A SURVEY OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA (W/ATTACHMENT)

Created: 11/1/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

c e

ma-

nc v

"AinihDION.. ffo' 1MB diputv Otitic Ton Foil tniCLLibcr.CE

JO-

5

FOR:

SUBJECT

FILE COPY

Mr. Kalt W. Rostov-Counselor and Chairman Policy Planning Council Department of State

Communism in Latin America

would like to invite your attention to the attached CIA study,urvey of Communism in Latin America." Itomprehensive work and, we believe, the best study of its sort available on the question of Communism in the countries south of our border. hink you will find it usefuleference tool.

-0

S3

b. CLINK Deputy DlrecWr for Intelligence

-8

CIA OCI No.

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATICsiO'niaoge'ctaasiiy ioiri'Deifassily conwrence

FFO'MDR

Vttrorawai No

DATE; DEC Uuub

/3

F.T

A SURVEY OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA CONTENTS

Pages

INTRODUCTION

Historical

Tho Impact of

Current Trends and

COUNTRY ANNEXES

The Communist Party of

The People's Progressive Party of British Guiana Dl-18

The Communist Party of

The Communist Party of

Communism in Costa

The Cuban Communist

Communism in the Dominican

The Communist Party of

The Communist Party of El

A History of Communism in

The Communist Parties of

The Communist Party of

The Communist Movement of

-uummu

Communism in

The Communist Party of

The Communist Party of

The Communist Party in Trinidad nnd

Thr Communist Prtrty of

INTRODUCTION

1. His toreve lopmetit

Most ol the Latin American Communist parties formally came into being in the decade following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia The Communist Party of Argentina is the oldest party in the hemisphere, having been founded Each of the parties has looked to Moscow from the start for its ideology and guidance. None has drawn on Latin America's heritage of communal practices and traditions which have stemmed from the area's great Aztec, Maya, or Inca civilizations.

The activities of Latin American Communisthave paralleled the international movement from the very beginning, although the Latin Americans frequently have been slow in picking up the latest "line" from Moscow. Ideological schisms in Moscow in thethe splintering off of Trotsky and hisreflected In Latin America.

During thendatinCommunist parties followed Moscow's advice in isolating themselves completely from other working class parties. This tactic was later reversed in theurn to "popular front" activities when the Communists sought alliances with socialist and left-of-center nationalist parties in Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay. In Cuba and Brazil, Communists made overtures to the early Batista and Vargas regimes.

Latin American Communists followed the Moscow line in at first supporting the Stalin-Nazi pactnd then switched tactics when the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany The Communists basked in the light of their devotion to thecause in most of Latin America for theof World War II, and made particular headway in trade union movements. Their influence was especially strong at this time in the labor movements of Chile,

Cuba, Ecuador, Argentina,

Peru, and Venezuela. The Latin American Workers Confederation (CTAL) was formeddwith the Moscow-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. The Communists were at their zenith6 in influence and general public acceptance. Their parties were either legal or at least tolerated in every country. They had members of congress in nine countries; three Communists held cabinet posts in Chile in6opular frontheaded by President Gonzalez Videla.

After the war the prestige of the Communiststo wane as they tended to become increasingly isolated from other popular, leftist parties. Only in Guatemala4 and in Cuba have they made great advances. However, the Communists were aInfluence in the Goulart regime in Brazil before the4 revolt. The Communists stillairly strong political position in Chile and serve as the power behind the terrorist forces in Venezuela. They are fully capable ofgrievances in every Latin American country to exacerbate smoldering local tensions. Themajor appeal of late has been to pose as the champions of social reform, saying that they could better carry out Latin America's social revolution if the workers, peasants, and intellectuals would but give them the power.

External Communist support is largely provided In the form of direct financial subsidies. The money usually is carried by special emissaries from foreign Communist countries. It is believed the Venezuelan Communist Party has receivedillionear in past years. The provision of travel funds for courses of training given to local Communists In European and Asian Communist countries ls anothersource of aid. Soviet guidance to localleaders is givenomplex system of personal contact and correspondence. Meetings are held in various East European capitals such as Prague. Some regional meetings are held in which Soviet party officials are present. Coordination for theseoften ls arranged through Czechoslovak embassies in Mexico City for Communists from Central America, and in Buenos Aires and Montevideo for South American

SECRET

2. The Impact of Castroism

Fidel Castro's rise to power has greatlythe orthodox Communist parties of Latinbut lt has also caused them problems. Castro's adoption of Marxism-Leninismowerful boost for Communism throughout Latin America,untilut his brandery different one from that adhered to by most orthodox party leaders. The heart of Castro's revolutionary thoory is that social justice can bo attained by guerrillaview which runs directly counter to the teachings of orthodox Marxism-Leninism as propounded by Soviet ideologists and traditionally followed by most Latin American Communist parties. Traditional Communist Party doctrine maintains that to be successful acannot be launched before the mass of theclass has rallied to the party. The Latin Amer-ical Communist parties havoeneral rulethe line that "objective conditions" have not been 'right" for revolution in this hemisphere. They have followed the "via pacifica" route ofand infiltration, although nevertho alternative of "armod revolution."

Castro-Communism runs directly counter to this tactic. Che Guevara, in his famous book onwarfare (which is still widely circulated in Latin America) states:

"We consider that the Cubancontributed three fundamental lessons to the conduct ofmovements in Latin America. They are:

Popular forces canar against the enemy.

It is not necessary to wait until all conditions forrevolutions exist; can create them.

In underdeveloped Latinthe countryside is the basic area for armed fighting."

SECRET

In effect, Castro's revolution and the Castroist "ideology"ery real challenge to the traditional leaders of the orthodox Communist parties of Latin America. Party leaders can ill. afford to antagonize innumerable Castroites Inside and on the fringe of their parties; nor do they want to pick anquarrel with the Soviet Union's sole Latinally. However, most have done little more than pay lip service to the Castroist tactic ofby guerrilla warfare (Guatemala and Venezuela are two notable exceptions). esult, most party hierarchies are being challenged to some degree by militant dissidents who are inspired by the Cuban model. Many of these are also influenced by the example of Peking.

It may well be that the major Impact thatrevolution has had on the Latin Americanmovement has been to set inadical revolutionary effort led by militants who areyounger and more activist than mostCommunist leaders, and whoort of Communist "wave of the future." As prospects for meaningful gains under the "via pacifica" strategy grow dimmer, these impatient militants will be even more convinced that "armed struggle" is the only way to achieve power in Latin America. They willto receive inspiration and probably someassistance from Cuba in this effort. They are not under the control of Castro (or Peking),in the sense that the Communist "old guard'* leaders are bound by discipline to Moscow. Some of the more radical militants appear to bemore formal lines of communication with Peking, feeling that the Cubans have become "revisionist" and moved closer to Soviet ideological positions.

The Cubans and the Latin American "soft-line" Communists are taking steps to remedy some of their friction producing differences. The highly unusual meeting of Latin American Communist party leaders held in Havana in4 had as one of its major purposes the seeking out of means forthe divisive tendencies which have so long hampered the Latin American Communist movement. The meeting alsoledgeoint strengthening of "national liberation movements" in the hemisphere and an agreement to promote

i v

"solidarity with Cuba." Cuba's agreemont to stop noddling with local extremist groups not endorsed by the orthodox Comnunlst parties may be followed up by greater Initiatives on the part of tho "soft-line" Communists toore active part in those revolutionary activities presently woll under way in the hemisphere. This trend already seems to be well established in Venezuela. Guatomala,and Panama.

3. Current Trends and Outlook

The orthodox Communist parties do not pose the most immediate threat to the existing governmental structure in most latin American countries. Bather, militantparticular those in Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala, andare Inspired by the example of Castro and many of whom have had guerrilla training in Cuba constitute the most serious threat. These extremists may haveague understanding of Marxism-Leninism, but believe that tho road of terrorism and vlolenco is the only workable means for displacing oligarchic social systems and instituting popular reforms. These are thewithin but most outside the regular Communistare putting pressure on the traditional Communist leaders for more activist revolutionary tactics. Thus It seems likely that over the next year or two the localmight be forced toomewhat "harder" revolutionary line in the hopes of bluntingfron the parties' left wing that the leaders are "do nothing" revolutionaries. At the same time, the parties will probably suffer accelerated :as the militant left-wing extremists become less and less satisfied with the parties* nild approach to revolution. If the Cubans uphold their part of the Havana conference bargain andonly those groups endorsed by the local parties, the left-wing splintering may be confined to small extremist fringe groups.

In addition to taking steps to mollify their critics from the militant left, the Local Communist

u

leaders appear to be trying to stimulate theof broad "popular front" typecalled "national liberation fronts" into which they hope to pull elements of theleft in each country. This two-prongedwill enable the Communists to manipulatewith the left hand while at the same timeespectable "nationalist" pose with the right hand. This would enable them to be on the ground floor and perhaps more subtly control "popular" insurrections such as that which occurred in the Dominican Republic.

It seems likely that Havana increasingly is going to be faced with an Intruding competitor in the form of the Chinese Communists in bidding for the loyalty of some of the more militant leftist-extremists. This has already happened in Colombia and Ecuador, and both Havana and Peking arethe'Peruvian guerrillas as "examples" for other revolutionaries in Latin America to emulate.

For the short-run at least no Communist party in Latin America is likely to challenge seriously the existing governments. However, prevailingeconomic, and social conditions and the widespread demand for revolutionary changemost of the continent are ripe for Communist manipulation and exploitation. The greatest danger is apt to come in situations where the traditional society and institutions give way completely in the faceharp, spontaneous, and popular revolt against the old order. In the fluid aftermath, Communist elements would be likely to rise quickly to the fore and threaten to dominate the revolution.

vl

CONFIDENTIAL

CONGRESS

committee

Central Committee Members

Control Commission

COMmISSIOHS

Finance Labor Studiesnd

Propaganda Education Women'* Affairs Land and

Indians Electoral

Organiiotion Commission

SECRETARIAT

Secretory Geneta' Assist ont Secretary General Hood of Adminilira lion and o' National Fin once Commissio"

Regional Youth Committees

59 LOCAL

Youth

Cells

flection

ReiponsMMy

YPICAL COMMUNIST PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL -

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OI' ARGENTIKA

1, Introduction

The Argentinerty (Fartido Comunistn do lais the oldest and largest in South America. It has never, however,argo mass following, due largely to ita failure toworking class support awny from the Socialists, and, since the, fromronists. Tho Roman Catholic Church has generallyactor inhibiting its growth. The PCA remains influential because of its ability to cooperate with other groups and movooents, both political and subversive, and Its readiness to exploit all signs of dissension and unrest. Though influential in labor unions and ethnic groups, the party's greatost success appears to bo its penetration of Argentina's intellectual community, the universities, and other educatlonul and cultural institutions.

In the past tho classical ideology of Moscow-based Marxism attracted the intellectuals and Recently, however, the moro "revolutionary" versions of Chinese and Cuban Communism havean ability to draw adherents, particularly FCA members and others impatient with pursuing legal rouds to power. The PCA has tried to maintain ties with many leftist extremist groups whichastro-Mao line, such as the Peronlst Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionarioand the leftist-oriented wing of the ultranationolist anti-Semitic Tacuarn organization . The growth of these groups, reportedly financed by funds from Cuba and possibly the USSR, recently forced the ICA to assert that all support for Argentine Communists should come through the PCA.

Unaided Communist agitation efforts have noterious threat to stability. However, when theallied with the Peronists to exploit economic and political unrest they have caused serious die-order. Such actions in the past lod to drasticon the PCA's activities9 and its eventual banning PCA successes have boen limited, largely because the PCA has not been able effectively to blunt the strong anti-Communist bias

of the military or to exploit the strength andof the Peronist movement.

Currently the PCA is not under legal restrictions, but the national electoral court denied itto run candidates in the5 election. Party activities have been stepped up, and Communist propaganda is becoming easily and more extensively available. Sinceeveral pro-Castro "guerrilla" training camps have been discovered in the interior of the country, alongumber of Communist arms caches in the larger cities.

The rise in Communistfrom the removal of restrictive political partymayerious issue between the government on the one hand, and the military and opposition parties on the other. The government appears recently to have decided to take repressive measures againstorganizations, including the Communist Youth (FJC).

2. History

esult of upheavals in the international Communist movement after Worldnd the Russian Revolution,year-old Argentine Socialist Partyn common with most Socialist parties,severe splitting. One dissident faction joined the newly formed, Lenin-oriented Third Internationalnd0 adopted the name "Argentine Section of the International," The early years of the party were threatened by factional disputes,strong opposition from both rightist and other extreme leftist groups, and public antipathy toward its espousal of violence andhe major issue behind party divisions was proposed reunification with the Socialists.

After the overthrow of President Irigoyenilitary dictatorship outlawed the Communistwhich was periodically repressed and denied electoral privileges Acquiring greater freedom, the movementoderate domestic policy to sustain its status. It also used tothe dissolution of the Comintern in3 which gave "independence" to national Communist parties.

The Argontine group then organized itself as theParty of Argentina (Partido Comunista de la

Argentine Communist policies and programsthis period and up to the end of World War IIchanged toariety of widely varying situations. During the Spanish Civil, the party capitalized on anti-Axis sentiment, butpro-Axis during the period of the Nazi-Soviet. Reversing itself when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in Junehe PCA fought against the pro-Axis sympathies of the Argentine Government while the US and USSR were allies. At the end of the war, the PCA returned to attacking any signs of pro-US attitudes.

A new military dictatorshipowever, severely reduced the freedom of operation extended the PCA It was in fact repressed and its leaders forced into exile. The new secretary of labor and social welfare, Colonel Juan Peron,ato attract the Argentine labor movement to his support and to usurp control of organized labor from other union leaders, in particular the Communists and socialists, by organizing rival "official" unions, coercingand jailing recalcitrant union leaders.

hortly after Peron was electedfor the first time, the PCA announced at its Tlth Nationaltrategy based on aand social liberation front." This strategy included support of Peron and eventually evento him in breaking the independent unions and handing over Communist-controlled unions to the state-run labor confederation. The Communists lost ground, however, despite catering to Peron forecade and sometimes acting as "radical" Peronists. Peron granted the party legal status but carefully restricted its activities. Generally the PCAthe government's policies, except any evidenceriendly attitude toward the United States.

After the fall of Teron, many Communiststhemselves directly with the Feronists,in the labor movement. Despite thoorientation of the post-Peron provisional

A-3

SECRET

SECRET-

government, the PCA enjoyed considerable freedom of operation, and was allowed to participate in7 constituent assembly8 nationalelections.

Permitted complete freodom8 undor the new Frondlzl, the party soon reached Its peak strength. Inowever, thewith theblamed for Instigating public disorders. PCA activities were proscribed by decree, although the party ond most of its front organizations were not outlawed until Then President Guido abolished the party when it attempted to take advantage of Peron's "swing to tho left" directive to his followers. The ICA was also seeking to capitalize on growing economic difficulties and unrest after Frondlzi's overthrow.

Inhe PCA held itsh National Congress, under the slogan: "For mass action leading to the conquest ofhe PCA was not permitted to enter candidates In the5 national deputy elections, but the party greatly increased its othersince repressive political party legislation was annulled by congress In

3. Party Membership and Leadership

he membership of PCA was nevernt moro 8 estimate rose sharplyembers plusympathizers. The rapid gain apparently was accounted for by the freedom of action enjoyod under the post-Peron provisional governments and theinitially extended by President Frondlzl. recurrent recruitment drives, FCA membership diminishedut rose again to its current level. Estimates of sympathizers stand, considerably lower than8 high. In recent years, the PCA has hadIn retaining new dues-paying members. Many who enroll as membersecruitment campaignfail to renew their membership or pay their dues,

A -4

SECRET

Another index of Communist strength and support has been the party's voting strength. The peak year of electoral strength By then the PCA's strength, although negligible in terms of totalvotes,ercent increasehough figures are not completely reliable in each instance, the PCA voting record88 was;

attrength levels, support only amounted toercent of the total national vote.

The PCA, like the Socialist and other working class parties, draws its strength largely from the urban industrialthirds of PCA support is concentrated in the city and environs of Buenos Aires. The remainder is largely in the cities of Rosario, Mendoza, andlittle PCAin the rural areas.

PCA leadership has remained largely in the handsew party stalwarts since its establishment. The result has been the perpetuation of offices andleading to antagonistic reactions from some second- and third-level party leaders. The major point of contention appears to be overemphasis on ideology to the detriment of uncovering other means to reach power. Ath National Congress Victor- he party's major figure, was named president of the PCA. Thisewlypost, probably instituted to allow moreon programs and policies by making it possible to broaden the decision-making base of party

A-5

SECRET.

Tho PCA ia structurally similar to tho general character of most Communist parties. The central committee, rather than the party executivo committee, is the top decision-making body. The party statutes call for biennial national congresses, but in the lastears there have been only two: 6 Tho nationaleeting of regional officers between sessions of the national congress, has seldom been called--the sixth and last being held The present central committee, elected byh National Congressonsists ofoting memberslternates. Tables at tho end list tho numbers of the central coromlttoo and thecommission heads.

Financial support for the PCA usually comes from annual duos, donations, and campaigns. Reportshave Indicated that the party has beenexploiting credit "cooperatives" for funds. There ls no information on the size of funds from external sources, although such support ls highly probable. It has been estimated that less than one quarter of PCA expenses cc-uld be covered by visible resources.

Croups and Ideological Disputes

The PCA hns been continually rent by splits since its founding. Various other workers' parties were established, Including several of Trotskyitewhich still have nominal support. The more important of those groups currently are tho orthodox and dissident Trotskyite groups: the Trotskyite Worker Party (Partido ObreroWorker word (Palabra Obrora), the Movement of theLeft (Uovlmlento de IzquierdaMIR) and the Socialist Party of the National Left (Partido Soclallsta de Izquierda

Generally the dissident Marxist parties and groupsore revolutionary terrorist line than the PCA and continuously criticize the PCA as nonactivist. Although small in number, their support of the Chinese Communist line in the Sino-Soviet dispute has gained them the allegiance of dissatisfied PCA members and

A-6

uitraitinu

othor leftist and nationalist extremist groups. The differences among the dlsaidont Marxists themselves concern largely methods to be employed to bringocialist revolution, and not objectives.

In the future the PCA may be seriously threatened by the effects of the Sino-Soviet ideological Although the party's central committee has frequently reiterated tho position supporting the USSR taken ath Congress ineveral individuals and groups have defected, or have been expelled. Othor groups, including the Communist Youth Federation (Federacion Juvonilhave vociferously supported Feklng's lino. Various provincial committees, as in Ente Rios and Mendoza, have suffered splits and expulsionsesult of internal differences on this issuo. losses by Communist labor leaders in unionare also attributed partly to the dispute.

6. Communist Party and Poronism

Since the advent of Peronho FCA's history has been bound up with Peronism. Peronlsm, in fact, has been the most serious threat to the success of the Communist Partyorking class party. Peronism more readily appealed to thonationalistic and Catholic attitudes of the people. Once in power it succeeded introng labor base, usurping traditional Communist and Socialist support. Peron also attracted several Communist leaders out of the party.

The PCA hasillingness to cooperate with the Peronists, especially to exploit commontoward the government in power, but alliances have not lasted. Each sldo has expediently sought its own advantages. There are at present some Peronlst union leaders who appear to be associated with theand, at times, "hard-line" Peronists assert objectives and tactics which differ little fromalma. The Communist labor front, the Movement for Trade Union Unity and coordination (Movimionto deoordinacionhas remained in the Peronlst-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT).

The major ties between Peronists and Communists, however, remain in the subversive revolutionary groups. Although the relations between the PCA and various extremistsome Communist-is not known, several of the lattertrong pro-Castro, pro-Chinese line and aro linked up with extreme-left Peronlst groups such as the MRP. These groups are usually small but have some leaders who were in Cuba and China.

The Communists apparently recognize that alone they could never overthrow the government. In place of that, their main objective has been tounited front" which they could later exploit to their own advantage Since the Peronists apparently have the broadest mass supportpercent of theCommunists have made everyto associate themselves with the Peronists. This tactic will probably continue although the Peronists appear to be very aware of Communistof operations.

A-8

TABLE I

LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA (PCA)

PARTY TOST

President

OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Victor Codoviila

MEMBERS OF

POLITICAL SECRETARIAT

MEMBERS OF

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

ENLARGED

EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE

Gen. Counsel

Arnedo Alvarez

Rodolfo Ghioldi Benito Marianetti Victor Larralde Vincente Marischi Alcira de la Pena Pedro Tadioli Florindo Morettl Angel Araoz Orestes Ghioldi Faulino Gonzalez

Alberdi Tirma Othar Hector Agosti Ernesto Guidlci Alberto Ferrari Jorge Bergstein Enillo Troisc Fanny EdOlman Alfredo Varela Jose Maria Garcia "lubeus Iscaro

* Member named inolds additional office per asterisk

A-9

TABLE 2

COMMISSION HEADS OF ARGENTINE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCA)

President Secretary Secretary Secretary President President

Secretary

President Secretary

NAME

Orestes Ghioldi

Rubens Iscaro

Fernando Nadra

Orestes Ghioldi

Orestes Ghioldi

Paulino Gonzalez Alberdi

Rodolfo Araoz Alfaro

Rodolfo Ghioldi

Jose Maria Garcia

COMMISSION

National Finance

National Trade Union

National Publications

National Propaganda

National Electoral

National Economic Studies

National Judiciary

National Education National Agrarian

A-10

U.I-

z

SECRET

COMMUNISM IN BRAZIL

1. Introduction

The Brazilian Communist Partyowwith rostrengthening the party apparatus, has long been an active albeit secondary force in Brazil's political life. Although tbe PCB has en-Joyed only two years of legalince its founding it generally hasopenly and has exerted an influence farthat which its relatively small size would indicate. Communist influence has been especially strong within the labor movement and among students, journalists, and intellectuals.

Until the overthrow of the Goulart regime in4 the Communists and their supporters were steadily Increasing their power through propaganda, by manipulation of unions and student groups, anti by penetration of all levels of government and tlu nrmud forces. Adhoring to the Moscow-directed line of promoting "peaceful revolution" the PCB concentrated on infiltration and united front tactics.

Since the installation of President Castello Branco's administration, the PCB has been forced to function essentially as an underground party. The government has suppressed most of the PCB front groups and clamped down on party actlvltios in Nevertheless, the PCB is reasserting itsparticularly in organized labor and in the universities.

The setback suffered by the extreme loft with the overthrow of Goulart aggravated tho deopthat had existed in the Communist movement for several years. Some PCB members now were inclined to support the line of violent revolution promoted by the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Brazilhich2 had been formed by dissidents who split from the orthodox partyispute over basic policy.

2. Brief History of Coonunisn

The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) was founded2andful of intellectuals who were

C-l

ft

SECRET

unknown in politics. Shortly after its formation the party was outlawed (inlong with other subversive movements in the aftermath of an abortive revolt by elements of the armed forces. Operating underground the party gradually gained influence in urban labor, and among students and professional groups. The Communists had littleon national politics, however, until after0 revolution that brought the dictator Getulio Vargas into power. 4 the PCB Joined with othor opposition groups toairly strong political movement known as the National Liberation Alliance. The following year the head of theparty, Lulz Carlos Prestes, led anattempt which the Vargas government quickly suppressed, with Prestes and most of the otherleaders being imprisoned for long terms. For tho next ten years the Communist movement in Brazil remained virtually inactive.

. During World War II tho party gained prestige and in5 elections polled more thanillion votes, fourth highest of the parties The election gave theotal of one federal senator, eputies, andtate Outlawed again7wo-year period of legitimacy, the party's prestige dropped andlow until5 elections in which the PCB openly supported the winning presidentialJuscelino Kubitschok. From that point on the Communist movement in Brazil continued on the rise.

The Communists benefited fron the politicalof Kubltschek's vice president, Joao Goulart, who during his ten years as labor minister, vice president, and finally president was gonorallyto cooperate with tho Communists in return for their support. Communist sympathizers held aof key positions in Goulart's administration including posts in his immediate office. Ills top military aide during the last months of his rule, for instance, was strongly pro-Communist. The presidential press secretaryong-timeParty member. From time to time Goulart also relied on his leftist, ultranational1st brother-in-law, Leonol Brizola, for counsel. Individuals considered to be Communist sympathizers sat on the powerful National Security Council and the Supreme Court. In tho congress some half dozen Communists

held seats under other party labels. In Pernam-buco theonfirmed Marxist, hadumber of Communists and pro-Communists to his administration.

Ineriod the Communists graduallyominant position in labor, gainingof leadership in four of the country's six national labor confederations, including theWorkers Confederation, the most important and wealthiest labor organization in Brazil. With collaboration the Communistsural workers' confederation which was given official recognition as the spokesman for the country's four or five million agricultural employees.

In student affairs both the leading university students' organization and the major secondaryassociation were Communist dominated. Federal funds were funneled for political purposes to such groups as the Marxist-controlled National Students Union. The Communist influence also reached into the armed forcesumber of party sympathizers held command posts and the "Sergeant's Movement" often served the Communist cause.

The Communist movementeverewith the overthrow of Goulart and theof President Castello Branco as his successor. Communists and fellow travelers lost their posts in the federal government and in the major labor

organizations, and Cowwunist influence in themovement was reduced. National partywere curtailed and spurious Communist labor entities such as the Workers Command were abolished.

3- Present Status of the Communist Movement

The Communists are renewing their subversive effortsear or so of relatively little activity, following the ouster of the Goulartand the antl-Communist crackdown that followed, At the same time, the Communist Party (PCB) isits organization. PCB membershipis still well below the0 on its rolls before the4 revolution, and the number of party sympathizers presumably is also

down from thettributed to the PCB during the Goulart period.

A meeting of the PCB central committee inhe first held since the revolution,umber of resolutions that restated the policy guidelines for future party activities. Onestressed the leadership's intention to continue the general political line adopted by0 fifthparty

congress, which emphasized the need forroad united front with leftist and nationalist forces. It was emphasized that although preparations for the use of paramilitary methods were to be encouraged, this was not intended to lead to open andrevolution. Further development of the PCB strategy was to be considered at the sixth party congress scheduled for sometime during the next year.

There have been developments in the PCB that suggest that the power of long-time party head Prestes has weakened. Prestes has been removed from the national secretariat, for example, and now has little responsibility or direct supervision over the day-to-day party affairs which that organ manages. Prestes has been under heavy criticism, particularly from the important Sao Paulo faction of the party, for allegedly failing to properly implement the party's policies and for allowing important records to be discovered by the police.

As in the past the PCB seems to be focusing its main effort in the industrial southern andstates although party units exist in most regions of the country. The PCB has begun to reassert its Influence in the urban areas,particularly in the unions and universities. Recent labor elections in Guanabara and Sao Paulo have resulted inby Communist-backed slates. Similarly, the Communists and their allies have demonstratedstrength in student elections in several states, where extreme leftists now control key university organizations. The PCB has also been active in promoting student and worker demonstrations andagainst the government.

The gradual resurgence of Communist influence is reflected in the willingness of some non-Communist

C-4

political leaders to accept PCB support again. Re-ports indicated that Mayor Faria Lima of Sao Paulo and5 Laborlte candidate for governor in Guanabara, Francisco Negrao de Lima, were among those who have recently received PCB campaign

Communist efforts totrongamong rural workers have had only moderatedue partly to stiff competition from othergroups such as the Peasant Leagues, and from the church-sponsored unions. Meagerresources have limited the party's activities in this area.

4. Schisms

The strains caused by internal friction among top party leaders continue, compounding the effects of the serious split which led to the expulsion1issident faction and the formation soon thereafterewCommunist Party of Brazil (CPB). Extremists elements who oppose Prestes' policy of "peacefuleek toore aggressive line of action.

The smallor CPB, which follows the Peking line has been an ineffective organization with very resources and lessemberslargely in the states of Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Guanabara. CPB Leaders believe that recent events in Brazil have discredited theparty and boosted the CPB's recruitmentamong disillusioned PCB members and otherleftists. In any event, the dissidentprobablyew opportunity to promote their line of violent revolution.

Both the PCB and the CPB have collaborated with other leftist groups often by participating in fronts. The degree of Communist control has varied butthe Communists have acquiesced in the formal leadership of others whiletrongon front policies. All elements of the extreme left are continuing to seek alliances along the lines of the now defunct Popular Mobilization Front. differences overexample, the

PCB regards the exiled Leonel Brizola as toolikely to deter close collaboration among the extremist groups.

5. Foreign Influences

In recent years the PCB has tended to soft-pedal its roleember of the international Communist movement, fearful that this would tend to Jeopardize the party's acceptance within Brazil. Nonetheless, it has cooperated with all majorinternational front groups such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Thein Brazil of diplomatic representatives of most European bloc countries has facilitatedcontact.

esser extent,their attention-on the more activist groups, such as the pro-Peking dissident Communist partyhe now defunct Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao, and the forces of the radically anti-US Leonel Brizola. Havana has furnished funds and training to such groups from time to time. Communists also maintain ties with them inundertakings. However, the PCB's position among the other parties in the hemisphere hasrelative to past years when the Brazilian party served as somethingodel.

SFiGltFiT

Table 1

Brazilian Communist Party Leadership

Secretary-General

Luiz Carlos Prestes

Secretariat

Giocondo Alves Dias

Mario Dinarco Rels

Orlando Bonfim, Jr.

National Executive Commission

Luiz Carlos Prestes

Giocondo Alves Dias

Mario Dinarco Reis

Carlos Marigbella

Orlando Bonfim,

THE PEOPLE'S PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF BRITISH GUIANA

1. Introduction

There is no Communist party per se In British Guiana, but the People's Progressive Party (PPP) led by Cheddi Jagan Is Communist-oriented and maintains close ties with Cuba, the Communist Party of Great Britain, and other foreign Communist groups and The PPP was formed0 and won every general election until Its defeat4 by aof the two major opposition parties. Sincepower the PPP hasoderate-extremist split which has weakened the party. AboutPP members have been trained in Cuba and although there is no large-scale insurgent activity at this time the PPP's youth organizationlosely alliedwing, the virtually defunct Guiana Liberation Armyould conceivably activate an organized force of trained, armed insurgents.

Today the PPP Is characterizedarxist-Socialist party whose loader, Cheddi Jagan, commands the loyalty, If not the absolute control, of almost the entire East Indianercent of the population). The East Indian sugar workers, forcredit Jagan with singlehandedly forcing the plantations to improve their working conditions and they are eternally grateful to him. When in office the party, in its flirtation with the bloc, went quite far in trying to supplant private trading and distributing facilities in order to make the economy ever more dependent on bloc goods. The East Indians, who are essentially petty capitalists, do notsupport these policies and without Jagan the PPP would lose much of its appeal.

Tbe PPP is the largest and best organized party in British Guiana. Its extensive network ofoffices, women and youth groups, and staff of paid organizers are tho envy and model for every other party in the colony. Itass ratheradre party and the bulk of its0 members cannot be considered to be indoctrinated Communists. Many of its top leaders, however, can

definitely be so labeled and the party, recognizing its problem, has recently stepped up its political indoctrination classes.

Although the PPP has depended mainly on itssuperiority to bring it to power through the electoral process it has often used terrorism to keep its members in line. In the past it has used sabotage and passive resistance to harry the British and it is now employing both these tactics against the Burnbam government,

2. Brief History of the Party

The PPP was formed0 by Cheddi Jagan and Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham out of the British Guiana Labor Partyolitical education group called the Political Affairs Committee which had been started6 by Jagan and his American born wife Janet. Both Cheddi and Janet viewed the British Guiana situation in the Marxist terms of classand it was apparent from its foundation that the PPP drew much of its doctrinal inspiration from Communism. Its aims, openly declared at its first party congressere absolutely clear. These were self-government, economicand the creationocialist society.

Tbe Jagans maintained as many contacts aswith Communist organizations, especially the British Communist Party from which they received financial aid. The party weekly newspaper, Thunder, often printed articles sent out by the British" Daily Worker and the Jagans frequently attendedcongresses, and rallies of Communist and left-wing organizations in Europe.

Other PPP members, led byan aspirant to partytheseas ill-advised because they could be seized uponeans of proscribing the party and denying the colony its Independence. Despite these latent antagonisms the PPP held together, grew in popularity and membership and won3 elections, capturingercent of the vote. Nevertheless, internalwas growing and the non-Communist faction,

drawn largely from Negroes in the professions .and government service/chafed under the control of the Jagans and their allies.

Meanwhile the PPP was notood job of governing. Its leaders rejected the existingas an improper instrument for achieving independent government and attempted instead totheir own policies of accelerated progressfull self-government and the establishmentocialist state. They had no well-thought-out development program and no capital was forthcoming from the West. Furthermore they had antagonized the unions by pushing through legislation aimed atfull control of the labor movement. Strikes, in which PPP parliamentary representatives and ministers were involved, bomb outrages and other disturbances.broke out. The Jagan government clashed with the colonial administration and the British became fearful lest Jaganoup against their authority andommunist state. Infter only five months of PPP rule, the British suspended the constitution.

With the party out of office intrapartycontinued to grow, culminating in5 when the Burnham factionarty conference and installed Burnham as party leader, ousting Jagan. The result was an open split in the party and theof racial politics, becauseegro, was supported by his fellow Africans. Jagan's East Indians refused to recognize Burnham and until he founded his own party both men claimed to be the head of theBurnham faction calling itself the PPP (B) and Jagan's group calling itself the PPP ew Negroes stood by Jaganew East Indians followed Burnham but the damage was done.

The constitution was restored7 and in the elections that followed Jagan was returned as premierf thelective seats and carryingercent of the vote. In October, after theBurnham's group adopted their present name, People's National Congress (PNC) and the PPPainly East Indian party.

9 the PPP suffered another internal shock when Edwardell-to-do- Indian businessman,

ji^iiiii'if

who had been minister of natural resources and vice chairman of the party, was forced by Jagan to resign from the cabinet and was expelled from tbe party. Be harry had openly opposed Jagan on economic issues and on what he asserted was tho Communist Influence within the PPP. Beharry's ouster probably caused some dissaffection In the conservative wing of tho party and coet it some financial support but it was not followed by any substantial defections.

A new constitution, granting thearger degree of intornal i if-governmont, was promulgated1 and elections were held in August. In this election the PPP got its mass support from the East Indian sugar workers and rice farmers and was also backed bynd medium-size East Indian Jagan was again returned as premier withercent of the vote andf thoeats.

Ineneral strike accompanied by racial violence noarly brought down the regime. Government employees struck to obtain better wages and leave conditions and were Joined by the largest trade union, whose leadership, encouraged by theparties, had become alarmed by certain anti-free enterprise aspects of the Jagan government's budget. In the rioting which ensued Negro mobs burned the stores of East Indian shopkeepers in Georgetown andesult the East Indians joined ranks more closely behind Jagan. Although thesurvived, the riots showedubstantial number of people were unwilling to be governed by it.

After the riots, the senior vice chairman of the party, Balram Singheligious Hindueputation for non-Communism and independent-minded-ness, was ousted from the PPP. Ral's charge that the Jagans were leading British Guianaan respected for his honesty and piety-shook some of Jagan's supporters. Protests were made to the PPP leader but other than that little more came of the Rai affair.

Inill designed to give the PPP government control over the labor movement was blocked

by meansday general strike and inay sugar workers' strike resultedovernment-supported attemptro-Jagan union to unseat the large Han-Power Citizens(MPCA) as the recognized bargaining agent for the sugar industry. The PPP's attempt to gain control of the sugar workers showed that while the MPCA's sugar workers voted for the PPP in purely political matters they intended to conduct their union affairs free from party interference.

In the meantime two constitutional conferences, held in23 respectively, had been unable to decide on the form of government for an Independent "Guyana" and on the means by whichovernment should be elected. Rather than seetalks come again to naught, all three leaders of the main political parties asked thetoolution. The British decided that new elections should be held in4ystem of proportional representation. The simple majority or "first past the post" voting system was thereby discarded and the way paved for the PPP's fall from power.

In4 elections the PPPlurality (winningercent of the vote andf theegislativeutajority so the British governor asked Forbes Burnham to form the newand he was able to do so with the help of the United Force. Burnham then became the new.

