6
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
rs
m
The Eastern Arab World
SuMhW by
vy^WiLvUWi
BATE: MNfDIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CwxuTod in b, lb*
STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
6
TIVE SECRETARY,
Authentkolod:
SE
7fi* following Melligtnc* otgan'txoliont participated In tha preparation of this eitimofei
The Centre] Intelligence Agency ondorganisations of iheof Stan, Defense, ond the NSA.
Conctwrinfli
Or. R. J. Smih. tor Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr.ughes, Tha Director of Intelligence ond Research, Department of Statu
lieutenant Gerard Aha K. fitch, for Oifaetoe. Defense lr<telfigenee Agency lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA. Director ot the Notional Security Agency
Abstaining:
Dr. Charles H. Reichordl, tor AuiUant Geoiral lor AdmlniUrol On,
Atomic Energy Commission, and Mr. Williamgar, tor Assistantederal Boreas) of cnyethoation. the wbfscl being outside of their |uriidkison.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 1
THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS .
DISCUSSION
I THE ARAB POLITICAL SCENE
The Radical 3
The COBKrvativo
The Political
II. ECONOMIC...
Arab Economic Cooperation ..
8
TABLE: CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION 0
ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTION 10
ARABS AND THE CREAT POWERS
Communist Stair*
Western Pnwprs
2
IMPORTS OF SELECTED ARAB8
AND n
TABLE: EXPORTS OF SELECTED ARAB8
AND13
Tha US
Othw Western Poweri
setter
the eastern arab world
THE PROBLEM
To assess the present situation and the outlook for the eastern Arab world over the next two or three yean.1
CONCLUSIONS
the last year or so, the Arab states have generally beenwith domestic problems than with such intct-Arabthe conflict between conservative and radical governments oramong the radical leaders. However, the odds are against aof this inter-Arab detente. The Arab states areto sudden political turmoil. An upheaval to any oneor the deathuler, could easilyollisionnot only within that state but among others. Much stillNasser who, though unlikely to regain the paramount influencehad, remains the most important Arab leader.
the Arab-Israeli dispute, neither side is likely tohostilities, but neither will moveasictensions will occasionally flare up. and the arms race will leadpressures on the US to supply expensive
socialist programs of the UAR, Syria, and Iraq areeconomic difficulties, stemming from more ambitiousthan resources justify. The conservative governments,them blessed with oil revenues, are better off. In virtually allrather than private enterprise, will be the directingthe economies. Inter-Arab economic cooperation is likely to be
"Tht)dralibe Anb WWa from Libya Mlfwud, tbe tbrn Magbrtb couotritl oi TuoMta. nlyi*y
nAnb iflaji.
limited, although oil-rich states are beginning to finance Arab economic and military schemes. )
D. Arab oil production will grow, and so will pressures on the oil companies for more revenue and greater control over production. Strong competition in the wojld oil market, however, sets limits on how far either side can go In this respect, and outright nationalization is unlikely. )
E. 7
F. Tendencies toward Arab detente have helped the US position in the area. However. US relations with the Arab world will remain troubled by the general Arab conviction that the US is basically pro-Israel, by the Arab radicals' belief that the US favors the conservatives, and by the conservatives' feeling that the US should support them more than it does. )
discussion
I. THE ARAB POUTICAt SCENE
he past year or to hai seen rignrficant changes in the Arab wot Id There huistinct muting of the coaftict between radical and conservative leader) which hurincipal feature ol politics tn tbe Arab Middle East for moreecade. Even within the radical camp, tbe controversiesNaiier and rival leaders have been toned down. Old hortilitier andof Interest have not basically been resolved, but for various, domestic and external reaaoru it has suited the needs ca convenirncc of tba chief antagonists to suppreu these difrrmcea.
i Thai tendency washe tone of tha three Arab Summit canter* encei, and waa highlighted by the agreement on Yemen between Nasser and Xing Faisal of SaudiS. By this agreement, Nasser sought to relieve the UAH, more or less gracefully, from ihe eapeosrvr burden ot its military commitment to the republican regime in the italemated Yemeni dvil war. assd Faisal sought the removal of Egyptian force* and influence on his southern borders. Presentedtatesmanlike compromise, it in fact amountsetreat by tbe reading exponent of radical nallomlism and Pan-Arab unity, aod it is su viewed in tbe Arab world generally.
the dear division between conservative and radicalthere is little close association or sense of common purpose amongin eitlierhe drive for Arab unity, which was aof the, hai led its momentum The one signlfkantcooperation has been in theof military preparations againstUnited Arab Commandounded4 and rrursed along byArab Summit agreements, continues toertain amountin strengthening and standardizing Arab military forces, usingtbe richer states. But ttw UAC. though led by the UAR anda form of rrscreaaed Arab solidarity, eanphaaurns inter-state cooperationArab unity.
