t i
i, i'M'.
ij(
*
NATIONALI IMA 1t-
.
ti
m
mm! o
. C
C 3
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
5
Prospects for Indonesia and Mai
L 3
LT J
PROSPECTS FOR INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA
THE PROBLEM
To examine the domestic political situation unci foreign policy (rends in Indonesia, and Malaysia, and to estimate ihe prmpects of both countries unci the probable courseeir conflict with one another over the next year or so.
CONCLUSIONS
principal development In Indonesia over ihe past yearihe sharply accelerated growth of the CommunistKlin government. This trend Is likely to continue al long asIn control. Opponents of this trend are discouraged andeven the military has all but kist the will to resist. Tlielives, the Iwtter will Iw thu I'Kl chances of maintainingits position following his death.
campaign to destroy Malaysia, now in its thirdalmost certainly continue nt varying levels of Intensity,little pnapect of an Indonesian military victory uud SukarnoThis realization has led him to denounce and harass thepresence in Son thrust Astu, and Indeed in Ihe
liKikontinuation ot Indonesia's hostile attitudeL'S, though chances are less than even tliut Sukurno will go soto lireak diplomatic lelatioiu. Ties with Oimmtmist Chinato liecome closer, since Sukarno .vers no immediateto Indonesian ambitions. Tha desire of ihe Indonesiancontinue receiving Soviet arms aid will probably inducemaintain relatively friendlv relations with the USSR.]
L 3
t Sukarno dies nr becomes iiicn^iitfiiateil in thu next year nrllie immediate successor government wouldhe un osten-sililv non-Communist coalition. Thu military would almost certainly exercise greater authority than .it present, hut would ho unlikely to risk civil war to initiate ii roll luck of the Communists. Indeed, ihe Communists arc already so entrenched that they could probably not
Malaria, existing political and racial friction* willeven if no settlement is achieved, we do tint Iwlirvr ll.atreakup of the federal iim during the period of thissubversive threat to Malaysia is unlikely lo bring down theunless it is significantly weakened by Indonesian uctions onwhich we consider improbable, [Parwt.
is totally depeiuleiil on llrillsh inililnry supportforeign policy Isllied to thai ol the I'K and Itspartners.
C 3
^^lt will prolsuhly prove udexumte to cope with likely Indonesian nrtinus and to deter Sukumo from substantially Ixilder itnuression. f
DISCUSSION I. INDONESIA A. Introduction
ill- principalipm.-nt in Imlnnrda tnvr put WW. mmlnuhm liigHlurt In "timh" MaluvtM lu* lorn Ihr diorply mirk-rulnl tjiwWh ol thr
nilt- tn gmnnimiH under the .jnimanUrfp nl I'rnHlrnt SiiUmu. TliU
trend luu token on mi greater uantlU-iini* hramw nf SiiUrwA dnllntng health.
Meanwhile. "CiHifrnntntiun."it ci ml in lies in dominate liitiuiioinn foreign
{Milky. Iuu> lici-mur only ioir atpri-tu biiiodrnril litckniniun nnnpaignovrrimt Sonlhrust AOu.at drawn Indonesia ml" mfiinii.il alllaiKr with Cuntmtmni
tliosm In withdraw limn tlx'and In plmi tnr llw rUmtlUhmeitlorn- rling Xioifrrrmv nl IhrKnmgHigrallynr any other Minpallwiu- iwliom .iikImwdrWrrtrni influence throughout ttiruu world.
omestic Trend* and Prospect*
Vrm/t. SuLnrimhi-iiim and Um mail years his rulehem virtually um'failleiigrd. Nevertheless, untila yearrowing predilection for ComminiM lermlriology mid lor astrenir MlM pottrrm nt governmentv.tv dowly inIhr njr ntrtvninlnirfnjtlonetlruined hy tho Indonesian military IvuuVnhip mid.esser ettenl ^lg Hie requirement* nl pulilU- iipiiiiu-n. purtkiilurly among tonm-vutlw Miidlnu.