Out of power for the first time the PPP disdained to take its opposition seats in the legislature until The party wasand discouraged. Immediately after theJagan had left the colonyour of bloc countries and without his leadership dissension broke out again. The inner party council divided over s; whether to use pacific or violent means against the Burnham government. At the annual party conference held in April an open split in the party over whether to return Brindley Benn, an avowed extremist, to the number two party position or replace him with Ashton Chase, awas narrowly avoided by angiving Jagan all party administrative power for

D-5

'ircmm'

a year. Despite the papering over attempt, however, the moderato-oxtremist split continued. In July, Moses Bhagwan, the extremist chairman of the PPP's youth group wasix-month suspension for anti-party activity. He subsequently resigned from the PPP, and is now threatening toival East Indian party.

The PPP la fearful that Independence will be granted while Burnham is still in power and Cheddi Jagan is now encouraging his party activists toin sabotage activities in order to prevent the conveningonstitutionalovember. Bhagwan and his supporters in the youth wing of the party have stated that they are in favor of independence now, even under Burnham, and unless Jagan can find an acceptable compromise the issue, if rightly exploited, could cost tbe PPP some of its youthful membership.

3. Strength and Supporting Groups

The PPP Is the largest single party in British Guiana and has0 dues-paying Ofallots cast in ths4 election the PPPercent) and woneats inmember assembly. The PPP's success was based mainly on exploiting the Eastfear of the African and an African government.esult virtually all East Indians voted for the PPP. Furthermore an analysis of the voting showed that the PPP's support came almost exclusively from the East Indian community. Non-Indian support for the party was only somewhereotes.

Most of tbe support for the PPP comes from the rural districts where the East Indians have settled. The0 rice farmers0 sugar workers make up the backbone of Jagan's mass supportood number of East Indian businessmen in the cities contribute to the PPP coffers out of fear of reprisal. Although these peoplo support the PPP financially they would probably prefer to voteess socialistic East Indian party.

The PPP is also supported by its youthMembership figures on the Progressive Youth Organization <PYO) rangend it is from this sector of the party that Jagan gets his activists. Some PYO members have received guerrilla training in Cuba and almost all have been instructed in sabotage techniques at home.

The Guyana Liberation Armyecretforce of the PPP, hasembers. It has been inactive for sometime although it could be reactivated. However, this would requireeffort.

The ladies support the PPP through the Women's Progressive Organizationeparate body formed in2 and affiliated with the party. Mo membership figures are available but in2 numbers were reported to be increasing and the WPO hadroups functioning throughout the colony. The WPO is affiliated with the Women's International Democraticommunist front.

There are four major East Indian religiousin the colony, two Hindu and two Muslim. Although from time toew leaders of all four mass organizations have come out against Jagan, the rank and file have continued to support him. Those who might have tended to break away returned to the security of the PPP Indian community afteracial riots shook the colony. Although they are not all of voting age, the PPP can count on the support ofindus and Muslims.

East Indians also predominate in the smallfield, particularly in small shops in the rural districts. This group, however, isetty capitalist one and leary of the PPP's socialism and communistic leanings. Before the February riots the East Indian businessmen showed signs of defecting from the Jagan camp but after the racial violence they too returned to the fold. Jagan has recently found it necessary to reassure them that his grand design for British Guiana does not include atake*ever of small businessmen.

Trade unions with predominantly East Indiantend to support the PPP at the polls. These

! ..

VFCRFT

include the Guiana Agricultural Workers* Unionhe Guiana Public Service Workers' Unionhe British Guiana Rice Marketing Board Workers';Union (no longer recognized and has littlend, although itsis antl-Jagan, the Man-Power0 members). The Sawmill and Forest Workers Unionnd the Sugar Estates Clerks Associationhe Guiana Air Transport Trade Unionand the British Guiana Seafarers Unionembers) also give the PPP their support.

4. Foreign Influence

Although Cheddi Jagan -denies; that he is anCommunist the PPP has long-established contacts with Communist world front organizations such as the International Union of Students and the Women's International Democratic Federation. Both Jagans are passionate supporters of the World Council of Peace and in5 Janet traveled to Helsinki to take part in the Preparatory Committee for the World Congress for Peace, National Independence and General Disarmament.

Both Jagans know personally leading members of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and one of the PPP leaders was an active party membertudent in the United Kingdom. While premier, Jagan limited himself to clandestine meetings with CPGB members but Janet was less discreet and is known to have consulted CPGB officials on questions ofeducation. The PPP hasamaicanresident in Englandontact man with the CPGB but recently, with the helpritish Communist, the partyondon office.

On their visits to the United States the Jagans are known to have met with members of the USParty, and both US and Canadian Communists have come to British Guiana to consult with the Jagans and other PPP leaders.

The PPP has close ties with Trinidadian The latter formed the Friends of Guyana, a

front group,2 and Jagan often addresses its members when he is in Trinidad.

A Soviet trade delegation visited British Guiana in2 at the request of the PPP. As well as discussing trade problems the PPP asked theto provide doctors and also machinery for its printing presses. PPP members have been provided scholarships to study in the Soviet Union and as late as5 Cheddi Jagan was thinking of naming one of these Guianese students as the PPP's officialto the USSR.

In their oftfbrjts to obtain aid from and trade with bloc countries, PPP leaders, moat recently Cheddi In

ave toured satellite countries, and trade delegations from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Last Germany have been invited by the PPP to visit British Guiana.

Tho ties between Cuba and the PPP are very close. Fidel Castro ls reported to have funded the party to the tuno0 in5 and at leastPP members have received guerrilla training on the island. When he was premier, Jagan arranged to sell much of Guiana's rice crop to Cuba. Probably onJagan's orders this trade was not continued when Burnham came to power and its loss continues tohis government with one of its most serious economic problems.

Janet Jagan visited Communist China in August

had an Interview with Uao Tse-tung, PPP leaders have also visited China. Init was reported thatisit toBenn, leader of the extremist wing ofwas0 in Algeria and Tanzaniaan0 was available Infunds, Benn claimed, actually originatedChina (where Benn'also visited) butthrough African channels. Benn alsothat the Chinese Communists areto break with the PPP and establish theof British Guiana.

esult of contacts made by both Jagans by

number of Guianese students in bloc countries

had increasedow of1 ton the USSR,n Cuba, n East Germany, ten inand one in Rumania. As of5 it was estimated thatuianese were studying in the bloc. The recently stepped-up bloctill larger Guianese studentbehind the Ironood probability.

5, Dissident Groups

Almost from the beginning there have been marked differences of opinion within the PPP over strategy and tactics. The Jagans1 espousal of the Marxist ideal appealed to the poorer elements in the party while the more well-to-do-members, led by Burnham and composed mainly of Negroes, have been pragmatic and more apt to compromise th**ir socialist principles in favor of the more immediate goals of independence and economic stability. Although Burnham, Beharry, and Rai can be accused of- aspiring to partythey were also opposed to Jagan's radicalism. Only Burnham, because he took the Negroes with him,ignificant political force after the break. Due to their poverty and the charismaticof Jagan, the majority of East Indians found the conservative line of the dissident East Indians unattractive and remained loyal to the PPP.

Jagan's triumph over the conservative wing has proven toixed blessing because it left the partyignificant counterweight to the truly radical element. After his fall from power inagan proposed that the PPPolicy of nonviolent obstructionism. Party led by Brindley Benn, opposed this tactic and found support for their views among members of the PTO. The extremists were so successful intheir cause that party militants beganon Jagan as too moderate and eventually Jagan was forced to state that he wouldabotage campaign calculated to prevent independence fromgranted under the Burnham government.

Although this move may have helped Jagan regain prestige it also caused further dissension within the

party. Mosos Bhagwan, East Indian leader of the PYO, felt that the party should push for independenceegro was In office or not. He saw Jagan's stand for independence when he was in power and against independence when ho was not as anof hypocrisy on Jagan's part. These views, contrary to PPP policy, aroused Jagan's ire and Bhagwan wasix-month suspension for his anti-party activities. Instead of meekly accepting his suspension, Bhagwan and of his supporters in the PPP and PYO resigned from tha party in In July Bhagwan had been consideringow political movement and while lt is now too early to see what following he will have, his contlnuod public statements could widen splits within the PPP.

7. Members of Ihe House of Assembly

Cheddi Jagan

Fenton Harcourt Wilworth Ramsahoye

Brindley Horatio Benn

Reepu Daman Fersaud

Cedric Vernon Nunes

Yacoob Ally

Ramkarran

Joseph Rudolph Spenser Luck

Eugene Martin Stoby

Bernard Caldeira (Resigned because of

poor health, replaced by Mooneer Khan.)

Earl Maxwell Gladstone Wilson

Maccie Hamid

Ranji Chandi Singh

D-13

Moses Bhagwan*

Lloyd Linde

Subhan All Ramjohn

Charles Ramkissoon Jacob, Jr.

Ashton Chase

Henry Jocelyn Makepeace Hubbard

Mohendernauth Poonai

Sheik Mohamed Saffee**

George Bowman

Derek Chunilall Jagan

Harry Lall

8. TABLE I

Trend in size of PPP Assembly representation:

of Vote

IS out of

ut Of

ut of

ut of

Note: The number of seats in the Assembly ha varied with the constitutional development of the country.

from tho PPP in5 buthis seat as an independent.

from tho PPP in April but retains his seat as an independent.

SECRET

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE

1. Introduction

Tho Communist Party of Chile (Partido Commu-nistii deis. In proportion to the country's population, probably the largest and best organized of any Marxist party in Latinexcept that in Cuba. Through skillful use of popular front tactics over the past three decades the PCCh has probably made more progress than any other Latin American CP in obtaining fairlyacceptance in Chileegitimate leftist party, not viewed by many as linked withCommunism and potentially subversive. PCCh acceptability has also been encouraged by aemphasis in Chile on civil liberties andenerally apolitical role of the armed forces. Mounting socioeconomic problems and popularin tbe last decade have alsothe standing of the PCCh and other leftist groups.

The PCCh, in order to preserve the legallt regainedas thus far adheredolicy of the "peaceful way" (via pacifica) and has generally avoided provocatory*subversive action, In contrast with the view of small dissidentand minority Socialist elements favoring the Chinese Communist line of violence (although none of significance has been mounted). The PCCh via pacifica, however, conceivably could be modllloa in tho event that the Chrlstion Democraticis able to carry through its ambitiousprogram over the direct opposition of the far leftists. There Is no hnrd evidenceCChto abandon its via pacifica; however, there are indications that the October congress will bring changes.

8 the PCCh has strengthened itsand has attempted to to reinforce its image of respectability byorking component of the Popular Revolutionary Action Frontoalition with the Socialist Party. The Na-

SECRET

tional Democratic Parties were members of theuntil the5 elections after which they withdrew their support.

2. Bri story of the

The PCCh was founded2ember of the Communist Third Internationalls Emilio Recabarren, veteran labor organizer, propagandist, and militant, who had formed the Socialist Worker Party An outgrowth of the SWP, it did not develop effective strength until. Previously It was rent by the appearance ofand Trotskyite factions; the latter group eventually declined and was forced out of the party, and some of the Trotskyite lerders even entered the Socialist ranks. Moreover, suppression during the Ibanezthe Communists. After the return of liberties the Communists extended theirespecially in labor circles and among some IntellectuaIs.

The PCCh congressional delegation greweputies2eak ofeputiesenators1 beforo the party was outlawed roportion of the total legislature this representation was uniquely large in Latin America, but it did not fully reflect the party's gains, especially among labor unions. Even non-Commmunists concede that the PCCh has excelled both in discipline and in adaptability to circumstances. Like Western European Communist parties it veerod to "popular front" tactical cooperation with othereven middle-class elements (thethe mid and. Despite theof'the fronthe PCCh did not revert to its earlier position of political isolation and uncompromising extremism. The PCCh, adhering closely to shifts in the Soviet party line, has declaredomestic movement, and has found Itto ally itself with other Leftist and even centrist forces for electoral purposes. This policylimax6 when the PCCh gave the margin of victory to the popular front RadicalGonzalez Videla. In return three PCChwere appointed to the cabinet as ministers of

agriculture, lands and colonization, and public works.

The PCCh was soon using its strategicposts to promote disorder in the coaland rural areas. Int was ousted from the cabinet, and8 the party wasby the Law for the Defense of Democracy. The passage of this law also reflected thefear that the continued legal existence of the PCCh would prejudice US capital investment and aid. The PCCh functioned mainly underground8 until the law was repealedargelyesult of its ineffectiveness and itsto non-Communists. During the proscription period the PCCh regrouped and regained much of its strength. It was represented directlyhose holdover terms were allowed to beand unofficially by extremist fringe groups; it thus remained active and influential.

8 the PCCh contributed significantly to the strong showing of the FRAP presidentialAllende (who lost by0nd in1 congressional election the PCCh won four seats in the Senate andn the Chamber of Deputies. In popular vote strength it was fifth and4 percent. The number ofas more than six times that of its then estimated membership 3 municipal elections the PCCh8, even though historically it has done less well in local contests which generally tend to be personality contests. Municipal governments traditionally have been mostly controlled byand rightist politicians, but the PCCh has made inroads in some areas.

4 Socialist Salvador Allende was again the FRAP presidential candidate. Although decisively beaten by the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, he polled nearly one million votes. Inlections the FRAPotes with the PCCh8 percent of the total vote. This gave the partyeputies and five senateain of two each, and the PCCh emerged as

the strongest party in Chile on the basis of percentage of total vote.

3. PCCh Strength and Supporting Groups

The PCCh has an estimated membershipard carriers who belongell, attend meetings, and pay dues. TheYouth <JC). Partynumber probably morehose who do not desire to become card-carrying members but who tend to support the party's program and its candidates in labor union and political elections. The present membership is somewhat smaller than that preceding the party's proscription During the first part of the clandestine, membershipdeclined but in thendt increased somewhat.

The PCChecruitment drive in3 to convertard-core groupmass party"egular0 JC members. Applicants (aspriantes) were issued provisional cards and could attend open meetings of the party. In the past many aspirantes haveetriment and dropped out. Secretary General Luis Corvalan, in an article in the Moscow Pravdaeclared that from2 to3 "the ranks of the party have grownhile those of our komsomol (youthhavee did notthe numerical base. There is littlehowever, that the recruitment drive had much success. Less thanercent of theJoined, according to one report. The great gains of the Christian Democrats in the last elections have led the PCCh toewdrive and to reinvigorate its organization.

In its composition the PCCh restsabor base, although it alsoonsiderableamong intellectuals and members of theparticularly teachers. In recent years it has sought growth in the countryside among farm workers and native Indians, and these efforts have produced some electoral results. The party has labored

E-4

SECRET-

in rural areas against traditional influence exerted by rightist faro owners (declining sharply; difficulty of communications, requiringexpense and manpower for new propaganda campaigns; and the indolent and independent nature of the average farm workers, who have been lessto Marxist propaganda than the urban In recent years the Christian Democrats have also registered considerable gains in this area.

The PCCh has had relatively little success in attracting women, possibly because of the deterrent influence of the Catholic Church. Not only does the PCCh not draw strong voting support among women, but also few Communist women have filled electoral posts. For example, only nine of theCCh womenwere successful in the municipal elections of4 male candidates were presented, of

The age composition of the party is not known, but the percentage of young members is believed to be high. The PCCh has long given special emphasis to organizing youth. The PCCh political commission has emphasized that while labor support is mostbacking from youth is also basic. lenary session of the JC innpporteur declared that the membership had triplede admitted, however, that the Christian Democratic Party was attracting tho greatest number of youths. In the universities the PCCh has lost control of student organizations to Christian Democrats in all seven of the Chilean universities.

4. Foreign Influence

With regard to foreign policy, Corvalan said that the PCCh stands for Chilean neutralism asthe two militarySoviet bloc and the NATO powers. This view differs with that of the Chinese Communists, and of Fidel Castro, who has proclaimedart of the "socialistastro has aLso asserted that armed insurrection is the only way to achieve social reform. Corvalan has paid tribute to Castro's "great contrlbution" to world

E-5

Communism in demonstrating that such revolution is feasible in Latin America. He has conceded that the Cuban road is the correct one for some Latin American countries but has asserted that themethod has been worked out for Chile. These views were published In tbe World Marxist Review, indicating

were suggesting to Latin American Communists they do not necessarily have to follow the Cnstro rood to socialism. Later inowever, implicitly acknowledged the seriousness of tbe doctrinal dispute by assuring the moreCommunists that the via pacifica does not preclude street demonstrations and strikes. Hethat the PCCh is engagedevolution whether or not arms are used.

The PCCh leaders, however, maintained until4enerally deferential attitude toward Castro on the assumption that he and hishad considerable propaganda value. The PCCh, mainly through the use of front organizations, sought to organize lnrge pro-Castro rallies, demonstrations, and strikes. Tho most recent attempt in this line is the Cuban Solidarity Conference which wasslated for Uruguay and is now scheduled for Santiago, although with foreign attendance reduced by government restrictions. Such past efforts have not had great success. The rallies generally have been poorly attended and no general sympathy strikes have been carried out. The party now sees less value in Castro.

The PCCh has long been troubled by the Sino-Soviet split. For the most part, the PCCh's reaction had been to do nothing and hope that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic would resolve their problems which were described as no more than asquabble. Party leaders maintained this line in the few public statements they made on the subject and in the limited internal party discussion that was allowed. The gravity of the conflict was brought home to the Chilean CP with the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet talks In In that year the PCCh leaders also learned or took cognizance of thesympathy for the Chinese position which existed

E-6

kJliiKJlVIlJ 1

in the rank and file of the PCCh, especially in the provinces where party estimates had it that as high asoercent of some regional conaittees had pro-Peking leanings. rip to Moscow in3 to obtain reassurances that he was following the correct tactic, Luis Corvalan returned and the party finally began taking punitive action; several members of the PCCh were expelled. The Espartaco group was founded during this period. With the(which have continued to the present)onstant reiteration of the necessity for party unity in order to assure the victory of the FRAP presidential candidate, Corvalan was able toparty discipline. The PCCh's relatively good showing in the5 congressional elections has also helped silence party critics and "Pekinis-tas" though tbe movement is still active and lsfor the more belligerent line the PCCh has been taking internally and somewhat publicly since

There hasecent change in PCCh tactics as regards its attitude and relations with the Frei

government.

Dissident Marxists

Several dissident Communist partyhave been formed in Chile. The mosta Chineseriented group apparently led by Jorge Palacio with Senator Jaime Barros as the most prominent spokesman, |"

7

pnrtnco nas claimed touubers, It as yet has negligible political power. It did, however, seem to be directing PCCh student groups who rioted over bus fare increases in early Implicitly Espartaco action squads are well trained and are able to exploit an advantageous situation.

As of5 there werehileans in Peking, China, constituting the largest Latin American nationality group in the city. Host of the men belong to Espartaco and werene-month training course in guerrilla wnrfare.

The other major splinter groups are theRevolutionary Party and the MarxistVanguard, (VRM) both were also formed by dissident elements of the PCCh. These groupsa hard line, and are opposed to the regular Communists and Socialists as well as the Christian Democrats. Recently, attempts have been made by Espartaco and the VRM to unify the splinter groups. Little success has been noted to date.

The PCCh is also confronted with the problem of preserving unity with the Socialist Party in the FRAP con lit ion. Socialists have occasionallysharply with the PCCh for workers* andsupport. Influential minority leaders and sectors in the allied Socialist party havethe PCCh's pro-Moscow position and itsof via paclfica.

TABLE I

rend in size of PCCh congressionalelected,

otal)

TABLE 2

9. Leaders of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh)

POST

OF

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

MEMBERS OF SECRETARIAT

MEMBERS OF

POLITICAL

COMMITTEE

MEMBERS (

LABOR COMMITTEI

'y-Cen.

Asst. Secy. Ccn.

Luis Corvalan Lepez*#

Jose Gonzalez Gonzalez*

Lula Corvalan Lepez**

Jose Gonzalez Gonzalez

Luis Corvalan Lepez**

Jose Gonzalez Gonzalez

of Ovariiabor

Astudillo Gonznlez"

Oscar Astudillo Gonznlez#

Org. Comm.

muel

Manuel

Manuel Cantero

P."

Zor- t

Orlando Mll-

las Correa Cesar Godoy

Urrutia* Jorge Montes

lejandro

Toro# Carlos Contreras

Gen.esearch

Labarca**

Volodia Teltel-boim Volosky'li

Julieta Campu-sano Chavez*"

Jose Cademartori

lllafc

Zor-

Orlando Millas Correa

Jorge Montes

Alejandro Toro#

(Alternate)

Volodia Teltel-bolmulieta Campusano Chavez*"

Ale.jandr-TOroflf

PARTY POST

Chief,

Natl.

Agrarian

Comm.

Head Natl

Control

Comm.

Cesar Domingo Cerda Cuevas

Bernardo Araya Zuleta**

Juan Garcia Romero**

Santos Medel Basualto**

CiprlanoUrrutla**

Osvaldo Araya

Luis Flgueroa Mazuela

Roberto Lara Olate

Luis

Enrique Paris

Pablo Neruda

Jose Bollndares Gonzalez

Pascual.

Luis Barrla

Torres Juan Luis

Campos C.

Juan Chacon Corona

Caspar Diaz Victor Diaz Emma Gomez de Cuello

OF

LABOR COMMITTEE

Bernardo Araya

uan Garcia

Romero**

Osvaldo Araya Luis Figueroa Mazuela

Roberto Lara Olate

PARTY POST

OF

CENTRAL COMMITTEE mevbers

OF

MEMBERS OF

POLITICAL

COMMITTEE

MEMBERS OF

LAP.OH COMMITTEE

Nntl.

Control

Comm.

Jorge Insunza Andres Lazo Marin Maluenda Gladyslberto Molina Fernando Navarro Jose Oyarce Victor Manuel

Quljon Alberto Rozas

Gen. JC

Zamorano Leopoldo Zuniga

Mario Zamorano

KEY

-

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA

1, Introduction

Except for the Conservative Party and theParty, both foundedbe Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista dels the oldest political organization in the country. It ls the principal instrumentality for implementing Communist domestic and international policies, and therefore it has the basic responsibility forand coordinating Communist efforts to penetrate non-Communist targetsubversive, labor, peasant, student, and Intellectual, The party youth auxiliary, the Communist Youth of Colombia (Ju-ventud Communistaumber of controlled front organizations supplement the party machinery in carrying out this priority task, which is designed to expand popular support of the PCC and its potential for subversion.

The PCC at present has no independent capability for seizing power by force in Colombia and itsfor winning control of the government by the electoral process are nil. Communist voting strength has never exceeded about three percent of the total vote cast In any national election.

Communist paramilitary resources are largelyin rural areas andewrural bandit leaders and caudillos. Although small in total numbers, these rural forces arewell trained, well armed, and could bepromptly. The PCC has demonstrated onoccasions throughout its history that It ls capable of fomenting serious labor disturbances and sporadic social disorders and student violence, but by itself it cannot sustain protracted; widespread unrest, sabotage, or guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, in combination with other opposition groups, the PCC is potentially capable of promoting all forms of insurgency, of disrupting the National Front, and even ofhreat to the stability of the government.

F-l

Tho PCC was formally established and admittedember of the Communist Internationalhe year which marked the return of tho Liberal Party to power afterears of unbroken Party rule. The origins of the PCC date back to the,arxist group composed of intellectuals and labor elements was formedthe aegisoviet emigrant. This movement was organized6 as the RevolutionaryParty (Partido Socialistsand affiliated with the Comintern as early When the majority Liberal membership of the PSR returned to the Liberal Party after the electoral victoryhe minority elements reorganized as the Communiat Party of Colombia.

The major growth of PCC strength in both labor and politics coincided with the period of Liberal, when the PCC was allowedfreedom to conduct ite activities. Thosupported President Alfonso Lopez and made notable advances during his two The Communist vote increased from5 to0 in the elections3hen the Communists won prestige and several seats in local legislative bodies as well as In the National.

Communist influence declined sharply6hen the PCC suffered considerable government suppression under Conservative rule and the Rojas dictatorship. During the final three years of this period, the PCC was outlawed.

After the overthrow of the Rojas dictatorshiphe PCC regained legal status and apolitical atmosphere for its activities. The party recovered considerable following amonglabor, advanced its political position through penetration and support of the dissident Liberal Revolutionary Movement ndtronger influence over student and intellectual groups than it had been able to establish before. However, it cannot participate in elections under tho National Front systom

F-2

Since the victory of Castro in Cuba, the PCC has been increasingly troubled by divergencies overthe question of the timely anduse of force and violence. Party policy, while endorsing an eventual recourse to armedrejected the use of violence as "inappropriate" in Colombia, The party stand was based primarily on fear of government countermeasures but also stemmed from the belief that political action (through the MRL) would be more effective in the long run.PCC leaders anticipated an adverse reactionublic already disgustedecade and more of fratricidal violence in the countryside.

Younger and less cautious members of the PCC and Its affiliates disagree with the pacific policy, claiming that the "old line" leaders are too passive and lack vigor. Probably egged on by the propaganda of Peking-sponsored groups in Colombia and otheregment of the PCC splintered off late4 to become the Communist Party ofMarxist-Leninist (PCC/ML). Inhe PCC/ML decreed that Gilberto Viera White was expelled from the post of secretary general and from the Communist movement. The regular PCC greeted this decree with sarcastic scorn, but acknowledged that the PCC -PCC/ML split was formalized by it and probably wouldasting division of forces and effort.

3. Strength and Supporting Groups

ostwar low of. the PCCits membership to0 byecent reports0 membership cards are outstanding, butembers areactive. The JCC is estimated toembers, but its membership tends to fluctuate widely and rapidly. Communistwho would actively support one or more of the party's policies in number ofalso tends to fluctuate frequently andide range.

The Communist central committee is composed ofembers andlternates. The executiveis made up of three members and two alternates.

F-3

There areegional committees located throughout Colombia.

he PCC has been prepared tomanipulate, and cooperate with most leftist-oriented dissidents, but has generally refrained from association with Conservative factions. The party particularly seeks to undermine the National Front and Its socioeconomic reforms and to exacerbate the frictions within and between the two traditional

PCC political policy leans heavily on thethe MRL and seeks the supremacy ofwithin this dissident Liberal faction.supports MRL candidates in elections andany tendency of rapprochement betweenand the majority or "official" element ofParty. Because the PCC attempts tothe stability of government in Colombia, anyof the MRL in support of thewould be contrary to Communist objectives.as recognized tacitly by the PCC, offerstheir best opportunity for legallytheir Influence in government at both thenational level. The National PopularNacionalis made up ofof the disbanded United Front forAction (Frente Unito de Accion

Weak and ineffective on its own, VNP is atseful sounding board of leftist opinion. TheMovement (Movimiento de Obreros, Estudientes, yis useful in the same way- MOEC is more directly oriented toward violence, but it is opposed to PCC leaders and eople are members of MOEC, but VNP membership is still not known to Colombian or US authorities. The old FUAR hadearlyutraction were active.

The Youth of the Revolutionary Movement ot associated with MRL, and the Array of National Liberation (ELN) have made their appearanceoth groups secured considerable publicity during the year, but neither has accomplished very much in the insurgent movement.

In the labor area, Communist-dominated unions speak for somewhat more0 loosely organized

F-4

SECRET

workers, or more than ten percent of the totallabor force, principally in the nation's majorCall, Medellin, and Bar-ranquilla. The Communist-dominated FEDEPETROL union of petroleum workersesult of government action following Communist instigated strikes in The leader of therominent Communist, was jailed, its charter was suspended byew non-Communist petroleum worker's union was started. The Communists traditionally havetrong-to-dominant position among transport, sugar, and construction

4. Foreign Influence

Foreign aid is provided directly and indirectly to the PCC in the form of cash grants, travelpropaganda, scholarships, and subversiveand guidance. The annual sums allotted to these categories cannot be estimated accurately; specific sources of aid and the methods of distribution are similarly difficult to identify. Although foreign support of Communist subversive activity is impeded somewhat by the lack of formal diplomatic relations between Colombia and the Slno-Soviet-Cuban bloc, several instrumentalities are available forassistance. These include the Czech Consulate General and the East German Trade Mission; branchin Bogota of TASS, the New China News Agency, and Prensa Latina, as well as bloc and Cuban bi-national centers or friendship societies, which are not currently active. In addition, travel between Colombia and the bloc is relatively unrestricted. Hence, Communist or pro-Communist travelers areused to transmit bloc guidance,nd

Bloc countries place their major overt emphasis on promoting subversion indirectly throughespecially subsidized travel and The short-wavs broadcasts of Radio Moscow and Radio Peking stress news of violence in Colombia and are consistently antigovernment. Bloc cultural delegations are another medium of the blocprogram, although very limited.

SECRET

The largest bloc expenditure is apparently for travel of Colombians to international Communistor to bloc countries and for study atunder the bloc scholarship program, The purpose is primarily to indoctrinate the recipients and to win their support for international Communist An average ofoolombians annually have been studying at bloc universities in recentin Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the USSR. The level of other travel to the bloc has been relatively high7 and has included professional, artistic, youth, congressional, and labor groups, as well as several leftist politicians.

The bloc also provides training and direction for leaders of the PCC, many of whom have beenin labor and political agitation inCommunist schools. Secretary General Viera White, for example, hasumber ofof the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as the special meetings for Latin American Communist leaders in Moscow and Pekingccasional visits of foreign Communists to Colombia areeans of Instructing the PCC on bloc-sponsored international activities. Bloc messages of "fraternal greetings and solidarity" sent to PCC congresses and the timely radiobroadcasts fromand Peking on Colombian political eventsthat communications between the bloc and the PCC are relatively frequent.

The Castro regime in Cuba sponsors the principal foreign subversive program against the Colombian Government. Cuba also servesase for bloc support of Colombian subversive elements. Not only istaging area for Colombians traveling to bloc countries and Communist international meetings, but bloc diplomatic missions in Havana have access to Colombian subversive groups whose representatives are visiting or studying in Cuba.

The Castro regime apparently considers that the protracted rural unrest in Colombia offers thepotential for encouraging insurgency andin the latter country. umber of Colombians have received training in Cuba in methods ofguerrilla warfare.

t-6

Cuban ties with the PCC were firmly established by the Cuban Embassy in Bogota prior to tho break in Cuban-Colombian diplomatic relationshe Communists have been closely associated with the establishment and operation of Cuban binatlonaland other pro-Cuban organizations in Colombia, and they havo been beneficiaries of considerable Cuban propaganda and possibly financial aid.

Cuba has considerable potential for promoting insurgency In Colombia, particularly throughaid to dissident political organizations and in training Colombians in guerrilla warfare. However, its propaganda program and relatedhave placod the Colombian Government on alert andajority of the Colombian public, including the traditional political parties, the non-Communist labor movement, and other influential groups. Colombia's break of diplomatic relations, government charges of Cuban intervention in Colombian affairs, the Colombian initiative in convening the meeting of American Foreign Ministers at Punta del Estend strong Colombian opposition to Cuba's application for membership In the LatinFree Trade Association demonstrate the strong anti-Castro orientation of the Colombian

In addition to its ties with Cuban Communists, the PCC maintains relations with several LatinCommunist parties, in an apparent effort to exchange Information and coordinate activities in the hemisphere. The closest hemisphere liaison, however, la conducted between the PCC and theParty of Venezuela and the Communist Party of Ecuador and dates back to the The PCC has also published considerable propagandaVenezuelan Communist subversive activity, but denied allegations in the Colombian preset that it was directly cooperating in the revolutionary and guerrilla tactics of its fraternal party in.

F-7

5. Dissident Marxists

Tbe nost important mass defection from thethat of the Communist Party of(Partido Comunlsta Colombiano Under the leadership ofa former member of the centraltheroup of pro-Chineseo criticize the Soviet line ofandew, hard line advocatingrevolution. They were dismissed from the PCC

Vasquez inthers during the following yearalf.

The dissidents naturally banded together,vitriolic criticisms of the leaders of the regular PCC, whom they described on at least one instance as hampered by "old age, inaction, andbourgeoisie*." PCC rebuttals accused Vasquez and his followers of "blabbering nonsense" and termed them "infantile terrorists." This intellectualcontinued with escalating passion on both sides untilt which time Vasquez hurled the ultimatecalled PCC Secretary General Viera aset up his own party, the PCC/ML.

The first plenary sosslon of the PCC/ML was held in September insite was chosen so that Communist power would be "drawn away fromasquez told his fellow members at the plenarythat Communist China had promised financial aid and would recognize them as the voice of Communism in Colombia as soon as the PCC/ML openly declared against Moscow.

There is no reliable evidence that the Chinese have yet supplied significant material aid to the PCC/ML, but the group has grown in strength and vigor. It is now believed to havodherents, although no reliable figure is available andtend to vary widely. The PCC/ML has assumed major proportions as the political guide of insurgent violence in Colombia.

Inogus national congress, the PCC/ML claimed to be the "singular" Communist party

in Colombia and "dismissed" the leaders of the PCC from their posts. The PCC leaders rejected the PCC/ML claims, but for the first time publicly acknowladged that the party had split and that the split probably would be long lasting.

SFCRFT

7. Members of the Legislature

The following members of the House ofelected onave been cited as Communists or Communist sympathizers:

Bernal Castano Hernando Garavito Monoz Jaime Velasquez Toro Ciro Rlos Nieto

From the Department of Caldas

From the Department of Cundiamarca

From the Department of Antioqula

From the Department of Santander

F-ll

COMMUNISM IN COSTA RICA

1. Introduction

Although now of minor Importance, theParty of Costa Rica, the Vanguardln Popular (PVP), is the oldest and most sophisticated in Central America and was at one time veryin the government. It is well organized but its following Is small and it has little control over the domestic political scene. It was declared illegal after the civil warut it has been permitted considerable freedom in thepolitical climate of Costa Rica, It has not, as yet, experienced the split between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions that has affected many other Latin American parties, but younger party activists are beginning to grow impatient with the nonviolent policies of the party "old guard." The Communists hope to participate in6 presidential election under the auspices of their political front, the Partido AlianzaSocialists (PAPS).

3. History of Communism in Costa Rica

The Communist Party of Costa Rica (PCCR) was founded9 by Manuel Mora Valverde, who is still,he party's secretary general. At that time, Moraoung university student, barelyears old. ecade after lt was established, the PCCR was virtually the only spokes-nan for the rights of workers, the small peasants and the down-trodden among Costa Rica's lower class. Mora and the party captured the support of the intellectually curious and socially conscious university students and succeeded inase of support among the artisans of San Jose and the provincial towns. Their Labor base was centered among the banana workers of the ubiquitous United Fruit Company, well known for its harsh antllabor policies.

During its formative period, the PCCR began organizing trade unions in San Jose, the first of these being the Carpenters' Union, ora

SECRET

was able to setentral trade union group, the Union General de Trabajadores, but it did not last long. Mora 's successes were greatest among the banana workers, Costa Rica's only rea 1'proletariatation of small farmers. United Fruit opposed the organization of the workersnion, and the government was also suspicious of Mora's Rivalry among the workers was keen and spurred by racial and national differences. Most were foreigners, Jamaican Negroes or Nicaraguans, and had little feeling for the country itself or its people. Despite these difficulties. Mora and the PCCR were able toanana Workers' Union.

The first test of union strength came 4 when the country's first major strike hit the United Fruit Company, and nearly all the0 inin the walkout. The strike was actually led by Mora, who wasember of the Costa Rican Congress, winning his seat the previous year. As leader of the strikers, Mora met several times with President Jimenez, who finally ordered the company to negotiate with the workers. The strikers named Mora as theirand at first the company refused to meet with the nation's leading Communist, but eventually the strike was settled.

At this time, the PCCR was recognizedfraternal member" of the Comintern, but wasull member. The party was one of ten that signed the manifesto supporting the Cubanwhich overthrew Gerardo Machado. he PCCR was acceptedull member of the Comintern at the Seventh International Congress.

In addition to Mora, one of the leaders of the PCCRenezuelan exile, Romulo Betancourt. Betoncourt had been exiled by Juan Vicente Gomez for his activities, and since heew years older than Mora, he was able to exert considerable influence on the party. Betancourt urged theof the party from the Comintern andompletely national party without ties to the Soviet Union. This hereticaL stand was finally rejected by the party membership andresigned,

G-2

After its very successful role in tbe banana strike, the party made little progress. Theof United Fruit from the Atlantic Coast prevented the PCCR from consolidating its gains among the workers. Mora was re-elected to the Legislature but it wasecade before other party members were able to gain seats.