The Radical Camp
5ad one for Nasser. When it began, sometroopi were bogged down in the Yemen stalemate with no end inin the year, Nasser sought to force the other Arab States lo takeaction against Wert Germany because of thearmsIsrael, in this be failed corsspacsaoosry. Hu external problems wareby domestic esxasorruc dislocation and by the necessity of ipending
olsruMtoa of Arib unity, ol th* role of it- mlUuj. and of the bant (areas it work in tha earlern AraVi world coMaiaed asMala Tnwb ia tba Arabpril IBM. rentals* nltd
scarce foreign exchange for food, due to cessation of US PL-4S0 shipments. Discontent ta Egypt.erious problem for the regime, nonetheless grewesult of these troubles, and Nasser was disturbed by the discoveryan extends, Moslem Brotherhood movement directed against his regime. Faced with these difficulties and unable to win on the ground In Yemen, Nasser fell impelled to come to term* with FabaL All these coral derations led Nauer to turn his attention inward; he broughtew Prime Minister und reshuffled the cabinet to tackle increasingly obvious administrative and economic problems at borne.
the past year, the other radical governments, likewn.their own reasons also tended to turn inward and to concentrate onThe tendency is dear in tbe case of both Iraq and Syria. Iraqwith the Kurdish war and the related tension with Iran, aswith Uie problem olovernment more eBecUve thanjunta which has run the country without notable success for somecivilian Iraqis who are beginning lo exert influence are less disposedthe Iraqi military leaders to establish close ties with the UAR. In anyEgyptians and Iraqis are now talking of unity only in perfunctoryterms. In Syria, the socialist Baathist government has beensuppressing both conservative and pro-Na*ser opposition, but it isdivisions inside tbe Party over civilian versus military leadership andof policy and administration.
The Come-rvalive Start*
casing of tensions among (he Arab governments has, at least forimproved the position and security of the conservative regimes.propaganda from Cairo, Baghdad, and Damascus against thehas lessened substantially; and the customary subversive campaignsradicals aimed at harassing or overthrowing tbe roonardiical regimestoned down or suppressed. Moreover, the monarchs themselvestheir positions at home and in lhe Arab world. This is mostthe case of Saudi Arabia, where Kingfar more astute andthan his deposedmaking progress in modernizing andSaudi government and society. He is also showing himself anof Saudi Interests and of moderate conservatism in the area atIdris in Libya seems somewhat more secure from radical attack.large and increasing oil revenues are In time sure to bring neware at present more occupied with enjoying their new prosperitywcurving about their political future. The ruling family of Kuwaitskillful use of the state's vast oil revenues, both to eliminatefor political discontent among Kuwaitis and. by judicious loans toto blunt radical nationalist criticism from outside. Aided byprosperity, even King Huxsain of Jordan has been eo joying domesticfor almost two years.
road smsc, the Arab monarchic* arc ol course on lhe delonslve. Essentially, they derive (heir principal rapport from tradibonabtl and wealthy ilrmeoti in thesr aoctctka, while (he bulk of politically toaaicsoui Arab, an lhe more loocSriu aectafi of society are ansae; ocustic to tbem Likee king* can reduce thru vuhserabtlity by selective concctjioiu to rnodesnisrn. and by public posture* inol popular themes like neutralism or hostility toward impeilalbts and Israel, but (heir iong-leim survivalifficult dilemma in balancing firmness and coo cessions al home and abroad. Concessions and reform frequently antagonize tbe conservative forces supporting (he monaichs. without satisfying radical opponents. Indeed, the latter ate often simplyto demand more, which tends to alarm (be rulers into reverting to repression, which in turn foods popular dUiideracc.
Tht Maghreb. The centrifugal tendencies apparent in the Eastern Arab world have been complemented and reinforced from the Maghreb. Tunisia and Morocco have never been actively mlmsted tn Pan-Arab unity or In the anii IomI cause Tunisia In particular haa disassociated itself more than ever from Eastern Arab alltrend made erpbeit iny Bourguibaipublic advice to the Arab* to acceptxistence. The downfall of Ben Bella in Algeria deprived Nasser of his chief ally in tbe Maghreb.
he new Algerianore concerned with his country's domestic problems titan with inter-Arab politic*.