cceleration n| Ihe pear ill Cwmniinmt gains over Ihr pari wm is attrilnit-ihli-he erodon nl ihrill tn resistIt t* also related tn Sukarno* alouidonnieitl id earlier hnprs uhUuikt in thr di.pntr with Maktvsu SoLuma'* dnlming Itrullh mav have inadr htmerd for hustr inoward that "iruiuiifion in (Ih- socially Huge" whkh lu-u Indonesia. Thr health problem has aUn intensified {kdltloil infightingI Im* uNimlal i" Improving il* pudlkai.
eargn. ihr maf* pointed fiiiMtNMi ot the I'kl uppe*ml
in lie to provide nfjUprop wppwi im Sukarno* vurfrCl dnsnntlv and ftmfeBi lampaigm. Today,ptu-Coiniiiiiin*t* orinhl wvrralroviiHsaln( Caroler DjaUfto. Xnrth Sunwim.Rait, .im) trvrral lirrpnTairi Ntunidplwrtalih ilo- iruyar. nhki nl Mcil.ni tiial SssnlvBjJ*. I'Ktsnd |BniTHiml IkkUci
h j
llll'll v'.ti 'Hi lllR ivKll llHTl'ltM'll IIVl'l lilt- |kltl Villi'. U(Sll>liili,il.
.ill-emlwatiiij; National FrontimwiaumVtelv dominated In'KI.
in- Gmunuitisto. with SuUmns imoiii.iKemi.-iit. have also ihvmtfntfM liowcr nwl atidocily
Iflir. Communist programtUilBttcroT landikI hy the prjiMtnii)hcmmeblatant mid wiiletpivnd. dmpitc 'opposition ?iv local Muslim and naluinnllit group* and llw poller.
eanwhile, the political fortunes of aiiti-HKI rh-meitl* haveof Indonesia's most prainiiH-nt wm-Cominunbt politicians. AdamDeputy Prime MinMrr Salch, ROW liiid ihi'lr unci miIuIhMuI admiuM nilseverely curtailed. Saleh'% priimirv |iolitical 1mm'. tlie"Generationaway hum Mm; and Malik's Mi-
ll,ir-nwl IcflUI (but utill-PKI) Murlio Party lain Imm.ii outlawed. FatrtJonahsMTI in tlie large Nationalist Pnrty is at H* peak, uiul ihe party's Iclt wing lias liecouu-little BBn than an echo oi tin I'KL Perhaps; must important. Sukaiiai luurlme in Indonesia, tlw non Communist jwes* I* almost completely silenced, cir mtimidttlcil. mill teachers umllii.-iub .lieli'd tn pay otiplu* lend* ol'tiuilnn a* ripuiinded liy Sukarno.
he military leadershipn hold cmwuleralile political pawn throughout Indonesia. Iiut oyer tin past several yours lias retreated from tlu> >tmng mitt-PKl povitlun it once livid.v given in tu Sukarno on several important umn For example, the Army lias lirjpni snnniK and training| "peoples'tfuirmm It Inn Imminul Indonesian military strutegv Is now hosed oil liteim that lite Westernather than the Communist Chinese, ore ttir likely enemy. The military school* have also revised (heir general curricula,infecting Communist dmtrtnr intii ninny subjects. Tim* far, the military lrudrr*lun InuiinpuMih by the PKI and Stisartlti to give theitlicy-nwking fum-txin in (In- delrmenve "IikIikIK vnnilv liter miliUryl anii-PKI potential.
tt. Tlie military leadership iv I'linstniinedt'oUinv SnKitrnn lieuuusi- til its heavy dependence un his perxaiul hiwu fnr |irivilencd and oltrn priifitulilf noutinm. and ltrcausr it vinn Siilaroo as nvntlal tn natiiMsalk-leadership it nUn wenkened by divlsKiiu nltltin ih owniriei of uiiijni iniitlnivs uf vimnger nlliivrs nguiimtml ul Staff, which hu* sevrrHv slmkiii lib milhixily Tlies ChiefStall.
MOW taking Sukamos Strang pn>OjiianimiM hue.Army regional temmuiidm ore- hIm> knuwn to he friendlv tn ihe PKI and might mil support Army nddm ugalnsl It, PKI liiflueme miliHig the lower Linking offttfrs cannot lie t'ltinuiliil. hut itrolmlile that ut lta*tliundred arc tinder Cmmminist infm-mr.infiuence iimiainl% probably mure widesnnnul.