In the, the party again began to make strides. Rafael Calderon Guardia was elected presidentasing his support in part on his reputation among the pooroctor. The President began to lose supportime in office because of charges of corruption, and he began to Look for additional political backing. He turned to the Communists, who were already strong supporters of the Calderon regime, because of the Comintern World War II policy of backing governments who were fighting against Faclsm. (Costa Rica had declared war on the Axis powers before the US). alderon and Mora spoke from the same platformar rally soon after Costa Rica had made its war declaration.

Under Calderon, and his successor, Teodoro Picado, the Communists became advisers to theon political, social, and economic affairs. The PCCR was influential in the propagationabor code, establishmentocial security system, enactment of workers compensation andof an income tax. They not only proposed these measures, but set up and administered theto carry them out. here were four Communist members in the legislature, andhey had seven.

In addition to backing the Calderon regime, the PCCR followed another trend among Latin American parties and changed its name, becoming the Vanguar-dia Popular (PVP). Onune,he PCCR po-Litburoational conference, at which the PCCR was dissolved and the new Vanguard Partyas its successor. Mora was named secretary general, and most of the PCCR leadership retained their posts in the new party. It was hoped that this change would be more acceptable toleft-wing and moderate elements in the country. The program of the "new party" was moderate and

avoided mention of the "class struggle." The party also announced its support for Calderon and for the United States. The party's program stressedreform, guarantees of agricultural prices, and launching of an economic development plan and acode. This new policy won wide acceptance, and the Archbishop of Costa Rica gave the PVP his The backing of the church gained the PVP the support of the workers and the party was able toational labor organization, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Costa Rica (CTCR) in October

Tho relationship between the PVP and the CTCR was clear, since the secretary general of the CTCR was also the trade union secretary of the PVP. The CTCR claimed that it hadnions and0 workers during its prime.

Tho Communists formed part of the governmentthat elected Picado to succeed Calderon The reaction among the opposition was strong, as Otilio Ulate, editor of Diarlo de Costa Rica, an opposition respected daily, accused"-the government ofictatorial regime in which the Communists shared authority with the elected leaders of the country. This attack on the government was echoed many times during Plcodo's term of office, and, as the election8 grew closer, tensions increased.

8 election resulted in the surprisingof opposition candidate Ulate at the polls over Calderon, who was tryingecond term. The Cal-deronlsta Congress nullified the vote and civil war broke out. Joseoalthy coffee planter, led tho Ulate forces against Calderon, who was backed by Manuel Mora and the Communists. At first Mora fought hard against Figueres forces, and in fact, became the chief defender of tho entrenched When it became obvious that the government was collapsing, Mora tried to bring the Communists over to the side of the Figueres forces, but the Communists were forced to give up their arras as the rebels moved into San Jose and took over the government.

The junta set up by Figueres quickly took action against the Communists. The PVP was dissolved and the CTCR was broken up by the Supreme Court. ew

*?Wr7ftET

constitution was written which banned the Communist Partyolitical organization, and the PVPwent into exile.

With the inauguration of Ulate9 and the end of the rule by the junta, the restrictions against the Communists were relaxed. Exiled Communists,Mora, returned to the country and soonregional trade union organizations. The PVP, itself, however, remained underground- he Communists were finally able to organize another national labor body, the Confederacion General de Trabajadores (COT). Their efforts to form afront organization for3 presidential election failed. Tbe electoral tribunal denied the participation of the Partido Progresista Independiente, the front group, in the election because itommunist organization and thus proscribed by the constitution.

During this period, and especially after the election of Jose Flgueres, the appeal of the party began to wane, and the PVP lost much of its The Nat.onal Liberation Party (PLN) had developedeologlcal platform, socialistad captured the Imagination of tbear.'1 its support.

The fragmentation of tho PLN before8 election led to the victory of Mario Echandl, the opposition candidate, and again tbe PVP was unable to develop an acceptable front party that couldin the election. One of the groups that broke from the PLN, that of Marclal Aguiluz, became the vehicleommunist-front group that could be politically active and was acceptable under the This party, the Partido Accion Democratica Popularas formed1 andyear campaign by theto take part in national elections. The PADP leadership, most of them PVP members,ro-Castro poLicy and were able to elect one to the Legislative Assembly, Jose Sunol Leal, who claims he is no Communist.

Since2 election, in which the PLNto power with Francisco Oriicb gaining the presidency, the PADP has faded and been replaced by still another front, again Led by Marcial Aguiluz.

0-6

SECRET

This group, the Partido Alianza Popular Soclalistaas been inscribed, but party leadersit to be challenged and possibly stricken from the rolls by the electoral tribunal before6 election.

3. Present Status of Communism

The PVP has neverarge membership, but has often attracted sympathetic support fromleftists. Prior to World War II, partyprobably did not0 people, and even during the party's most active period during the Calderon and Picadoctual dues paying members probably amounted to. Party strength declined tofter the party was declared illegal,ecent upsurge has taken place, and it is believed that there are againembers in the PVP. In5 the partyecruitmentaimed at addingew militant members to PVP rolls. Estimates of party sympathizers range as high This figure is derived from membership in front groups and the electoral support received by the PADP In2 election, when it garnered moreotes. The PADP was said tonscribed voters prior to the election.

Despite the fact that it is illegal under8 constitution, the PVP is permitted to operate without severe restriction by the government. Party publications are permitted and Secretary General Mora hasadio program for several years. The PVP .concentrates most of its activities among labor and student groups and occasionally attempts tointernational situations, such as thecrisis. The PVP prints its own paper, Libertad, on presses provided by East Germany. The paper is freely distributed andirculation of.

The PVP works in labor through two federations, the Confederacion General de Trabajadores Costarri-censes (CGTC) in urban areas andanana workers' federation in rural areas which belongs to the CGTC. CGTC isehicle for theof low-level propaganda, Communist agitation

TT

and the sending- of workers to the bloc countries and Cuba for study and training. fr'UTRA wasin an embezzlement scandal3 and lost three fourths of its membership. Recentconditions in the province of Limon have renewed the interest of the banana workers in improving their lot and the PVP hopes to be able to exploit the situation.

The PVP has been unsuccessful in building any firm base of support among Costa Rica's students. Generally, students at the University of Costa Rica ore anti-Coromunist and in the past have taken great pleasure in harassing the hard-corero-Communists on the campus.

The Costa Rican Socialist Youthouth wing of the PVP, ls estimated to haveembers. Most of the present leadership hasor is now receiving training in either the USSR or Cuba, and in some cases both countries. Although the JSC has so far followed PVP discipline, there are continuing indications that, if allowed, the organization wouldore militant stand on many issues.

The PVP has had some success in penetrating the National Federation of Progressive Juntas, which is made up of civic improvement groups, but they have made no apparent mark on the group's policies. Other PVP front groups Include the Alliance of Costa Rican Women (AMC)eachers' front. All these organizations are small and lack any real.

The PVP's most significant political activity is centered around the PADP, now clothed in its new title as the PAPS, The leader of this front group is Marcial Aguiluz, who broke from the PLN before8 election. The PAPS hasocal point forhinese Communists andrevolutionaries as well as the moreoriented Communists. Aguiluz is probably Costa Rica's most dangerous left-wing revolutionary leader and has been involved in antigovernraent plotting at home as well as in Honduras and Panama. The PAPS has offically given its support to neither

the PLN-government prosidentint candidate, Daniel Odubcr, nor the apposition conLition candidate, lroicssoroaquin Tro.ios. I

The PATS will probably concentrateeast Keeping one sent in the Legislative Assembly no* held under the PADP oanncr by Jose Sunol and perhaps gaining one each from 3nn Jose and Puntarenas. The PAlo still faces the danger of being challengedommunist-front party and losing its place on the electoral rolls before

Despite its small size, the PVP is the most sophisticated and best organized Communist party in Central America and is capable of providingand logistical support to parties in neighboring* countries. Costa Rica has served in recent yearsraining; ground for Communists from Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Recently, there haslowdown in this sort of activity, but it may resume after6 election.

The principal source of funds for the PVP comes from the USSR and salaries for party leaders as well as other expenses have come from Moscow for many years. The present PVP monthly budget runs in the neighborhood0 colones, of whichr Less, is raised locally. The top party leadership has received training in Moscow and younger party members have been trained in Cuba.0osta Rican students have been sent to Communist countries for schooling. 1osta Ricans traveled to Havana at the expense of the Costro government.

Because of its democratic tradition and the lack of repression of the Communists, Costa Rica has been usedistribution point for Communist propaganda

fiJi^Cffi PIT

in Central America for many years. Prlnclplos, the Spanish-language version ofs printed In Sat. JoseIbution to Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Recently, party secretary Mora was reportedly experiencing difficulties in sellingopies that are printed each month. The party0 yearly for publishing Prlnclplos.

Both TASS and Prensa Latlna have representatives in Costa Rica, but the New China News Agency (NCNA) office was closed3 after the localthrew his support behind tbe pro-Soviet stand of the PVP. The NCNA stillocal stringer in San Jose.

Costa Rtca maintains diplomatic relations only with Poland, whose ambassador ls resident in Mexico City. Trade relations have been meager in the past andessn goods was exported to Poland and none to other Communist countries.3 import figure was somewhatrom Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Sincehen severaldeputies visited the bloc area, pressure on the government to increase trade with Easternhas increased. Inrade treaty was signed with Poland. rade treaty ls pending with Yugoslavia, and East Germany has tried twice, both times unsuccessfully, toce In San Jose. Czecholovakia presentlyour-man unofficial trade mission in Costa Rica. The East Germans offered toignificant amount of Costa Rican coffee and in fact didrivato purchaseommercial deaLer. The coffee growers can be expected to put pressure on the government to permit further sales toEurope if their sales in the West diminish. The recently passed Barter Law will allow trade deals with Communist countries.

The youth of the Costa Rican Party isincreasingly impatient with the leadership of the party old guard, but the PVP has not split into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions There is no guerrilla movement in Costa Rica, but some of the hard-Line revolutionaries may be found in

the PAPS of llarcial Aguiluz. The Chinesehave had little success in Costa Rica but their tactic of training young revolutionaries may eventuallyeparate movement that could break away from the PVP. Aboutosta JUcans have received guerrilla training in Cuba.

ENTIJU

THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY

1. Fidol Castro and the Cuban Communist Party

In the autumn5 Fidel Cafitro took the first significant steps to establish the authority of Cuba's Communist Party on the national level. Byoliticalecretariat and five standing committeesan central committee, Castro made it clear that the party will be entrustedide range of powers. As abis regime will become even more .

Betweeneptemberastro announced the formation of the new national party organs, declared that the drafting of Cuba'sconstitution hadhanged the party's name to the Cuban Communist Party, and also said that its first national congress will be heldlate

The party, which was known for about three years as the United Party of the Socialist Revolutions the smallest in the Communist world. 0 members are drawn from an elite core of Castro's most militant supporters and are therefore intrinsically loyal to him and obediently responsive to the regime's policies. With most of its representation from the Cuban masses, however, the party is grounded more in unsophisticated adulation for Fidel Castro thanomprehension of Communism.

A. .The Central Committee

Fidel and Raul Castro continue as first and second secretaries, and Armando Hart, formerly the minister of education, has moved up to the third slot in the party hierarchy as its secretary of President Dorticos, chairman of the economic committee, is also on both the political bureau and the secretariat. These four will probably control virtually all activities of the party. Their only colleagues on the eight-man political bureau for example are four army majors' with scant experience in government who were seemingly included tctrong representation to the military,

H-l

CONFIDENTIAL

The six-man party secretariat will apparently assume wide responsibilities for administering policies set by the political bureau. Most of its members are able political technicians with long government experience. Both Bias Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, veteran Communists and ableare members. Raul Castro is the onlyrepresentative and also heads the secretariat.

Most of the responsibilities allocated to the five standing committees within the central committee concern matters which were not previously under party control. The most significant policy shift lain the composition of Dorticos* five-mancommittee, which Is made up of four otherof "liberal" economic principles. Theviews espoused by Ernesto "Che" Guevara have no proponents in the Cuban leadership. Armando Hart heads the education committee which includes the new education minister and the head of the party schools.

The new foreign affairs committee is headedoung revolutionary with little experience in foreign relations rnthor than by Foreign Minister Raul Hon, who is only the second member. Theof Manuel Pineiro, the bend of Cuba'sand subversion service, is apparently meant to emphasize the regime's Interest in"anti-imperialist" revolutions in Latin America and elsewhere. Although the committee will probablyeorganization of the Foreignand assume some of its powers, the conduct of foreign affairs will romaln predominantly under the direct oontrol of Fidel Castro and President Dorticos.

The constitutional studies committee is chaired by Bias Roca and Includes the justice minister. The committee is charged with drafting Cuba's "socialist" constitution and withew court and judiciary system patterned after Soviet bloc examples. It may also study 'changes in the lower partyand will probably plan the first Communist Party congress.

The revolutionary armed forces and state security committee is headed by Raul Castro and staffed by the interior minister and army chief of staff. About one fourth of the party ranks and two thirds of tho central

ittee numbers are in the armed forces. Bythe party and military establishments, theis ensuringolarization between its two most important bulwarks. Moreover, because of the wide representation in the central committee, It appears that factionalism in the Cuban leadership ls at its lowest point since Castro came to power.

The central committee comprises nearly the entire top civilian and military leadership of the Castro regime. Inclusionumber of veterans of the pro-Castro party suggests that the conflict between the regime's "old" and "new" Communists nowead Issue. In addition to both Bias Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez more thanther important "old" Communists have gained added Influenceesult of central committee membership. The bitter disputes which characterized the early years of the party's' development appear to have given wayenerally united program.

B. Outlook

The accelerated development of the Communist Party5 reflects several important trends in the political evolution of the Castro regime. The party has assumed wide powers and is clearly meant to function as the regime's inner bureaucracy and control most affairs of government. Manyof government ministries will probably be shifted to the party, but control over the economy, foreign affaire, and education will remain essentially in the hands of the same men. The composition of both party cadres and higher councils indicates that veteran followers of Fidelny from hisulya pre-eminent position. The party therefore, can probably be expected to remain indefinitely as the personal political machine of Fidel CaBtro.

2. History.of the Pre-Castro Communist Party

The Cuban Communist Party was founded5 andecadetrictly proletarianpolicy. Although outlawed almost from' tho outset, the party was already an important force in Cuban politics in thehen Communists achieved power in the labor movement and helped to

overthrow tho Mnchado dictatorship ear later concerted Communist oppositionrincipal factor in the fall of the Grau San Martin government. With unabated vehemence the partyFulgencio Batista, the new Cuban strong man, who ruleduccession of puppet presidents until he was elected president himself It was with Batista's assistance, however, that the party became one of the most important and powerful Communist parties in Latin America.

5 the party began to adopt popular front policies in accord with world-wide Communist policy. Perhaps to emphasize the change in the party's line, Cesar Vilar, who had been secretary generalas replaced by Bias Roca. Theodification in Batista's attitude toward the Communists was when he permitted them tofrontUnited Revolutionary Party (PUR) Juan Marinelloroup of prominent Cuban writers and intellectuals who joined with the Cuban Socialists in the PUR. Although the Communist party was still illegal, Batista allowed it topublicationaily newspaper inS. Two months later the party completed its turnabout and declared that Batista had become antifascist and "an integral part of the progressivehe new amity between Batista and the Communists was sealed when they called the dictator "theof democracy."

Batista legalized the party in8ear later lt merged with the PUR and became the Communist Revolutionary Union Partyhe Communiststrong influence at the constitutional convention which drafted0 constitution. In terms of labor and socialit was one of the most advanced in the hemisphere. In the0 elections, thesupported Batista's candidacy for theand joined In his Socialist Democratic

esult of this collaboration with Batista, the Communists elected ten members to the Chamber of Deputies and moreembers of citythroughout the island. Communist mayors were elected in Santiago and Manzanillo.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact9ew strain on the Cuban party, but had little effect on itswith tho government. Tbe party continued to support Batista and tooderate policy of domestic reform, but directed its propaganda against the Allies and assisted in the dissemination of Nazi propaganda. This new position led the Socialist group within the PURC to split with the Communists and found an independent Socialist Party. When Germany invaded Russia tho Communists shifted their position, and throughout the war they pursued the popular front program, avoided all talk of violence, and refrained from criticizing tho United States. 2 Cuba for the first time established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Tbe party again changed Its name In preparation for4 elections and became tho Popular Socialist Party (PSP). It supported Batista's candidate who lost to Grau Sanho party gained considerable strength during the war years and polledotes in4 elections. Two of its prominent leaders, Juan Marinello and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, served at different times as ministers without portfolio in Batista's cabinet. They were the first Latin American Communists to be so honored.

72 however, the PSP steadily lost strength. In8oters registered ashighest yetbut actual voting strength was below that46 because the party had failed to form a In addition the administration of Prio Socarras took stronger action against tho Communists than had Gnu. 0 few unions remained under Communist control, and in the congressional elections of that year the PSP registered0 voters. Although the core of the organization was never broken tho PSP remained isolated

The party was publicly critical of the military coup which returned Batista to powernd in October of the following year it was againIllegal. Batistaureau for the Suppression of Communist Activities within theand most of tbe top PSP leaders were arrested or went Into exile. The underground organization continued to operate, however, and Batista apparently used some of the less prominent Communists tohis own labor support.

CGArFIDENTlAL

The PSP did not actively Join in the struggle against Batista even while lt was being persecuted. Fidel Castro was scornfully looked uponputsch-lst" and "adventurer" and not until the summer8 when Carlos Rafael Rodriguez traveled to the Sierra Maestri, did the Communists attempt to make official contact with him. Rodriguez was with Castro during tbe final months before victory, and probably concluded an agreement with him permitting tbe PSP to re-emergeegal party upon Batista's fall. Once the Castro regime was committed to its radical program, the PSP began to quietly urge theof revolutionaryn order to maximize its strength and to neutralize other political factions.

3. The Development of Castro's United Party

Since the united party first began to form lt has passed through three distinct organizational phases and has twice changed its name. Itumultuous power play, suffered apurge,and finally was completely reconstructed. Through all these changes, however, Fidel Castro has uniformly stated that "the role of the party is to govern." As early as1 he promised tbat the regime would be institutionalizedroletarian party.

The development of the united party began in the spring1 when the Integrated Revolutionary(ORI) was formed as an amalgamation of tbe three political groups which survived the Batista regime. h of July Movement and theDirectoratetudent faction) were merged with the PSP. The ORI, however, was formedlear definition of its powers or role in the Cuban regime, and in1 Castro revealed that it was to be only the preliminary step in the formation of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS).

Although various regime officials described the ORIommunist party, ltomewhat equivocal course until Fidel Castro publiclyMarxism-Leninism in During tbe first year of its organization, therefore, the ORI had no meaningful program or national executive organ, and no effective party organization.

E-6

The "old" Communists of the PSP Inevitablythe ORI. Theymall and well-organized club of professionalgeneration older than the young Castroites. In each of the sixand in moat of the municlploa (municipal dia-tricts) "eld" Communists controlled the ORI butto express primary loyalty to the PSP In2 the ORI national directorate was announced, and itsembers included about an equal number of "old" and "new" Communists. Fidel Castro as first secretaryix-man It appeared, however, that Castro was no longer in control of the regime and that the PSP waa freely implementing its own policies. Tensions mounted aa "new" Communists in the regime becamecritical of the PSP.

Castro struck at the "old" Consunists late In March. He sensationally denounced Anibalrominent PSP leader, for "aectarian tyranniea" and accused his of creating "absurd and monstrous" confusion because of his "madness for power." Ea-calante was purged from his post as organization secretary. Moreover, Castro bitterly railed againet the "old guard" Communists for squandering political power and forgetting the masses, and calledervasive purge to remove the undesirable elements. Escalante waa the only "old" Communiat removed from the national directorate, but the purge extended to four of the alx provincial party chiefs, to most of the local bosses, and waa not completed until all the party celia were completely reconstituted.

The restructuring of the party cells began in2 and continued for about two years while commissions appointed by Castro held nominatingin work centers and state farms throughout the island. ystem of popular assemblies,by Castro to generate party cadres among the masses, has been acclaimed by the regime as an lmpor tant innovation in Communist procedure. At rhe worker assemblies, "model workers" were selected on the basis of their demonstrated devotion to the regime, and party commissions subsequently selected those suitable for PURS membership. In addition the former ORI members were individually reconsidered but probably at least half of them were purged. By the end2 the Cuban press waa bwginning to

)ENTIAL

refer to the party as tbe PURS and the transition was effected by3 without official notice.

The PURS national directorate was composed at first of tbeemaining ORI leaders but by4 was reduced As the party's main organ, however, lt was limited mostly to educational and organizational matters and did not hive clearly established responsibilities. The PURSoverning party and was Important mainly as an intermediary stage inulingparty. For almost three years the PURS slowly augmented its membership and powers aa lower party commissions and cells were formed andarge degree of autonomy. 4 the provincial party organizations were granted extensive supervisory and administrative duties. They continue toas the centers of authority In the six provinces.

4. The Structure and Role of the Cuban Communist Party A. Provincial and Local Party Structure

In each of the provinces there is adirectorate made upmall secretariat and an executive bureau. The secretary general, the highest provincial officer, is assisted by aof organization who also exercises considerable power. The number of additional members of thesecretariats varies,but there are usually secretaries for education, finance, and revolutionary orientation (COR). Other members of tbe executive bureau include representatives in charge ofactivities with the mass organizations and with secondary party organizations.

Regional party directorates were3 to provide the intermediatebetween the provincial and local levels and to supersede the old municlplos. Regionalare directly subordinate to the provincial party apparatus and are similarly organized. The creation of the regionals was one of the majorreforms of tho Castro regime. There areegionals in Cuba with between six andin each province.

Sectional and municipal committees wereto administer andarying number

H-8

CONFIDENTIAL

of party cells. They generally conform to thepattern of other party committees, but are limited to applying higher party decisions and coordinating cell activities. In4 thereunicipal committeesectional Although municipals generally are in more populous areas, it Is not clear why two such similar structures have been retained.

The party cell or NBA (Nucleo de Reyoluclonarles Activoa) ls the lowest party organ and ls composed of "militants" and candidate members. Inhere were mereells varying in size from five to as manyember*. Probably at least half of the party members are laborers and farm workers who were chosen as "model workers" by assemblies in their work centers and stats farms. The cell has no administrative role. Its primary functions are to mobilize workers and maintain an exemplary work standard.

Members and candidates pay dues ranging from one to four percent of their monthly salaries,but they are probably more than compensated through favors and spocial considerations. Candidates who share all the responsibilities but none of the benefits of full members,ne to two yearafter which they are considered for party

Party committees below the provincial level were "elected" from within their own Jurisdiction by sectional and regional assemblies, butist of candidates suggested from above. Nohas been established for provincial assemblies, and provincial party officers continue to be appointed by the national organization.

B. Indoctrinationducation

The committee for revolutionary orientation (COR) is attached to the central committee andsupervise! and coordinates party Itulletin at regular intervals and controls the Cuban Institute of Radiowhich operates all radio and television stations. The COR probably also malc-ains direct control over the press. Each lower party coasitteoOR

NT IA I.

representative, who Fidel Castro Insists "isculsair"revolutionary instructor." The COB chairman is Raul Garcia Pelaez, previously the Hatanzas Province party chief. Isldcro Malmlerca, the former COR chief, now is editor of the party daily, Granma, and will apparently function mainly as its political overseer. It la not clear how the COR is related to tbe new education committee.

The party also maintains an extensive system of sorearty schools including the Nlco Lopez National Party School, five national schools for tbe mass organizations, and six provincial centers, ae well as day and evening basic schools specifically created to bring revolutionary instruction to peasants and workers. The schools have graduatedtudents and are supervised by the national directorate of the schools of revolutionary instruction which is apparently attached to the party's education committee. Courses attempt to integrate classical marxism with the Cuban revolution. They Include tbeorotlcilstudies, Cuban history, and the works and speeches of Fidel Castro. Lionel Sotc is tbe head of the schools. The party also stimulates andproper political indoctrination in the nation's regular school system by maintaining delegates on provincial and municipal education boards.

C. The Union of Young Coifr'Bunists

The Union of Young Communists <UJC> is the party's youth organization and its nationalis guided by the party in grooming tbe "mostCuban youth for party membership. The UJC had its origin in the former Association of Rebel Youth', which changed Its name in Aprilndfive separate ycutn groups. The UJCembership of0maller number of candidates. The regimeotalofubans between the ages of The UJC publishes the weekly magazine Mellauly newspaper CzventRebelde (Rebelt controls the Federation of University Students (FEU) and supervises two other organizations for younger Cubans.

The Union of Pioneershe junior version

of the UJC, was established to organize andchildren between the ages cf six and thirteen.

E-10

0 members int is designedto prepare young Cubans for the UJC and to organize recreational activities. The Union of Secondary Studentsormed inow has0 members.

D. The Party in the Armed Forces

With more0 members of the Cuban armed forces also members of the party, the military la rapidly developing its own political cadreloyal to the regime. Raul Castro has personally supervised the construction of the party In th* military by appointing all politicaland by staffing all party offices with truated supporters of the regime. 4 he said that the military will have the highest percentage of party members in the country, because the "armed forces are the political and military vanguard of the revolution.

According to Castro,hird of thewill eventually be admitted as full or candidate merabera of the party and the Union of Young An armed forces minister and second secretary of the party, Raul Castro is building tbe regime's largest unified political force within it* strongest and most faithful institution.

The organization of the party in the armed forces was initiated in3 with the formation of the first cells in the Army of the East. he process began in the Central Army andyear later in the Western Army. The navy and air defense forces have also organized party cell*.

Military cells are constructed in essentially the same manner as in civilian work centers. That ls,the membersilitary unit gatheropular assembly to choose the "sodel combatants" who are later reviewed by the party commission appointed by Raul Castro, Those acceptedell and elect their own officers. Thereew Intermediary party structures which coordinate and direct the activities of lower bodies, but the hierarchy ls kept weak because military channels maintain the line of command.

Military advisers from the Soviet bloc countries served as consultantsere largely responsible

H-ll

for tha system that has been created. The central committee directs the military cadres through Raul Castro's military committee. The principal duties of the military cadrea are to drum up support for regime policies, to advance the Communist doctrine, and to provide the example for high military and political performance. In ao extensively conatruct-ing the party in the armed forcea the Castro regime has taken another important step in assuring ita tight hold on power in imitation of the otherof the Communiat bloc.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CU3AH COMMUNIST PARTY

Secretary Second Secretary Secretary of Organization

Fidel CASTRO Ruz Raul CASTRO Ruz Amando HART Davalos

I'UREAU

CASTRO Ruz Raul CASTRO Ruz Osvaldo DORTICOS Torrado Juan ALMEIDA Bosques Ramiro VALDE3 Menendez Armando HART Davalos CuiUermo GARCIA Fria Sergio DEL VALLE Jimenez

Raul CASTRO Ruz Osvaldo DORTICOS Torrado Fidel CASTRO Ruz Bias RCCA Calderlo Faure CHCMON Mediavilla Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ

COMMITTEE

Osvaldo DORTICOS Torrado Faure CHOMON Mediavilla Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ Raul CURBELO Morales Joel DCMENECH Benitez

BOUCATIOK COMMITTEE

Armando HARD Davalos Lionel SOTO Prieto Jose LXANUSA Gobel

FFAIRS CCKMITTBE

orrisran Raul ROA Garcia Manuel PINEIRO Lcsada

ARMED FORCES AND STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE

CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES COMMITTEE

CASTRO Ruz Ramiro VALUES Menendez Sergio DELL VALLE Jimenez

Bias ROCA Calderlo Jose MARAHJO Morales Alfredo YABUR Maluf

Jose ABRANTES Fernandez KuJ. Rcgelio ACEVEDO Gonzalez Maj. Armando ACOSTA Coraero KaJJuan V. ACUHA Jlunez Severo AGUIRRE Crlsto Maj. Jose M. ALVAREZ. Efigento AMEIJEIRAS Delgado Capt. Emllio ARAGONES Navarroe ARTEAGA Hernandez

Maj. Flavio BRAVO Parco

Ramon CALCINES Gordillo

Maj.. CAMACHO Aguilera

Maj. Lino CARHERAS Rodriguez

Maj. Ernesto CASILLAS Palenzuela

elarmlno CASTILLA Mas

Maj. Leopoldo CIHTRAS Fria

Maj. Abelardo COLOME Ibarra

Maj. Angel Joel CHAVECO Kern&rtdez

Maj. Manuel DIAZ Gonzalez

KaJ. Victor E. DRAKE Cruz

Vllna ESPIN Guillcys de Castro

anuel E. FAJARDO Sotamayor

Msrcelo FERNAICEZ Font

Oscar FERNANDEZ Mell

Kaj. Harold FERRER Martinez

KaJ. Callxto GARCIA Martinez

Maj. Julio A. GARCIA Oliver*

Maj. Pedro M. GARCIA Pelaez

Raul GARCIA Pelaez

Elena OIL Izqulerdo

Fabio GROBAKF

MftJ. Raul GUERRA Beraejo

Maj. Orestes GUERRA Gonzalez

Secundlno GUERRA Hidalgo

Maj. Joel IGLESIAS ieyva

Maj. Omar H.ojena

Maj. Blenerio JIMENEZ Lage

olando KINDEIAH Blea

Maj. Antonio B- LUSSON Batlle

Manuel LUZARDO Garcia

Maj. Jose R- MACEADO Ventura

Isidore KAIMIERCA Peoli

Juan MAPIHELLO Vidaurreta

Miguel MARTIerez

Joe* MASAR Franye

Capt. Jcairuin MEKDEZ Caninehea

KaJ. Raul MEHEHDEZ Toaaeeevich

Arnaldo MILIAH Castro

KaJ. Carlos MIR Karrero

KaJ. Pedro MI RET Prieto

Maj. Jesus MONTANE Oropesa

KaJ. Arnaldo CO-OA Sanchez

KaJ. Mario OLIVA Perot

Maj. Flllberto OLVBRA Moya

KaJ. Raaon PARDO Guerra

lAza.ro FEKA Gonxalea

Maj. Faustlno PEREZ Herr-andez

Capt. Antonio PEREZ Herrero

Kaj. Valfredo PEREZ Rodriguez.

Maj. Lizardo PROENZA Sanchez

Jose RmKIREZ Cruz

Capt. Eliseo REYES Rodriguez

Capt. Jorge RISQCBT Valdes

Maj. Orlando RODRIGUEZ Puerta

Baallio RODRIGUEZ Rodriguez

Urslnio ROJAS Suntleeteban

Maj. Antonic SANCHEZ Diaz

Cella SANCHEZ Mandulay

Maj- Aldo SANTAMARIA Cuadrado

Haydee SANTAMARIA Cuadrado de Kan

Kaj. Rene de los SANTOS Ponce

Cleoentina SEP HA Robi

Kaj. Jose R- SILVA Berroa

Maj. Eddy SUNOL Rlcardo

Lt. Julio TARRAU Castillo

Kaj. Dioclaa TORRALBAS Gonzalez

Felipe TORRES Trujlllo

Capt. VELAZ Suaraz

Maj. Roberto VIERA Estrada

MoJ. Luia A. ZAYAS Ochoa

COMMUNISM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Communist Party of the Dominican Republic originated in thendroup of Spanish Communist exiles who came to the country after the end of the Spanish Civil War. In the Dominican Republic, these Spanish Communistsetwork of front organizations and publications and began to proselytize. They appealed mainly to anti-Trujillo Intellectuals, particularly among the university students. Although Trujillo courted the Soviet Union during World War II,Communists were jailed or kept under surveillance, and operated underground2 5 the Dominican Communist Party was formed under the leadership of such men as Pericles Franco Ornes, Francisco Henriquez, and the DucoudrayJuan Bautista and Felix Servio Ducoudray Mansfield. Inhe police prohibited Communistactivities and leading Dominican Communists sought diplomatic asylum and exile. Most sought refuge in Cuba.

Latexiled Communist leaders returned to the Dominican Republic at the invitation of General Trujillo, who was preparing an "election" which would permit him once again to become chief executive. The Communists supposedly were to be allowed freedom of operation while the Trujillo government could take credit for furthering democracy by allowinggroups to take part in the life of the nation. The Dominican Popular Socialist Party*(Partido So-clallsta Popular Dorainicano -active in thelegally established as theCommunist party in the country and beganpublic campaign meetings. This recognition scheme, which was toavorite Trujillo maneuver, was short-lived. The PSPD was suppressed shortly before7 elections and its principal leaders were put in jail and then exiled.

The Dominican Communist exiles established their headquarters in Guatemala and began publishing Orien-taclon, which was smuggled back into the Dominican Republic. After the fall of the Arbenz government

*Changed to Dominican Communist Party (PCD) in

1. The Pre-Rebellion Period

in Guatemalahe Dominicans moved their headquarters first to Mexico and then to Cuba, whore it remained until after the death of Trujillo. The PSPD played an important role in the attemptedbased from Cuba, which took place onuringumber of the top PSPD leaders were killed.

Prior to the assassination of Trujillo inhe Cuban-based PSPD members were negotiating with him in an effort toommunist organization in the Dominican Republic. During the months of negotiations, there were no Cubanattacks on the Dominican dictator. Immediately after his assassination the Cubans reacted withof US Government complicity in the deed.

With the relaxation of controls that followed the death of Trujillo, exiled Communists boganthe returning Dominican exiles. Byxtremist propaganda leaflets signed by the central committee of the PSPD began appearing In the Republic. The PSPD alsoaily radio program to the Dominican Republic from Cuba. Communists bocameactive in the labor field and suspected Communists headed both the Unitod Workers' Front for Autonomous Trade Unions (FOUPSA) and the National Federation of Public employe in; aim Autonomous Institutions (FENEPIA). The Communists were also active in organizing or infiltrating women's and professional fronts such as theWomen's Federation (FMD) and the Dominican Lawyers' Association (ADOMA).

Although the central committee of the PSPD in2 duclarod itself opposed to the Council of State government and the forthcoming2 elections, it cautioned leftist forces in tho Dominican Republic against being drawn into armed insurrection in which they would probably be defeated. This stand against violence reflected the PSPD's quarrel over tactics with the more extremistof the farisagreement which impeded the unification of leftist forcespopular front" movement.

The election of Juan Bosch raised expectations within tho party that the new government would be

Initially left of center, followedefinite awing to the left that wouldolitical situation favorable to Communist activities. By the time Bosch had been inaugurated as President inost Communist Party leaders hadto the Dominican Republic loudly praising Communist Cuba and expressing conditional support for Bosch. Although still illegal, the PSPD was able to organize clandestinely without much restraint and El Popular,the party newspaper, circulated openly for tlie first time during the short Bosch Bosch refused to take repressive action against the extreme leftist groups so long as they pursued their ends by peaceful means. He apparently wanted to avoid forcing the extreme leftosition where they would probably resort tohad happened in Venezuela under President Betancourt. The PSPD, for its part,ouble-faced policy toward the Bosch government. On one side theymost of their propaganda resources onthe line that the government was in imminent danger from an ultrareactionary plot, involvingof the military and the "imperialists." the Communists emphasized the desirability of protecting tho "democratichey made almost no mention of the Bosch administration. Thealong with other extreme leftist groups, hoped to load the anticoup forces without committingtoo much to the regime. The other side of their position involved exerting pressure on the government for more "revolutionary" measures, with the intent to exploit for their own benefit Bosch's failure to deliver on his promises.

Shortly after the military coup which ousted the Bosch regime, onhegovernment declared all Communistand activities illegal, and forced the PSPD under ground once again. 45 the Communists have intensified their efforts onwith and organizing new labor unions. ThePRD-dominated labor confederation FOUPSA-CESITRADO has now been successfully infiltrated by Communists who are clearly attempting to seizecontrol. Communists dominate the relatively small Dominican Workers' Union, known as "Land are particularly strong in the cement, paint, and textile industries.

1-3

SECRET

Communist indoctrinators and recruiters hnve concentrated their efforts in the schools with marked success. Communist and Cuban propaganda is distributed more or less freely in the schools. The average worker or peasant in the Dominicanis semi-illiterate and incapable ol absorbing Communist doctrines quickly, while the students are usually avid readers and, as in other Latin American countries, become Involved in politics at an early age. Fraguahe pro-Communist studenthas, since its founding inargely dominated campus politics at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. General student apathy toward campus elections and the militancy of the pro-Communists help Fragua control the Dominican Students' Federation (Federacion de Estudiantes Dominicanosho official organization of the student body.