Th* PoJrricol Ot/ttooa
' Ii is difficult to predict how long the present tendencies toward detente and concern with separate domestic problems will persist. On the one hand, virtually all tha Arab slates have important domestic economic or politicalThis is especially llie case with the activistnd to the greatest degree with Nasser. He sail wishes to reduce hi* casta and commitment, to Yemen, and this desire willtrong factor favorior. continued detente. In addition, the several Arab goveinmenti have learned something of the difficulty of intervening in lhe ajlairs of theu fellow Arab states.
n the other hand, detente among the Arab states Is abnormal in terms ol ihr history of the past two decade* Sooner or later, oonRkting national and dynastic microti, as well as tbe pervasive incompatibility ol outlook betweenand radicals will disturb, if sot shatter, the present calm The Arab slates are generally susceptibleudden political turmoil Asny one of tbem. or (he deathuler, could easilyollision of lorcc* not only within that slate but among Others. Th* UAfVSaudlon Yemen has yet lo be carried oul. and both Faisal and Nasser have lively suspicions of each other's intentions, lhe agreement could easilyead letter, with consequent rials of renewed hostilities aa Yemen and an arenrnpaoyingor bybetween Faisal and Nasser Cairo has already expressed some criticism ol Saudi purchases of Western arms and Is cosscerned (ha! Faisal Is working for Die formationonservative Islamic
SEC
bloc hostile to Ihe UAR. Trouble with Uriel, which in some respect5 impels, ihe Arab* toward greater solidarity, abo scrvea ortesi lo sharpen and dramatize their ehffceencrs over howope with the problem realistically. The balance of factors does not favor long cceuinuatkm of an effective inter-Arab detente.
he attitude of Nasser, who Is chiefly responsible for the preaent detenle, will have much lo do with how long it lasts. Ills domestic problems, and his ewitinusng desire to press against British special positions in the area and to hulld up Arab strength against Israel, will make him want to moderate inter-Arab frictions. Yet when he does not harry rival Arab regimes, they tend to consohdale thennd even to trespass on what he regards as his own. Master's frustration at this stale of affairs fi likely to grow and eventually to contribute to the ending of the truce.
e believe that Natter will remain the single moil influential Arab leader, but time and circumstancea have set limits on what he can achieve; be ia not bkely again to attain the influence and prestige he had in the late lOSOs, when hr personified the Arab revolutionary movement. To be lure, he has rebounded before from serious defeats, but tbe general situation has changed Nasser Is no longer the only Arab natlonalitt leader capable of facing irp to (he West, of getting aid from the Soviets, and of carrying out ma|or social reforms The other Arab stater, once overshadowed by Nasser or on the defensive against hit movement, have successfully resisted UAR efforts tit run their affairs. They now Snd themselves more secure from has pressures and more independent of his influence This rs true of both the conservative government and the rival radical regimes. The Baatbret movement In particular, which not only control* Syria but has branches in most of the Arab states, will rant any effort by Nasser to reassert his former domination of Pan-Arab nationalthough in other respects the broad goals of Nasser assd the Baaltusct are similar
II. ECONOMIC PROBIEMS
irtually all tbe Arab coo nerves have put considerable effort into (cemomvc and social development during the past decade or so. relying variously on oil revenues, foreignand such domestic resource* as have been available. Significant economic progress has been achieved. However, the growth haa been uneven, ofien concert riled among relatively small tegmenu ol theor In particular vmors of the economy. notabry oil Indeed, oil revenues have been virtually the sole cause of economic growthbe Arabian Pceuiuuli. Ubya, and Iraq
n recent years, the radical Arab stales have found themselves in increasing economic difficulties. Tha application of various socialist ideas in the UAH. Iraq, and Syria has worked indifferently. In addition, each of these itates has tried to do more ia such fields iu economic development, indiittruilriarion, in-created rehKatson. and mibtary expendrtiares than its resources ftattfled or its administrative skill* permitted. The UAR hai been faced with an accumulation
o(ruing consumption, govrrnmcru mumanagement, andof foreignairly rung period of stagnation Hi Iraq, duehaotic political situation, hai been compounded by eflorti to put virtually all mduiirwi. banlo, and service*oigle authority. In Syria, widespread natlonallaationa in iccenl yean have caused economic dislomtlon and night of capital
uch difficulties have caused these stales to recosssSder their economic policies While mainentral role for the state io their acorjornias, they have been driven to make various adjustments In putting socialist ideal into practice This cliange has been most dramatic In Egypt, but Iraq and Syria have also made change* which give somewhat greater scopemall husuieu However,ernrnenU are far from admitting that socialism has proven the wrong path. They remain ideologically opposed to capitalism, which they associate with imperialism, and which they feel Is inadequate to solve their ecooomir and (octal problems
In contrast to the three republics, the monarchies are doing rather well economically. In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, this Is due to massive oil revenues; in Jordan, to increased tourism. Western help, and good rainfall. The rulers of the? oil-rich states arc making eflorts to spend their revenues effectively, although tbeir prrlormance haa been leas impressive than their Intentions. The monaishm will continue to (avor private commercial and entreprcneitrlalwhich liar kings fedtake in the monarchy and thus serve as one of it* maan support*.