)
1
c 1
Mllt-GllUlll'l" I'Kl mil' in provim!
miiniiiK
uncienlarge i
ri-riiuiily move to rlimii among ooii'C!nmiminisf spoken ninsrrviilKi' M
II.I'Ih- Iii-ikI lnu.ird inuiMM-il C'.iniiHini-limnVsis likely tti cuiiliiuie. Sukarno pnilwlily
nun
Communisls mill their sympathizers tnuliid loi-.il .iilmiiiisti.ition*, lit-almost lion lo Midi moves
.oiiltnui- to measures'iuIire likely (onlrilmte to iniTai Su wiirscmng ertiuon nl ihe police and imilei* omtntl qui
Uv.
uesiiui economy mill We (hi not believe. ;x| bv ie|HTeussiiHw lnini the lasion ami live coercive pns'cis iij iinv series til civil <liso|ihTs
In pressing his pro-Ci
.lllsl iiiinpaigu Sukttinii ptnluibly does not tn-leml lh.it the PKI shall tome lo ilomlnale htilnnrsia in his lib'time and threaten hhii mill ihe puh*Jhk- kru ui hi. imkno* pmttion. IUiIh'i. seehdt he seek* toMliuii.iluteni:ut rtl iiMnptlMOt; till rodksll And na-tionallslk elements lovid to him uml his polities, lie pmlwhlvthe PKI asuiliHed by size, nrgiililaitiini. csprrlcnif. mid lilrology lo play the leading, hut nut dominating, role luovniimcni. In his view, siimigwould altn insure uistaiiiedt pursuit atiumpBttpi tn oust Ihr West Imm SMUhmtl
onieivnhlv (he PKI could hceinilc powerful enough to thmilei) .Sukarno* own dominance, hut su long us the Indonesian military remains Uiiically liostile to tlk' PKI. SuUino tumid lir Inespect. For it* purl iIr-PKI KiMitd almost ctiUuilv mil ilwlk-ngr hislis- dm-rgNig Imm it* pit-Milt uM^XTUlive ami jwoftlahle tiuiru* I'Klhabivthai continuingiiii Mill eveiitiially peiinil them lo assume tin* leadimi gov-eriiuienliil role miller onlv gmerali/eu siiprrvUInn bv .Sukarno. They prnhahly liopr dial llietrill brewm*lretk lied iiitdrr Ins pnXrrtinii dial, when he leases the urnr. the milKarv will lnvr neilhrr ihr willtlw iMttv ton pmlnuiliiumr hihr longer Sukarno llvrs. the betterIm-innet's nl maintaining ils podium lollmvhlg his death.
event
KteSSlM
wou
li The Sinvmhw- SiiUiihi is ftl hik! In poor health Hism survive hit MTimt* kidiirvi mil onlvir nesiiigrry. and prrlkip* imi more lhan Ave srar* inse ulh nr Ineiiputily in tlu- nrvl yenr u* so. Ihewould piubiblv Ik nstmsihlv iion-CmiimuilistHiu-CtMiiiamiisI uiilkary ami th-ilian mime*. limited |tai1 It* .ninrdand.ihiMfjlo iimlitarv Ileinr wr hrlk-t
PKI wiinlii In- unlikely toei/un- ol fullIn lour. Tlime, almost ttrlaliih I'Ven-iu' ureitliT .uillmrlly than
l: 1
because Its support would be essential to tlu- maintenance of public order, but It would Im- unlikely lo risk civil war looll hack nl theor It* part, the new leadership, anxious to avoid PKI ugitatinii In thewould probably noturge ol Communists in national or Inculeriod of political ferment would Inevitably follow. Although the outcome cannot be estimated. Communist arengtlis and uipa-hlHties are ulready such that the Communists could probably not lw denied an Important share in any successor guvemment.