2. Tho MPD

The Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) (Movlmiento Popular Dominicano) was organized6 byexiles in Cuba, where MPD members activelyFidel Castro. In0 Trujillo, In hopes of favorably influencing opinion in the Western Hemisphere, allowed MPD leaders to return to the Dominican Republic tooken Within two months the Dominican government arrested MPD leaders Maximo Looez Molina and Andres Marcellno Ramos Peguero and had the party headquarters looted by mobs,. Lopez had been expelled from the PSPD He was accused of following the "Chinese heresy." Although tho MPD operated forhort time and at Trujillo's pleasure, it gainedpopularity and established itselfona fide anti-Trujillo organization.

Lopez and Ramos were released in1 and the MPD was given new guarantees by Trujillo, who was again making overtures to the OAS. Following theassassination at the end ofopez and othor party leaders reactivated the MPD amid extremist speeches filled with anti-US and pro-Castro propaganda. Party leaders deniod favoring violence or Communism, but the MPD created disorders in Santo Domingo and their public declaretIons contained an unmistakable note of class warfare. Theed and black flag with an uoralsed

1-4

the extremlMt impression. organized by the govornment repeatedlyheadquarters during the summerythe party had anembersand was ponetratlng otherin the Dominican Republic. During theUPD, in cooperation with the PSPD,to unite all leftist parties into afront. Inesultviolenco Instigated by the MPD, theJoaquin Balaguer declared the MPD

Until the inauguration of Juan Bosch inhe MPD was subjected to sporadic harassment by the government and wont underground. It lost most of its popular following and incroaslnglyto provoking riots and mob violence led by disgruntled youth drawn largely from tho lowest urban classes. When MPD loaders returned from exile In the spring3 the party tried once again to setnited front of leftist parties. Although the party was still outlawed, Lopez was allowed to travel throughout the country publicizing the ideas ofliberation" and the popular front, which were echoed in the clandestine party news organ, Libertad.

Shortly after tho3 military coup the MPD, along with the PSPD, was declared illegal by the governing triumvirate. Arrests of MPD leaders more or less eliminated the party from the guerrilla campaign of Maximo Lopez Molina and nine of his followersupply of weapons werenear Cotui in In onrlygovernment forces captured several high-ranking MPD members during on attempted landingoat called tho Scarlet Woman and discovered on arms cache nearby.

MPD strength is found among members of the poor urban classes. Most of the leaders are lowor middle-class university students or professionals with laborlnc-class family backarounds. Without close

family ties, often without employment, they and their largely unlettered followersighly combative group of the dispossessed.

The Cuban Government has presumably supported exiled MPD members while they were in Cuba and faclll-tated their travel to and from Cuba. "

3. The Fourteenth of June Political Group

The extremeh of June Political Group CAgrupacion' Politica Catorce dero-Castro political organization which came into-existence in thelandestineaimed at unseating Trujillo. As an anti-Trujillo organization, the APCJ originally attracted membersroad political spectrum, many from wealthy and socially prominent families. Theh of June, commemorates an abortive invasion attempt mounted from Cuba In0 the APCJlot to kill Trujillo, with the result that many cf its members were imprisoned and tortured. Theas net involved in Trujillo's assassination on Shortly after Trujillo's death and apparently at the insistence cf the extreme leftist faction of the movement, the APCJ assumed the roleunctioning political party. In1 the APCJ refused to enter the Council of Stateproposed by President Joaquin Balaguer. The increasingly pro-Communist orientation of the APCJ caused moderate leaders to resign from the party inoaving the APC: in the hands of By2 the APCJ was organizing armed groups, and stocking arms caches for future guerrilla activities. The party's public pronouncements became

iv LJ x

increasingly anti-US and pro-Castro, reflecting the dominant position of pro-Communist forces.

The APCJ did not participatearty in the2 elections, basing their abstention on the accusation that the Council of State wasthe repressivepolice and thethe Trujillo dictatorship. After theof the popularly elected Juan Bosch, the APCJfor recognitionegal political party, which was granted in3 by the superior electoral The party continued, however, to organizecells, and party leaders appeared to be in full agreement with Marxist-Leninist solutions to the economic and social problems of the country.

3 extreme leftist groups, especially the MPD, attempted to unite all Dominican leftistsopular front. Personal rivalries, however, doomed the proposed front.

After the3 coup the APCJto rally non-CommunistPRD and thea national front to "struggle for the restoration of By lateowever, when it became apparent that anticoup forces would not join forces with the pro-Castro APCJ, party leaders decided to commence the much discussed but poorly planned armed insurrection.

The APCJ temporarily Joined forces with theleftist MPD under the banner ofh of June (Movlmiento Revolu-cionarioeand inorce estimated aten took to the mountains. Leaders of the MR-1J4 apparently hoped that the uprising would point out the instability of the triumvirate government and make the MR-1J4 the leader for the presumed growing discontent with the government in the Dominican Republic. They failed in both hopes. The MPD guerrilla contingent was quickly captured, and the uprising attracted little sympathy. PSPD leaders, who continued to counsel against violence, withheld their support.3 the government, using an3 antisubversion decree, declared the APCJ illegal. Campesinos in the zones of operation refused to aid the guerrillas in spite of efforts to win them over. Dominican Army leaders crushed the uprisingonth.

SFCltET .

The death of several leaders and tbe imprisonment or deportation of others such as Jaime Duran, Fidolio Despradel Roques, Juan Roman Diaz, and Pablo Johnson Ortiz, left the APCJ disorganized and divided. 4 some wanted to rehabilitate the APCJegal political party, others wanted to continueubversive group aiming at the violent overthrow of the de facto government. Byow-ever, Cuban-trained APCJ leaders began returning clandestinely to the Dominican Republic andore active APCJ became manifest.

the

w lunnaj nm party prooaoiy Supports

itaelf by contributions from members, sympathizers, businessmen hoping to buy protection, the sale of the party newspaper Elnd bonds. Some funds also come from sympathizers in New York.

The most important group In the APCJ la thebureau, and the organizationentral executive commission or committee, provincialand cells. Leaders of the APCJ before tho recent rebellion appeared to be:

Rafael Baez Perez

Norge Botello Fernandez

Fidelio Arturo Despradel Roque

Jaime Duran Hornando

Roberto Duverge Mejia

Luis Genao Espalllat

Juan B. Mejia

Daniel Ozuna Hernandez

Juan Miguelnow dead)

Rafael Francisco Taveras Rosario

1 tho aim of the APCJ has been afor national liberation from what they term tho domination of the landowners, the oligarchy, the upper bourgeoisie, and US imperialism. The Castro revolution in Cuba is Ltl model.

The APCJ is openly pro-Castro and maintains representatives in Havana, Paris,and Moscow. The Cuban Government is known to have trained APCJin guerrilla warfare, sheltered APCJ exiles, and assisted them to infiltrate back into theRepublic. Radio Havana has furnished propaganda support to the APCJ as well as to other extreme ieftlst groups in the Dominican Republic.

1-8

SECRET

Beginning last autumn, the Communists and allied extremists who had been deported following theguerrilla effort began filtering back Into the Dominican Republic. They came backariety of circuitous routes and used various clandestine means of entering. Soae were caught by tbe Dominican authorities. Most were not. Even some of thosewere not sentenced because Communist lawyers were able to intimidate and influonce theew were released on bail and never appoared for trial. By early April of this year, on the eve of the insurrection, there were nearlyommunists or allied extremists back in the country afterperiods in exile.

The returnees who came back during the six months that precedod the outbreak of the insurrectionmany who were to take very prominent parts in tbe fighting. Among the more prominent were Juan Miguel Roman Dlax, top APCJ militant who was killed onay leading an attack on the loyalist-held national palace; Jaime Duran Hernando; Daniel Ozuna Hernandez, an APCJ militant active during thoCnyotnno Rodriguez del Prado, top MPD leader also active during the fighting; Baldemiro Castro Garcia, an MPD leader who was reportedly killed while taking part in the rebel raid on San Francisco de Macorls onune; Tomas Erickson Alvarez, an MPD activist who was captured by loyalist forces during the early stages of the fighting; Felix Servio Ducoudray Mansfield, top PSPD leader who is playing an active political role in the rebel camp; Franklin Franco Pichardo, another ranking PSPDwho has been particularly close to rebelminister Jottin Cury; and tho PSPD militant fighter Antonio Isa Conde. Many of the returnees had been active in the abortive guerrilla effort of

/ Training, materiel,nau uet

and intelligenceau uuen provided to the police and security organizations of the Reidthey had to the Bosch arovernment before

Dominican

viBaiiiiMLjun uiu uui uuvuiup into aservice. Capable and educated men could not

I 2!

bo Induced to serve in it and Reid insisted on diverting its few trained men away from theirtask of controlling Communist subversion and instead continually assigned them to investigate smuggling and to colloct information on his non-Communist political oppononts. Reid never seemed to take the subversive threat as seriously as the facts would seem to have justified.

One factor that made the situation particularly vulnerable in the case of the Reid government was the fact that the Communist parties had found an exploitable issue--one which placed them on the same side as the non-Communist political parties which had the greatest popular support. That issue was the one of "constitutionalism" and antimllltarism, reflecting the public's opposition to the military coup of3 and the unpopular governments that had followed.

4. The Rebellion

In its earliest moments, the rebellion appeared tooup by anti-Reld officers, some of whoa had old scores to settle with their superiors, and some of whom were intent on returning Bosch from exile In Puerto Rico. Many PRD members who had not beenin the plotting quickly throw in with tberovisional government headed by PRDRafael Molina Urena was proclaimed and Bosch was asked to return.

It now appears, however, that extremist andgroups had advance word of the revolt, not surprising in Santo Domingo where plotting had been endemic and the subject of frequent gossip. Some lower level PRD members are reported, moreover, to have been in contact with some extremist leaders and seeking supportoup effort.

In any event, once news of the revolt became public on the afternoon ofpril, these extremist groups moved quickly to participate. Leaders of the throe Communist parties began collecting arms,their forces, and establishing strongpoints in Santo Domingo. The PSPD established its principal strongpoint, or garrison, at the house of party leader Buenaventura Johnson Pimentelalle

Espalllat. Crudely fortified machine-gunwere set up on the roof of the house. PSPD activists, including Buenaventura Johnson Pimentel, Nicolas Pichardo Vicioso, Uanuel Ortiz Delangres, Ignacio Perez Uencia,and others were observed onpril making Molotov cocktails and crude grenades at the house, which continued to serve as an arsenal and as headquarters for the main PSPD paramilitary forces untilpril. The PSPD moved itsto the house of Rafael Esteves Weber on the night ofpril, probably for security reasons, but the Johnson house has remained an important stronghold and arsenal.

A building on the corner of Arzobispo Portes Avenue and Sanchez Street also servedSPD stronghold during this period. Diomedes Mercedes Batista, Jose Rodriguez Acosta, and other PSPD leaders were observed there and were seenaramilitary force armed with submachine guns and rifles, Molotov cocktails, and hand grenades.

The APCJ is known to havetrong-point during this same period on Jose Gabriel Street near the Malecon in the Ciudad Nueva section of the city. eavily armed paramilitary force was seen using this buildingase. eadquarters and strongpoint of MPD guerrillas was established in the Ciudad Nueva area.

Shortly after the rebellion began the military rebels, fearful that the high command would move rapidly against them, opened the arsenals of Santo Domingo and began passing out weapons to civilians. One such arsenal was atebruary" camp on the outskirts of the city. This and similar actions elsewhere provided the leaders of the variousand extremist groups with the materiel they needed to supplement their own collection of arms andignificant factor in the rebellion.

Buenaventura Johnson Pimentel, Juan Ducoudray Mansfield, Jaime Duran Hernando, and Fideiio Despradel Roque were particularly active in acquiring weapons and equipping their followers in both the PSPD and

l-ll

All these

men appeared to oe responsive to direction from Manuel Gonzalezpanish Communist veteran of the Spanish Civil War.

By the afternoon of Sunday,hein Santo Domingo had become chaotic and confused. Violence had begun but there was more feinting and jabbing than significant action. Some of the rebels, particularly among the military, were tempted byfrom the loyalists for tbe establishmentew Junta which wouldolution, presumably along traditional compromise lines. The forces of General Ellasessin, apparently taken by surprise, were reacting slowly and not effectively. In this situation the Communists were intent on strengthening popular participation in the revolt. Public address cars manned by identifiable PSPDprowled the city directing the crowds topositions.

At this point the PRD leaders appeared to share the initiative with rebel officers; the Communists were busying themselves with organizing theof weapons to "reliable" groups and rounding up manpower for civilian militia units. It was in this period that the various Communist partiestheir weapons depots and set up disbursing controls.

As they established their organizations to assure the military effectiveness of the civilian rebels, the Communists apparently also began to turn their attention to the political ends of the revolt. On the night ofh and the early morning hours of Aprilebel leaders consulted in the captured National Palace on strategy and on the compositionrovisional government. To these meetings came PSPD leaders Milvio Perez Perez and Silvano Lora Vicente, as well as Antonio Isa Conde,

These conversations in the palace showed for the first time not only that tbe Communists were intent on winning influence in the rebellion, but that they alreadyegree of bargaining power. Theformed by Molina after these consultations included as attorney general Alfredo Conde Pausas, who had two sons in the PSPD. The director of the

National Department ofsecurityto be Luis Homero Lajara Burgos,to be involved in intelligence activities for the Trujillo government while In the USaval attache*. The subdirector was to be Lajara's son, an APCJ militant.

PSPD leaders, and particularly Diomedes Mercedes Batista, commented during the early days of thethat they were very pleased with theof Captain Mario Pena Taveras, one of the army rebel leaders, whom they describedfriend of the party." Another rebel leader, the lawyer and retired army officer RafaelSaldana Jimenez, was acting as legal adviser to the rebel militaryoccupying the National Palace betweenndpril. Saldana is closely connected to the APCJ and is reported to have used his military connections3 to obtain weapons for the APCJ. APCJ and MPD leaders are known to have been inwith Saldana onpril and at other times.

Thus by the night of Aprilhe rebellion wasapid evolution. The Communistamong the rebel forces had established their credentials as effective and ruthless leaders. They were recruiting supporters with sound trucks and manufacturing Molotov cocktails for use against Wessln's tanks. This latter taskpecialty of PSPD members. APCJ activists organized in patrols were arresting "political prisoners" and often meting out rough justice on the spot.

Monday,as the last full day of the short-lived Molina rebel government. The day began with sporadic bombardments of the downtown area of Santo Domingo by loyalist planes and naval guns. While casualties were being sustained in the rebel sectors, ten members of the PSPD were meeting to plan the destruction of the city by fire if Wessin's troops entered. This was apparently characteristic of the Communists' doggedness during this bleakest hour for the rebels. Before the night was over it had become the dominant mood of the workers' quarters embittered by the bombing raids. Some of therebels apparently had had enough, but they were relieved of their weapons by rebels before being allowed to defect to the loyalists?

The principal defections at this stage of the rebellion besides that of Molina were those of Jose Pena Gomez, Colonel Hernando Ramlroz, and Antonio Martinez Francisco, the socretary general of the PRD. After he had withdrawn from the rebel camp and taken refuge, Jose Pennrominent PRD leader,S Embassy officer that hehis movement to have been defeated. He admitted that tbe Communists who joined the rebel force had infiltrated into positions of importance and that it was very difficult to stop them. Pena Gomez later returned to the rebel zone and played an active part in Caamano's government. Molina, who took asylum in the Colombian Embassy, is reported to have saiday that he wanted to get the truth of Communist infiltration across to the world, but that he could not face furtherhis and his family's safety. He reportedly said that he was alroady under intense attack by thefor opposing them. Also, he was reluctant to make any statement that would force him to give up asylum.

Martinez made his way out of the rebel lines and onh addressed the nation over San Isidro radio, controlled by the forces of Generalessln. In that broadcast, Martinez said: eg all to lay down their arms; turn them in to the nearest military post, because this is noight between political parties."

Communists did, in fact, clearly dominate the rebel movement betweenprilay. They wore in obvious control after having fillod the vacuum created when moderate non-Communist political leaders who had been in control lost heart for the fight and abandoned it. The moderate-led rebel government of Rafael Molina Urenaonpril and most members of Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) went into hiding or took asylum In Latin American embassies. Most of the robol military officers who had initially sparked the revolt also wont into hiding. Even Colonel Coamano was briefly in asylum. The collapse was brought on largely by the movement of loyalist army troopsthe rebel strongholds and recognition on tbe part of the non-Communist rebel leaders that their forces could not have prevailed over the superior

military power then moving toward them under Generalessin and other loyalist commanders.

The Communists and their extremist allies had no place to hide and they prepared onndpril to defend the rebel stronghold to the last ditch. The Communists,in short, upheld rebel resistance when it otherwise would have completely collapsed. This is what they are unlikely to permit the non-Communist rebel leaders to forget. This is ansource of their present strength and their influence in the Caamano government.

Actually, the Communists were not brought to the ultimate test. The expected loyalist onslaught on the city did not come during the crucial days ofndpril. The "gutless generals" on the loyalist side were unable or unwilling to bring their well-equipped forces into action against the rebel Tbe much-vaunted Dominican militarywas, in fact, onpoint of utterby the evening ofpril when the first US Marines landed. It was not untilay that loyalist forces became sufficiently stiffened to take theoffensive. By that time, US troops werebetween them and the main rebel stronghold.

Betweenpril and the first two days of May the Communists and their extremist allies were the only effective rebelwith the naive youths manning the barricades under Communist leadership. ay, however* various of the moderate PRD leaders had come out of hiding and asylum, returned to rebel headquarters, and began resuming at least nominal control. The presence of US troops and the continuing Impotence of the loyalist military gave them at least some confidence that there would be no all-out loyalist onslaught on the city. ay, the non-Communists of the rebel movementovernment under Colonel Caamano and composed of non-Communists, Including some highly respected moderate leftists. Thus, the rebels were able to re-establish the pictureoderate leftist regime dedicated to the fulfillmentopular revolution. Communists were not obvious in the rebel camp by the time the bulk of US and other foreignarrived on the scene. The Caamano government proceeded to try toespectable front and to try to enhance

its bargaining position for tho political discussions and the negotiations with the UN and the OAS that were to follow. This is, in general, the situation as it has prevailed since that date.

There is voluminous testimony as to thecontinuing important role in the rebel This was acknowledged even by Antonio Guzman, who was under considerationew presidentRD-weighted government. Guzman repeatedly stressed in his conversations with high-level US officials that he could not afford to act against thein the rebel movementrecipitous manner. He seemed to be honestly convinced that he would be unable to lead the kind of government that would have the supportignificant portion of the non-Communist rebel movement if he were required first to deport or take other strong action againstand other extremists who were with the rebels. Such action, he said, would only have the effect of creating more Communists.

9S

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ECUADOR

1. Introduction

The Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE)mall Marxist party, divided into two rival organizations on the basis of tbe Sino-Soviet ideological Through popular front tactics over the past three decades the party has at times attained some influence by organization and drive in the political lifeountry which has never developed strong and effective political parties. The PCE has always been primarily an intellectual elite which exerts inconsistent Influence over the proletariat in part due to frequent dissension and ineptitude. he hard-line party has generally advocated and plotted violent popular revolution, while the Moscow-line regulars have pursued their traditional program of fronts and infiltration. While both PCEs pay lip service to the necessity for adapting the revolution to prevalent "objectiveor them aa for all Ecuadorean political parties, these dependegree upon the nature and course of the Junta's transition to constitutional government expected to take place by

2. Brief History of the Party

The Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE) emergedroup of intellectuals who began publishing an avant garde newspaper, La Antorcha, at Quito late The editor, Ricardo Paredes, published articles on advanced socialism and provided ancenter behindevolution. Similar socialist groups sprang up In other cities, and the revolution brought to power briefly as first Junta prosldent Luis Napoleon Dillon, a member of the Antorcha group. TheParty (PS) was founded by them

Within the party, Paredesoctrinairethe "Friends ofho published Comintern proclamations and those of other Internal Communist bodiesew journal, La Fragua. As Socialist

Party secretary general, Paredesear in Moscow,, and represented both the "Friends of Lenin" and the PS at the VI Congress of theInternational. The Socialist Partyadjusted its program to conform withCommunism, and as early9 its youth group took the name Juventud Coramunista Ecuatorlano (JCE).

The PS splithe Communist portion Joiningroup of GuayaquilGrupoby Carlos Guevara Moreno. The followingew, traditionalist Socialist Party appeared. Initially denounced by the Communist Party (PCE) as "socialhe Communists into the sinuosities of the Cominterntoopular front with them and the Liberals. This front helped overthrowJose Maria Velasco Ibarra. In generalrelations remained friendlyand the PCEeputation formuch with little strength through other In coalitions, the Communists have generally been the more aggressive, better organized, andfinanced.

4 the PCE participatedevolutionary front whichiberal government and brought back Velasco Ibarra. For ay-pear they were included in his administration, but he turned against the far left in March,6 and removed them from the cabinet. The PCE has never been legally registered with the Supreme Electoralequisite to inclusion on the ballot. It has operated under other labels and its secretary general, Pedro Sadd, was elected to the Senate2 and retained office

At the VII Party Congress inhewithin the ranks of international Communism surfaced in Ecuador. Jorge Rlvadaneiraoastal youth leader, sustained the thesis that "cuatro gallos audacea" (four bold roosters) would be sufficient to resolve the problem of revolution. Tho congressevolutionary line which Saad's dominant pro-Moscow wing failed to implement, Quito's provincial committee, led by Rafael Echeverria Floree, assumed the load of the activist group and the split widened in3ember of the centralJose Maria Roura Cevalloa, was arrested while

bringing in money provided by Chinese Communists to finance pro-Peking propaganda and guerrilla Roura was expelled from the PCB for having gone to China without permission. The expulsion was arranged by Saad, who has consistently opposedactivity andore cautious approach. Saad then attempted unsuccessfully to remove Ecbever-ria from the Pichincha Provincial Committee

The Echeverria group increased its strength,and was able toationalapparatus of its own. ime it grew in influence and virtually took over the party while Saad and his fellows languished in prison. cheverriaump party congress, expelled the pro-Saad central committeemen, andational organization to plan androgram which included early guerrilla actions in the countryside. The grouped capability for such operations rose duringut declined after Echeverria went to China and Cuba for medical care and training. Echeverria returned in5 and immediately announced his intention to open guerrilla operations, but onctober he wasand is awaiting trial.

Saad's regular party meanwhile received some impetus when he was released from prison for New It has continued with some successefforts against student and laboras well as the government itself.

3 . PCE Strength and Supporting Groups

The PCE presently has an estimated membership among its factions of no morective "card carriers" who take any part in Communist activities. Prior to3 military coup, its strength wasto be as highuring the permissive regime of drunken Carlos Julio Arosemena. At that time the JCE had, and associated extreme left groups claimed an; since the coup, these organizations have been relatively

Party financing was apparently irregular even before it was outlawedues collected were small then, and negligible since. The PCE formerly raised funds by raffles, sale of party publications, and importation of Communist-made products for sale

through commercial firms organized by Saad,et, al. Inhe Saad groupale of party bonds.

Recruiting has largely beenaphazard basis in Ecuador, and only5 did the hard line set out tolandestine inner party to which one could not gain membership merely by self-proclaimed adherence to international Communism. The party has throughout its history Influenced associated groups, especially youth and labor, and thereby has hadfar greater than Its own small membership would suggest.

Most youth are non-Communist but virtually all their organizations are Communist controlled. The JCE has exploited tho extremist intellectualwhich existed in many schools and universities prior to repressive measuros taken sincey the military government. This success isto the frustrations of increasingly ambitious youth, and to the good organization and discipline of the Communist minority. Communist gains also stem from the naivete and passivity of most non-Communist groups, which have allowed them to pose as thegroup. The physical poverty of the universities has exacerbated this situation.

Heavy Communist and "fellow traveler"of the university faculties prior to the junta's reforms certainly made many students receptive to Communism. In many cases, incoming universityalready have had six years of Marxistin the secondary schools. Furthermore, theof these students are from the aspiring middle and lower classes whose impatience influences their attitudes.

The Ecuadorean National Union of Teachers has alsoarget of PCE infiltration. Thehave generally dominated or heavily infiltrated the Federation of University Students (FEUE),of local student delegations of the five state

universities. The degree of this penetration has fluctuated, and there have been splits at theFEUE congresses between pro-Communist and pro-democratic delegations. The Communists dominated the5 congress, whereupon therom Protoviejo's small university withdrew, but the Communists remained firmly in control ofeadermall terrorist organization, Desta-camientos de Organizacion Secreteas electedational office.

Other youth fronts include the Union Revolucionaria de Juventud Ecuadorianauban-influenced revolutionary group which has lost most of its once-substantial following: the Juventud Socialista Revo-lucionariomall youth arm of the fellow-traveling Revolutionary Socialist Party; and the Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarias del Ecuadorigh school students' organization which is under FEUE influence.

The PCE from its founding has sought toIndians. Paredes was an avid student ofaffairs and4 organized the Federacion de Indlos Ecuatorianos (FIE), Campesino work has been erratic, however. 8 the PCE attempted tosuch efforts,believing the poverty-stricken Indian sierra was fertile ground for infiltration and the developmentommunist-oriented native movement. The Pichincha Provincialto become the hard-linethe position that the revolution would be primarily agrarian and anti-feudal, and that the Indians would ultimately begin it. The direction of Indian affairs early passed to several of the "hard-line" leaders, Jorgeeira, Jose Maria Roura, Carlos Rodriquez Paredes, Rafael Echeverria, and especiallyMunoz.who prepared to mobilize the Indian campesinos against tbe government.

The Communistsational campesino conference at Quito in0 attended byelegates, mainly sierra Indians. After the meeting, violence broke out along the sierra as armed men seized haciendas; in1 there wereover wages and working conditions. The PCEto exploit grievances, exhort furtherand direct the operations, f

Plans were made in1randof the Indians for land reform, inwith the Third National Congress nf tha tft

A few days lator, the PCEocond congress of the Coastal Federation of Agricultural Workers (FETAL) in Hilagro, Guayas Province. The Communists have been active among coastal rural labor mainly to promote violence and agitation over conditions of labor and land tenure. ampeslnosthis meeting.

The Communists, howevor, have oncountored real difficulties in their rural program. Indians could bo persuaded readily enough to seize lands, but have been unresponsive to revolutionary doctrine. They basically prefer to work their land unmolested by "whites" regardless of orientation. Duringeeting of Communist peasant leaders was held at Guayaquil to consider the organizationalof the PCE in the countryside. They called for renewed emphasis on Indian affairs, for the creationew PCE campesino committee, and organization of cells among Indians. Since3 coup, the hard-line PCE has continued efforts to preparefor revolution, but Its success has been limited by the Inability of most would-be organizers toto>rural lifo and people.

Communists have been more successful Intheir domination of artistic and Intellectual activities to influence the entire national society.

haveervasive influence overeven of the supposedly anti-Communistjunta. In part this has been carried out through the Infamous "Cracko-called sportsmade up of pro-Communists, which included Junta president Admiral Castro Jijon, and which has been engaged in efforts not only to infiltrate but actually to control the operational levels of tbe government.

The oldest and largest labor confederation in Ecuador, the Confederation de Trabajadores del Ecuadoras founded4 by Communists and Socialists. Thereafter the Communists quickly took control and have maintained it ever slnco. The CTE is an affiliate of the Soviet-dominated WFTU, and some of its national affiliates are similarlyto Communist-front international labor Before3 golpe, the CTEthe labor scenelaimed (but highly doubtful) membership When the military junta took power, the CTE central committeeeneral strlke--which was universally ignored--and then fled into hiding. Byheseall but one of whom are members of the PCE or the fellow-traveling Revolutionary Socialist Party, began to emerge and to resume operations withboldness. As ofheir Pichlncha and Guayas provincial affiliates wereopenly and the CTE central committee had begun to make demands on tbe government, mainly for publicity purposes. The central committee, asat that time, consisted entirely ofCommunists and professional people such as lawyers and teachers, but no workers. The two-year near-quietus (largely self-imposod)35 caused rifts in the CTE national The provincial organizations in Uanabl and Esmeraldas provinces became inactive and virtually disappeared, while in some other provinces discipline and organizations suifi^sned to lesser degrees, 'ffhe strongest organizations remained in Pichlncha and Guayas provinces. There were reports, ashat the PCE hadeneral campaign to restore its control and discipline in certain CTE provincial organizations. The government, if aware of these efforts, showed no inclination to prevent their success. In other respects the regime'stoward the CTE has been mixed but for the most

part benign. Fromo5 theof social security and labor was Luis Jaramilloormer legal adviser of the CTEelf-proclaimed "extreme leftist" who exerted efforts both to protect the CTE leaders and to restore the CTE to respectability. He was largely successful. Asubsidy0 sucres per year hasto flow into the CTE treasury.

4. Foreign Influence

Cuba, Communist Cbina, the USSR, and some other bloc countries have been in contact with the PCE and other far leftists in and from Ecuador despite the absence of diplomatic relations. Young Ecua-doreans have studied at Friendship University in Moscow. Cuba and Communist China have providedsupport and training, particularly intactics, for hard liners. Both have given safe haven to exiled or escaped Ecuadorean subversives.

Cuban aid to the revolutionary groups mainly has provided training in subversion and guerrilla Cuba reportedly has supplied small amounts of arms. In2 and3 anen had received subversive training; Information sinceecrease. Training has been given both in Cuba and in Ecuador; in4 Echeverria reportedly was seeking to locateCuban-trained men to further his guerrillaplans, and there have been persistent reportsew such personnel in coastal Ecuador. small groups oftotaling aboutsent to Communist Chinaor political and guerrilla instruction.

J-8

6. Leaders of the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) (hard-line)

Central Committee

Rafael Echeverria Flores, Secretary General andof the Secretariat Hugo Salazar Tamariz, Franklin Perez Castro Mario Cardenas Villegas Bolivar Washington Alvarez Fiallo Jorge Arellano Gallegos Luis Napoleon Vargas

Cesar Munoz Mantilla, Member of the Secretariat Celso Fiallo Fiallo Molses Robalino

Jose Maria Roura Cevallos, Member of the Secretariat Celso Atarihuanaose Barriaga Delgado Carlos Rodriguez Paredes

Byron Alfonso Ordonez Paz, Alternate Member Jorge Ronlternate MemberJose Efrain Barriaga Delgado, Alternate Member

Executive Committee

Rafael Echeverria Flores, Chairman

Hugo Salazar

Cesar Munoz Mantilla, Secretary of Indian Affairs

Franklin Perezecretary of Propaganda

Mario Cardenas Villegas

Luis Napoleon Vargas

Bolivar Alvarez Fiallo

Jose Maria Roura Cevallos, Secretary of the Executive Committee

Pichincha (Quito) Provincial Committee

Miguel Rosero Herrera, Secretary General Olga Munoz Munoz de Carrera, Secretary of Propaganda Francisco Vega Avila, Secretary of Political

Leonardo Bahamonde Caceres, Treasurer Carlos Anibal Chiriboga Quijaro

Hugo Salazar TaJttr*i, Secretary General

Molses Roballno -

Hey Ernesto Barrionuevo Silva

Colon Ellas Ramirez Morejon

Enrique Verduga, Treasurer

Guayas (Guayaquil) Executive Committee

Hugo Salazar Tamariz, Chairman Mario Cardenas Villegas Franklin Perez Castro

Bolivar Alvarez Fiallos, Secretary of Organization Enrique Verduga, Secretary of Youth Affairs

Los Rlos Provincial Committoe

Jorge Andrade Julio Marclllo Patricio Gomez

Carchl Provincial Comnlttoo (provisional) Gulllermo Passos Perez

Esmeraldas Provincial Committee

Javier Cardenas, Secretary General Ciro Aparicio, Secretary of Propaganda Manelao Jara, Secretary of Organization Mado Wilson Nieves, Treasurer Wilson Edmundo Burbano Burbano Santiago Santlllan Jimenez

Azuay Provincial Committee

Jorge Roura Cevallos

Hernan Sarmiento Montesdeoca

Benjamin Cordero Ordonez

Luis Uonsalve

Jose Barrlaga Delgado

Melquiades Sucre Ortega Rodas

J-ll

Loja Provincial Coaralttee

Jorge Castro

Manuel Ruiz

Fausto Maldonado

Celso Atarihuana Carrion

Arturo Silva

Dolivar Provincial Coramit tec_ Cprovisional) Angel Paredes Miranda, Secretary General

7. Leaders of the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) (Moscow-line)

Executive Committee

Pedro Saad Niyaim, Chairman

Enrique Gil Gilbert

Rene Alejandro Idrovo Rosales

Milton Jijon Saavedra

Alba Calderon de Gil

Manuel Leon Mora

Victor Nieto

Solon Guerrero Metz

Guayas (Guayaquil) Provincial Committee

Manuel Leon Mora, Secretary General

Juan Pio Narvaez Garcia

Aqulles Valencia

Gonzalo Vlzueta Maruri

Guillermo Canarte Canarte

Carlos Basto Castillo

Luis Cardenas Pinto

Antonio Morales Rivas

Luis Soils Castro

Deleg Pacheco

Adolfo Nieto

Solon Guerrero

Pichincha Provincial Committee

Gonzalo Villalba Coloma, Secretary of Organization

Emmel Alvarez Fiallo, Secretary for Youth Affairs

Mario Isaac Valencia Valencia, Treasurer

Cesar Endara

Laurto Gordillo

Manuel Eduardo Nieto Avlles

Tungurahua (Ambato) Provincial Co-omittee

Alfredo Reynaldo Mlno Vaca Jorge Morales Fausto Enrique Moreno Neva Jorge Enrique Calero Ortiz

EGRET

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF EL SALVADOR

Although the Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista de Elhas been illegal for allew months ofyear history, it was one of the first Central American Communist parties to gain enough influence into give the government cause for concern. It was also one of the few Communist parties in Latin America to seriously undertake an armed revolution. Despite restrictions placed on the Communist Party by most Salvadoran governments, the party has shown remarkable powers of recuperation. it has utilized every opportunity to spread its influence, especially among students and

El Salvadorountry which provides afield for Communist propaganda. The extremes of wealth and poverty are greater in El Salvador than in any other Central Americaniddle class is emerging at an average pace. The economy is dominatedmall group of coffee planters. There isarge rural proletariat who have no land of their own and, therefore, work as wagelarge,

2 the picture has Improved. Many of the previously landless peasants have been resettled on land of their own, but many more remain landless. New industry has been introduced to absorb aincreasing population. One of the mostsigns has been the success of the Rivera government in securing the cooperation of theupper class in promoting economic and social reforms. On the whole, the present government has been more energetic in attacking the problems which have given Communism its influence than any of the previous governments. Rivera appears to enjoy enough support to finish out his term and, hopefully, to effect an orderly transfer of power

The Communist Party of El Salvador (Partidode Elwas founded5 as

SECRET

a resultisit by do legates from the Communist party of Guatemala, which had been instructed by Communist leaders in Mexico to extend its activities into neighboring republics. Its first adherents were groups of students and workers from San Salvador.

One of the first steps taken by the smallgroup was to organize an Anti-Imperialist League, which was active throughout the rest ofnd was particularly effective in rallying support among the intellectuals. However, most of thoenergies wore concentrated In the labor The labor activities of all the CentralCommunist parties were directedonsejo Obrero Centro Americano, with headquarters in To this werecattering of unions in the various countries of the isthmus.

Communist activities in the unions werewith their activities in other fields. Asection of International Red Aid was organized for the legal defense and financial assistance ofwho got themselves into difficulties. The name of the Salvadoran section was the League for the Defense of Persecuted Fightors (Liga Pro-Luchadoresnd it was through this group that close contact was maintained with the Comitorn.

The Communists participated in the presidential electionacking Dr. Arturo Araujo, theParty (Partido Laborista) candidate. Araujo,did not allow himself to fall under theof the Communists, and early1 he ordored the arrest of three Communist leaders. esult the Communists publisbed'a violent denunciation of Araujo's government. Subsequent agitation by the Communists coupled with growing discontent within the army caused Araujo's overthrow ine was succeeded by first vice president, General maximlllano Hernandez Martinez.