xcept in the case of Lebanon and eicept for the foreign oil companies, however, the state will continuee the prcoVsiriinant firsanon. builder, and owner of large ecocasnuc enterprna in all the Arab countries. The state has far larger funds at its disposal than private persona or firms Moreover,iintIons in the republics of Iraq, Syria, and especially Egypt have greatly reduced Ihe fundi and the opportunities available for private investment They have also greatly increased tbe age-old distrust which the businessman of the region has foe has government. All in all, private ersteeprise seems likely toistinctly subordinate part in tho economic life of the eastern Arab world in coming years.
Arab Economic Cooperation
rab economies are nottheir primary exports are raw materials for whkb there is only small demand within the region, and which are thus exportedore advanced itsdiisnial state* io return for manufactured goods When Arab states turn to industry, each builds what tt feels it need* in the way of factarie* for cement,oth, and tho like, without regard to what its fellow Arab states may manufacture Inhibitions in (he way of political unity prevent both the stimulus and the condiboo* fur greater economic coopstBlioo.
on* respect,easure of economic cooperation amongSates it appearing. Kuwait's fund for Economic Development hasmillion to eight Arab countries, and the state has mode loans forpolitical purposes amounting to moreothe UAR, It is likely that other relatively weak Arab states with largewilt come to see the political expediency of doingodest scale Initially. Libya wilt probably see the wisdoma move fairly soon. The newly rich sbeikhdom of Abu Dhabi in the lower
Persian Gulf, which is acquiring conspicuously large amounts of money in*
Hon to its size and population, will probably have to follow suit sooner or later.
III. OIL*
Steady and sizable rises In production and dramatic new finds of major petroleum reserves arc twin features of the current Arab od werrc. Crude oil production in (he states covered by this estimate has risen from aboutillionay tnillionnd now accounts forercent of Free World production. The bulk of this oil still comes from the Persian Cult area, where Saudi Arabia and Kuwait continue to be the leading producers. Among the smaller Persian Culf stales, Abu Dhabi has esxeeded the quartcr-rniflionay mark, and7 the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman it likely to begin producing oilate ofay.
Of newer sources in other parts of the area, Libya isajor exporter of crude oil, averaging wellillionay, There have aho been Important oil discoveries by Western oil firms prospecting in the UAH's offshore areas of the Culf ofnd exploration is proceeding in the Western Desert. Finds to date suggest that0 tbe UAH will be rtroduclng two to three hundred thousanday. This will result fat substantial savings of foreign exchange for the UAH's hard pressed economy. Present indication? are that oil production In the states covered by this estimate Is likely to increase at
a rate of about seven percent annually during tho next several
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countriesn which
tbe Arab stales play an important part, hasajor factor m
the host countries to extract increased revenues from the oil companies, even
ime when world oil supply greatly exceeds demand, With respect to the
older concession agreements, the method of applying the long-standing "SO-W
profit-sharing formula haa been changed so that the host country In effect now
receives aboutercent. In the newer agreements, different formulas are
resultingrofit split on the orderercent in favor of the host country,
"It iheeld fa* remembered that although all producing cmatrtea both east and not of Suez are dealt wfta oi ihtt oshisate, Itilwo important producers If the rearedand Algeria.