domestic policies would prolsably not change significantlyfirst months following Sukarno's deporture. mainly because ot generalto rock the political boat. Tlie current flirtation withmightnd there would probablyrowth of curdiKlltyUSSR, if only at tho Insistence of the military who rely on continuedshipments. For wantrominent spokesman. Indonesia^ wouldbecome generally less IwUteroiu on the Afro-Asian scene. t/
1 The new leaders would probably not cease to agitate tho antl-Malayila issue, but continue the campaignower key. The ug-gressively naHoiiallst doctrines of the Sukarno era and the liroad commitment lo regional hegemony will ahnost certainly persist
C. Forslgn Policy Trtndi ana Prospects .
lie two-year-old campaign to "crush" Malaysia continues, though there is little prospect of on Indonesian military victory In the near future and Sukarno knows it. He persists in this course for several reasons: he is committed to It in the eyes of his people and the rest of the world; It strengthens national unity and helps to Justify the siege mentality that diverts attention from ecoriomic problems at home; it bolsters his reputationilitant leader In the worldwide struggle againstand. finally, he" is probably convinced that it contributes to the weakening ond ultimate dcwmiction of the Malaysian state.
Confrontationeak of intensity during August andhen groups of upniformed Indonesians were landed by sea and parachuted into southernmost Malaya to commit sabotage, to recruit and train insurgents, to establish guerrilla redoubts, and generally to harass local security forces and demoralize the population. 'Die effort failed, though It did succeed in tying up large numbers of British and Malaysian troops and In Impressing Kuala Lumpur with Indonesian audacity. The episode wasliy British threat! of relallatlon and the adoptionore aggressive policy by Commonwealth forces In northern Borneo. These and other events hove apparently convincedleast for thethe perils of proceeding beyond minor infiltrations of Maluyn and Singapore and small-unit irullttiry action in northern Borneo, both coupledariety of subversive activities.
C 3
1ft OtlmI Irontation in .lai.-f*
Ar/ofkMM Cnmtng (narration withalhu* ul Con-
led Siikarnoroaden IU* iMiplfj) |it llow attack, the entirepresence in SoiiuW AaU.
indeed, hi the Arro-Aaien world in general, and refer* to thin effort as "ihe struggle irf the Newrtw iXEFOlthe Old Established Fnrtii lOLDEFO Thh .hlft in rmpluul* ho* helped to dUgnUe theestroy Malaysia andersonally wtlsfvhig psychological substitute. It ha* also pvrmiired him to move liroord closer ties with Communist China. oveiTfdlng deep-seated antipathies in Indonesia, particularly among the military. It bus not. however, helped to reinforce Sukarno's position as the self-proclalmed spokesman of the Alro-Asianoat nf whose leaden are offonded by his overhearing and contemptuous attitude toward them and disturbed bv hi* close neat to the Chinese Communist*.
Indonesia* growing curdlalltv towardear identify of *hort-tenn intereit* In Southeast Asia: both seek the elimination of the USontributingukarno'* ncnonal admiration for Moo and his organisationalheir Informal alliance has been nourished by the distinctlyosture, of the PKI In the Sino-Soviet dUpute. Sukarno also views Chinas* support of "nattona) llheratton" movements as an endorsement of his own NEFO-OLPEFO doctrine.
Indone*Iu ba* derived relatively little material gain trom it* closewithew Chinese' adviser* and lechnicians are now InChiya has shipped *mall quantities of rice, lestlles. and other consumer goods to Indonesia and has providedsmall arms as well Perhaps more Important to Sukarno, the Chinese have been lavish In their praise for his foreign policy initiatives, particularly his withdrawal from the UN. For its part.haseadiness to front for and support tlie Chinese lineariety of Afro-Asian conferences.