At first Hernandez Martinez sought support from the Communists and permitted them to presentunder their own name in the municipal andelections held in Theclaimed to have won elections in severaland to have been denied victory, but

K-2

SECRET-

Genoral Hernandez Martinez refused even to see their representatives and hear their protest. Havingthe armyonsiderable degree, thodecided to make use of their influence among tho enlisted men and noncommissioned officers to over* throw ithe government. Tho central committee of the Communist Partyevolutionary military committee and sets tho date for the insurrection. The revolutionary militarywas to function as tho general staff of the. Red army, "Commanders" were named from among the Communist soldiers, and detailodwere sent to them. General Hernandez Martinez found out about their plans and began moving against the plotters. tate of siege was proclaimed,umber of Communist leaders were arrestod. Other lenders attempted to call off the uprising, but not all "commanders" received such notification. small but uncoordinated revolts occurred, and tho whole insurrection failed miserably.

General Hernandez Martinez was ruthless inthe remnants of the insurrection. Thousands were killed and virtually all Communist loaders wore captured, court martialed, and shot. Only thrco leaders escaped to Guatemala where they were jailed by Ubico. The suppression of this revolt destroyed tho Communist party, all Its front groups, and the labor movement.

The Communist party did not attempt to reorganizend evon then members operated at the risk of groat personal danger. Little opportunity for activity existed, since Hernandez Martineznothingabor movement to 2 the regime allowed the reactivation of tho mutual benefit socioties, and the Communists were again able to conduct their undergroundwith some degree of success.

Between May and4 the Communistsa brief period of feverish activity and temporary success. General Hernandez Martinez was ousted in Mayeneral strike of students and workers. residontlal election was planned, and the Communists, then In the full bloom of wartime "collaboration- with other left-wing forces,ildly leftist teacher. Arturo Romero of theUnion Party (Partido UnionPUD). In addition to political activity, trade

SECRET

unions were rebuilt almost overnight. The National Union of Workers (Union Nacional deUNT) was founded and, byembership largely under Communist in-fluence.

Communist activity, as well as other political and trade union activity, was again suppressed in4 when Colonel Osmin Aguirro, who had been chief of police under Hernandez Martinez, seized power andictatorship. Most Communist leaders went into exile-in Guatemala. Elections woreew months later, and,the resulting government under President Castaneda Castroilder dictatorship, themovement was not allowed to revive.

Castaneda Castro was overthrown in8roup of young officers who were somewhat more conscious of the nation's social and economic problems than previous regimes had been. One of these officers was Major Oscar Osorio, who was elected president in The Communist party remained illegal throughout the Osorio The labor movement was not allowed to reviveational scale, but individual local unions were allowed to function. Osorio's chief instrument for suppression of tho Communist party was the Law in Defense of Public Order passed Unfortunately, the law was also used by Osorio for suppression of all political opposition.

Lieutenant Colonel Jose Maria Lemus was elected president esture of national unity, Lemus rescinded2 law shortly after he took office. He also permitted the return of allexiles and, although the Communist party did not obtain legal status, allowed Communistsational labor congress int was at this time that the General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (Confederacibn General de Trabajadores Salvadorenos--CGTS) was formed andCommunist controlled. During the Lemusthe Communist party doubled infromembers6 toInits capability increased as well, probably due to assistance from Cuba after Castro came to power.

K-4

Ineftist Junta overthrew Leraus; during the brief three months this junta was in povor, tho Communists opera tod even more openly. Thejunta was ousted in1ilitary junta which arrested and exiled most of theleaders. Colonol Julio A. Rivera emerged as the chief of government and was elected president2ive-year tern. His government has been active, not only in suppressing Communist activity, but in promoting economic development and socialr ins designod to weaken the appeal of Communism.

3. Present Posture

In5 the PCES had anembers (active members numbered no more) and raaybo as manyympathizers. About half of the party members, most of the militants within the front organizations, and the majority of the party's sympathizers are located in the Sanarea. The PCES has little influence over othor political parties but cooperates with some of them from time to time on specific issues. Since the PCES has been illegal during most of its existence, its potential voting strength ls unknown but it isto be very small. There are no knownin high government positions; the rector of tho National University, Dr. Fabio Castillo Figueroa, ls a leftist, however, who frequently furthersefforts, especially at the university.

The PCES conducts its overt political activity through itB political front, the Revolutionary Party of April and May (Partido Revolucionario Abril y The PRAM originally was organized9 as the Moviralentouyoembership ofersons. Int adopted the name now being used, PRAM currentlyominal membership of, but ls largely inactive, and only its directorate meetsegular basis. It has been unable to date to achieve legalityolitical party and lsto be granted legality in the foreseeable The PRAM is currently exploring theof forming an alliance with one of tholeftist parties being formed in preparation for6 municipal and legislative elections. Raul Castellanos Figueroa, Gabriel Gallegos Valdos, and Haul Padilla Vela, all Communists, arc the principal leaders of the PRAM.

SECRET

The labor front of the PCES is tho Generalof Salvadoran Workers (ConfederacionHe Trabajadoreswhich was formed7 and has been under Communist domination since its beginning. It comprises nine labor unionsotal membership of. 3 the CGTS affiliates joined with independentunions to form the Labor Union Unity Committee (Comite Unltario Slndical--CUS). Dominated byleaders from the nine-union CGTS bloc, the CUS comprisesabor unionsotal membership of (By contrast, theoriented General Confederation of Trade Unions (Confedoracion General dehasnionsotal membership The CUS and CGTS are planning to mergeingle labor federation in

There is no general student front at theUniversity although the General Association of Salvadoran University Students (Asociacionde Estudiantes UniversitariosAGEUS) is occasionally dominated by Communist The leftist but non-Communistoting majority in the AGEUS. However, in the three most politically activelaw, economics,articular student group. At present they dominate the University Student Action (Accion Estudiantil in the law school, the Student Revolutionary Front of Humanities (Frente Revolucionario Estudiantil do Humanidades--FREH) in the college of humanities, and theUniversity Front of Economics (Frente Uni-versitario Revolucionario dein tho college of economics. The latter two are the strongest student groups in their respective,

The organization which most nearlyouth front is the Vanguard of Salvadoran Youth (Vanguardia de la Juventud Its activities are not, however, confined to the The VJS hasivided intoells. It is an adjunct of the FUAR (see below).

The militant action front through which the PCES operates is the United Front for Revolutionary

Action (Frente Unida de Accionwhich was organized The FUAR has adivisionilitary division. The political organization consists of ten specialized groups called columnsith eachirectivesubordinated to the national directorate. The groups or columns include those of the VJS,workers, students, peasants, women, bankprimary school teachers, plus theRevolutionary Movementpril) and the 9th of May columns. The total membership of the FUAR is, although many are presently inactive.2 the FUAR overtly has confined itself to disseminating propaganda and participating indemonstrations with other Communist fronts.the military commission of the FUAR has been selecting specially qualified FUAR members and organizing them into clandestine, paramilitary cells capable of carrying out terrorist activities. As of2 of these cells have boen organised in various areas of El Salvador,otalof. Undor the tutelage of the five-man national militaryof whom have received guerrilla warfare training indepartmental military commissions, the cell members are receiving intensive politicaland military training. The members of the military organization are continuing theirwith one of the regular FUAR columns and have been adjured to keep their nonmilitary FUAR colleagues unwitting of their military role. The FCES timetable for activating these units isbut it will undoubtedly wait for what itn propitious political climate; underpolitical conditions active insurgency would be suicidal.

4. Foreign Communist Influences and Assistance

The PCES in general is Moscow, rather than Feking, oriented. There is,trong tendencyviolence in the revolutionary approach of younger members. This is particularly noticeable in such organizations as the VJS and tho FUAR. This may be the result of training many have received in Cuba. The number of Salvadorans who were trained

SFCUFT

in Cuba2 is unknown; thorc wereal-vadorans given guerrilla training in Cuba between3 and Despito this there has been no terrorist activity in iii Salvador as yet, although as previously indicated tho PCES isa terrorist apparat under FUAR, itsaction front.

Most Communist groups in El Salvador appear to be usually short of funds, and are apparently not receiving any sizable financial assistance from Cuba or other Communist countries. The only large sum of money reportedly given to Salvadoran CoaBuinis_ts_ wasent from Cuba

X-o

A HISTORY OF COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA

1, Introduction

A forerunner of the Guatemalan Communist Party was first organized soon after Worldhe overthrow ofyear dictatorship of President Estrada Cabrera, At first called the United Workers (UnlficaclunO) and then the United Socialist Workers (Unificaciun obrerahis groupommunist Party with the guidance and instruction of theCommunists3 and joined the Communistat the Comintern's Fifth Congressn spite of constant government persecution, the party maintained contact with and participated in international activities of the Comintern. Theconcentrated much of their energy on work among trade unions, and throughouthat small portion of the labor force that was organized was heavily influenced by the Communists. The regime of General, however,emporary end to Communist activity in Guatemala. he Communist International reported that theparty had collapsed.

For all practical purposes, Communism inwas born with the revolutionhich ousted the dictator Ubico. The handfull ofwho survived the firing squads and years in prison under Ubico played no important part in the revolutioninor role in subsequent events.

Among the many Guatemalans returning from exile4ew who had become associated with the Communist movements in their country of exile. They were joinedizable group of Communists from other Central American countries whoaven in "revolutionary" Guatemala, President Juan Jose, tolerant towardactivity in the labor movement, forbade the open organization of the Communist Party; but his successor. President Jacobothe party to participate openly in national politics. Under Arbenz, Communists were able to

move into positions of leadership In laborand gain influential posts in tho government agencios which shaped public opinion and administered social welfare programs.

During the early years of the revolution the fact that one couldCommunist" without having to meet the demands of party membership facilitated the Indoctrination of young revolutionary Isadora. Onmall group of confirmedmuniata, which Included moat of the future leaders of tho party,landestine organization called tho Guatemalan Democratic Vanguard (Vanguardla DemocratlcaDG). During the next twoumber of front groups were established and functioned oponlyeans of drawing other leftists into the work of the Communist movemont, but the existence of VDGoll-kept

At the March convention of tho administration's Revolutionary Action Party (Partido Accionhe Communistsetback as thoir slate, headed by incumbent SecretaryJose Fortuity, was defeatedoalition of socialist leaders. After tho assassination in9 of the anti-Communist Col. Francisco Arana, the leading noderato candidate for the presidency, by Arbenz henchmen, the election of Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman became almost certain. The Communists then began considering ways for coming at least partially into the open. ecret meeting of the VDG in9 the Communists adopted the name Communist Party of Guatemala (Partido Communists deCG) for use among themselves. This meeting, later referred to as the First Congress of the Communist Party ofurning point in the development of Communism in the country. At thisispute broke out between the "political" and "labor" factionsemand by Victor Manuel Gutierrez that the PCG come fully into the opon, actively champion the interests of tho masses, and becomeorkers'umber of labor leaders broke away from the PCG and early in tho following year founded the overt but not legally registered Revolutionary Workers' Party of Guatemala (Partido Revoluclonario Obrero deROG), 0ROG

servedchool for the training andof the most militant and active sector of the working class.

Onuring tho electoral campaign, the majority Communist group (the clandestine PCC) headed by Fortuny broko with tho pro-administration PAR which lt felt was not sufficiently militant. The following month the PCC began publicationeekly newspaper, Octubre, from which its sponsors received the nickname Octubristas. The PCGactively in the campaign of Jacobo Arbenz and aftor his election began to operate moro openly. Inonth after Arbonz' inauguration, the Octubre group publicly assumed the name of the Communist Party of Guatemala (PCG). On tho first anniversary of the founding of Octubre, PCGublic rally attended by high government officials and leaders of theparties.

Under Arbenz Communism in Guatemala camo of age. Although their position was far from securereat deal depended upon the continued good will of tho President, the Communists were able to operato freely and were part of the government 1 tho Communists completed the task ofnified labor federation which would be under their control and healed the split in their ranks which bad existed Coopera tion between the unregistered Communist parties, the PROG and PCG increasednd in December Gutierrez wrote from Hoscow that hetho need for unity to override anyor tactical differences with the PCG leaders. Upon his return to Guatemala in2 the PROG was dissolved, and most of its members swelled the ranks of the PCG. As part of the aergor, the line of the PCG was adjusted toward closer links with the masses and full support for agrarian

By the end2 the Communists were able to set their sights uponass pa.'ty. At its second congress inhe partyew name, now statutes,ew program, all designed to facilitate the transition to full

SECRET

legality and rapid growth. On IShe Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco delGT) was granted full legal status despite the existenceonstitutionalagainst "political organizationsoreign or international character'1 and the public statement by top PGT leaders that tho work of the congress was inspired and shaped by the decisions ofh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Guatemalan Communists made their greatest gains Two of their most prominent loaders, Fortuuy and Carlos Manuel Pellecer, were included on the government's coalition ticket for congressional elections in January. Thisof the PGTull partner in the regime was institutionalized in the National Democratic Front (Frente DeiaocraticoDN) made up of representatives of the four government parties, organized labor, and the peasants' confederation. The General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (Confederacion General do Trabajadores de- CGTG) was completely controlled by theand the National Peasants' Confederation (Confederacion Nacional Campesina de Guatemala -CNCG) was subject to increasing Communist influence. The PAR, the largest government party, was weakened by constant dissension and leaned upon the Communists for support against the pretensions ofarty of the Guatemalan Revolution (Partido de la Revo-luclonRG). The PRG itselfan influential group of Communists andwho prevented it from developingerious rival of the PGT. The final member of the FDN, the National Renovation Party (Partido RenovacionRN) was so weakened bycorruption, and dissension that it was noignificant force. Its secretaryJaime Diaz Rozzotto, wasoramun?st. Under these conditions the Communists came to exert an increasing and often decisive influence over the policies of the Arbenz government.

The most distinctive characteristic of the Arbenz regime was the close relationship existing

between the Communists and the President. They brought Arbenz readily mobilized popular support, furnished badly needed organizational andtalent, and provided ideological underpinning for his* orogram. Arbenz in turn accepted them as the spokesmen of the masses, considered them his most trustworthy and honest collaborators, and entrusted them with the administration of certain keyagencies and programs. Hisof the Communists effectively prevented the other parties from attempting to Isolate the PGT. Competition of the PAR and PRG over the spoils of office enabled the Communists totrategic balance of power position. ime when these parties were divided and hesitant, the Communists had the advantageystematic doctrine andto political action, discipline, coheslveness, and organization which the others lacked. Combined with control of organized labor and the favor of the President, this was sufficient to enable the Communists to seize leadership of the national social revolution and turn it to their ends.

By the end3 they were able to shapepolicy and influence the course of national affairs to an extent unknown at that time to any other Communist party outside the Soviet orbit. Largely through its control of the administration of agrarian reform the PGT had builtass basealf dozen of Guatemala'separtments, and elected mayors in four towns.

With the successful anti-Communist revolution inhe Communists, whose future had been bound to that of the Arbenz regime, found themselves faced with an entirely new and difficult situation. They were suddenly confronted with the problem of survivalostileof Carlos Castillo Armasleaders were pledged to eradicate Communist influence and destroy the party. Throughout the Castillo administration, PGTelatively ineffective clandestine organization. Most of the Communist leaders left the country for exile in other Latin American Membership fell fromo less

. During the Castillo regime slow but steady progress was made in rebuilding the party, but it was kept well in check by the government.

Aftor the assassination of Castillo in7 tbe Communists had an opportunity to improve materially their capabilities. However, they were not able to exercise any significant effect upon the elections of either7 or

Under President Miguel Vdigoras, the Communists, their front groups, and other leftist elements steadily became more active,following congressional failure totrong anti-Communist law after the lapse1ransitory constitutional article which had permitted the President to refuse admission Into the country of certain Guatemalanew compromise law enacted in deference to leftistroponlod the Castillo legislation that had established severe penalties for Communist activity. With the weakening of institutional controls, the party began to reorganize under the direction of returned oxiles including most of PGT's principal leaders. Emboldened by relative indifference on the part of the government and by Fidel Castro's success in Cuba and the Bay of Pigs disaster, the party and its front groups began operating more openly. Tho party was successful in infiltrating government institutions, securing increasod funding and arms shipments from Cuba, and sending PGTto Cuba for training.

The rosurgence of leftism was at its height3 as political parties prepared for November elections. However, while the leftists were numerous and vociferous, their potential was lessened by their lack of unity. The prospect of Arevalo's candidacy loomedhreat to both conservative elements and to the Communists. The Communists felt Aievalo had made too many concessions to the "Imperialists" in recent years, and would boIf elected, With the3 coup, events overtook the party's quarrel over which

L-6

candidate to support and confirmod for many PGT members the futility of pacific struggle.

SinceGT has beenontinual state of reorganization. The military regime has adminlsterod the government for the most part under state of siege, with stringent controls to counter subversive activity. Kalds, armed battle, and general harassment directed against PGT had practically ruined the party's hierarchic structure formed during the Ydigoras years.

Forced inactivity in PGT's usual spheres of operation has seriously affected the party but has by no means destroyed it. Instead, the party has turned its attention increasingly to violence. rowing demandGT commitment to armed struggle was inspired by the survivaluerrilla movement begun1 in northeastern Guatemala and led by army defector Lt. Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. This group, theovember Revolutionary Movement, at first committed only to the overthrow of Ydigoras, has since evolveduerrilla and terrorist organization supported by and politically aligned with Cuban and Mexican Communists described by tbe PGT as espousing the Peking line. The PGT has2 triod to control theovember group and in the process became Itself heavily committed to violent tactics. 4 relations between the PGT and Yon Sosa fluctuated between extremes of cordiality and hostility, and in5 the guerrilla movement split. The PGT in its most recent reorganization has given priority to military work in the form of the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadasow the guerrilla arm of the PGT.

Guatemalan security forces effected several significant raids against Communist safehouses during the summer Many PGT members, two high-level officers, have been jailed. These actions curtailed most PGT plans for terrorist action in July and August. Isolatedandin the capital and in the northeast, but whether they areto the PGT or to Yon Sosa is uncertain. PGT has been damaged not only by the government's anti-Communist action, but alsoplit within its

own ranks. entral committee member, Ricardo Ramirez de Leon, disenchanted with PGT's adherence to the Moscow line, delected from PGT in5 with the intention ofival partyarder line.

of tho POT

The swift and effective government action taken against the Communists following Guatemala's "Liberation"4 by Castillo Armas and theminimal Communist influence in tho country4 indicate that Communism did not take deep roots during tho revolution. Political gains reaped by the party under President Ydigoras were lost with the impositionilitary regime in The incumbent administration, not bound by constitutional guarantees of civiland operating under its own anti-Communist docroo-laws which provide for rapid action against and stiff penalties for subversives, has beon fairly successful in its repression of the PGT.

Although the party's organization has been severely damaged, It has been characteristic of the Guatemalan Communists that they have been able to survive under very adverse conditions. Theirof violence, particularly terrorist activity in the capital, has been maintained through most of Chief of Government Poralta's tenure and continues at present.

he PGT experienced the defoction of some low-level members who were unable to cope with their fear of police repression, of somemembers who joined Yon Sosa'sovember group in the northeastern mountains, and of several high-lovol members who objected to continued PGT adher-once to Moscow. Tho numerical loss to PGT is Over the past few years, PGT membership had been fairly static at, so that its current membership is estimated at.

The reluctance of certain central committee and other high-level members to commit the PGT wholeheartedly to violent struggle has causedinternal dissension and criticism of the

old guard leadership. Available informationthat the party's main strength has recently shifted from the revolutionary era leadersard-core middle level which has displayed its dynamism and willingness to employ its paramilitary training in guerrilla and terrorist activity.

In addition to its regular members, PGT can count on the willing collaboration ofympathizers, chiefly found among workers, students, teachers, and white-collar employees.

Many PGT leaders and members are in exile, mainly in Mexico and Cuba, but they continue to contribute to the direction of the party and participate in the making of policy, dome of the exiles clandestinely travel back and forth from Mexico to Guatemala to take part in meetings, to conduct training classes, or to fill temporaryoccasioned by the arrest orey leader. Border-crossing for purposes of moving both men and arms appears not to be difficultecurity point of view; the border is not effectively patrolled.

A split is known to have occurred in the party inut there is little information available on which to judge tho seriousness of the

break.

PGT Influence in National Affairs

The PGT has been unable to participate openly in Guatemalan political affairs since the ouster of the Arbenz regime Communisthave been illegal since that time. PGT's main political effort3 has been to coordinate and control (in the guise of support) the activity of the non-Communist revolutionary groups. It has attempted tonited resistance front composed

of all portios opposed to the regime, emphasizing tho need to overthrow the repressive government of the armed forces and working at convincingcollaborators that Peralta will not permit honest elections. Essentially, the party can do little more than capitalize on unpopular actions of the government, exploit nationalist and anti-Yankee sentiment, and strive to infiltrate non-Communist leftist organizations. Because thegovernment has tightly controlledhere is no open evidenceinsight on the effectiveness of PGT's

The party has had its greatest successes In the field of labor. Its ability to seize theof the labor movement during Arevalo'sserved as the foundation for its rise to political importance and influence under Arbenz. Although its control of organized labor was upset by the fall of Arbenz, the PGT hasroportionately greater Influence among the urban workers than over any other sector of Guatemalan society, with tho possible exception of the middle-class intellectuals. The working class was more advorsoly affected by the liberation4 than any other group. After having been favored by tho governmentecade, the workers suddenly found themselves the object of official mistrust and suspicion. Because the liberation occurred before most workers had begun to doubt theof Communist promises, there hasendency for labor to look upon the Arbenz eraeriod when it enjoyod just recognition. Good prospectsavorable labor response to Communism are somewhat offsot by recent gains made in the trade union sphere by democratic organizers, however, only0 outotal work force ofillion are organized, and tho continuod slow pace of democratic trade unionism could work for the Communists.

The tendency of many Guatemalan students to take an ultranationalist and radical position, combined with memories of the "glorious" role of tho university students in4 revolution, makes them receptive to the proposals of the

Communist minority. Communist influence among the students at San Carlos University continues to be significant. Although moderates have boonground tn student organizations, the over-all student organization ABU is still dominated by

The party has low-level penetrations of the government who provide warning of government moves. There have been unconfirmed reports of some high-level official collaboration with the PGT and

The clandestine nature of PGT activities and tho tendency on the part of the government and conservatives to use the label "Communist" indiscriminately against any opponent from tho loft make it difficult to judge the extent of true Communist influence. An important source of Communist influence is theaid to the PGT given by extremely conservative military officials, businessmen, and landowners who tend to equate trade unions, poasant organizations, and cooperatives with Communist organizations. The proximity of Cuba is another asset for the party. Transistor radios, readily available to illiterate campesinos, receive Radio Havana with ease. Cuban propaganda serves to rolnforce their impression that only Communists are Interested In their problems.

ml

Tiie Communist Parties of Haiti

Haiti has two Communist parties, the Party of Popular Accordntenteand the Popular Party of National Liberation (Parti Populaire de LiberationBoth are illegal, small, and relatively poorly organized. They engage in very little activity for fear of government reprisals, since Duvalier tolerates their continued existence only so long as they are not overtly antiregime. The Haitian Government does little to counter their limited clandestine anti-Duvalier activity and propaganda.omplete breakdown of law and order, their capability of causing the regime anytrouble is limited.

The main strength of the PEP and the PPLN lies in the fact that they constitute the only internal opposition with any degree of organization. Opposition political parties are banned; the only party permitted to exist is Duvalier's own Party of National Unity (Parti de 1'UnitePUN). Similar situations have existed throughoutarge portion of Haiti's history that non-Communist political forces have never been able to align themselvesermanent basis. The Communist movement, on the other hand, has had the Ideological incentive to survive underground for long periods of time and reappear under various names and complexions.

The Haitian Communist movement was begun0 by two intellectuals. Max Hudicourt and Jacques Roumain. Illegal in the beginning, it remained an Illegal underground party for the first sixteen years of its existence. Roumain, one of the country's leading poets and novelists, was deported to Mexico, where he died. Hudicourt, also exiled, spent much of his time in the United States.

With the overthrow of the dictatorship ofincountryhort

period of relatively democratic government under

SECRET

tho presidency of Dumarslas Estime, Bstime's administrationegree of political freedom which had previously been unknown in Haiti. It launched ambitious prograns in tho fields of education and economic development and allowed the developmentrade union movement for the first tiiae. Political parties were permitted to fori.i, among which were the Communist Party of Haiti, (Parti Comunisteand the Popular Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Populalre.

The PSP grew out of the movement founded by Hudlcourt and Roumainj this was apparent when Hudicourt arrived from Hew York soon after the fall of Loscot to take over its leadership. Its nature was also revealed by the position it took on International issues, and by the way it was viewed by international Communist authorities. Tho PSP began on intensive propaganda campaign against the Marshall Plan, dwelt incossantly on the dangers of "Americannd attacked the Estime government for being subservient to tho Americans. The Cuban Communist newspaper, Hoy, ontated that the PSP was based on the principles of Marxism with an immediate program which was conscious of the prossing needs of tho Haitian people. Hoy criticized the PCH as "filled with infantilo concepts." The PCH supported the Estime regime, including itswith the United states, and was not openly accoptedart of tho international Communist movement.

There are two possible reasons for theof two Coomunist parties in Haiti. The basic reason is perhaps the traditional inability of the Haitian Negro and mulatto to workPCH wasegro party, while the PSP was formed by mulatto intellectuals. The second reason is believed to havoacticalon tbe part of the international Communist movement. Dual parties have been encouraged in several countries, one supporting the incumbent government and one in opposition to lt. In this way no matter what direction domestic politics should take, one party would beosition to

M-2

SECRET

work with, and perhaps control, tho .

In the electionSP founder, Max Hudicourt, was elected to the Senate, and another party member was elected to the Chamber of Doputies. Even though Hudicourt wasew months after his election, the PSP survived0 when Prosldont Paul Magloire declared it illegal. The PCH had become inactivend many of the leading Communists of both parties began leaving the country Most of them remained in exile until During that decade, Ihose Communists who remained in Haiti worked largely through labor and student groups, attempting to dominate them or influence their

4 the group of PSP mombors whoin Haiti split into two factions, one of which was the predecessor of the PPLN, the name which they adopted The PEP was formedroup of Communist intellectuals who were permitted, and in some cases invited, by Duvalier to return to Haiti Recent efforts to unite the two parties have been unsuccessful. The main obstacle to unity has been personalitybetween the leaders of the two groups, with ideological differencesinor role. Racial differences are noactor, since both parties have Negro and mulatto members.

3. Present Posture

A. Popular Party of National

The exact size of the PPLN is not known. The most recent, and probably the most accurate, information on membership was published In the PPLN internal bulletin, Bulletin-Liberat ion. in At that time the PPLN claimed toembers organizedells. The PPLN also has anympathizers, most of whom have at one time or another been members of PPLN study groups or fronts. The PPIN'o major front activity htt3 been concentrated in aof short-lived youth fronts. Cno of the most

recent, taking its nameype of peasant attire, was called the Carncoa Bleu. It was organized around the endndear.

him mam aunviiy 6i'Caracoa bleu was mar ot sponsoring lectures, concerts, and art exhibits through which those attending received considerable Communist indoctrination. Members of the Caracoa Bleu were organized into brigadesembers each (tho use of tho word "cell" wasavoided). Those members who showed promise and intorest were recruited into the PPLN. This front became increasingly inactive toward the end4 and in5 was believed to have been reorganized, taking the name Popular Youth League (Liguo de Jeunesse This group continues to sponsor much of the same type activity carried on by the Caracoa Bleu,

The PPLN has no members presently participating in the Haitian Government, The party publishes no newspaper; the most recent effort of this natureublication called Haiti-Demain (Haitiwhich appeared23 somewhat irregularly, but approximately ona monthly basis. The segments of the population which this paperto influence were chiefly the urban workers, peasants, and the small middle class. The PPLN's propaganda line has for several years been much more activist than that of the PEP. The PPLN has concentrated heavily on indoctrination of thelower classes using such emotional themes as anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism. Since3 the PPLN has advocated armed struggle against-the government, but it is not believed to be capable ofuccessful revolt at this time. Leaders of the PPLN include Max Chancy, Yves Barbot, and Roger Gaillard.

B. Party of Popular

There is no precise information available concerning the number of PEP members and sympathizers Most estimates of the membership are, while estimates of the number of sympathizers range. The PEP manifesto plays down

M-4

thef class warfaro, does not mentionlvizntion,nnd emphasizes that Haiti's major problems are caused by foreign ownership of capltnl,S "capitalists." The leader of the ?HP was believed to be Edris Saint-Amand, about whom nothing has been hoard The exact identities of current leaders are not known.

The major front activity of the PEP wasin the Intersyndtcal Union of Haiti (Union Intersyndicalea now dormant labor federation over which the PEP exercised considerable control. The UIH was affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unionsinternational Communist laborwith its regional, tho Confederation of Latin American Workers (Confedorncion de Trabajadoros do America Latina--CTAL). The UIH was banned3 and is believed to have been replacedlandestine front group.

In addition to trade union members, PEP propaganda and influence is directedmall group of leftist intellectuals. The PEPVoix du Peuple, appeared24 clandestinelyonthly bauls;it now appears

C. Communist infiltration of the government

There are no members of cither party known to bo participating in the Haitian Government. There are, however, several government officials who, while not affiliated with either party, have beon meinbors of an earlier Communist party or areCommunist sympathizers. The most prominent of these are Herve Boyer and the Blanchet brothers, Paul and Jules, each of whom has held several cabinet posts. The minister oi labor, Max Antolne, is not believed toommunist, but heersonal friend of some of the leading Communists in the UIH.

4. International contacts and assistance

The PEP is the party recognized by international Communist authorities aa the Haitian Communist Party. It is Moscow oriented; the amount of financialit receives from Moscow. If any, Is unknown,

U-5

but It is believed to be receiving Soviet guidance which is passed via Mexicoaitianexile, Gerard Pierre-Charles. The PPLN ls not known to have nny direct contact with Moscow; it is more Cuban-oriented and receives its guidance over Radio Havana which beams two programs daily to Haiti, one In French and one in Creole, to which PPLN members are instructed to listen. Recent Rndio Havana broadcasts have beon admonishing Haitians to overthrow Duvalier and hove been assisting their preparation by reading excerpts from Cheuerrilla warfare handbook.

Most exiled Communists are located either in Europe or Mexico. The largest group is in France where they have formed an organization of approximately ISO students (most of whom are Communists orsympathizers) called the Association of Haitian Students in Paris (Groupement des Haitiens Etudiants aor the Federation of Haitian Students in Europe (Federation des Etudiants Haitiens en Europe--FEME), Very little is known about this it may actually be two separate The next largest group of Communist exiles is located in Mexico. This group ls believed to numberhe name of their association is not known, but they reportedlyulletin called Rai1lement which is also circulated in Europe. In addition, there are probablyexiles studying in bloc countries.

eaders of the Haitian Communistthrough the years

early days,

Jacques Roumain Max Hudicourt Pierre Hudicourt Anthony Lespes Max Sam

Felix D'Orleans Juste Constant

Antonio Vieux

Albert Mangones

Jean Brierre

Jules Blanchet

Leon Sahous

Roussan Camille

Popular Socialist Party (PSP),political bureau

Ztienne D. Charlier Jules Blanchet Max Sam

Regnord Bernard Anthony Lespes Fritz Basquiat Max Hudicourt

Communist Party of Haiti (PCH),political bureau

Felix D'Orleans Juste Constant

Roger Mercier

Edris Saint-Amand

Max Menard

Jacques Alexis

Andre Bistoury

Odnel David

Popular Party ofo present

Yves Barbot

Antonyn exile in Africa Maxn exile

Yvesn exile Roger Gai Hard Marceln exile Micheln exile Clauden exile

, Loffuial

Alexandren exile Rodelin Charles Guy Lomlny

The Party of Popular Accord8 to present

Alexis (executed ?)

Josephn exile

Edris St.ocation unknown

Rodolphe Molse (may have joined PPLN)

FOUNDERS

Intersyndlcal Union of Haiti (UIH)

Ulrich Joly Andre Leroy

Caracoa Dleu and Popular Youth League

Albert Frederick Claude Plerre-Antolne

SECRET

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HONDURAS

The Communist Party of Honduras is illegal. Its present strength Is estimated to beembers andympathizers. The central committee of the PCH was located in San Pedro Sula until the3 coup when most of the Communist leadership as well as many leaders of the non-Communist opposition went into exile. The PCH became so disorganized that, by the endnly two of the ten municipal committeesew cells were functioning. In4 an amnesty decree permitted the return of all exiles except ten of the Communist leaders whom theconsidered dangerous. While the list of ten is still formally maintained, the present lenient policy of the government toward political exiles suggests that no attempt would be made to prevent any of these ten Communists from entering the country. Recentindicate that two and possibly three of the ten are presently in Honduras.

The PCH was founded on While the PCH isell-indoctrinated party itairly well-disciplined organization. It has boen retarded in its development by Internal dissension, particularly among the top leadership, and has been criticized by the Communist parties of Guatemala and El Salvador for its lack of militancy and revolutionary zeal. On the other hand, the constant political instability and general underdevelopment of Honduras provides the PCHlimate relatively favorable to the expansion of its Influence. Furthermore,0 its capabilities have been strengthened to someby assistance from Cuba.

of Communism

Like most Central American countries, Honduras has suffered from an almost interminable series of dictatorships. Little opportunity for theof political parties, Communist or any other

N-l

/SI

kind, has taken place. eriod of relative freedom in tbend,year-long dictatorship of General Tlburcio Carias Andino virtually stopped all political activity. When Juan Manuel Galvez was installed as presidenthe political atmosphere began to clear andactivity of all kinds became possible once again.

In such an atmosphere, the Communist Party of Honduras was not able to achieve the size orof its fellow parties in neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador, thoughew years int made some progress, and under Galvez the Communists again became active.

Communism in Honduras began in the, and the first labor organization in which thewere reported to have gained some influence was the Railroad Workers Union, established and recognized by the government In this period thewere also active among the banana workers in the north coast area.

The most picturesque leader of these early Hon-duran Communists was Juan Pablo Walnwright, theson of an English fatheronriuran mothor.oung man he had gone to the United States, where various misadventures had landed him in jail. Somo time later he enlisted in the Canadian Army during Worldnd fought in France. After his discharge he wandered widely in Europe, Africa, and the Far East, returning home

The misfortunes of Honduran politics, however, soon had him on the move, this timo visitingGuatemala and El Salvador. In the latterheommunist, and8 he returned home to organize the banana workers. Afteriolent strike among them0 he was jailed, but succeeded in escaping to Guatemala.

Throughout this period herincipal figure in Communist activities in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. He was implicated in the Communists' revolutionary attempt in El Salvador inut succeeded in making good his escape to Guatemala.

However, there he was captured once again, and was finally executed by the orders of General Ubico.

Duringhe most important laborin Honduras was the Honduranhe local affiliate of the Workersof Central America (COCA). The Communists at first worked inside this group, but unlike their comrades in Guatemala and El Salvador they wereto gain control of the organization. TheFederation refused to join the Communist-dominated continental labor group, the CSLA, andhe Communists in conformity with the Comintern's Third Period policy organized their own nationalgroup, tbe Honduran Sindical Federation (FSH).

The Sindical Federation was established by ahold on May9 In Tela on the north coast. It claimed to have all the important unions in the country "among them tho embattled Railroad Workers Union" (UFH) within its ranks. The headquarters were established in Tegucigalpa although most of itswere on the north coast. The chief officials of the Communist union group were Abraham Ramirez,

secretary general, and F. Armando Amava, secretary of internal affairs

A second congress of the Honduran Sindicalmet on May0 and resolved to concentrate activities in the banana fields, where "actionwould be established, since full-scale trade unions were impossible because ofhe congress also resolved toelegate to the "world congress in Moscow."

Soon afterward tho Communistseriousto carry out tho decisions of their trade union group. Theyeneral strike in the banana fieldsuly. But onuno the government cracked down on them, and most of the leaders of the Federation were jailed or exiled to desolate orparts of the country. In spite of this temporary setback, the Communists continued their work. They coordinated their activities closely with theparties in neighboring Guatomaln and El Salvador.

K-3

Whether In conjunction with the Salvadoranor not, the Communistsecondstrike among tho banana workers of the north coast of Honduras early in President Collndres declared martial law and rushed troops to the area. The troops and the United Fruit Compnny's police rounded up the strike leaders and deported them to El Salvador, from where they never returned.

2 President Tlburclo Carias Andinoto power. His regime ruthlessly crushed not only Che Communists but all dissident politicaland completely destroyed the trade union movement. For more thanears the Communist movement in Honduras was driven so far underground as virtually to cease to exist.