'OPSCttmbert are Kuwait. Saudi Arabia,ibya, and Qatar. Non-Arab members are Iran, Venexurla, and IndonrUa.
al.hrn.gh it ha, to put ap half the capital investment for the operation ifcommercial quantity i*
awn Ai.bn
Saudi-Kuwait Neutral
rUkraia
qmr
Abu Dliabi
HmtOw United Arab Btfiibtw
Another method of seekingeuse ihe revenues for ihe producing stairs isrfnrt lo eslablish production quotaseans of controllmg supply and thus maintaining or even raising prices. Tldi effort is being fought by the companies, which contend thai liven- concession contrails give them control over their own rsrodirrlion Moreover, each hoar country face* the dilemmaroduction control system would restrict its own opportunities to get greater revenue In addition, the OPEC countries now face increasingtiling frum newer producingence. OPEC as an organisation will favor production controli, but resistance ol individual member state* is likely lo present the adoption of meaningful controls for the foreseemble future.
any Arab state* are also trying lo -couue some voice an prodoetSuei and marketing operations. For several years now, most new agreements have involved some form of host country participation, oftenie country toheeducing company after oil i* found. Some Arab cumtnei are alto eslahtuhlng then own production and marketing companies. Syria is contracting with foreign firms lu putipeline andfaculties forpresently unesploued fields^ It pnsbabry will be the first Arab State to produce and market oil on its own, although the quantities will be smalt National oil companies have alto been formed in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, aod the UAHyear agreement between Kuwait and Spain hasrecedent for agreements between an cd-producing countryonsuming one which provide an assured marketpecified quantity of ml. Agreements of this nature are likely to becomeoman.
SS.arallel move, host eourstrie* have pr eased for tbe release of con-oraaioii areas wltich are not being exploited. The Iraqi guvcsnmenl and Ihe Iraq Petroleum Company have been disputing iho issue for several years, the
Kuwait Oil Company has sorreevdercd about half of its concession; and Aramco
has firmed back two-thirds of Its unerplolted area.
Arab state* will seek to increase then- revenues by invokingof natiorudiratton. Some governments will almost certainly moveto reduce the older companies' concessionary privileges-do not believe that any of the host goswnmerrtt willould feel compelled to abandon operations. Finally, weoutright nationalisationroducing company is unlikely, at leastperiod of this estimate.
IV. THE ARAB-ISRAEll QUESTION
Over the past year or to, the Arab states have shown considerableand pragmatism in dealing with tbe problem of Israel They have, especially in the decisions adopted at the third Arab Summit conference,the fact that they cannot now stop Israeli diversion of water from the Jordan valley. Work on projects in Syria and Lebanon to divertof the Jordan River has virtually ceased. The Arab leaders decided to concentrate on strengubeoing their armed forceseriod of severalecision which hasew impetus to tbe arms race In tbe area- The Summit conferences also hunched tbe Palestine Uberatton Organ nation,to coovtnoe tbe Palestine refugees and others that the major Arab states arc still backing the struggle against Israel
Tbe Arab rulers agreed at the first Summit conference la4 to0 million overears, to be used far building up the armed forces of Jordan, Syria, andthree countries within whosetbe projects for diverting the Jordan waters are to be located. This figure was raisedillion at tbe second Summit conference, and at the thirdurther increase was decidedon the order0 milhon. We believeillion has actually been contributed, which has been used foe increases In the armed forces of Jordan. Syria, and Lebanon in the past two years. However, none of these countries wants the forces of another Arab state stationed on its territory or is willing to give real authority over its own troops to the United Arab Command. We believe that thiswill persist, and that. In consequence, tbe UAC Is unlikely to achieve any very effective control over its members' armies.
the major Items in the projected force buildup is thethree squadrons of supersonic aircraft for Jordan. Tbe UAC hasHusaahs* right to buy Western aircraft, but will supply moneythe basis of the much cheaperrice. The UAC also arguesof starsdardiaing Arab military equipment, using Soviet materiel
EI
Israel, for ft* part, will continue to com Wer that efficient, weH-truined armed force* are essential to ft. survival. Inael and several of the Arab state* are nutting large amounts of scarce foreign exchange into arm* purchases. To be sure, the Arab armies have other purposes than opposing Israel; they con-ttlbute to internal security and are factors in the inter-Arab contest for power andit is for just these purpose* that tbey have been used in recenl years.he rationale for the buildup is always Israel and thus the arm* race between Israel and Its neighbors is lihetv to continue
Israel regards the UAR armed forces as the only important threat. The race between Cairo and Tel Aviv has reached into the rocketry field. The UAR* miniles, built largely of European components under the direction of Ccrrnan technicians, haveostly failure so far, and.umber of missiles have been test-fired, there have been extensive troubles with the pro-
Wehly unlikely that any will be operational for several years
anticipate neither significant progress toward settlement of thecontroversy nor major host ill ties during the next several years.generally satisfied with the territorial status quo, and the Arab statesthey cannot change It by force. In these csramttancea, the chieffor trouble lie In Arab sabotage raids, Israeli nibbling at certainborder areas, and Syrian belligerence. Termons along the bordersand incidents- are likely to occur from time to time!
