing of Souvanna's government, the French reactions would be severely negative, in this case, Paris might cut off its remaining economic aid and political support for Souvanna's regime- If another regime had replaced Souvanna's. it would be condemned by France, almost as strongly as by (he Communist powers,S puppet We do not believe, however, that France would initiate action against the US in the UN, and we cannot see much that France could do to make its opposition fell practically.
The reaction of other members of the world community wouldollow predictable linespproval from Taipei and condemnation fromith an increased amount of unfavorable reaction. If the action had Souvanna's support, reactions would be somewhat less unfavorable than otherwise Tlie success of the US action would also have an important effect on world reactions; if the three division* did not resultpeedy andlessening of Inutilities in South Vietnam, criticisms would be harsher and endorsements less enthusiastic. Even though Hanoi and Peking havedenied that the UN has any jurisdiction in the Vietnam conflict, symjwihi/er* might moveN conoVmimtlon of the US action. Tltcof such an effort would be greater, of course. If the US actfon were taken over Souvanna's opposition.
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