It was not until the inauguration of President Juan Manuel Galvez in8 that the political situation In Honduras began to change once more.slowly, Gnlvez took steps to allow theof the political parties. The opposition Liberal Party returned to lusty life,ow party, the Honduran Revolutionary Democratic Party (rDEH),on the political horizon.

In the beginning many left-wing Liberals joinod this new group, but it soon came under the control of the Communists. Although it was not an avowedly Communist party, the PDRH became the front behind which the Communists worked to rebuild their forces. As usual, they were active in the labor movement. Although President Gnlvez did not allow theof trade unions until the summerumerous mutual benefit societies did appear. One of these mutualist groups, the Society of Graphic Arts, was organized in Tegucigalpa9eriodical, Voz Obrera (Voice of the Worker). Early0 Voz ObVera undertook toa labor-organizing committee under the name of Workers Committee for Organization (CCO). Itin its ranks the printing-trades workers, the shoemakers, the tailors, and other groups.

Voz Obrera, meanwhile, became increasingly pro-Communist "TiTTFs orientation. Articles by Vicente Lombardo Tolcdano appeared, and in Various issues the

paper announced its adherence to the Communisttrade union group, the CTAL, and the World Federation of Trade Unions. It also gavo publicity to events in neighboring Guatemala.

Inresident Galvez moved against Voz Obrera and the PDRH. The newspaper was suppressed; TTs principal editors took refuge in the Guatemalan Embassy and left the country, while the party was.

Meanwhile the Communists had once again beenactive among the banana workers. There Is no doubt that many Hondurans crossed the loosely guarded frontier between Honduras and Guatemala, and received training in the Communist schools inCity. There they were taught the basicof trade union organization, wcrei-coached in public speaking, and were indoctrinated withldoas and ideology.

Tho Honduran Communists got what seemed like their great opportunity in the strike which broke out In the banana fields along the north coast in Itubject of controversy whother or not tho Communists were responsible forthis walkout. President Galvez asserted that he had proof that the banana strike was originallyas an attempt to overthrow his government. He claimed that Guatemalan Communist leaders Jose Manuel Fortuny, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, and Carlos Manuel Pellecer wore In Livingston, near the Honduranfrom where they directed the movement. While President Galvez and the officials of the United Fruit Company maintained that tho spark was lit by the Communists, the strike leaders, Communists and non-Communists alike, maintained that the movement was spontaneous.

Whether or not they began it, there is little doubt that pro-Communist elements became the first leaders of the walkout. However, after tho strike had been In progress foronth, thosowore deposed from the central strike commlttoe and thereafter tho leaders of the strike, and the negotiators of the final settlement early in July, were strongly opposed to the influence of theand the PDRH.

After the strike was over, the struggle forof the newly organized banana workers The Central Trade Union Committee (the old central strikeirmly in the hands of theonference in order formally tonion among the United Fruit Company's employees. Its efforts sere opposed by the PDRH faction.

The PDRH leaders controlled the workers' groups in the principal company towns scattered throughout tho United Fruit Company (UFCO) holdings. Theat the union convention was so arranged that the plantation workers, who make up the great majority of the company's employees, were adequately represented.

The founding conference of the new bananaunion met on Most of the PDRH elements boycotted the meeting, and it was completely in the hands of the non-Communists. The PDRHmeanwhile, had set about the organization of what would amountival union among the United Fruit workers. The control of the banana workors of the Standard Fruit Company remained firmly in tho hands of the non-Communists.

Innother threat to the nation's political stability aroseesult of theelections touccessor to Prosldent Junn Manuel Galvez. There were three candidates: ex-dictator Genoral Tiburcio Carias Andlno of the Nationalist Party; Abraham Williams of the Reformist Party; and Jose Ramon Villeda Morales of the Liberal Party.

The election campaign took placeense Threats of civil war if they lost emanated from all three parties. It seemed almost certain that the election would deteriorate into armed Although the Liberal Party received more votes than either of its opponents, and manyfelt that it had really elected its candidate, no nominee was recognized as having received theofercent of the popular vote which was

required by the nation's constitution. The election waB then thrown into congress, but no party had the two-thirds majority of the house which was necessary for election.

A deadlock occurred. President Galvez took "leave" and went to Panama, leaving the presidency in the hands of the vice president, Julio Lozano. When the constitutional time limit for the election of the president waB reached, Lozano declared adictatorship." Announcing that no new chief executive had been elected, he declared that the newly elected congress was dissolved and that he would continue in office for two years after which ho would call new elections for both the presidency and congress. The solution of the crisis wasby all parties. Lozano was able tohree-party cabinet in which the key posts were held by members of the majority Liberal Party. ational consultative assembly, also composed of members of the three parties, was sot up as afor congress.

With the inauguration in4 of the Julio Lozano, the Communists were subjected to the same political suppression which affected all opposition to the government.

A new crisis, however, occurred inresident Lozano had decided to stay in power, in spite of his promises not to do so when he originally took over two years previously. He presided over electionsonstituent assembly, which werewon by Lozano's supporters who had announced in advance that they Intended to name the provisional president as constitutional chief executive.

ew days of protest by the forcestoLiberals and the Nationalist followers of GeneralPresidentilitary coup. The members of the new junta announced that they had seized power because of the fraudulent nature of the elections presided over by Lozano and the fact that the majority of thewere opposed to his regime.

The Communists played no part in this political crisis. The peaceful resolution of the situation

SECRET

prevented then from capitalizingivil war, which might well have givenhance to offer "support" to one faction or another, thus enabling them for tho first time toignificant factor in thepolitical life. Membership in the PCH at the end of tho Lozano regime was cstimatod to be no morelus an equal number of sympathizers.

3. Communism at Present

A Liberal Party administration, under theof Dr. Jose Ramon Villeda Morales, took office in During the six years Villeda held office, opposition groups, including the Communists, were permitted considerably more freedom of action than in tho past. The PCH made significant gains, not only in expanding its influence amonij students and labor groups, but also in infiltrating the lvov-ernment, especially the Ministry of Public Villoda, while admitting his concorn over the possible danger of Communism to Honduras, continued to display what many observerssoft" attitude toward the PCH. He maintained thatcould not be destroyed by negative suppression, but rather by constructive governmental action which would rob Communism of its appeal. Villeda sought the support of as much of the leftist element asapparently in the belief that ho couldand use the PCH for his own purposes. Heheld occasional meetings with PCH leaders in order to inform them just what degree of opposition his government would tolerate.

3 coup brought to power agovernment supported by the Nationalist Party, the more conservative of the two major Honduran Since that time the government hasore restrictive policy toward Communist activity, including the expulsion from Honduras of most of the party leaders. Most of these exiles, including party first secretary Dionisio Bejarano Ramos, went towhere they were able to establish international Communist contacts with greater facility than had been possiblo in Honduras. Since the amnesty decree ofost Communists who had not already returned to Honduras clandestinely have beon readmitted to the country and are attempting to rebuild the PCH organization.

The Communist Youth of Honduras (JCH) wasby the PCH1 as part of Its policy of emphasizing the recruitment of youth.

The JCH is the youth section of the Communist movement but its members are not under partyor control. The lending members of the JCH nro Jorge Arturo Reina Idiaquez, Carlos Falk, Oscar Molern, Rodil Rivera Kodil, und Ismael Mntute The JCH is not organizedolid cell basis as is the PCH. It ls composed of youngas well as students, and has followers in labor unions, schools, and in tho National University of Honduras. The JCH may have as manyctivists and sympathizers. Through these followers itsome control over student and youth groups. Prior to the3 coup, Reina reportedly had formed the JCH groups into assault brigades and wan conducting classes in military and parnallitaryat his ranch near Tegucigalpa. Reportedly the JCH has received considernble assistance from Cuba, especially in the form of scholarships.

The principal youth front is the UniversityFront (P'IU) Toraed8 by Uoina. The FRU has controlled the Federation of Honduran University Students (FFUH) during only one school, but it has lost other electionsmall margin of votes; it consistently shows strength In suchfaculties as law nnd economics. Factionalism nraone the non-Coiauun 1st turiflji i* groups at theduringnd IS '4lso contributed to the strength of the FRU. One such group, theIntegrated University Frontupposedly affiliated with the Liberni Tarty, is believed to be heavily infiltrated by JCH uerabers. Tho principal strength of the FRU is in the school of economy in the university, whose student body organization has been controlled by the FRU for several years. The e'ean of the school of economy is Ccclllo Zelayawhoommunist and belongs to perhaps the outstanding Communist family in Honduras.

The concentration by the PCH on recruitment of youth starts at the secondary school level. The om-phasis at this level, however, appenrs to be placing Con mi ii 1st:; in tSSCb log positions ratbeXrr. or.active front groups among the students. Theline and Marxist theory were taught in manyschools during the Liberal Party administration

of Villeda Morales. The most notable success of tbe PCH on the secondary school level wasarxist high school, the Alfonso Guillen Zelaya High School in Tegucigalpa. This school is namedeftist Honduran poet and is largely staffed by teachers of Communist persuasion. The application for its establishment was approved by the pro-Communist Director of Secondary Education, Manuel Antonio antos, before hisfrom that post in late Since the coup inome offort has been made to correct this situation. The minister of public oducation from3 tor. Eugonlo Matute Canizales began dismissing some Communists from teaching positions before the endatute devotod most of his dismissals to members of the Liberal Party in order to provide more jobs for Nationalists.

FECESITLIH, the Central Labor Federation inis Communist controlled. However,ew directorate of FECESITLIH In5 resulted in tbe election of an anti-Communistro-Communist slate. Both factions havetheir slates to the Labor Ministry forand the indications are that theslate will be approved as the new directorato. Should this take place the Communist control of FECESITLIH will have been eliminated. Its total membership of represents less than ten percent of organized labor. Formerly the PCH's most valuable labor asset was SITRASFRUCO, the Standard Fruit Company labor union in La Ceiba. Thecontrol of SITRASFRUCO was eliminated at the union elections in The union, now called SUTRASFCO, has nowembers and iswith FESITRANH, the large north coast labor union.

The PCH hasotable lack of success in organizing peasants and women. In the case of the small farmers this lack of success was due to the organization of the National Association ofCampeslnos (ANACH). This organization was foundedraining program held in2 sponsored by the FESITRANH, inotaleasant leaders were given orientation courses in agrarian reform, community development, andmovement and related subjects. ANACH later

N-10

received legal recognition from the government and eventually was admitted to the North Coast Labor Federation, FESITRANH. The original effort of the PCH toront through which they couldtho farmers began1 with the formation of the Central Committee for the Unification ofFarmers, Comlte Central de Unificaclon Camposina (CCUC). 2 the nnmo of thewas changed to the National Federation ofSubsistence Farmers, Federnclon Nacional do Campesinos Hondurenosn an attempt to take advantage of the organizational name of ANACH by confusing the peasants into believing that FENACH and ANACH were tho same. FENACH leaders failed In this maneuver and thon made overtures to ANACH to consolidate their efforts under tho banner of ANACH, the legally recognlzod union, When the ANACHrefused even to talk to FENACH leaders, thoorganization eventually ceased to exist.

Women, except for the female members of tho PCH, have manifested even less interest than the subsistence farmers in joining PCH front groups. Since9 tho PCH has attempted on nn avorage ofear toomen's front, each one of which was dissolvedew meetings because of lack of Interest. The main reason for this lack ofis that Honduran women traditionally do not like to appear in public as rabble rousers. Only the most dedicated Communist would allow herself to assumeole; therefore, the nucleus around which ench of these short-lived organizations was formed appears to havo been the same handful ofPCH members. Because ofew approach was trlod3 with the formation of the Llbora-tionist Women's Confederation (COFELI). Membership in this group was intended to bo drawn predominantly frOm those women who were already members of tho PCH. Nothing further has been hoard of COFELI, and it is, therefore, nssumed to havo gone the way of its predoceasors.

The government of Villeda Morales had taken steps to control the inflow of Communist propaganda through the mails and customs and with some success. It was less effective in the restriction of subversive travel because resources for border and coastalwere inadequate. After the successful coup of

N-ll

he Lopoz military regime cracked dovn hard on the PCH, which resulted in many of itsgoing into exile. However, since the amnesty decree ofith the exception of sporadic arresting of Communist Party members and sympathizers, the Lopez government has,arge extent, left the Communists alone. Lopoz hasthe policy of the Villeda Morales government in restricting and controlling the flow of Communist propaganda through the mails and customs. It isthatercent of the propaganda ontering through the postal system is Intercepted by Honduran authorities, but border and coastal surveillance facilities still appear inadequate. Semana Popular has been considered to be the official PcH publica-tion for some time. Itimeographed paper which appears infrequently and is clandestinely Inew clandestine publication of the PCH, appeared. In5 Pedro Brizuela informed the Municipal Committee in San Pedro Sula that the PCH would againewspaper in Honduras and that this periodical would be ready for distribution in The FAP began publishing Avarice, its official paper, in Avance is considered an official party publication and is1 openly distributed. El Cronista, the left-wing Tegucigalpa dally, which formorly slanted its news coverage to show the United States Government in the most unfavorable light possible, has toned down its anti-US position considerably. However, its Sunday editionuch moro violent anti-US position and maintains its status as it did previously. While there are no bookstores indealing exclusively in Communist literature, several are noted for their ability to provide such literature on request and are operated by Communist party members or sympathizers. There are the Llbrerla Mexico in Tegucigalpa, the Ll-brerla Navarro in Comayaguela, and tho Libreria Atenea in San Pedro Sula,ranch in Other bookstores which deal in Communist literature are La Idea in Tegucigalpa, El Faro in Comayaguela, and Books in America in San Pedro Sula. The Libreria Ramon Rosa in Tegucigalpa dealsin Marxist and Communist literature, but iteading room ratherookstore.

SF.CRF.T

Radiobroadcasts originating in Honduras are not closely rogulated by the government, but there are no Communist-oriented broadcasting stations in Honduras, deception of broadcasts from Cuba on medium wave is poor except on the north coast; Radio Havana reception is excellent, however, in short wave in uost areas of Honduras. Radio Havanais slanted toward the subsistence fanners, plantation workers, and unskilled laborers, using such themes as "Yankeehe need for revolution in Latin America, how tho Cuban revolution has benefited the Cuban poople, and attacks on the Alliance for Progress. Radiois received only on tlie wore expensive andshort-wave sots. However, Radio Moscow ison any moderately priced radio with the proper short-wave bands of which many Japanese models are readily available in Honduras.

During the periodomeondurans were in attendance at tho Marxist/Leninist Cadre School in Moscow. boutondurans were attending the Patrice Lumumba Friendshipin Moscow. r more Hondurans ore presently studying in schools in Cuba, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

The potential for terrorism, sabotage, and other violence rests with three revolutionary organizations: the pro-Castro Francisco Morazan Movement (UFU) the Popular Action Fronthe revolutionary front of the PCH, and the United Front of Liberal Unity and Action (FUAL). Tho UFM was formed in Cuba3 by the more militant members of the group of JCH members who had received scholarships to study in Cuba. Upon the return of Oscar Simeon Martinoz and Mariano Agullar Ouyela, the UFU began to recruit members in the late summer. Since tho abortive attack on the Rio Liiuio Hydroelectric Plant in Marchhe UFM has not pursued any militant activity. The arrest and detention of Nartlnez and Aguilar

N-13

along with other Cuban-trained MFM members hasenigrating effect on the MFM and its present activ-ties do not include overt acts of violence. Tho MFMembershipn the Tegucigalpa Central District with anembers and/orin the Department of Francisco Morazan which encompasses the capital. The estimated strength of members and supporters in San Pedro Sula and the north coast area is claimed tohich appearsexcessive. The MFM believes that their greatest potential for support lies in the Department of Olancho' Concentrated attempts to organize the MFM in Olancho have not been very successful, however. The MFM is not controlled by the PCH and its leaders are notCommunist Party discipline. The FAP, on the other hand, isCH organization. The party wants this organization to be its united front of national liberation. Most of its leaders and activists are members of the military command (commando militar) of the party and have received training in Cuba and the USSR. They are now training Honduran cadres in sabotage, street fighting,tactics, demolition, bomb making, guerrilla warfare, and other methods of The FUAL is comprised of an unknown number of leftist members of the Liberal Party of Honduras, and is led by Dr. Rodolfo Pastor Zelaya, adoctor in San Pedro Sula. FUAL support lsin the north coast. The organization is small but vocal and has published leafletsrevolutionary acts against the Lopez government.

THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT OF JAMAICA

1. Introduction

There is no Communist party in Jamaica, but rather several Communist front groups. These groups have been unable to unite into an effective coalitionhaving received considerable outside urging and havingumber of abortive attempts. Should they be able to unite, however, an inviting area exists for them to exploit among the large body of unemployed and underemployed, particularly in the slums of Kingston.

Jamaica has long been free of the instability which has troubled other Caribbean countries. trong tradition of parliamentary rule exists, basedorking two-party system. The ruling Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and the opposition People's National Party (PHP) both are essentially conservative parties with broad popular support based primarily on their respoctive labor unions. Tho large rural population iseparate political force, but findsalong with other well-doflned interest groups, in the two major parties.

Jamaica's long-term prospects for continuing stability are not all bright, however. The rapid economic growth of the luiOs, which was basedon bauxite development, has levelod off. is estimated to bo betwoonnd is coupledapid population expansion. Extremely bad living conditions exist for manywhorino target for Communistand organizers.

rief History of Jamaican Comm

many years the Communists in Jamaica worked inside the PNP and its associated trade union group, the Trade Union Council (TUC). The leaders of the TUC were from the beginning tho left wing of the PNP. Tho TUC joined tho World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) at its founding congress, and remained in that body long after its democratic membership had withdrawn, orman Hanley, head of tho PNP, and other party leaders were highly concerned

with the possible influence of the pro-Communist element on the PNP's chances for winning the coming election and for conducting an effective government after the election. Party leaders became convinced that the left-wing group was trying toartyarty. Charges of disloyalty to the PNP and its principles and of trying toommunist group within the party were made by the PNP executive, and tbe left-wing group was expelledublic trial.

Those expelled from the PNP split into twoone headed by solicitor and intellectual.Richard Hart who founded the Jamaicanof Trade Unionsnd the other led by Ken and Frank Hill which retained the TUC name. The PNP established another trade union which quickly attracted most of the following of the dissension-torn TUC. The TUC sponsored the formation of the National Labor Party which, however, became defunct following its failure to elect any candidates in5 elections. The TUC joined the Federation of Christian Trade Unions, but in4 merged back into the PNP's labor organization.

Ferdinandell-known Communist in the international labor movement and an officer of the WFTU, returned to his native Jamaica He teamed up with JFTU leader Richard Hart, andpresident of the union, which subsequently affiliated with the WFTU. Hart and Smith formed the People's Educational Organization (PEO)hich they later reorganized and renamed the People's Freedom Movement (PFM) The PFM failed to elect any of its candidates to the House ofin5 or to municipal office inut maintained its overt operations. However, police raids4 effectivelythe PFM's activities. The party attempted to organize groups in both Kingston and rural areas but had little success in attracting members. Party leaders tried tougar workers' unionactory workers' union to affiliate with the JFTU. The WFTU recognized the JFTU, but both the government and employers ignored it completely. Its scantquickly evaporated when it became apparent that the union could not help them.

The Jamaican Youth Movement, originally formed by the government during tho early years of World War II, was taken ovor by Hart, but it, too, failed to produce any appreciable results. Smith became ill, and the PFM sufferedebilitating lack of leadership. Membership lagged and funds were almost invariably insufficient to undertake any major projects. ew party chairman was as unsuccessful as his predecessors in spurring recruitment. Smith continued to receive some funds from the WFTU and tried to take some credit for9 sugar strikes, but his failing healthrestricted his activities.

Inhe PFM seemed to be benefiting from the impact of the Cuban revolution, and some members were thought to be receiving funds and guidance from Cuba. Activity picked up and members attempted to exploit the Rnstafarlanlack supremacist, back-to-Africa cult which,proved to be too internally disorganized and individualistic to lend itself to Communist

2 the PFM split into two factions. The original and more moderate group, headed by Hart, took the name of the Socialist Party of Jamaica (SPJ), The other faction contains more radical members who retain the PFM name but preferront, the Unemployed Workers Council (UWC). Winston Monroe heads the UWC and the PFM. The UWC has participated with members of major party trade union organizations in demonstrations, usually exploiting such economic issues as unemployment. In addition they haveew small pro-Castro, anti-US demonstrations which have never been able to attract moreew onlookers. The UWCin its role as the militant arm of the PFM and reportedly hopes to send some members to Cuba for guerrilla training. ome UWC members evidently did not find its policies sufficiently revolutionary, and they broko away to establish the embryonic Youth Force for National Liberationhe YFNL has become practically defunct since its leader, Keith Miles, returned to England.

Tha SPJ also apparently suffers from considerable intraparty dissension^ 4 Richard Hart moved

0-3

to British Guiana to assist his close friend Cheddi Jagan and to serve as editor of the Mirror, the organ of Jagan's People's Progressive Party"! Shortly after Jagan's failure to win4 elections, Hart moved to Great Britain. He appears more interested in British Guianese affairs than in returning to Jamaica. Pur eel Lawson who currently heads the SPJ has borne the brunt of considerable criticism from fellow SPJ members. The SPJ has been inactive in recent months and the party seems likely to remain in its present state of disarray for the immediate future.

Both the PFM/OWC and the SPJ openly espousedoctrine. They have Jointly supported and publicly shared in the activities of suchas the Friends for Cuba Committee, which is now virtually inactive. Both British and Cubanhave exerted considerable pressure on the two groups to uniteepresentative leftist front. They have been promised assistance if they can combine with the left-wing of the PNP and the militant youth organization of the PNP known as the Young Socialist League (YSL).

Although the YSL was created by the PNPt is no longer responsive to the moderate leaders of the party. YSL President Hugh Small has led the group's drive to organize followers and to spread Marxist teachings into rural areas. The YSL has been quite effective in attracting members. It is not fully Communist controlled, but many of itsmembers are known Communists. Leroy Taylor, one of the party's loading figures has been to Cuba and is activelyro-Castro party orientation.

Because of the YSL's espousal of extreme leftist doctrines, it may soon be expelled from the PNP. YSL leaders attempted to take over the PNP during the5 congress. Although they were notin getting the PNP to accept extreme socialist measures in the party platform, their strength and organization were surprising, and the YSL is athreat to party moderates. The YSL willingly lends itself to Communist purposes and probably justl-fiedly deserves its characterization as the best hope of the far left for eventually taking power in Jamaica.

0-4

.*Wr>

3. Strength and Supporting Groups

There are probably not more than thirty or forty hard-core Communists in Jamaica, andympathizers. The oembership and sympathizers arc divided fairly evenly between the PKM/UWC and the SPJ. In addition, the YSLollowingto bo, and although most of these persons could not be consldorod Communists,e certainly sympathizers with extreme leftist causes and responsive to the direction of extremists.

Lack of funds hashronic problem for Jamaican Communists, and when combined with their internal disorganization and lack of effective leadership, has made it almost impossible for the party to produce significant political action either alone or In concert with other groups. The various fronts havo attempted to exploit0 or so members of the Rastafarian sect, but so far have had little, or no, success, At the present tine the YSL seems the most likely source of support for the goals of Communism in Jamaica, particularly if the YSL includos prominent members of the left-wing of the PNP in its ranks.

In addition to the supporters of Communist causes mentioned above, thereew self-styledCommunists, such. (Roily) Slmas, Vincent Groen,G. Sinclair. Sinclair has been identified with the SPJ and has been In and out of the PNP as well.

The Communists appear to have few adherents among either trade union or student groups, but theytheir efforts to penetrate such organizations and to exploit dissatisfaction with the government's conservative policlos.

4. Foreign Influence

The various Communist fronts have no established international ties and receive neither direction nor important financial or materiel support from abroad. They do, however, remain in close contact with Cuban. British, and British Guianese Communists whoonsiderable Interest in Jamaica and its strategic location. All of them continuously exhort the

Jamaicans tonited front; the Cubans reportedly have promised substantial financial assistanceront be formed which includes representatives of the SPJ, UWC/PFM, YSL, YFNL, and the left-wing of the PNP.

After the Initial impact of the Cuban revolution, little direct benefit appears to have accrued to Jamaica's Communists from Fidel Castro'sregime. There are0 Jamaicans resident in Cuba, and the government has found it prudent to maintain cool, but correct, relations with Castro. Social, cultural, and athletichave been limited, and the government has generallyolicy of restricting and care-fully controlling travel to and from Cuba, f

No Communist bloc country other than Cuba has been allowed toiplomatic presence in Jamaica and trade relations are negligible. The Sino-Soviet split appears to have had little effect on Jamaican Communists who are not really responsive to either party. Thereairly sizable Chinese community in Kingston, and in5 it was the object of mob violence by envious members of the economically hard-pressed Negro community. Although some propaganda from Red China is circulated and some citizens have apparently visited the mainland, there is little to tie the island's Chinese toChina.

5. Dissident groups

Because there is no official Communist Party in Jamaica, it ls impossible to name any of the fronts

0-6

tmnu

as more dissident than any othor. There does not seem to be any question of tho Communistor any of these groups, it lsatter of the choice of leaders under whose directionactivities shall be conducted. Should aimportant issueharismatic leader with real popular appeal arise, there seems nothing to preclude the unification of the splinter groupsohesive party.

7. Members of Legislature None

8- Trend in Size of Congressional Representation None

of Communist Party

Socialist Party ofHart

Peoples Freedom Movement/

Unemployed WorkersMonroe

of the

No official party exists, and tho front groups do not have formal organizational structures.

sf.gwv-

-SECttKZ-

SEClftfT

COMMUNISM IN NICARAGUA

Communism has neverajor force inbut assistance from the Soviet Union and Castro's Cuba has enabled tbe party toossible, if weak, threat to stability. The party is small and operates effectively only through front groups. Its appeal is limited and the recent boom in tbe Nlcaraguan economy has reduced its attractiveness to Nicaragua's growing middle class. Tbe Communists have sought for many years toroad-based political front to oppose the dominant Liberal Party, but has met with almost no success. However, tbe political ambitions of General Anastaslo Somoza Debayle, son of the late dictator, soon nay produce unrest in the country and provide the Communists their long-sought

History of Communism in Nicaragua

In the, the leaders of theCommunist movement began to take morein Latin American affairs and found Ina man that they could consider as anexample of "anti-imperialism." This man,Augusto Cesar Sandino, was fighting theof his country by US Marines and haduerrilla campaign to force them out of the The Comintern set out to "capture" Sandino for their cause and at the Sixth Congress of thein Moscowesolution was adopted which called on the proletariat of all countries to support Sandino,Hands Off Nicaragua Committee" (MAFUENIC) was founded. The Comintern tried, rather unsuccessfully, to raise funds to back Sandino and, at the same time, discredit Sandino's agent in Mexico, since the general had little interest.in the Communists' offer. Finally, the Communists kidnaped Sandlno's brother to pressure the general into acceptingand Sandino would have nothing further to do with the Reds. andino agreed to meet with the government and end his guerrilla campaign, as the US occupation was ending. The Comintern then

Q-1

brandedraitoretrayer of Nic-araguan independence. When Sandino surrendered, President Sacasa alsoumber of tbe nation's few Communists arrested.

Throughout, the Communists operated within the Partido de Trabajadores de Nicaraguahich maintained friendly relations with the he PTN split over the presidential candidacy of General Anastaslo Somoza Garcia and the Communists withdrew, forming their own party, the Partido Sociallsta (PS). Tbe party's leaders at that time, including Juan Lorio and Manuel Perez Estrada, are still, the policy makers within the party today.

resident Somoza closed down the PS and many of its leaders fled into exile. Armando Amador, a: pnrty'fourtder, become active in theParty of neighboring Costa Rica.

A rapprochement between Somoza and the PS took place during World War II, as the party took theCommunist line of supporting regimes who supported the United Nations. Somoza agreed to give the PS more freedom of action and supported tbeof the Confederaclon de Trabajadores de Nicaraguahich the Communists eventually came to Somozaumber of "Workers' Houses" to serve as union meeting places and it is ironic that he was assassinated in the Casa Obrera in Leon

After the conclusion of the war, Somozacontinue to deal with the PS to gain supportliberal reaction to his dictatorship. Heso far as_to permit public meetings of

[The PStrengthuu

oers in uBcemoer.and support ofercent of theinflated figure. Despite histo retain Communist support, Somoza resisted party pressure for legislative seats and government Jobs.

During the campaign for7 election, the opposition Conservatives sought the support of the

Q-2

PS against Sornoza, but were unsuccessful. Sotnoza's candidate, Leonardo Arguello, was electedixed vote, but Arguello turned against him and tried to follow an antl-Somoza and Independent policy. The PS quickly supported Arguello, but Sornoza removed the President and relations between the PS and the ruling Liberal Party declined rapidly.

eeting of the PS executive committeen Managua, Sornoza henchmen moved in and arrested almost the entire PS leadership. At the same time, the CTN was dissolved by the government and its leaders arrested. The party was thus forced to go underground, and has continued to operate inemiclandestine fashion ever since.

8 tho General Confederation of Labor (OCT) was formed to replace the CTN; the Communists soon dominated the new labor group, as they had its predecessor. evolt against Communistin COT ranks succeeded in ending theirof the organization. 3 the Confederation of Nicaraguan Workers (CNT) was formed from non-Communist elements of the COT and this organization still exists as the Nationalist Confederation of Democratic Workers (CNTD). The Communists formed their own trado union central organization, the General Union of Workers (UGT) which, however, was unable to get legal recognition and was the smallest of the country's contral labor groups. he Communists concentrated most>of their efforts on the labor movement, since the party wassmall and weak. It was estimated that at the time the Communists lost control of the COT, the party had onlyotal membership, andympathizersountryillion people.

The assassination of General Sornoza6 further restricted party activitiestate of siege was Imposed on the country by the newthe general's son, Luis. he party has become slightly more active, but the strong anti-Communist stand of tho Somozas andRene- as limited its.

Q-3

he Movilizacion Republicans (MR) was formedolitical front for the PS, sinces thelegally proscribed. It has had little success in attracting anti-Somoza political elements or inroad-basedopposition. The Communists have alsoouth group, the Juventud Socialista Nicaraguensehich is very active among Nicaraguan students.

The rise of Castroism, caused the creation of an activist exile guerrilla group called the National Liberation Front (FLN) and later tbe Frente Sandinista de Liberacion National (Sandinist Liberation Front, in memory of the old anti-US general). This group tried four times to invadethe way Castro started his Sierra Maestre campaign. All four attempts were poorly organized and poorly led, and easily wiped out by the National Guard. Despite, these setbacks, the FSLN has managed tomall cadreuture guerrilla effort within the country.

3. Present Status of Communism

A. Strength and Supporting Groups

The party itself is outlawed. Its Influence ls strongest in labor and important among the youth and students. Its role in politics.is negligible. The PSN now hasembers and countsympathizers. There has been littlein party membership in theorld War II period. The partyeekly paper, called Orlentacion Popular, whichirculation of about

Politically, the PSN operates through the MR, formed With anembers, the MReputation of importance it has never merited. The MR strongly influenced the platform of the united coalition Nicaraguan Opposition Front formed2 to oppose the candidacy of Rene Schick, but this effort collapsed before the election. The MR capitalizes on its reputation by door-to-doorand registration and4 it wasthat the MR could mobilize0 votes in an election. arty propaganda sheet,s

published weekly. Recently, the MR has been trying to unite the FSLN, PSN, and the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) to oppose the candidacy of General Somoza for the presidencyut with little success.

Although the labor movement in Nicaragua has little strength, it is growing very rapidly in size and Importance. The principal operational goaL of the PSN continues to be the development of alabor movement of such strength that it wouldhreat to the stability of the The Communist-controlled faction of the General Confederation of Laborhich is not recognized by the government, has been until recently theorganization in Nicaragua In terms of leadership, organization,and financing. It is led by dedicated Communists, at least two of whom have studied in the USSR. Tho known strength of the illegal COT with its strongest component, the Managuas. The illegal CGT appears to have lost ground4 and has not been able to match the rapid growth of the Social Christian Autonomous Trade Union Movement'eess lt still possesses considerable potential for disruptive activities.

Communists have longominant force among Nicaraguan students, but, as in the labor movement, are being challenged by the Social Christians. The Juventud Socialists Nicarguenso (JSN) is the official youth arm of the PSN and is the most active youth group in the country. The pro-Castro Revolutionary Student Front (FER) was formed in2 and provides support for the Communist line. The FER lost considerable ground at the National University in the elections of5 to an "independent" backed by the Christian Democratic Federation (FDC).

The Nicaraguan Patriotic Youth, nce an important group, ceased to function3 and there are no known attempts to revive it. The Communists are active in the Student Center of the National(CUUN) but are not known to have members on the executive board.

While PSN leaderselief in eventual revolution against the Nicaraguan Government, the

Q-5

party has traditionally opposed violenceactic and has no paramilitary organization. Militantamong the PSN-supported youth and laboradvocate immediate revolution, but the split between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions that has developed in other countrlos has not yet affected the PSN.

The FSLN, while directed from Cuba in itsefforts to invade Nicaragua, has nowadrearamilitary organization in Nicaragua. The FSLN failed completely to develop an internal subversion and terrorist guerrilla front at the time of the armed incursions from Honduras int is now attempting to work within thestructure of the PSN and MB. Communists are dominant in the movement, which also includesextremists, self-seekers, and revolutionaries of little philosophical bent. While weak, the FSLN ls believed capable of organizing sporadic acts of terrorism. Upicaraguans have been trained inumber in guerrilla warfare.

B. Foreign Influence

Nicaragua maintains diplomatic relations with only one Communist country, Poland, whose ambassador ls resident in Mexico City. Diplomatic relations with Cuba were broken Trade with the bloc ls negligible and total Imports from4 amounted toercent of the year's total. The Communist countries have made no effort to try tooothold in trade relations with Nicaragua, since the anti-Communist view of the government is well known.

Inolio outbreak attracted aoffer of vaccine and technicians. President Schick accepted the vaccine, but declined thedespite pressure from the left to do so. The USSR has not made any further effort to exploitin Nicaragua.

In general, the government under the Somozas ond Schick has been outspokenly in favor of US foreign policy in regard to world Communism. The opposition Conservatives, who strongly oppose the candidacy of

Anastaslo Somoza are also pro-US in orientation and would undoubtedlyimilar foreign policy if they ever cane to power.

Nicaraguan Communists have had nany ties withCommunism. PSN members have attendedCommunist-front congresses and have traveledto the USSR and the eastern Europeanfor orders and training. Students selected by the party attend the Patrice Lununba Friendshipin Moscow, and other bloc schools. FSLNand JSN hard-core followers receive training In Cuba in one of Castro's guerrilla training camps.

D. Communists in Government

Nicaraguan Communists have been able toa number of government entities, such as the ministries of economy, agriculture and education, the SociaL Security Institute,and the National Sports Commission. Very few have reached positions of The Nicaraguan Office of Nationalestimated2 thatommunists orwere holding government positions. leading Communists are personal friends of the Somozas and it has been reported that some of these people hold top jobs, although there is no confirmed evidence to prove these statements. President Schick's right-hand man, Pedro Jose Quintanilla Jarquin, the minister of the presidency, is thought by some toommunist or sympathizer, and it is known that hearty member8 Hemembership in the party, but it is suspected that some Communist job-holders got their positions throughnfluence.

The vice minister of education was also thought toommunist sympathizer, but he was removeda minor cabinet crisis in Someat the university are known to be sympathetic to the Communist cause, but their influence over the students is not believed to have ledignificant upsurge in support for the party youth arm, the JSN.

Q-9

U 1

COMMUNISM IN PANAMA

I. Introduction

Communism has never found fertile soli In Panama despite the opportunities afforded lt by theof the US-administered Canal Zone and aand economy controlled by one of themost degenerate oligarchies. Three factors might explain this paradox: the small size of the Panamanian urban working class; tbe Importance of workers of the zone, who are reluctant to imperil their Jobs by becoming Involved In Communistand finally, the inclination of mostto support the country's traditional non-Communist movements which promise most of tbe things the Communists offer.