V. THE ARABS AND THE GREAT POWERS A. Tho Communist States'
Corjunurnst states haveonsiderable presence in theover the past decade. The Soviet* have supplied nearlyillionarms for the UAR, Syria, Iraq, and Ycroen; they have also extendedamounts of economic aid to the area. In addition, the USSR ha*and encouraged airtixokmtol and neutralist sentiments. Theresome indications in recent yean of the Soviets' diiappolhtrnent thathave not resulted in greater gains. Tbe Arab governrnenti remain wary
V LaumTiocd erf Farther KndearO January
. "Soviet and Chines* Communist
sjpatr*^"
hc USSR, and even those which take Soviet aid suppress Communistand try to avoid over-dependence on Moscow. We believe (hat the Soviets will continue to woo tbe Arabs and will try to expand their presence" and influence even in (be conservabve states For their part, (he forces of Arab nationalism will probably be able to continue resisting undue influence from outside powers and playing oh" East against West.
share of the Communist states in Arab trade rose rapidly inand, but has tended to level off in recent years.in the area is still largely confined tolt. Syria, and Iraq, therecipients of Cornmunisl aid. For example,ercent of totalas with the Communist countries. Although the Communistusually able aad often willing io absorb commodities the Arabs cannoteach of the Arab stales has greater trade with US andthan with the Communist World. For the areahole, tradeWest accounted for someercent of Imports andercenthile the Communist states account for onlyercent These basic patterns of trade are likely to persist.
B. The Western Powers
Arab view of the West Is strongly colored by (be fart that mostArab world was once dominated by European powers. This attitudereinforced by Western support for Israel over tbe years. But whilegenerally harbor suspicions of Western tevtentiens. they are stillby Western culture and by (be products of Western industry.
truer* eaohide most tnajntSa of milUary roatpmect Iron bolb East and Weil They usdiioe. USharily la she on of the UAR.
IMPOKTU OF SELECTSRAB8 ANDio*agun* rounded u>Ulloiri
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwurt
1 'l^anui,
liiva
S*udi.
Sudan
VniM Arab Htyuttir
Induing Cuba and YuAubvi*
IfnBkiB
EXPOIU*Bftia ANI> (in million US to Ham)urea routidrd io themilitant
Jordan it-all
Libya
Saudi ArabiaSudan- .
flyrfa
ITftlud Arab ITcpubLc
*
i
2
IvaSS
*
.
P-trelrum .erounta ior almotl all Ibc export*
as
Th. us
Swith the Arab world wtUubird by tbe geearnl Arab convict too thai tbe US ii beslcaDy pro-Israel, by tbe Arab radicals' belief thai the US favors the cosuervatives, and by tbe conservatives' feeling that the US ought to aupport then niore than it docs. These attitudes tend to set lLralU on how far improvements in US relations with the Arab world con go. As long as the general truce among the Arab Mates persists, it will help the US eacap mvolverrtent in Inter-Arab disputes. |
by Arabr. over suchVbedus Field, support (or lhe UK position, or USeside the Arab world
robably tlie mod trouMcsomc problem for tbe US bra in tbe field of Arab-Israelithe ormi race. Tbe US ii gradually beajor .supplier of weapons lo both sides. Hawk surface-to-air missile* are now in Israel, are promised to Saudi Arabia, and have been offered toS tank* have gone directly to Jordan from the US and to Israel both directry and through West German chanrtrU. Both th- IsraelisUm Arab states are seeking advanced US aircraft Supply of military equipment would give the US some leverage with the recipient. However, the US would find itselfarged with favoritism by one side or the other, border Baimp* will be accompanied by assertions that US arms were used, and these accusations will complicate US relation* with both Arab* and Israelis.
Oner Wejie'n Powers
rab relations with the eontmrrriaJ European states are much lestthan those with the US, the UK. and the USSB. Nevertbeless. from lime to time Arab-European relationsritical issue. For example, Cermansupplies to Israel ledupture of diplomatic irlations between Bonn and all the eastern Arab fates but Libya. Economic lelation* with Germany have coittatiued, however, and the chances are good that diplomatic relations will be restored in the near future Frances rclationt with the Arabs have improved since lhe end of tbe Algerian war. However, because France remains the mo|or supplier of arms lo Israelikely to continue toigh priority lo Israel's needs. French-Arab rcla lions are likely to remain limited.
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