The growing congruence of Indonealan and Chinese Communisttatements, and action* lus cooled Djakarta's relation* with Moscow. TV USSR- ha* failed to receive significant Indonesian support fur it* pertldpation hi Afro-Allan conferences. Instead. It has seen Sukarno tolerate vehement PKI attack* on the whole gamut of Soviet domestic and foreign polity. The only maksr Soviet asset in the effort to maintain some tiuliiente withts vast military assistance program. particularly Indonesia'* need to service and
rospects. Despite its overall lack of success to date, we believe thill Sukarno Intends to continue the mlHtary campaign to weaken amialaysia. A* Iwfore. he will prolhiblyorward at varying degrees ot inteniity. seeking to avoid an open war iiut occasionally tenting British resolution with some flamboyant military operation. Tliere Is *ome dangerjliat In tarrying unt his tflmpolgn he mav miscalculate the British response. [_
adhering to Illsukarno will occasionally move the dispute lo Ihe tonfeience_tuble,r
_jBut ne"would heto terminate the campaign unless on ogreement were reached which opened the way for the achievement of Idswithdrawal offorces and the dismemberment of Malovsia. CZ_
WW
ndonesian cordiality toward Communist China Is likely In continue. Sukarno and most of his lop leaders uro aware of the long-term dangers of growing Chinese strength in Southeast Alia, hut they see the Chinese threatistant one. to be considered when mote Immediate obstacle* to Indonesian ambitions have been Overcome. As foe the USSR, the IrtooneiMn military will probably urge Sukarno to repair relations with Moscow to that Soviet military aid will continue and eapand Chances are at least even that Sukarno will heed this advice, portly In retponse to the renewed Soviet Interest InAllan affairs and In the "unncoloniar struggle generally. He might grant die USSR such tangible concMilons u. satellite tracking station* nnd tbe limited usa of Indonesian air and naval facllltlei.
C 1
II. MALAYSIA A. Inlroducrlon
alaysia's Intt-mul problems ore political and racial. Racial antagonism is not now Nigurau among the masses or the rwople. and the Important political purlin are .till not exclusively racial In character. Yrtamong the various ethnic groupa In Malaya. Singapore. Sarawak, and Sahah have not been overcome, and almost every issue that now arises In the new federation take, on communal overtones. These latent antagonisms could readily lie aroused liy extremist or ret-kleai politicalccasionally there are acts uf violence, and there ore leasoni to believeeriod nf Increased racial teruion may ba approaching.
onfrontation remain* Malaysian greatest external threat. At live same time, Indonesian hostility provides an Issue whicheeling of mutual interdependence among the various areas ond races. The morale of the population lias also lieen Imosted by the forthright manner In which the UK has come toefense. In tlie foreign relations arena. Indonesian actions have drawn sympathy and.support for Malaysia from tome Afro-Asian quarter* once unfriendly to Its conservative pro-Western regime.
evertheless. Confrontation has exposed the fragility of the Malaysian stale. Its armed forces are not adequate to contoin such limited military actlvi-ties us the Indonesians have ennied out. much less to foce an all-out attack. Djakarta Is attempting, though so for without much succew. to esploit tho ethnk and political cleavages that existed at Malaysia's Irlrth In September 1WJJ
omestic Trends and Prospects
Ticndt. Though the problems ol communaUsm, communism, andwhich plagued Malaysia at IU Inception have In some Instances worsened over tlie pan two years, the government ofeasonably stable. The federal political apparatus Is dominated by Prime Minister Tiiuku Abdul Rahman'sonservative coalition of Malay. Chinese, and Indianwhich has governed In Kuala Lumpur forecade.
Behind Alliance ruleacit agreement between Malay-Muslim leaders and the Chinese busmen commuiiitv of the Malaysian mainland, whereby the former are allowed to wield the rurpemderant political power In return for Implicit guarantee* to ihe latter of personal and economic well-being. This concept is intended to serveevice to help the relatively backward Malays to catcheducation, business, andthe more energetic and advanced Chinese who might otherwise quickly dominate Malaysia.
Though not wholly sutUfuctory to tin- Chinese unci otherince It leave* political power largely in Malay luuuls. this formula had liven widely accepted up to now on tlie mainland ns the liest available. Rahman and other Malay leader* expected to extend It to all oiy bringing Into the ruling Alliance tbe moderate and conservative communalof Singapore. Sarawak, and Sabah. This effort bus been lorgelv unsuccessful.