2. History

The first Communist group in Panama, the Labor Party (Partido was organized5umber of labor disputes andoccurred in Panama City and Colon. Itcandidates in the national elections8 andotes in the city of Colon. the Communists claimed that they received enough votes to elect two members to the National Assembly, no Labor Party candidates were certified as having been victorious. 9 tbe Communist Party took the lead inew labor group, the Sindical Confederation of Workers and Peasants of Panama (Confederacion Sindical deampesinos deand most of the country's small unions Joined tbe new

Tho Communists used the trade unions under their control to give more of an appearance of solidity to their political activities. Thus Inbe CSOCP Joined with the Communistsewunions toorkers and Peasants bloc, for political purposes. During the same period theParty (Partidoof Panama was officially organized and one of its leaders, Ellseo Echevez, was sent to Moscow to confer with theof the Comintern,

3 the Socialist Party of Panama was formed and immediately began to challenge Communist control of tbe country's small trade union movement. both sides resorted to violence. In thetill another political group appeared on tbe scene to steal much of the Communist's thunder. Arnulfo Arias' Panamanlst Party (PartidoPP) gained widespread supporttridentlyprogram closely akin to fascism. 0 Arias was olocted president andhort while the Communists cooperated with him because of his anti-US attitudes and his sympathy for the Axisthe policy adopted by International Communism during the Stalin-Nazi Pact days.

During World War II the Panamanian CommunistsMoscow's line of cooperating with regimes who supported the United Nations. 3 the party was disbanded upon the dissolution of the Third The party then had an estimated membership. The next year it was reorganized and followed the lead of brother parties of the hemisphere in changing Its name to the Party of tho People (Partido del,

The last two years of World War II saw thegain considerable ground in Panama, especially in the trade union movement. In4 alabor congress was held in Panama City under the auspices of the Communists. During the congress the party's labor arm, thoSyndlcal Federation of Workers of the Republic of Panama (FSTRP) was formed and EfrainDP labor leader,was elected secretary general.

For tbe firat time Communists also made substantial headway among the workers of the Canal Zone. This penetration was not achieved by tho PDP itself, but rather by the United Federal Workers (UFW) aUS union, at that time affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 6 the UFW's Union of Workers of the Canal Zone claimed to0 members. For three years this union remained in the CIO and represented about one half of0 Panamanian workers employed by the Canal Zone administration. fter the UFW was expelled from the CIO as being under Communist control, the Communists lost their hold on Canal Zone workers.

During this period the party operated as a rather thanational party because it was unable to secure the large number of signaturesto permit lt to functionationwide The party managed to elect candidates tocouncils in some instances, but could never name candidates for the National Assembly. 'Tellow travelers" did win seats in the Assembly from time to time and through its control of various front and infiltrated organizations and its close ties with leftist and nationalist groups, the PDP was able to bring considerable pressure to bear on the Panamanian Government.

Conforming to the strongly anti^-US policies of the USSR after World War II, the Panamanian Communists used their influence over workers and students to encourage and support anti-US demonstrations. The PDP attained its most effective point in7 when lt joined forces with nationalistic elements to defeat renewal of the US-Panama Defense Sites

With the return of Arnulfo Arias to powerhe Communists found rougher sledding. Inrias and'his cabinetesolutionthe PDP. However, the decision was laterunconstitutional by the attorney general and lt was suspended. By thehe Communists had lost most of their support in the trade unions. The FSTRP was split several times after World War II, and4 lt was virtually reduced to threerecognized trade unions.

The decline of the Communists' support in the unions was matched by the general decline of their popularity. First Arnulfo Arias and then Jose Remon, who became president at the endaptured the support of many who might otherwise have been subject to Communist influence. Remon'sappealed to local nationalism by seeking aof3 treaty.

In3 the Remon administration passedrohibiting the Communist Party and allactivities. This move marked the culmination of an anti-Communist campaign conducted throughout

the year by Remon even before passage of the law. Lawccelerated the disintegration of the PDP. Official harassment caused fear and distrust among party members, limited attendance at PDP meetings, and resulted in disorganized performance andineffectiveness.

The over-all strength of the PDP This decline was not noticeably reflected however, among hard-core, militant members whosomewhat underhroughout this period. It appears that party membership declinedeako

The party's weak position rarely permitted it to seize the initiative in fomenting unrest. it tended to move cautiously afteror other developments had been set in motion by other groups. The partyinor role in the anti-US student riotingommunist involvement in the anti-US demonstrations ofhile still limited, occurredonsiderably larger scale than the riots earlier in the month and bore evidence of calculated planning.

The events9 demonstrated, as they did again inhe PDP's capability forinfluence far out of proportion to itsby making coamon cause with ultranationa-lists and other anti-US groups. Although the party wasn excellent opportunity to exploit nationalism aroused over the Canal issue, itonly small membership gains. ad dropped tond in February of that year ten individuals were said to besomeosts in the party and its laborthe FSTRP,

Communists or extreme leftists have controlled the leadership of Panamanian student groups much of the time during the pastears by capitalizing on the apathy of the majority of the students. The PDP's influence among student organizations and the country's educational system represents perhaps its most significant accomplishment.

0 moderate student leaders united toong period of leftist and Communistof the Union of University Students (UEU) and

by extension of UEU influence, of its parentthe Federation of Panamanian Studentshe non-Communist leaders did nothing, however, totrong following. Resentment over the serious deficiencies throughout the educationalcaseead In student riots inuicklyound and popular reform program, the Communists attracted the great majority of the university students to their newly organizedReform (FRU), The FRU swept student elections throughout the University cf Panama, including the UEU, In the fall2 with the help of thenMinister Alfredo Ramirez. Ramirez wanted student support in his drive to become president This FRU triumph >was followed in2 by the election of PDP militant Victor Avlla to head the FEP and the selection of other Communists for key posts.

With student affairs the most active field of Communist influence, leaders at the universitythe key figuresivision of Communistwhich started in the. The advent of Castro, and later the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, split the Panamanian Communist movement. The PDP's doctrinaire leadership has consistently looked for guidance and financing to Moscow andthe Soviet position of transition toby peaceful means. 1 pro-Castro elementsand non-Communiststhe Vanguard of NatlonaL Actionn organization which advocated Immediate and violent revolution In Panama. Its leaders, who Included some former and present PDP members, were trained in Cuba andcontact with Havana through frequent travel and members resident la Cuba.

Despite unity agreements, the PDP.and.the VAN were continually at odds. PDP leaders wore deeply concerned over the VAN's Influence in Cuba to the detriment of the PDP and resented the fact that Castroltes rather than PDP members were the chief recipients of training in Cuba.

In2 and3 the PDP began to show increased sophistication in Itseflection of training of PDP members Idschools in the USSR and China. In addition, the party may have been spurred by competition from

R-6

the VAN. The result of training began to show in many PDP activities, particularly insofar asand sustained effort were concerned. of party work in all fields, provided In the past only by National Executive Committee (CEN)was delegatedarge extent to mid-level members. Security was Increased markedly withcompartmentation of party cells in all areas.

Party finances improved to tbe extent that even key mid-level party leaders became paid functionaries who devoted all of their time to PDP affairs. The PDP in2 changed its political line from peaceful co-existence to violence. This line was kept flexible and subject to tactical changes,as evidenced in the elections4 when the PDP inserted or supported candidates in the Socialist Party.

The nationalistic upsurge in4 gave considerable Impetus to the extreme Left and the PDP may have regained its preillegallzatlon strength ofembers. The membership revival resulted largely from its ability to foment and prolong the serious anti-US riots. In so doing, the PDP once again demonstrated its capability for exertingfar out of proportion to its membership. 4 the PDP virtually came out into the open and the leftist extremists blatantly boasted of their control over student organizations and their consequent influence on President Chiari and thein genera 1.

In spite of their rivalry and quarrels, the PDP and VAN collaborated effectively throughout the riots and exhibited shrewdness in recognizing the sudden wave of nationalismong-sought opportunity for exploitation. Success in exploiting the crisisboosted morale on all levels in the PDP. Following the riots, the party began the training of special "action brigades" designed to effect acts of violence and sabotage.

After the events of4 fewer Panamanians looked upon the Communistsangerous element, and more saw them as useful allies. Among groups where they were alreadylabor andCommunists expanded

their Influence. Extreaists and pro-Coaaunlsts who had influential positions in government and In news media became an invaluable asset.

President Johnson's announcement4 that the US Intended to replace the Canal treatyew one encompassing Panama's major demands robbed the PDP and extremist groups of their most useful issue. The statement cut away most of the cowmon ground between the extreaists and the more moderate Panamanian nationalists.

Communist student leaders at the university again became the key figures in the struggle"hard-line" pro-Castro activistwho favcrad violence and the'.'soft-line" PDP members who preferred to discredit the oligarchy by political action. The divisions between the two groups prevented ucanlalty and President Robles1use of the national guard preventedagitation from gettingooat of hand.

The widely publicized arrest in5 ofembers of the PDP central committeechecked party activities even though the men were held only cne week. Fearing widespread government repressive measures the Communists for several months remained in the background and carried on their activities under extreme security precautions.

3. Current Status cf Cc-nmunist Party

The Panamanian Comaunist movement ls small and badly splintered. There are estimated to bective members withsupporters. The aoveaent suffers from an ideological spilt between the Moscow-oriented PDPmall activist group known as the UnitedMovement (MUR) which, like its precursor tha VAN favors immediate terrorist action against

Canal Zone. (-

In5 PDP socrctory general Ruben Dario Souza returnedisit to Moscow where he Is believed to have sought aiore funds and help against the growing threat of tho pro-Chinese MUR. Hewith plans to Inject new vigor into theew recruitment drive was initiated and Souza threatened to remove inept party bureaucrats. Very little in this direction has been accomplished,and in August the party was described as going through tbe throesevere organizational crisis.

There are indicationslandestinecongress will be called soon to revise party leadership and programs. Souza is said to feel that emphasis should be placed on the creation of popular mass organizations which the party can later exploit rather than try to penetrate and direct existing In addition, Souza believes that too much time and effort is expended in working with student groups whose activities are sometimes hard to channel in thecright direction. Instead, Souza favorson the creation of new labor unions.

The PDP still controls just one labor federation, the FSTRP, and It has almost no strength and exists primarily on paper. The FSTRP leaders are vocal in pursuing the Communist line, but have little support and no real control over most labor unions. The large and well financed labor union of the Cbiriqui Land Companynited Fruit subsidiary, isbut often Influenced by its labor adviser, radical Socialist Carlos Ivaneputy to the National Assembly.

The PDP continues to try in fits snd starts to proselytize the peasants and Indians with little or no success. Endeavors to form peasant leagues have been met with distrust or apathy. Recent reporting indicates the PDP-domlnated Union of University(UEU) is planning to assist in organizingleagues in Panama Province.

Although PDP strength is not great, lt is well placed to obtain maximum effectiveness. Theand their allies hold key positions in student movements, on the university faculty, in someministries, in press and radio and in thefield as lawyers.

The PDP's greatest current asset cones from ltl ability to incite national emotions over the Canal Zone. In this regard thereoincidence ofbetween Communists and non-Conmunlsts; and In fact many so-called Communists may be motivated only by extreme nationalism and the call to action over the Zone issue.

PDP NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Vice

Secretory

Secretary for Organization :

Secretary for

Secretary for Education :

Secretary for Press and

Secretary for Labor Affairs: Secretary for Youth Affairs:

Hugo atejandrO'Victon Escala

Carlos Francisco Chang Marin

Ruben Dario Souza Batista Miguel Antonio Porcell Pena Jorge Arnando Ferrera Eugenio Barrera

Ruperto Luther Thomas Trotnan

Jose del Carmen Tunon

Cloto Manuel Souza Batista

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PARAGUAY

1. Introduction

Tho Communist Party of Paraguay (Partido Comu-nistatiannovorajor olomont in national politics. Approximatelyercent of its membors and sympathizers live in exile. They have had little success in porsuading other exiles to join themnited front, despite repeated Those who romaln in Paraguay are severely repressed by the efficient government security forces. They are largely ineffective and have no seriousfor overthrowing tho government of President Alfredo Stroessnor.

ong history of dictatorship and bloody strife, Paraguay has found stability under thorule of Stroessnor. The three traditional bases of power in the country have been the strong, partisan military establishment, the police,ell-defined security function, and the political organization of the ruling party. The only real source of political leadorshlp in the country is found among the small number of leading families, who have strong partisan ties. Tho President has maintained his regime in power for ten years by carefully balancing Colorado Party, police, andInterests. Political and press freedom have gradually Increased, but Stroessnor still firmly holds the reins.

In tho highly conservative and isolatedsociety, it has been oxtremely difficult for .Communism toertile field for growth. Paraguay haseasant society and its internal oconomy is based on subsistence farming. Most of the people, bowevor, are economically there is no hacienda or plantation system to exploit tbe peasants, most of whom havo access to more land than they can cultivate. In addition, Paraguay hasew light industries andthere is no large mass of industrial workers to become dissatisfied and who might respond to the appeals of the PCP.

2. Brief history of the party

Founded8 and admitted to tho Comintorn later that year, the PCP originallyew former anarchists active in the small labor movement in Asuncionmall group of young Intellectuals. The PCP opposed the Chacotand which offended the patriotism of most Paraguayans and cost the party considerable popularity. During World War II it was implacably pursued by the government. In5 it attempted toeneral strike; many Communists were jailed and deported after the strike failed. In6 the PCP was allowed freedom of operation, although it was not fully recognizedegal political party. It held public mootings andewspaper, but the excesses ofpropagandaising tido ofand in7 the PCP was again outlawed.

When dissatisfied military elements and members of the opposition Febrerista and Liberal partiosagainst the government inhe Communists, while never dominant, were able toconsiderable influence in the ensuing civil war. Several hundred Communists joined the rebel forces at Concepcion, where they controlled tbe radio, and they were responsible for some propaganda andin Asuncion. With the collapse of the revolt inCP leaders went into hiding and exile.

During the, the ruling Colorado Party was preoccupied with the opposition Liberal and Febrerista parties. esult tho Communists achieved considerable success in penetrating many governmental, political, university, and Inborespecially the police and one faction of the Febrerista Party. Since Stroessner took powerCP activities within Paraguay have been severely curtailed. The Communists haveto lead several guerrilla Invasions which have been easily routed.

3 the PCPetback when pro-Chinese members who had been expelled from the party decided toival organization, the Paraguayan

Leninistnlst Party (PCLP) . Another serious reverse came inolice crackdown

S-2

resulted In the arrest of numerous low-lovel party combers, primarily in rural areas. It was reported that they were attempting to organize cadres for the creation of now guerrilla groups. The government immediately initiated Investigations to determine whether or not there were links botween tho PCP and other oxile groups and whethor any army officers were involved In subversive activities.

In5 another rebellion split PCP ranks as many of the party's leaders, headed by Obdullo Barthe,Committee for the Defense andof thend denounced theof Secretary General Oscar Creydt. Partymany of whom havo chafed at his autocratic methods and his failure to support insurgent may find that their attempt to remove him will result in an even further reduction of the party's already limited capabilities.

Government harassment and repression of the PCP has successfully soon to it that theolitical party is practically nil,

3. Stength and Supporting Groups

f thearaguayan Communists live in exilo, most of them in the neighboring countries of Argontina, Uruguay, and Brazil. There is little formal partyoutside Asuncion, and much of theof the PCP exists mainly on paper. Within the country, most of tho party members are peasants or laborers, though some are students, intellectuals, and professional people. esult of frequent exhortation by the exiled Secretary General Oscar Creydt, thereonstant drive to recruit new members. Most of these withdraw subsequently,by the continuing government harassment.

The party has been in poor financial condition since at Income from dues is modest and the party receives little, if any, support from wealthy sympathizers. The PCP receives funds from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist countries, but the amounts are not known.

The principal effort of the PCP outside Paraguay has boon tho maintenanceront, the United Front far National Liberationesigned to coordinate the activities of all opposition olomonts in an effort to overthrow tho Stroessner regime. This is the primary objective of the PCP. It hopes todemocratic government" over which it can gradually achieve control. FULNA grew out of the non-Communist exile organization United Front for Liberation, which was taken over by FULNA headquarters are in Montevideo where itollateral front, the Paraguayanocial club. In addition, FULNA hasregional coromittoos in several Drazillnn towns and probably in several Argontlne cities.

FULNA has almost completely failed in attempts to secure the cooperation of other exile groups, except for the extreme left wing of tha Febrerista Party, whose propaganda line is now almostfrom that of the PCP. FULNA has tried to organize invasion forces to overthrow Stroessner, but with very limited success. Between December

and1 exile groups made six armedinto Paraguay from Argontina. These were all small-scale, the largest involvingen, FULNA, however,eading role in only three operations. ) FULNA guerrillas who crossed the upper Parana River In June

wero almost all killed, and very small FULNA bands raided two police stations in February and

At the present time thore are no affectivo guerrlllo operations within Paraguay. Small groups of from four to eight men hove been reportod in central'Paraguay, but have won little popular Tho recent government arrests probablywiped out the nuclei of the guerrilla groups which were trying to build cadres to form new columns.

Front activity within Paraguay is woak. omen'sawyers' front,ational propeaco commission are virtually defunct and The Democratic Revolutionary Students' Front (FRDKK) has engaged in sporadic wall painting and occasionally has attempted to stir up tho

university students. It is not an effective group, and has suffered from continuing governmentand repression.

4. Forolgn Influence

There is no official mission from any Communist country in Paraguay. PCP leaders in Montevidoo, however, maintain contact with the Soviet and other Communist embassies. PCP delegations frequently visit tho USSR, whose leadership the party diligently follows. Membors also occasionally visit othorcountries for training, meetings, or other purposes. Cuba and Czechoslovakia have giventrainingumber of Paraguayans. Cuba has additionally furnished propaganda material and funds, and may have furnished some arms. Reportedly some labor leaders hove also received training in Cuba. Radio Havana shortwave broadcasts in Spanish and Guarani are regularly directod toward Paraguay. As previously mentioned, tho USSR, Cuba,and other bloc nations provide some funds for PCP activities and travels.

PCP leaders in Montevideo work closely with the Uruguayan Communist Party, which is also predominantly pro-Soviet. Paraguayan Communists in Argentina and Brazil have received some cooperation from those parties, and there is evidence to suggest that Brazilian Communists havo assisted in training Paraguayan The Brazilian and Argentine governments havo become increasingly cooperative with the Stroessner government, however, in preventing assistance to the PCP.

5. Dissident groups

The PCPevere setback3 when tho rival PCLP made its appearance. In3 tho PCP expelled) membors forthe authority of Secretary General Creydt and his pro-Soviet position and for supporting the Chinese Communist line. Further expulsions have brought the total to In3 some of the expelled members proclaimedeparate party. eeting in Montevideo4 they formallyall Creydt's decrees and declared thatthe PCLP would compete with the PCP in Paraguay,

Not all of the expelled PCP members joinad tho PCLP, which probably only has aboutembers and has not gained any substantial number of adherents sinco the original split, The PCLP is reportedly controlled by Alfonso Guerra, Marcos Zeida, and Sevastlan Querey, who is secretary general. Obdulio Bart he. the number two man in the PCP hierarchy, was reported to be associated with the PCLPut he has since recanted his pro-ChinGse views andto PCP activities, PCLP representatives have reportedly been promised financial assistance by Chlneso Communists whom they met in Montevideo, but there ls no conclusive evidence to indicate that such help has been forthcoming. The PCLPls attempting to Increase its operations within Paraguay but has so far been relatively

Inew group made an appoarance, and the PCP appears to have boen torn even further asunder. Committee for the Defense andof the PCP"eclaration in the Argentine Communist Porty wookly magazine rejecting the loadorship of Oscar Creydt and calling for armed insurrection to overthrow the Paraguayan Government. The declaration, signed by many of Paraguay'sCommunists, including Obdulio Bartbe and Agusto Caoete, accuses Creydt of denouncing party members to the police and of plotting toarty based only on those who serve him unconditionally. This further division within the PCP seems likely only to decrease its already slim resources andt:uness.

The aamo factors which have prevented tho PCP fromajor role In Paraguayan politics, however, will also operate against the PCLP and the new porty grouping. The principal effect of the creation of rivals has been to spread distrust within the PCP. The extent of this disruption ls evidenced by the continued postponement of the third PCP congress, originally scheduled for The widespread dislike of Creydt and hismethods and the existence of somehinese Communist sentiment within the PCP are likoly toa reconciliation.

9. Loaders of the Communist Party of Paraguay

PARTYOF CENTRAL COMMITTEE*

SecretaryCreydt

Corazon Aqullar Enciso Celso Avalos Ocampo Obdulib Barthe Calixto Bogado Augusto Canete Carlos Luis Casablanca Erailio Gomez Hipolito Gonzalez Efrain Ibanez Apolonio Lezcano Arturo Lopez

Ricardo Menendez Torres Ortigoza Juan Morai? Efrain Morel

Olazar (fnu)

Quiroz (fnu) (Darlo?)

Justo Ramirez

Teodulo Riveros

Carmen Soler de Casabianca

Dalila Solor de Quevedo

S-8

-

PARTYOF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Miguel Angel Soler

Derliz Villagra Arzamendia

Alfredo Alcorta**

Severo Acosta Aranda**

Ignacio Benigno Fernandez**

Livio Enrique Gonzalez Santander**

Ireneo Eliodoro Averiro Insfran**

Ananias Maidana**

Antonio Maidana**

Julio Rojas**

S-9

THE COMfc'.UNIST PARTY OF PERU

1, IntroductIon

In recent years, Communism has displaced the Peruvian military and oligarchy as the primary throat to government stability. This threat does not how involve thaommunisi; takeover in Peru. It docs include the potential of Communist and extreiue leftist groups to prevent the Bolaunde government from acliieving much-needed economic and social reforms by peaceful and constitutional means. Tho Communist strategy, therefore, is to sow popular distrust of or opposition to the government and its policies, todiscord within the government itself, and to disrupt tho economy. From this point on, oach Coumunist organization proceeds differently and sapnrately toward the common long-range objective

It is this fragmented character of the far left in Peru which cripples it most. Tho PeruvianParty (PCP) is split into two factions or groups, one of which follows the Moscow line of peaceful coexistence and the othor, Communist China's thesis of violent revolution. Each group claims to be the only Peruvian Communist party. This split has lowered tho prestige and influence of the PCP almost to the level of the other numerous small partios of the far left which are also split into two, even three, competing factions. rominent exception to all these parties is the pro-Castro, Chineseeaning Movement of theLoft (MIR). The MIR has not experienced the same degree of internal dissension and is now actively engaged in guerrilla warfare aimed at revolution.

In addition to the internal dissension rampant within far-leftist partios, tho far left has been unable or unwilling to find any general basis for cooperation or unity. Personal rivalriesajor factor here, but differing interpretations of Communist doctrine alsoarge part. United, the Communist loft could seriously challengestability.

T-1

Articlef the3 Constitution roods "The State does not recognize tho logalof political parties of International Persons vho belong to such may not fulfill any political function." This article, originallyto outlaw the American Popularould seem to make tbe Communist Party illegal also. However, tho PCP has been allowed to participate in most elections under various cover namos even though the letter of the article has been periodically invoked by Peruvian governments.

The attitude of the present government toward the PCP and othor Communist groups has varied. Fernando Belaunde Terry tacitly acceptedsupport for his candidacy and party during3 pro-electoral period. esult, two senators and twelve deputies who aro avowed Communists or Communist sympathizers wore elected to Congress. All but two of these congressmon were elected on the Popularhristian Democrat Party ticket.

In its first few months, tho Belaundewas quite tolerant of tho Communists, using thoir support to undermine Aprlsta strength in the labor, student, and peasant fields. This policy, howover, only encouraged the Communists and thus Communist-inspired strikes and land invasionsin numbers and intensity. eries of several very sorlous incidents, conservative elements and the military prossurod the administration intoirmor line. oundup of known agitators, coupled with passage of the agrarian reform law inemporarily ended Communist disturbances. With the outbreak of guerrilla activity directed by the MIR inhe government took even stronger measures. tate of siege was decreed, tho armed forces have been committed to the countorlnsurgency effort, suspected Communists Arc under arrest, and Belaunde has been provoked into condemning Communist intervention in Peru.

2. Brief history of the party

The history of organized Communism in Peru begins with the Peruvian Socialist Partyoundedroup of Marxist intellectuals and labor leaders

Lessear later, PSP members differed over the issue of dropping the socialist label in favorommunist title. Unable to reconcile theissenting minorityto function ns socialists while thechose to become the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP).

CP activity centered around theof labor unions, at first in cooperation with tho Marxist-oriented American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) but soon contending with APRA for domination of the labor movement. The PCP-APRA labor struggle reached its climax4 when all cooperation botwoen the two parties ended. Anto renew general cooperation with APKA was made by tho Communistss they attempted towith the Comintern's line of tho popular front, but APRA rojoctod all PCP proposals and the two parties continued to compote with each other to the extent that their illegal status permitted.

During tho period from the fall of the Legula dictatorship0he PCPertain degree of toleration. Successive Peruvian governraonts generally regarded APRA as the chief subversive threat and seldom interfered directly with PCP activities. owever, following an APRA-inspired general strike, both Communist and Aprista leaders woro imprisoned and their trade union organizations suppressed. PCP fortunesduring the national electoral campaign9 when tho party was able to exploit the government's desire to attract labor support for its candidate, Manuel Prado. The Communists won from therecognition of the Chauffeurs Federation and elected Juan P. Luna, Communist leader of theto tho Chamber of Deputies.. Following Prado's election, tho PCP was permitted considerable freedom,ajor role in the revival of an active labor movGiiiont in Peru. Tho party was strong enough, in fact, to elect Luna as tho first secretary general of tho now Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP) although APRA, the PSP,umber of independents were also nctlvo andignificant number of member unions.

In tho oloctionsho PCP supported the administration's candidate for the presidency in coalition with APRA and independents. Therunning under the name Socialist Vanguard of Peru, won four seats in tho Chamber of Deputies; throe Communist-supported senators wore also elected. Nevertheless, tho real victor was APRA, whichajority to ooch house of Congress. Despite an increasing membership duringeriod, PCP fortunes were adversely affected by tho unprecedented and overwhelming growth of APRA. Aprlsta captured control of the CTP as wellumber of other labor organizations run by the PCP.

The antl-APRA military revolution8 was only of temporary benefit to the Communists who in turn were suppressed by the junta government. ajor split was also developing in the party,Luna and the central committee, over policyisLuna broke away from the party and managed toeasure of cooperation with tho Odria, but the official wing of the PCP was.outlawod and persecuted. Tho hostileof the government toward the regular PCP, plus increasing factionalism, was primarily responsible for the collapse of its national organization and the appearance0 of no less than sixCommunist groups throughout Peru. Many old guard PCP leaders were imprisoned or exiled, party membership dwindled, and nationwide contacts and communications wore sevored.

Preparations .for6 national oloctionore open political climate and asmeasures against tho PCP losnened, the party was able to rejuvenate its organization andegreo of order from the chaos which had developed. Following the re-establishment ofcommittee authority, the PCP decided to support the candidacy of Fernando Belaunde Terry who was running as an independent. Although Belaunde was unsuccessful in the election, the PCP continued to work closely with the Popular Action (AP) party established by the candidate shortly after elections. The PCP enjoyed great freedom during the early years of President Prado's secondntil in0 anti-Cnstro Cubans raided the Cuban Embassy in Lima and seized documents dealing

T-4

with Communist infiltration into Peru and Cuban subsidization for antigovernment elements. esult, diplomatic relations with Cuba were broken off and the Peruvian Government, prodded by the military, took forceful measures against theimprisoning many leaders.

Again impending elections resultedetup of anti-Communist activity; in response the PCP organized tbe National Liberation Front (FLN)ehicle for Communists and other leftists toin the elections. The FLN candidate fordrew only two percent of the total votes cast. The election was annulled by the armed forces, however, and the new military junta proceeded to devote its attention to repression of its traditional foe, APRA. Communist activity increased alarmingly as the party prepared to hold its Fourth National Congress, the first inears without government ising number of Communist andpeasant land invasions, however, caused the junta to reverse its policy of toleration and in3 itolice roundup of suspected subversives.

New national elections were scheduled for3 and the PCP decided to back Fernando Belaunde as it had During the campaign, Belaunde neither renounced nor acknowledged his Communist supporters, but following his election he evidently tried to repay the Communists byery lenient attitude toward certain Communist-led labor unions and peasant federations. Again Communist-inspired strikes and land invasions began to increase in numbers and intensity until military andpressure forced the Belaunde government to take stricter measures. Constitutional guarantees were suspended and the Civil Guardarge-scale roundup of subversives. Combined with passage of an agrarian reform law inhese steps resultededuction in the number of landanderiod of relative

A more important factor in the decline ofagitation, however, has been the division of the PCP into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. The split, as it developed, came out in the open at

the party's National Congress inas exacorbated by tho Cuban missile crisis in October, and became more pronounced in tho following months as each faction struggled for control of the party's various commlttoos. In3 the16th central committee plenum met ostensibly to discuss party differences. The old guard pro-Soviet leadership managed to rocapture control of the central committee from the pro-Chinese leaders, and during the plenumeclarationMoscow's peaceful coexistence line. Pro-Chinese membors of the central committee and the important Lima regional comnittoo denounced the declaration and refused to recognize the nowly elected pro-Soviet political commission. The split was finallyIn4 when the rival factions hold separato conferences in which oach faction expelled the leaders of the other, and members of the pro-China faction raided the offices of their rivals. Each faction now claims to be the only Communist party in Peru.

3. PCP strength and supporting groups

PCP membership, estimated at0 divided almost equally between the two factions, hasmarkedly over the years since the party's founding. Fluctuation in the past has been related closely to the degree of tolerance toward Communist activities of the government In power. Sinco the Inauguration of President Belaunde, the PCP hos lost strength due in part to the appeal of his loftlst-reformist government, and in part to disillusionment caused by the schism within the party. Betweenercent andercent of PCP strength is believed to be located in southorn Peru, prlncipolly in Apuri-raac, Aroquipa, Cuzco, and Puno. National party control has consistently been centered in Lima. Northern and eastern Peru, where the PCP is relatively weak, contain no more thanercent of tbemost of it very poorly organized.

The majority of PCP members come from urban labor, student, professional, and intellectual circles. In Lima the centers of party strength are in the labor movement and among tho students nt San Marcos Although Communism has made some progress among the Indians of the Sierra in southern Peru, it is

T-6

secret

still relatively weak in this segment of theas is the national party among agrarianthroughout the country. Other small leftist-extremist activist groups have made more inroads among the Indian peasants.

Although information on the financial condition of both factions of the PCP is limited, it isthat neither is well financed. Thishas evidently been chronic since the party was founded. Party dues, calculated proportionately according to each member's salary and place ofare believed to be the major source of funds available to the PCP for use within Peru. Many party members, however, do not pay regularly or in the amounts required. hronic problem faced by the party is misappropriation and theft of funds byentrusted with financial responsibilities. elected to congress are said to be required to contribute their entire salary to theage from the PCP in return, Other devices for raising funds have included: semi-public raffles and dances, the sale of bonds and "coupons" to party sympathizers, and book and periodical sales. The party is also reported to haveortion of the proceeds of some Soviet and Communist bloc cultural activities held in Peru.

Given its poor domestic financial support, the PCP could not operate even at its present level of expenditure without significant outside assistance. Absence of Communist diplomatic representation in Peru, however, makes transfer of foreign fundsdifficult. The major portion of bloc-supplied funds is believed to be brought In by travelersfrom visits abroad. The pro-Chinese faction of the PCP appears to be in worse financial straits than the orthodox faction despite its claims that Communist China and Cuba are supplying funds. from Cuban and Chinese training courses have probablyimited amount of money into Peru.

PCP front activity has generally been limited to the establishmentumber of small general-purpose organizations,ew groups intended to appeal to specific elements of the Peruvianhave also been created. None of thesehas been particularly successful in generating

any large-senlo support, and most tend to be One of the most successful front groupsby the Communists in recent years was theRevolutionary Frontounded2ehicle for Communist and extrcmo leftists to participate in tho national elections. Since that time tho FLN has fallen Into disarray, nowlittle moreaper organization.

The PCP controls only two front organizations of any importance. One, tho "Patriotic Front for the Recovery of Laas formed In5 by tho pro-Sovlot faction of the porty, The purpose of tho group ls to enrry out agitation and propaganda against tho US-owned International Petroleum Corporation (IPC) in favor of theof the company's assets in Peru. The othor front organization, tho Joso Carlos MnriateguiInstitute, was founded inultural organization, but in fact has been the front for tha national headquarters of the PCP in Lima. Cenoro Ledosma Izquieta, Communist

deputy for tho Department of Pasco, currently hoads the institute.

The revolutionary left in Peru, which includes both PCP factions and numerous other Communist and extreme leftist groups, ls presently seeking to unite students, workors, peasants, and disaffected members of APRA ond AP into one mass organization. Thoofnited front would be to promoteobjectives and to rally support forof the Revolutionary Loft (MIR) guerrillas. The MIR initiated limited guerrilla activities in Unity themes center on popular issues such as nationalization of the IPC and radical land reform. No general agreement on this proposed front is yet in sight, however, primarily because ofamong the loftist groupsontrolling voico in any unity organization. Thus, the front is being promoted under various names, tbe mostof which are the Single Anti-Imperialist Front and tho Patriotic Front of National Liberation.

Despite tho pro-Soviet PCP's decision to support the MIR openly, its slowness to act hasebellion among pro-Soviet youth. Pro-China youth are similarly dlsonchantod with their parent Both youth groups hove adoptod new

tin

the pro-China group ia known as the Armed Forces of National Liberation and the pro-Soviets aro theRevolutionary Movement. These two, along with the Revolutionary Vanguard which claims to represent socialist youth, joined the MIR in issuing an October manifesto. Calling for armed struggle, the paper also proclaims the formationingle National Anti-Oligarchical and Anti-Imperialist Front of Political Youth. APRA, AP, and Christian Democrat youth are invited to join.

Youth: the Communists havo considerable strength among youth and are the strongest single political force among university students. It is estimated thatoercent of Peruvian youth inand secondary schools support the Communist cause, due primarily to the system of university autonomy and the natural middle-class radicalism of most students. Enthusiasm for Communism, howovor, is not bnsod in intellectual response to Marxist-Leninist theory but to an uneducated desire to euro personal and national troublosadical fashion. While many students eventually lose their radicalism, or even retain their extreme views but drop ties withmall, hard-core elementremains.

For more than three decades, APRA dominated university student organizations in Peru. owever, Aprlsta dominance bogan to weaken as party collaboration with the elite Prado governmentits appeal to studont radicals. The waning of APRA's appeal coincided with the rise ofin Cuba and with the founding in Peru of the reformist, popular-based Popular Action (AP) and Christian Democrat (PDC) parties, both of which opposed the Apristas. nti-Aprlstaof Communist, AP and PDC students, often dominated by Communists, succeeded in gainingof all public university student federations and tho national student organization, theof Peruvian Students (FEP).

Aprlsta students regained control of theirstronghold, the University of Trujillo.ut their narrow victory at San Karcos in Lima4 was won only because of President Belaunde's personal Intervention. At the last moment, Belaunde

T-9

ordered AP students to withdraw their support for the Communist-backed candidate. Thei5 eloc-tions, however,eturn to tho tactic ofwith the Communists to dofeat APRA. Thus, Communist-backed candidates captured the federations in the universities of San Marcos, Cuzco, Cajamarca, and Huacho plus the vice-presidency at Trujillo.

The Peruvian Communist Youthhich is theoretically responsible for PCP youth activities, has probably never been much moreaper organization. 80 there wereof slight JCP activity, but it appears that from the latter year9 the group was completely inactive. During the, PCP efforts to revitalizo the JCP apparently mot with some success (draft statutes for the organization were drawn uporut activity was limited. The split in the PCP damaged the JCP as well and eventually caused it to split into pro-Moscow and pro-Chinese factions.

Labor: Capture and control of the Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP) has been the goal of both Communists and Apristas since the labor confederation was foundedhe Communists were able to name Juan Luna as the first CTP secretary general. One year later, however, Apra won the top office and continued to hold undisputed sway over the majority of Peruvian unions and labor federations5 Whan General Odria attained power8 he imprisoned or exiled the principal Aprista labor leaders, and duringeriod the vacuum created by the absence of these leadersthe PCP to recapture many labor organizations. The CTP was abolished and the separate nationalbecame the centers of trade union organization. Juan Luna againower in the labor movement,dria decided to pormlt the reorganization of the CTP in the mistaken belief that he could use the new organization to mobilize labor support for his chosen candidate in6 elections. to his plans, the Apristas rallied to regain control of the re-established CTP, and have held on to it ever since.

Communist influence in the labor movementsignificantly during the tolerant second Pradond was strengthened

furthor by the military takeover Until the series of Communist-inspired strikes and violent labor clashes which precipitated the3 roundup of all known Communists, Military attention was fixed on weakening the traditional APRA foe. The roundup ended Communist hopes of control over Peruvian labor >

PCP inability to capture the CTP since6 has generated attempts toan independent national labor federation under Communist control to compete with the Aprlsta national organization. Inf the Bank Clerks Federation, CivilFederation, and Chauffeurs Federation metongress they characterized as tho National Trade Union Conference in an effort to take over theunions- The effort failed and so theunions formed an executive committee for tho unification and reorganization of the CTP. Ovorercent of the officers elected by the reorganization committee were Communists. Tho committee reportedly received some governmental support both from thojunta and st least during the early months of the Belaunde administration, probably reaching its peak of power and importance in3 or The three principal bulwarks of the committee were the metal workers, construction workers, and bank workers, all Communist led. During the first halfowever, tbe Communists lost control of the bank workers and Len of the major metal workers unions broke away from their Communist federation and affiliated with the CTP. By4 Communist influence in the urban labor movement had probably reached its lowest level in years and prospectsecovery are not good.

4. Foreign Influence

The PCP has relied heavily upon its contacts with international Communism for guidance. Before World War II its principal contact was with the South American Bureau of the Comintern; then, during the war, contact was kept by means of Cominform and personal meetings mainly with members of other Latin American Communist parties. World War II the Legation of Czechoslovakia in Limaain source of international communication.

T-ll

I mw

It provided funds for and arranged many of the trips made by party leaders to the Soviet Union and othor bloc countries, and is presumed to have sorvodocal point for the issuance of directives to the PCP. Peru broke diplomatic relationsap in internationalwith the PCP until it was satisfactorily filled by the Cuban Embassy. This outlet was also denied by the break in relations between Cuba and Peru in0 and since then it has boonfor Peruvian Communists to maintain closeties. Travelers to and from Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc now account for the bulk of propaganda and funds brought into the country.

Some mombers of the PCP, most of themmembers of the pro-Soviet wing, have received political and labor organizational training in the Soviet Union. The FLN and tho pro-China PCP have members trained in guerrilla warfare or political indoctrination in Cubaew in Communist China. Several hundred more Peruvians, belonging to various leftist extremist groups, have also recelvod guerrilla warfare or other types of training in Communistprimarily in Cuba, but also in Communist China and North Korea.

5. Other Communist Subversive Groups

In addition to the two factions of tho Peruvian Communist Party, there are numerous other Communist or crypto-Communist parties. All have varyingfor militant action, but none yetpossosses the brood popular base essential for successful national revolution. Host are badlyand, at least untilad notIn unitingingle revolutionary

The best organized and best trained of anygroup in Peru is tho Movement of thoutionary Left (MIR). The MIR hasatf whom have received extensive guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist China, and North Korea. The MIR has the potential toery serious insurgent threat. In5 it began its long-planned guerrilla activity In the remote regions of east-central Peru, with plans to initiate similar activity in other parts of tho

T-12

XRCRF.T

country. Support for the MIR by the poasants, while not overwhelming, has exceeded expectations. MIR guerrilla activitiesevero setback In5 when Peruvian Army troops succeeded in killing national MIR leader LuIb de lo Puente Uceda and four other hard-core guerrilla leaders.

Apart from the MIR, the other extrome leftist groups are very small and their lack of ideological convictions causes members to drift rather freely from one group to another. It is estimated that the total strength of all these groups ls not more. There are three separate Trotskyite groups in Peru, all of which appear to be quite loosely organized. The Revolutionary Workers Party (POR/T) is tho official Trotskyite party In Peru and ls affiliated with the Fourthinuscule splinter group of the POR/T, theParty of Workers and Campeslnosas boen trying touerrilla group, but lack of funds has hampered this effort. PROC leader Ismael Frias Torrico, however, has merged his forces with the MIR guerrillas. The third group is the Workers' Party (POR) with strength in the south, particularly in the Cuzco and Puno areas.1 tho PORuerrilla armin Cuzco Department, called the Front of the Revolutionary Left (FIR). FIR also Included tho Peruvlan-Lenlnlst-Communlst Party mall pro-Castro group.

Inhe PCLP pulled out of the FIRisagreement with remaining Trotskyltes over strategy. Tbe FIR has since been Later the PCLP began on attempt to organize guerrilla groups with the assistance of the National Army of Liberationind of someuerrillas who were trained in Cubahis combined group which calls itself the Fifteenth of May Movement) claims to have one guerrilla band and to have received funds from Cubn andChina. ELN leader Alain Ellas Caso committed this band to the MIR In Both tho PROC and ELN guerrillas are operating from base camps in the vicinity of Andahuaylas, Apurlmac Department.

...

8. Communist Party Leaders

uf tne PCP spllt and the disorganization of both factions which hasomplete listing of

prominent party officials is unavailable. ist of PCP leaders by faction with official position if known.

PCP

Victor Raul Acosta Salas Jorge Del Prado Chavoz

Edgar Ruben Molleapaza Bilbao

Enrique Garaarra Contreas

Alfrodo Abarca Abarca Juan Barrios de Mendoza Augusto Chavez Bedoya

Sixto Miguel

Betty Abarca de Guerra

Manuel Diaz Salazar Carlos Vega

Gustavo Esplnoza Monte-sinos

Gustavo Valcarcel Velasco

Cesar Levano La Rosa

Jose Ismael Reccio

Raquel Bocangel Cesar Augusto Jimenez

Dbillus Vloleta Hoke de Valcarcel Roberto Yillajuan Asageles

Secretary General Central

Central

National Financial Secretary,

Centralentralentral

Centraleneral, ArequlpaCommittee

Central

Central, Lima Regional Committee

Central Committee

Central Committee

JCP representative on Central Committee

Central Committee alternate;

editor of Unldad Secretary, Lima

Regional Committee

Lima Regional Committee Lima Regional Committee

Lima Regional Committee Lima Regional Committee Lima Regional Committee

Cesar L. Mendoza Yactayo Molses Perez Medina Cesar Alva

Jose Asuncion Suarez

Felix Antialon Espinoza Victor M. Sales Rodriguez Ventura Zegarra Arana Teodoro Aspllcueta Car-rasco

Haruja Roque de Carnero Ernesto More Barrionuevo

Maria Salazar Moscoso Edmundo Cruz Vilchez

Oscar Jara Salcedo

Jorge Carlos Vega

Mario Anibal Ugarte Hurtado

Huancayo Regional Committee Huancayo Regional Committee Huancayo Regional Committee

Huancayo Regional Committee Huancayo Regional Committee Arequipa Regional Committee Arequipa Regional Committee

Front group activist

Front group activist and wife of Genaro Carnero Checa

Head of peace movement, senior adviser to Political

Active in peace movement JCP leader, editor of Joven Guardia

JCP leader, member of National

Executive Bureau JCP leader, member of National

Executive Bureau

Youth leader being trained in Moscow, possibly involved in illegal support activity

Pro-China PCP

Paredes Macedo Danti Cunti Aviles Jorge Barreto Rodriguez

Edwin Bastos Giron

Jorge Valdez Salas Jose Ellas Sotomayor Perez

Juan Ubaldo Soria Alarccn Manuel J. Chambi Lopez

Secretary General Central Committee

Central Committee, AncashCommittee

Organizational Secretary,Commission, Central Committee

Central Committee

Central Committee

National Secretary on Central Committee

Central Committee alternate from Cuzco, importer offilms from China

WTlfredo Alvarez

Miguel E. Carrillo Natteri Enrlquo Za pater Ballon

Alberto Delgado Bejar Hector Ballon Lozada Vlctro Julio Ortecho Vll-lena

Estuardo Coronado Zelada

Brunilda Quesada (vluda) de Atala

Luis Andres Ferrer Reano

Alejandro Romualdo Valle Palomino

Alfonso Barrantes Llngan

Vicente Mendoza Diaz

Juan Bautlsta Sotomayor Perez

Filomeno Rodriguez Hugo E. Caceres Guzman Rodas, (FNU) Noe Gallo

Francisco Hanguy Kyo Augusto Cespedes

Donato Alberto Izarra PaloninO

Lima Regional Committee Lima Regional Committee Secretary General, Arequipa Regional Committee

Arequipa Regional Committee Arequipa Regional Committee

La Libertnd Regional

JCP leader

Front group activist and cell leader

Secretary General, Huancayo

Regional Committee Orga nlza tlona1 secretary, Huancayo Regional Committee

Financial Secretary, Huancayo Regional Committee

Peasant Secretary, Huancayo Regional Commit tee

Education Secretary, Huancayo Regional Committee

Press and PropagandaHuancayo Regional

Secretary of Press andfor the Confederation of Peruvian Peasants,

9. Organization

Little ls known about the organizationalof tho pro-Chinese fiction of the PCP, but it is believed to parallel closely that of the orthodox party. (See party organization chart.) Thereentral committee headed by Secretary General Satur-nino Paredes Uacedo, but the total membership of the committee is unknown. At the Fourth Nationalof the pro-Chinese faction, held int was decided that those members who hadserved on the Lima Regional Committee would make up the new political commission, while cell loaders in Lima constituted the Lima Regional It was also reported at the conference thategional committees have been formed, some of which include two or three departments.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

1. Introduction

There is no organized Communist party in Trinidad and Tobago, but the so-called West IndianParty (WIIP) is Marxist oriented and probably maintains ties with international Communism. Although the WIIP itself is virtually defunct, many of itsmembers are in positions of Influence, particularly in the important trade union field, and theya potential threat to the island's stability.

Trlnidadlan politics have long been dominated by the People's National Movement (PNM) led by Prime Minister Eric Williams. The opposition Democratic Labor Party (DLP) is badly fragmented and indisarray. The two parties have tended toon ethnic lines, with the PNM being predominantly Negro and the DLP predominantly East Indian. At the present rate of population increase, the more pro*liflc East Indians will become the majority ino IS years, and the tensions inherent in this reversal may well upset the island's traditional calm. the PNM can be oxpected to intensify itstoward the inclusion of Grenada into thestate of Trinidad and Tobago, to offset thepopulation increase andredominantly Negro majority.

So far Communism has notoehold Inbut all of the eloments for trouble exist, waiting to be exploited. Racial tension, higha rapidly growing population, and limited possibilities for economic expansion could easily combine to produce an explosive political climate and provide opportunities for Communist agitators and organizers.

2. rief History of Communism in Trinidad and Tobago

7eries of strikes, oftenin nature, swept through the British colonies in the West Indies. In Trinidad these strikesin the oil fields and were led by Uriah Butler who struck out violently against the abuse of laborers and the evils of the colonial system. Butler's

U-1

prestige declined rapidly, however,acuumin Trinidadian politics which was onlyfilledlethora of snail parties which were quite unable to provide meaningful leadership. Had the Communists been able to take advantage of this situation, they might well have been asin Trinidad as they were in British Guiana during the. It was nothen Dr. Williams founded the PNM andell-defined political program, that any party received widespread enthusiastic support.

At least five organizations existed0 which could be termed left wing. These Included the West Indian National Partyhe SonStudy Group, tho Point Fortin Study Group, the Workers' Freedom Movementnd tho WostProletariat Group. Tho WlNP was evidently the parent body and membership in the groups was often overlapping. None of those organizations had much success despite the holding of numerous meetings and many attempts to expand their membership. The WFM, which was establishedas probably the most active and influential of these groups.

Inusion of the WFM with the Trinidad and Tobago Labour and Socialist Partythe West Indian Independence Partyost prominent Trinidadian leftists were associated with this new organization which was headed by solicitor Lennox Pierre, and included other pro-Communists such as John LaRoso, Jack Kelshall, George Weekes, John Poon, and labor leaders John Rojas and Quintin 0'Connor.

The birth of the WIIP also marked the joining of the nonunion based WFM and the left wing of the Trinidad and Tobago Trades Union Congross'Connor and Rojas were among the first oftrade unionists and were active instrong unions among government employees and oil workers respectively. On this base they built the TTTUC which was affiliated with the Worldof Trade Unions and remained in thisong after the withdrawal of the democratic membership. The decision of Rojas and O'Connor to accept membership in the WIIP was their first overt associationarxist organization. Rank and file union members, however, soon brought pressure to bear, and forced them to withdraw from the WIIP

This proved to be only tho first of the manywhich the WIIP has suffered. Membership has consistently decreased, and the publicationonthly magazine "Freedom" had to be quickly erious rift developed when John Poonissident faction out of the VHP. The break was formalized7 when he founded the Youth's National Congress (YNC) (also known as the Progressive Youth's Organization). For the next five years the WIIP struggled along making little headwayontinuing series of executiveorganizational meetings and sporadic study classes. 8 WIIP Secretary John LaRose moved to Venezuela, and party activity dwindled tonothing. 0 an attempt was made to heal the breach between Poon and party leader Pierre. However, the YNC retains considerable autonomy and continues its separate but ineffective approaches to the youth of Trinidad. The WIIP tried tothe ranks of the governing FNM and theDLP during the, but met withsuccess. After Trinidad achieved independence inno thanks to thethat the party's announced ralson d'etre no longer existed and official activities ceasedentirely. 5 party activity is mainly confined totudy group which meets in Port of Spain.

It would nonthelessistake to discount the effectiveness of Individual members of the WIIP. In, L. R.ell-known extremereturned to Trinidad from Great Britain andbegan maneuvering to take over the DLP. Acting DLP leador Stephen Maharaj led the move aimed at ousting party moderates who had voted with the government to pass the controversial Industrial Stabilization Act. Maharaj received enthusiastic support and coaching from James, Kelshall, and George Woekes, president of the Oilfield Workers' Trade Union (OWTU). The bid to assume control of the DLP failed and Maharaj was read out of the party.

Undismayed, the group began talking ofew socialist party which would include elements from the left wing of the DLP and the trade union movement. arty has been discussed before,

but the possibility of its establishment in the near future seems likely. teering committee, including James, Weekes, Pierre, and Kolshall, has boen chosen to organize the new group which, toeftist stigma at least for the time being, has been named tho Workers and Farmers Party, with Maharaj as pro-vishairman.

The leftists obviously hope to base this new party on the quasi-urban Negro members of the OWTU and the rural East Indian sugar workors. If they are able to putoalition together, it wouldajor break in Trinidad's de facto racialism in politics and couldeal challenge to theof Prime Minister Eric Williams.

3. Strength and Supporting Croups

The WIIPembership highince that time membership has declined stoadily, particularly after the defection of union leaders Rojas and O'Connor. 5 the membership isto be between Members havo not displayed any interest inecruiting drive, being content to lie dormant and to oxerclse their influence from within other organizations. Should the new socialist party be established, former WIIP membors could be expected to push for positions of Influence and to seek to increase party

The WIIP does not hold elections, and there ls no officer except Lennox Pierro, who continues to be known as the party chairman. No secretary general has over been appointed to replace John LaRose who moved to Venezuela The party does notdues, and no membership cards are issued.

Despite the lack of popular support for the WIIP itself, organized labor has long been aof support for its Marxist views. Prior7 Trinidad had two trade unions which federated in that year to form the Trinidad and TobagoTrades Union Congress (TUC). John Rojas, president of the OWTU, became the first president of the TUC. Internal power struggles plagued the unions, and when Rojas decided to support the ruling PNM in the generalebel group, headed by WIIP member George Weekes, forced him out

U-4

LJJJJ'

of office. Weekes became president of the OwTU and served as acting president of the TUC, relations began to deteriorate as workersto frequent strike action rather than using the well-established negotiation machinery. In5 Weekes encouraged and abetted sugar workers to rebel against their long-time leader, and in effect attempted to take over the important sugar workers union, to which many of the island's East Indian workers belong. Weekes' unauthorized foray into the sugar unions resulted in the withdrawal oflarge unions from the TUC and led toew progovernment National Federation of Labor. The sugar strikes and accompanying labor unrest caused the government to demand passageough Industrial Stabilization Act. Weekesas prosidont of the TUC, but retains hisof tho OWTU and has used tho power of histo obtain an appropriationrom OWTU funds to test the constitutionality of the act and its strict antlstrlkc provisions. Of this0 is being paid to John Flatts Mills, British Queen's Counsel,who has arrived from England to plead the OWTU case before the highest court of Trinidad. If necessary he will appeal the case before the Privy Council in London. In addition, Weekes isto lend his support to the newly formed Sugar Workers Trade Union <SWTU) created mainly toase for C. L. R. James and other political extremists. Should the SWTU succeed in pushing out the established sugar union, James and others plan to utilize both the SWTU and the OWTU toi-racial base for their proposed political grouping.

The Youth's National Congress, which hasbeen discussed, is probably tho only organiza-

m at j www| -

tlon which could qualifyront group. Caribbean Women's National Assembly (CWNA),

Foreign Influences

The WIIP and YNC have no established international ties and receive neither direction nor finance from

U-5

abroad. WIIP leaders have alwaysery close relationship with Cheddi Jagan's People'sParty (PPP) in British Guiana and alsocontacts with the Communist Party of Great Britain and some Venezuelan Communists. The Friends of Guyanaormedas attempted to drum up support for Jagan and the PPP in Trinidad, but has not had notable success.

Trinidad does not maintain diplomaticwith any Communist country. Should thecourtship between Prime Minister Williams and the Soviets result in the establishment of apresence in Trinidad, members of the WIIP and their supporters would prove willing assistants for any Soviet plans.

The Sino-Soviet rift has had little, if any, effect on Communists in Trinidad, most of whom would probably support the Soviet line. There has been little contact with the Castro regime, which does not appear to exercise significant influence in Trinidad. There have been occasional visits to Communist China by members of the Trinidadlancommunity, but most of their activity seems concentrated in distributing propaganda.

S. Dissident groups

There is no dissident group among Trinidadian Communists and extreme leftists. The breachPoon of the YNC and Pierre of the WIIP has been at least papered over, and the two groupsto work together.

:

TIIE-:

1. Introduction

The Uruguayan Communist Party (Partido Comunista dells legal, vociferous, and relatively large. The party has never been forced to operate underground, andesultell-developed organizational structure. The party enjoys full democratic freedom andIn elections through its front organization, tho Leftist Liberation Front (FIDEL). The PCU has substantial Influence among students andorganizations, and controls or influences much of organized labor. In dddltlon, PCU members hold positions in most levels and branches of the government. The party is well placed to exploit the increasing malaise and public discontent as more and more Uruguayans feel forced to lookthe traditional partiesolution to their burgeoning problems.

Uruguay, once the model democracy of Latin America, has become increasingly unstable mainly because of inept leadershipumbersome Dlno-man executive and an extended period of economic deterioration. There is little prospect for stronger national direction; tbe administration tends to drift along tbe path of least resistance as determined by political pressure groups. The probable inability of the government to halt the economic deterioration and take significantmeasures will provide further opportunities for leftist exploitation of the labor force and will also Increase dissatisfaction in Uruguay's large middle class.

Although public disillusionment with the plural executive system is increasing, progress toward constitutional reform of the system has stalled as party factions are unable to agree on the form change should take. Under Uruguayan electoral law, politicaltbe two large traditional parties, the ruling Blancos and the oppositionbecome severely factionalized. This results in complex inter-and

intraparty maneuvering, and patronage and individual self-interest have proved more tbe rule thanfor the national welfare.

As progress toward legal change slows down, pressures for extralegal change increase. Military officers have been increasingly willing to spoak out in political matters. Business and commercial leaders, long staunch defenders of democratic processes, are increasingly reluctant to support the current system. Crippling strikes or ain public order couldoupthe forces working for reform are able to produce an acceptable alternative.

The heavy cost of Uruguay's overextended social welfare system together with inefficient government enterprises has produced an excessive burden on an economy characterized by industrial recession, rising unemployment (nowndpiraling cost of(which is expected to rise aboutercentnd growing budget deficits. Fluctuating world market prices and loss of markets for the principal exports, wool and meat, have contributed to the decline. Moat of the population is nowthe economic pinch, and the PCU isoptimistic that many more Uruguayans will be susceptible to their approaches.

2. rief History of the Uruguayan Communist Party

The PCU had its originarge-scaleof members of the Socialist Party, anof the Second International, foundedt the ElghthCongross of the Socialist Party inhree quarters ofdd members voted to affiliate with the Communist Third International. Inhis majority group, led by Eugenio Gomoz Carreno, was formallyas the Uruguayan Communist Party.

From its inception, the PCU had to contend not only with the splintered Socialist Party, but also with the dominant social democratic Colorado Party which went far towardemi-socialist system in Uruguay during itsears of

uninterruptedBlancos have governed. The new Communist Partyappealed for the support of labor, intellectuals, and youth groups, but its success inas largely limited to elements among the foreign-born sector of the population.

Itomewhat wider audience in, capitalizing on depression conditions and the popularity of antifaclsm among ail groups, especially Intellectuals. 9 the Uruguayan Communists helped to organize the Latin American Trade Union Confederation which was headquartered in Montevideo and was the forerunner of the now nearly defunct Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL) as the Latin American sector of the international Communist labor front. The PCUuccession of labor fronts during, but with little success. The party was equally unsuccessful in its efforts to form ties with non-Communist political organizations during the popular-front period of the.

PCU efforts to extend its influence first achieved significant results during World War II. In this period tbe Communists emerged from their positionegligible splinter party toore important positiontrongerin tho national congress, althougharginal factor in the country's political and social life. Thereovere crisis in tho party and its leadership during the period of the Nazi-Soviet. In the climate of thealliance between tbe United States and the USSR, the PCUemarkable recovery which was also based on their appeal to labor groupsfrom the economic effects of wartime.

The PCUeak just after World War II, and its labor front, the General Union of Workersecame the leading national labor federation. The party won five percent of tbe national vote in6 elections, seating one senator and five deputies in thehe Communists successfully exploited mass discontent with rising prices anderies of strikes for higher wages.

V-3

In Congress, party deputies Joined with anti-US nationalists in condemning the government's policy of cooperation with the US.

The combination of factors which strengthened the Communistsas short-lived. As the party more and more obviously revealed itself to be tho creature of international Communism, itsamong the workers and the middle classes began to drift away. The party followed all tbe twists and turns of Soviet policy, and the stubborn pursuit by party leaders of the militant international party line ledteady deterioration in both the PCU and its front organizations.

The PCU again started on the upgradethe death of Stalin and the subsequent changeolicy in favor of exploiting domestic issues appoaling to organized labor and other masshorough revision of the party program and strategy was undertakennd long-time Secretary General Gomez was charged withdeviations and expelled from the party. An indication of successful internal PCU discipline is the fact that he was able to tako only aof sympathizers out of the party with him.he party has followed the policy of trying tonited leftist political front which it could dominate and especially has sought the cooperation of the Socialist Party. Inhe Communists were successful in attracting some smaller revolutionary leftist groupsommunist-dominated front called the Leftist Liberation Front, popularly known by its Spanish acronym, FIDEU, Ihe Socialist Party has agreed to cooperate with the PCU andingle slate of candidates in6 elections because it found to its dismay that all of FIDEL'S electoral gaina2 were made at the Socialist's expense. However, the PSU and PCU are still having trouble in using FIDELommon political instrument and will probably continue to have difficulty inthis problem so long as the present electoral laws remain unchanged. FIDEL activity in the legislature is characterized by slavish following of the party line and tbe use of delaying tactics to sidetrack any legislation which does not suit party purposes.

The PCU has successfully exploited domestic economic issues, particularly In the labor field, although it has generally been unable to get sizable numbers of workers to turn out for political demonstrations. Although the party has the ability of calling crippling strikes, in recent years It has exercised considerable caution In keeping strikes and demonstrations within acceptable bounds. PCU leaders do not wish to provide any right-wing group with an excuseoup which they probably rightly believe would resulteduction of their present considerable freedom of operation. Tor defensive purposes, the PCU has prepared plans to go underground and has also organizedunits ofeople to serve as cadresoup force the party to call its supporters into tbe streets.

The Communists conduct extensive propaganda activity in Uruguay. The party newspaper, El Popular, (formerly known as Justlcla)of" and apparently considerable outside financial support. Estudios, another PCU publication, does notarge circulation, but doesumber of students and Intellectuals. o-called "third posltionlst" but blatantly pro-Castro and pro-Communist newspaper, Epoca, hasalso appears to receiveoutside help from bloc sources. Ina weekly magazine. Marcha, frequentlythe Communist viewpoint, although It is owned and operatedon-Communist. Marchaide circulation and influence among students, professionsle, and Intellectuals. onthly publication of FIDEL, appeared for the first time inoviet and otherbloc publications reach Uruguay in large numbers, both for local and continent-wide In addition, at least one local publishing house specializes In Communist literature,ubstantial number of locnl bookstores distribute this material. The PCU and FIDEL use Radio Noclonal extensively to present programs aimed at workers, with particular emphasis on the party's newest target group, the rural workers.

v-5

3. Strength aod Supporting Groups

In50 PCU carnets were Issued In Montevideo andhroughout the rest of the country. Thisof0 includes onlyctivists who spend the major portion of tholr time and energy in party work. In addition, the Communist Youth Organization (UJC) has anembers and is probably experiencing arise in membership.

The PCU is constantly pressed for funds, according to its own statements, and it has heavy deficits and chronic indebtedness. Revenues raised in Uruguay comeultitude of sourcesfinancial campaigns, party dues, El, Popular sales, kickback of salaries by PCU deputies, and through raffles, dances, etc. The party alsomoney from the government to reimburse it for certain national election expenses into the number of votes polled. In view of the magnitude and variety of party operations, however, it ls evident that it receivessupport from the USSR and othor Communiat countries.

One of the major sources of party strength has been its remarkably stable leadership. Pol-lowing the overthrow of Gomez, who founded the party and led itodney Arismendi emergod as its principal leader, and he remains first Secretary Many of the top party offices are filled by the samo people who filled them ten, and in some cases twenty, years ago. Party organization ls highly centralized with most of the power concentrated in the handsew leaders in the executive committee.

The PCU has campaigned in national elections under its own name since it broke away from the Socialistsut has never enjoyed great success. Tbe high-water mark was6 when the Communists3 percent of the vote; in the most recont electionshey won9 percent of the vote. Communist ability toollowing has improved whenevor Uruguay's oconomic

position has tended to deteriorate, but at the same time their appeal has been conditioned by tho requirements ol' world Communist policy. Theseverity of the economic decline which bos been going on since the end7 has made party loaders highly optimistic about their chances to increase their electoral strength andrepresentation. FIDEL has bogun another house-to-house campaign in Montevideo, and members nre encouraged with the early results, particularly among people formerly affiliated with the Blanco and Colorado parties. They hope that at least ten porcent of all householders will agree to sign cards pledging them to support FIDEL. Although this estimate seems overly optimistic, there is some reason to believe that the party will improve its showing in6 elections. In addition, the PCU plans to expand its organizational efforts in the interior of the country and hopos toonfederation of salaried rural workers towith the party-dominated Central of Uruguayan Workers (CTU). PCU leaders apparently believe that tho time is now ripe to broaden their base in rural areas that have traditionally favored the Blancos.

In the past, the PCU has been based almost entirely in urbnn areas,eavy concentration in Montevideo. Tho party finds its mainamoiiii workers, and exerts its major efforts in tho field of labor. Tho PCU operates through theorganization which replaced the UGT during 0 and which has0 uombers. The CTU has node prugress ninong workers in important government-owned enterprises, such as public utilities, banking, and petroleum. Rural laborew target group, and tho PCU has had some success among workers in western andareas, although the gonerally well-off Uruguayan agricultural worker is not traditionally responsive to Communist appeals.

4 tho PCU organized the Nationalof Workers (CNT), hoping to attractwho would not respond to tho openly pro-Communist CTU. The CNT, with the support of the CTU,uccessful "Congress of tho

People" in5 which attracted delegates from annurober of non-Communist organizations. These people gave their supportlatform whichthe oft-repeated Communist demands forof private banks, expropriation and redistribution of land,expropriation of foreignand industrial enterprises, and expansion of trade relations to include all countries.

The many Uruguayans who belong to independent unionsut of the organized labor force) frequently cooperate with the CTU and tbe CNT in pressing economic demands on government and industry which -are no longerosition to grant large, or sometimes even moderate, wage and social benefit increases. CTU-led orstrikes have been effective in getting employers to meet their demands, andesult independent unions have found cooperation with the Communists beneficial for their The Communists have not, however, been able to exploit this cooperation in economic issues by turning it to political support. In addition to the independentemocratically oriented labor federation has0 members. Itsleadership has been corrupt and has lacked militancy,ecent change of leaders maypur to its lagging efforts.

The PCU has also been successful inprofessional teacher organizations, dominating the major primary school teachers' union, andthe most active secondary teachers' union. The Communists have devoted great energy to the student movement in Uruguay's only university and inschools. Although Communist youth organizations exist In most high schools, they have not beensuccessful. The University of the Republic, however,ell-organized Communist youthwith cells in all faculties. The secretary general of the federation of Uruguayan University Studentsommunist. Despite their limited numbers, the Communists dominate student policy through the use of classic Communist parliamentary maneuvers, through their militancy and superiorand by virtue of the fact that most Uruguayan students are inclined toward Marxism and poorly informed about democracy.

There are undoubtedly Communists, as well as many sympathizers, In tho vast wasteland of Uruguayan bureaucracy, but to date they have not exerted great leadership. There are no identified Communists In the police, navy, or air force. There are,ew army officers, Including one general, who are certainly Communistif not outright party members.

Tho PCU utilizes other front groups whenever it serves their purposes. Professional organizations peace fronts, women's fronts, press groups, and bi-national centers with Communist countries have all played varying rolos in tho party's activities. Those groups are reactivated or phasod out as party line and current Interest demands.

4. Foreign Influence

The PCU long ago proved itself toevoted servant of the Soviot Communist Party line. Itso today. Party leaders have repeatedly stated their support for the Soviot Union and criticized the Chinese Communist position in the Sino-Soviet rift. PCU leaders and other party mem-bors make frequent trips to the USSR and other bloc countries and maintain close liaison with Communist diplomatic missions in Montevideo. The USSR and all other Eastern European countries maintainin Montevideo, except East Germany which hasrade mission. The PCU receivesand undoubtedly considerable financial and materiel support from the Soviets and other bloc nations, and in return provide foreign Communists with an ideal base of operations for activities In much of South America. In addition, Montevideo is usedtaging point to facilitate travel to and from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the bloc for Communists and sympathizers from many Latin nations. Tho PCU has hosted international congresses and front-group meetings; high-level Soviet officials have attended PCU anniversaries nnd congresses, and PCU representatives are in attendance at most important international Communist meetings.

The present leadership of the PCU has shown no inclination to shiftore militant stand,

fearing it mightightist take-over and subsequent crack-down on party activities. They have no illusions about their present ability to bring down the government by themselves, andhave.little desire to do so if they could. The Uruguayan atmosphere simply is not conducive to violence; Uruguayans are by temperament talkers, rather than fighters, and militancy has practically no appeal to tbe ordinary Uruguayan. Instead, the PCU seeks to present Itselfespectableparty, attract other groups into fronts, infiltrate key organizations, but avoids violence.

esult of this policy, tho Chineseline has found few adherents, but pro-Chinese splinter groups do exist and are discussed below. The Chinese havo not been able toiplomatic presence in Uruguay, but they-press the government for permission to open attstfdeobf face. The North Koreans doemiofficial trade office in Montevideo, butather precarious existence since their visas must be renewed everyays.

Uruguay reluctantly broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in The removal of the Cuban Embassy cut the PCU off from one of its sources of support, but the departure was probably moreto Cuban interests than to those of the PCU. Party leaders continue to visit Cuba, but the PCU generally follows the line of praising Castroationalist ratherommunist hero without endorsing his wanderings from the party line.

Geography has inevitably made Uruguay sensitive to pressure from its two large neighbors, Argentina and Brazil. The PCU is no less susceptible to such pressure, and it maintains close relations with both the Argentine and Brazilian parties. Inthe PCU provides some assistance to exiled Brazilian leftists who have been in Uruguay since the fall of the Goulart regime innd to exiled Paraguayan Communists.

5. roups

The divisive effects of tho Sino-Soviet split have taken some toll of PCU ranks. There are several

pro-Chlnoso Communist political groups in Uruguay, tho largest bolnjv the Leftistomposod mainly of former PCU and UJC members. It hasembers, although many could not be considored party activists. Tbe MIR was originally formed inthe name Revolutionary Action MovementPCU members who hod been expolled because of thoir pro-Chinese activity. ortion of the MAR came under the domination of pro-Cubans who had broken away from the Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement (MRO) headed by FIDEL Deputy Ariel Collazo. In3 the MAR and MIR both gained considerable notoriety and generated internal group conflicts by conducting robberies to obtain food and clothing to distribute to the poor. Other FIDEL components also split over the Sino-Soviet rift, with pro-Chinese groups operating sometimes alone and sometimes inwith the MIR.

One thing about which all of these groups could agree was the need for violent revolution as opposed to tho PCU's continued emphasis oncoexistence. Ineries oftook place in which the groups agreed tonified Marxist-Leninist Communist party, which subsequently agreed to use the MIR name. They further agreed to coordinate attacks against the PCU and the Uruguayan Socialist Partyothe principles and practices of the Soviet Communist Party and support those of the Chinese, and to support any rural organization which showed potential ofeasant militia. The new MIR has reportodly sought Chinese Communistand members who had been in China haveto Montevideo to guide party activities. The MIR is planning to publish an eight-page tabloid twice monthly.

The pro-Chinese segment of tho PSU haswith the MIR, although its leader, Raul Sondic, has como under fire from MIR leaders because of his endorsement by the PCU and PSU. Sendicilitant socialist whose revolutionary ardor usually puts him far to the left of the PCU. He has been active primarily in the northern sugar cane growing province of Artlgas, whoro he has led

V-ll

rural workers in annual "marches" on Montevideo, seeking to dramatize tbeir poor working conditions. The marches have attracted some attention, but the Sendlc-supported union has not made significant strides in overtaking the democratically oriented union in the area. The5 arson in cane fields in Artlgas Province is attributed to Sendic's followers and has resulted in public opinionstrongly against this group. Sendlc himself is in hiding because of his earlier involvement in armed robberies, and the active loader of his group Is Washington Rodriguez.

SRC RET

of Legislature

of Deputies

Rodney Arisraendl

Joae Luis Mnssera

Arlol Collazo

1. Enrique Rodriguez

in Size of Congressional Representation

1 total)

Party Post

First

Members of

Central

Committee

Members of Secretariat

Members of

Executive Commit toe

Gerchuni Perez

Rosario Pietrarroia

Jaime Gerchuni Perez

Rosario Pietrarroia

Jaime Gerchuni Perez

Rosario Pietrarroia

Rodriguez**Enrique Rodrlguez**Enrique Rodriguez**

Charge of

Relations with Cuba

Suarez Vignolo

Julia Arevalo do Roche

Alberto Altesor Mezquita

Jose Blanco Mendez

Leopoldo Bruera

Felix Diaz Clavijo

Jose Luis Massera*

Cesar Reyes Daglio

Gregorlo Sapin

Eduardo Viera

Ricardo Mario Acosta Baladon

Juan Acuna Hector Betancurt Gerardo Cuesta6

Alberto Suarez Vignolo

Julia Arevalo do Roche

Alberto Altesor Mezquita

Jose Blanco Mendez LeopoLdo Bruera Felix Diaz Clavijo Jose Luis Massera* Cesar Royes Daglio Gregorlo Sapin Eduardo Viera

Membersof

Edison DePascua

Hermes Gadda

Armando Gonzalez

Juan Mujlca

Omar Oldan

Irene Perez de Acuna

Haul Rezzano

Raul Tealdi

Jose Tomaslch

UJCWainatein

General

Esteban Fernandez Ruggiero

Eduardo Dloior Horovitz

Walter Sansevloro*

Salomon Scbvartz Aloxandrowltch*

Luis Silva Rebermann*

Simon Krausov*

Severino Alonso*

Henerson Cardoso*

Luis Fernandez*

Godofredo Fernandez*

Members of

Central

Committee

Members of Secretariat

Members of

Executive

Committee

Franco* Juan Jesus* Francisco R. Pintos*

KEY: Deputy Senator

tf Alternate Central Committee member, non-voting

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA