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OF CONTENTS
THE PnOBIEM
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
HE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM II DECISIONS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TABLE I
ON THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Safeguard Systems
Sharing
Agreements
Measures ..
OF PROLIFERATION BY SELECTED NATIONS
Germany
Africa
I Nationalist China
J. The UAR, Pakistan, and Indonesia .
V. THE SNOWBALL EFFECT
THE LIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of additional countries to acquire nuclear weapons, and the likelihood that such countries will do so.
CONCLUSIONS
the present five nuclear powers, only Indiauclear weapons program in the ne.xl severaland Sweden might do so.
do not believe that West Germany or Japan willnuclear weapons programs for at least the next few yearsIndia. Israel, or Sweden does so.
and the UAR. and perhaps South Africa, are likelynuclear weapons in the next decade, but could obtain themsubstantial outside help. )
safeguard systems are likely to detect anyto unauthorized uses of nuclear materials or equipmentcover. However, there are gaps and limitations in thethe future, competition among the major nations supplyingand equipment may erode ihe effectiveness
treaties against testing or nuclearimpose legal, moral, and political restraints ofountry came to the conclusion that possession ofwas required by its vital interests, international treatiesunlikely to prevent it from taking such action.
is technically possibleountry tomallweapons program at least upest. The chances ofwould depend on the extent to which our suspicions hadand the methods available or used to
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i. the dimensions of the problem
any nation* in addition to Ihe present five nuclear powers have|>otential to develop nuclear weapons. Each year the technical problems and costs of making small numbers of plutoniurn weaponshis trend will con-tinur. By the, there will almost certainly be widespread use of nuclear power reactors which will piodtioc.y-product, largo amounts of plutoniurn. Allhotigli there will be industrial uses for this plutonitun. itswill reduce further the technkfll probk-rm and costs o( weapon*and increase the temptation tohe nuclear weapons field. Theof the potential nuclear powers as to whether to acquire nuclear weapons will depend increasingly upon military, psychological, end polilical motivations and restraints
1rw monthsear, Canada could, without outside assistance,irst device, and could produce weapons relatively shortly thereafter. Either alone or with some outsideumber of nations couldew weapons In the nextears; Belgium. Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands. Norway, Portugal, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany are In this group. However, we believe that none of the nntiotu mentioned in this paragraph willuclear weapout program in the foreseeable future. Their motivations to do so arc not strong, while the factors which would act to restrain them are numerous and compelling.
the other hand, there arcweden,Germany. Switzerland. Australia. South Africa, Nationalist China,Repubhr, Pakistan, andpossible Incentives toweapon* during the nextrarssufficient to warrant moteThoir incentives vary widely, as does their need for outsidefollowingpagendicates their capabilities; the likelihood ofdeveloping nuclear weapons is considered in Section IV,
ii. decisions to acquire nuclear weapons
factors which determine whether oration will seek toweapom differ widely from country to country. National needsvary from case to case, as do systems ot government andSome governments have to take public opinion into account farthan others; In the case ofecision can be made by one or aleaders, while in othersatter of weighing conflicting interests or
reckoning with divided counsels within the government, parliamentary bodies,
or the public at large.
' Sec Annexucu'SJoo al the prempiltllBi forand other
teehflfca] udecaaderattoM taong ratios* which BMgM eaafaark onrogram, andut of the larger nuckar teacton In countries othrr (has the present five nuckar powers.
T
NATIONS WITH POSSIBLE INCENTIVES TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
donwftic aupplfc* of uranium.
Sweden Japan
Two year*
Two years ii
on present reactors v
Has ir.ipon.rd and stockpiled Sufficienturaniumew weapons.
Weil Ceimany
H,i> (Wneilic tupplie* of uranium. Would probably have to import uranium without safeguard..
Switzerland
Aiittralia South
Nationals China
Twof, M prohnblyto buwrt sroduce nuclearITs Ownthan si,have to import uranium without
More than eight years
ometrlt suppllei of
pappbei ofutiide nations would have to provide almcttt all facilities and materials, althoughaloed ereruiica!
ii [iri'.il.k aia-lable.
United Arab Republic, Pakistan, and Indonesia
Would havo ro importutude nalioaa wouldo provide almotl allad technical manpower, or the flnubed weapons thriiwclvei.
* AiMiaungtsaonr bom, and no further outside hehs were obtaiied. As ran* patsei and further work under ciwtlnf peaceful programs Ii done, these time periods mav decrease. In nil canet eicept India, the linn uiciudri that needed to build an adequate plulooiwn wparatlon plantr-tol redwclkM facility. Aba see Aneei
In addition, levels of sophistication In nuclear matters and tlie bases of political thinking and military doctrine vary considerably from state to state and within states What may appear to the US ot to other ernerienccd countries as critical deficienciesrojected nuclear weapons program may not appear as such to the government considering the program, the latter may feel,niiture of political, military, and other reasons,iven program wouldood investment.
Despite these variations, certain common motivations figure in theof all potential conteodets The first and most compelling is that of national security.ation may believe that It needs nuclear weapons as a
deterrent or for use in war if deterrence fails. Tlie question maylliations which arc without close allies and in others which, though members of an alliance system, do not feel fully protected by it. In general,ation has concluded that nuclear weapons- are vilal lo its security, no oulside restraint other than force is likely to prevent it from trying to acquire them.
Another significantpsychological and partlylo acquire nuclear weapons is lo avoid being left behind. Nations dislike the idea that others of equal nr less importance might move ahead of them. The more nations acquire weapons, the more others can find reasons to do likewise Thus nuclear proliferation couldnowball effect. Moreover, in some nations it is argued that entering the nuclear weapons field is necessary to keep abreast of technological and scientific developments.
Finally, there is the incentive of national prestige and political leverage. This motivation runs through all oilier calculations but. in the modern world, the feeling has grown that nuclear weapons are essential to front rankthe French force de dissuasion being the prime example. Dc Gaulle, hisin France, and like-minded people elsewhere do not maintaination mustuclear force rivaling that of the US or the USSR, but argue thatmall force enhances their opportunflies for independent action by giving them leverageis the super powers.
III. RESTRAINTS ON THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
wide range of domestic and internalioiwl restraints operates lonuclear proliferation. There is, of course, the restiaint ofproducing weapons but more Importantlyeliveryevery nation thatotential addilion to the nuclear ranks therepolitical and psychological forces working against proliferation.nuclearUS. the USSR, and thethe spreadweapons. They do so through both bilateral and multilateralHowever, these nations may not be willing in all circumstances topriority over other policy objectives. The attitudes ofCommunist China toward proliferation are ambiguous; it is possiblemight help certain Other nationsuclear capablllly. Aindustrialized but non-nuclearGermany,ndbecoming major suppliers of nuclear equipment, Tbefollow in the sale of reactors, nuclear equipment and technology willthe rale and extent of nuclear proliferation even if ihey themselves doweapons. Allhougb the foreign policies of the major powers tendfurther proliferation, there is no certainty that they will prevent it.
A. Present Safeguard Systems
elaborate restraint on nuclear proliferationystem ofcontrols designed by international bodies Or by nations exportingand equipment to delect any diversion of such products to unauthorized
purposes1 While the objective i. to prevent diversion, safeguardstt are concerned more with detection than prevention Like other internationalsafeguard agreements could be abrogated or violated. Tlie sanctions imposed oo oficiKiers would depend ultimately on the amount or:ilitary pressure which other countries were willing Io bring to bear In the ense of recipients who are dependent on continuing supplies ofhaw using enriched uranium in reactors, the need to avoid alienatingactsanction to ensure compliance with safeguards.
IL We believe that tlie inspection and verirViition provisions of broadsuch as those administered by the IAEA and EUFATOM arc generally effective in fulfilling iheir limited function;they are likely to detect any significant diversion of materials or equipment from the uses intended by the supplier In addition, the risk of detection lleterrent of someh gainst the unauthorized use of material? and equipment covered.
owever, there are certain gaps and lunitabons In tbe safeguard systems. For example, some of the earlier transactions in nuclear material and equipment wereno safeguards or under agreements of limited scope. Norway hai supplied heavy water to Israelumber of other countries with only general understandings iu to use and no provision for inspection. The US provided heavy water to India under an arrcement that specifics only that it will beor peaceful purposes. /
eactor built by Canada for India is under
no specifichough India agreed thai it would be used only forpurposes. Tlie safeguards system Is not applicable to materials orprodiKedounOy for It* own use. Thus. Sweden haseactor at Agesta without incurring any safeguard obligations because the reactor and fuel were produced domestically. Aside from the reactors rnentioried in this paragraph, and several reactors in Canada, we do not know of any reactors
'afeguard! ceaastt of anpftwrru tk*aad theunder which d* latter peoiiiliei toie imported goods only lor tpeclnrdaddition, thf recipient olUn agrees to keep detailed writtenf oil acfftfticirulertsl aad eooipnieot. and to allow th* sapptitog country to check ttmr record*makeatwirr their nccuracv Sm* controlsxi n
ovi'if natural urnnluiu, filthinaliir material! (principally pluionlum and uranium eeruhedeavy wain and other wane or eiprnstve cceoanodrtSrs aHoeiatrd with prodoctxm of bmmiabsr matrriab, tritium, iNcttn. ronponmti of reactors, and neutron generators. Safeguards may be adiitinisteied hy various bodtoi. The US, British, uridor ruunplr, place bdalaral safeguard* on tbab riporti of nocWv-irlaird produttt El'KATOM sopcrvSsei safeguard arrangements On many nuiWnr farlllttes In th" Common Mnrket countiies. The Inlcinational Atomic Energy Agency (lAfcA) admUiMUrs safeguards on materials and enuipnirot wipplirilad alto aoaVr agreeowMs Ss whkh St kit been aprcdVd as tbe inasinblrriwj; aerio by the t'S and orlper oountrlra. Some member nairam have voluntarily submitted themtckit*IAEA safeguards, Eflorti are bring inndc to bringl various countries under IAEA safeguards.
outside the present five nuclear powers which are now capable of producing enough plutoniurn for even oneear and are not under safeguards.
here Is no formal agreement In existence among all potential supplier! that safeguards will he applied to reaclois or nuclear materials or equipment; such safeguards at are applied result from tbe unilateral decisions of the suppliers. While it is present practice for tbe UK and Canada to require safeguards like those imposed by the US. France has rejected the policy of automaticallysafeguards in (Onrscctioei wiih sales. Soviet and Chinese pokey with regard to safeguard' is unclear. The USSR ass most East European countries arc active members of the IAEA and approve the principle ofut no reactors in existence or under construction in the Smo-Soviet area haw been placed under IAEA safeguards. Neither the USSR nor China has to dateany other countryeactor able to produce plulonium In quantities sufficient for weapons, excepl lhat the Soviets may have furnished the Chinese prior0 with equipment and technology for buildingeactor. Nevertheless, reactors now under construction in Czechoslovakia and East Germany with Soviet assistance will Ih1 capable of producing enough plutoniurn for weapons We do not know whether any safeguards are applicable to these reactors bul almost certainly these countries will not undertake independent nueloar weapons programs.
here are no comprehensive controls over world trade in natural uranium, although there is an informal arrangement between the principal Westernof uranium and some other materials to keep each oilier Informed as to sales It has been possible for both Israel and India to buy unsafeguarded uranium. Furthermore, there is no standard policy regarding the provision of technical information or specialized equipment.
here willubstantial increase in the number of nuclear power reactors in operatioti in comingonsiderable number are now under construction In India, Sweden, Japan. West Germany, Ilalv. and otherll will produce some plutoniurn or other fissionable materials, many willlarge quantities. To the extent that these reactors are under safeguards, the country or agency administering the safeguards willeans ofwhat use is made of the plutoniurn. However, competition in the sale of reactors already exists and is likely to grow. Such competition may erode the effectiveness of safeguards, particularly if the compelitors include suppliers from counfiies which have oo policy of strict safeguards. Such erosion would be rnost likely in tbe fields of equipment and ancillary' technology.
uclear Sharing
t is possibleation which wanted nuclear weapons might have its aspirations satisfied, at least for some time, and be restrained fromational weapons program, by an arrangement under which ithare in
'Seand VI of Annei for major reactor* now In operation or urxlvrcountries other than the five nuilvur power*.
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the control of weapons belonging to an existing nucleare do not believe thai useful genera ligations can be made In this field. Inreat variety of factors would bear on the effecthe degree of control which the non-nuclear power had over weapons, the prospects for future greater control, the level of confidence between the sharing partners, the domesiic and foreign Incentives and restraints bearing on the non-nuclear power, etc. So far as the matter of proliferation is concerned, ihe effect of an offer io share could be judged only in terms of tbe particular* ol the offer and an analysis of the individual case.
Agreements
the US and the USSR agreed on multilateral treaties furtherprohibiting testing, or prohibiting further nuclear proliferation, theyconsiderable pressurefar on oilier nations to sign such treaties.would probablyurther treaty on testing than would sign atreaty, since this latter kind of treaty is considered by manyas discriminatory* in favor of the present nuclear powers. Suchimpose legal,nd political restraints of considerablethe signatory nations. Tlieartial test ban already constitutesand psychological curb on proliferation. However, mostsign such treaties only provided that they could withdraw if theythey must. Wc believe thatountry came to the conclusion thatof nuclear weapons was required by its vital interests,would be unlikely to prevent it from tesling or producing them.
Measures
unilateral measures by the US or the USSR might restrainFor example, tbe US or the USSB could cot offo India or Israel, or disavow their alliances with anybegan to develop nuclear weapons. In areas where US or Sovieteconomic leverage is strong, even threats or partial steps inignificant restraint. In particular, any countrycontinued imports of nuclearhose having reactorsuranium, would hesitate to disregard the pressures of itsis also possibleotential nuclear power could be dissuaded fromnuclear weapons on its ownirm security guarantee or otherfrom the US or USSR. There are, of course. limitations on thethe major powers to take such steps as discussed in this paragraph andnot be prepared to give non-proliferation priority over other
IV. LIKELIHOOD OF PROLIFERATIONELECTED NATIONS A. India
has the capability to produce nuclear weapons, and we believea first deviceearecision. To do so in the near future, India
se
rPcU^Umhe C'K reaCtol-hcavv partial test ban treaty would still
such tune a* the pew prime rninistct corrso agates rus power
thr current critical food situation is alleviated, major policy alterations arc unlikely. Furthermore, given India's present and prospective economicthe costs ot moreoken nuclear weapons program, andelivery system, would be an imjiortant limitation.
n the other hand. India's decision would be based as much on factors of prestige and strengthening its bargaining position as on the idea ofa realistic deterrent, and pressures in India to develop nuclear weapons for these purposes are likely to grow in the future. Considerations of national security arc also likely to become increasingly important in India's deliberations. China's growing nuclear strength and the specter of Pal isfcmi-Chineseagainst India wilt make it more difficult for the major powers to restrain India or to oiler guarantee* which the Indians would accept as adequate to their security needs. On balance, we believe that within the next few years India probably willuclear device and proceed to produce weapons.*
Delhi will almost certainly not accedeoo-proliferationfails to restrict Communist China's further development of nuclearand we see no chance that Peking will accept such restrictions. Atest banwithoutbe moreIndia to refect, particularly one endorsed by the US, the USSR, andof non-nuclear nations. However, India would count on anto preserve its options.
is also unlikely to be restrained from producing nuclear weaponspresent lackelivery system able to reach major Chinese targets.probably believe that they could ocqture such aircraft as themedium jet bomber, which has been sold to several otherandombat radius sufficient to reach many parts of China.might, during tin- nextoears, even be able to purchase ormissile delivers' system. India might alsose for nuclearrequiring new delivery systems. Short range aircraft with lowcould be used against Chinese forward bases end troopterrain and population conditions would allow use of relativelyprcposltfoncd atomic demolition munitions to restrict militarythe mountain passes along the Crsioeso border.
ore detailed discussion of India and nuclear weapons, leelodiai Niadear Weapon. PoisesdatedECRKT.
srael*
variet) of incentive* and restraints are at work on Israel, bul we believe
at in tbe final anahw Israel's decision on developing nuclear weapoiu will
depend primarily on its judgment concerning trends In relative military strength between It and its Arab neighbors. For the next lew years, at least, Istitel will probably judge that it can maintain its security through acquisition ofweapons from the US and other Westernowever, Israelwould develop nuclear weapons if It came lo believe that the threat front the Arab stales could no longer be contained by conventional means. In this situationombination of internationalressure from the US, and explicit US security guarantees might not restrain the Israelis.
C. Sweden
Swedish Government has repeatedlyecision toweapons. Many govrriimental leaders are sympathetic to militarythai tactical nuclear weapons would be essential for defense againstand appear to believe that possession of such weapons wouldpolicy of non-alliance and neutrality. Public opinion, however,ccinsistenlly against acquisition of nuclear weapons. The governmenta policy of keeping Its hands free to take action should Sweden'sdeteriorate, while working actively for effective internationalMilitary planners have apparently considered in some detail theweapons which would be most effective against landing foresweapons and low yield warheads for delivery by tactical aircraftrangeweden will probably continue to postpone athe next several years. If no progress Is made toward disarmament andproliferation occurs, the chances will increase that the governmentproduction of nuclear wraponv
D. Japan0
ublic resistance to nuclear weapons is still so strong in japan Ibut no Japanese government is likely toveapons program in the near future. In tbe course of the next few years, however, these domestic pressures are likely
sonr (Mailed cstimaf> of Israel'i nuclear weapooa pdtcv. and fore information on tswee. -TheProfeienC dated
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to dimmish. If Communist Chinaa developing weapons capabilitv. or if India should develop nuclear weapons, the feeling Is likely to grow fn Japan lhat it too,ajor Asian power, shoulduclear capability. Pressures Im greater military autonomy from the US may also grow, along with other nationalistic urges. Nevertheless, US treaty guarantees and pressures willdissuade the Japanese from acquiring nuclear weapons during the next few years, If Japan did develop nucleart could alsotrategic missile delivery system without major difficulty, since it already is engagedairly advanced space program.
Germany
here is strong domestic opposition lo development of nuclear weapons In West Cernuny, and there are also treaty prohibitions which the Germans could not easily breach Germany would not only face intense opposition from the USSR if it embarkedational nuclear weapons program, but would also severely damage its relationship with the Western Alliance, including tbe US. Exceptringe of eatremists. Germans of all political fcanings are unwilling to do this. They- will Increasingly demand greater influence in West-em nuclear councils and will favor joint projects designed to give them such influence. But whether or not such project* come to fruition, and whether or not major changes in the Alliance occur, we believelose US-West German relationship will continue and that West German incentives to acquire nuclear weapons will not outweigh the restraiuls upon them in the next few years.
ome Swiss military leaders argue that the nation should have atew tactical nuclear weapons to protect Swiss neutrality. This is anof traditional attitudes, the Swiss concept of neutrality has always included the idea of an active military defense of the nation. Though Switzerland has an active nuclear power and research program, we believe there is very littlelhat the Swiss willuclear weapons program during the next few years.
ustralia probably would seek nuclear weapons only if iteriously threatened by Ck>rnrnunist China and was no longer willing to place itsin guarantees of protection from die US and theajor deter-mlnant of Australia's attitudes on those two poinls will be its estimate of the US position In Southeast Asia. If Australia came to believe that the US was being gradually pushed out of Southeast Asia, the chances are about even that Australia would begin to develop Its own nuclear weapons. Although Australia has no sizable reactor in operation or under constniction, it has had an active nuclear research programumber of years.
H. South Africa
outh Africa will face in coming years increasingly hostile- politicaland perhaps economic sanctions, not only from black Africa but from much of the rest of the world as well. We cannot exclude the possibility that South Africa might, for psychological rather lhan military reasons, respond byto acquire nuclear weapons, though we do not consider this likely. South Africa wouldood deal of outside help to develop nuclear weapons; we believe it unlikely that any country would provide such
I. Nationalist China
Kai-shek, shortly after the first Chinese Communist nuclearinetcienlific research institute; there is somethat one of its purposes is to study the possibility of Nationalistits own nuclear weapons. Although thereumber ofNationalist Chinese scientistsigh degree of competence infield, the Chinese Nationalists do not have the capability toweapons domestically. They would have to import unsafeguardedsuitable reactor, and almost all other necessary equipment. For the nextat least, we believe that Nationalist China would have greatobtaining such unsafeguarded materials and equipment.
J. The UAR, Pakistan, and Indonesia
The UAR would probably seek to acqtu're nuclear weapons If it believed Israel was developing such weapons, Pakistan would try to get nuclear weapons if it became convinced India was developing them.to the recently attemptedpublicly proclaimed an intent to acquire such weapons.
Each of these countries would need substantial aid in virtually all phasesuclear program and we believe none of the present nuclear powers is likely lo give such help. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that Communist China might do so at some time in the future. Communist Chinese statements have implied that it wouldood thing if more "anti-imperialist" nations had nuclear weapons. For the nexl several yean, at least until their own capability passes the embryonic stage, we believe that the Chinese will not transfer control of nuclear weapons to other nations.
V. THE SNOWBALL EFFECT
above survey indicates that very few nations are likely to emergenuclear powers in the next several years. India and Israel are thecontenders for nuclear status. In the longer run. however, Indian or
Israeli possession of nuclear weapons would cause Pakistan and the UAReek them. It would also increase doubts in other nations about the feasibility of non-proliferation or comprehensive test ban treaties. This in turn would tend to weaken some of the restraints presently operating iu other countries such as Sweden.
n West Germany and Japan, close alliance tics and securitywith the US would probably outweigh for at least Ihe next few years theall effect of weapons programs elsewhere. We do not believe that evenevelopment of nuclear weapons by India, Israel, and Sweden togetherause West Germany or Japan to follow suit, if the US remained stronglyoscst However, either of these two countries would be strongly motivatedto develop nuclear weapons, if the other did so with US acquiescence.
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