2,c
The political dlfflculties among Malaysia's non-Communist parties have tended to obscure the continuing subversive threats to Its existence. On the Thai-Malaya border, several hundred herd-coVe Malaya Communist Partyare the object of considerable concern in Kualamallof Communists elsewhere hi Malaya and in Singapore have assisted Indo-neslan infiltrators. The once powerful pro-Communist flarisan Soslalla Party of Singapore has turned to peaceful tactics, but certain factions are now pressingenewal of strikes, demonstrations, and mass violence ngainrt theThe most dangerous Communist group at this time is Ihe Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO) In Sarawak. Tlie CCO is composed almost entirely of ethnic Chinese; Itard-toreartially armed and trained by the Indonesians,ympathizers. Tlie CCO
aramilitary effort of serious dimensions. The subversive slmanW In Sabah Is lesshoughOU Indonesian plantation loljorersource of concern.
ar lew serious threat Is posed by pan-Malay sentiment, which look* to the ultimate goaltate embracing all Malay-Muslim peoples uf Southeast Asia. Some pan-Malny extremists within Malaya have covertly aided thocampaign to subvert the Kualu Lumpur government.re under arrest or have fled the country. For the time being, however, pan-Malay sentiment (which Is primarily anti-Chinese) hasset back by Sukarno's Confrontation polity and by his cooperation with the Chinese
c 2
roi/wctt. Oxer ihr nest yrsr at su mining [HMitk.il and racial friction" in Malaysia willincrease In intensity. The principal cause of domestic tensions will be the rivalry Iwtuwn Kimln Lumpur and Singapore, which may take on Increasingly raciallie chances are about even that hi order to reduce prmiinrt. thehe tun sfck* will reach some sort ot accom-inodflttim. although some sudden act hy either side which would Invite racial violence cannot Tw precluded. While Singapore unquestionably wants more autonomy than it nowarticularly with respect tn policeuIntern! In the economic benefits of federation thou Id Inhibit actloni which might threaten dluoiurlon of the fedcratton. d
ence, we do not believe Uuit the "niggle Iwtween Kuala Lumpur v*UW and Singapore will lead to tlie breakup oi Molavdn during the period of this climate.
threats to Malaysia will remain potentially serious, butbring down tha proient regime unlet* It Is significantly weakened byaerionicnle whkh we consider Improbable. One of theofts relatively ptofperoua economy. Protptcti forof favorable situation are good, despite iorne lingeringSingapore from Indonesia's econnmic boycott. Tlie principal economicbe the necesiirv lor increased military budgets which will tend todomestic devrlopmeiital plans, particularly tn Borneo.
C. Fortlgn Policy Trandi ond Proiptcts
tha face of Indonealan hoitilltv. Malaysia ii utterly dependant
will probably prove adequate to tope with likely Indonesian actloni and todatar Sukarno from substantially bolder aggreulon. In tomequence. Malaysianpolicy is closely allied lo that of Its Commonwealth partners .Malaysia will benefit in international conclaves from tha firm support of most Afro-Asian inembm of the Commonwealth, particularly India and Nigeria. In the broader Afro-Asian sphere, Malaysia's dependence on the military support of white Commonwealth nation* srlll tend to candid with lu strong desire to be recog-nliedona Ada member of the Afro-Asian community.
probably now believe that Commonwealth force* arecontain Sukarno over tha next fewut they are leu confident overferra and concerned too over the potential threat from Communist China.
tJMMfl
c
M. Thailand remain* Malaysia* cliwst Asiun friend. Tlie-ho irird lur many inuiithiediate tlx- Cinifmnlatiunwvr licvomr disgusted with hioaitseiion tactic* and mm- itprcu outright sympathy for Malaysia. Maluwia and the Philippine* now havr consularut effort* to. re-ntabllali diplomatic rtlatlumt are stalematedewilution of Manllus claim to "im* Sahah. The Hue I* quiescent and unlikely to Ik- revived ;intil otter the Philippine election* in the fallalaysia and liveof China have moved clo*er In tlw past veer and thUikely to continue, although domestic tuiuloVrations will pcolssblv prevent Malaysia from agreeing to tlie eitahllihment of full diplomatic relation*.
mikAin v
HJ-.MM ;: ; i
. hawln
I hai*f II..I I" Uriknilfi.il lif lit"
.JU.nK .al.,il^alaMaati
n.i iHP.a
I.i,
IMkaaw 1niiy, Im ll.i.
lli'j-illt.toiil llini
jj'i iJi.iiUhi>mm llii|taai
. m.M Au Intui
A mil, ii ,|
4 .Hllll.l'. hilll-.ll
iii.mii in tnoNiliNci
illoiiiail
vvi
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: