THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

Created: 2/2/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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2 Fobruary6

FULBRIGHT COMMITTEE BRIEFING

THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE Introduction

I. Wo have recently reviewed and updated ourintelligence estimates concerningmilitary power.

A. Ve continue toigh confidence in the accuracy of these estimates for the next few years.

1. They are broadly basedide

spectrum of intelligence collection and analyticfrom classical clandestine methods,ide variety of electronic systems, to our successful and highlysatellite photography.

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ant to remind you that many of

our methods, and particularlymust be closely guarded. The existence of suchis special, privilegedoven within the intelligence community.

Them about to describeicture in which Soviet military power today clearly lacks the punch and weight of US power, in terms of strategic

have estimated that it is hiRhlythat the Sovtuls in thisachieve offensive ondstrong enough to persuadeit could risk launchingupon the West.

tho same time, our estimatesSoviets to be pursuingwhich, we believe,onsiderable strengthening

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2 February6

FULBR1GHT COMMITTEE BRIEFING

SOVIET STRATEGIC STRIKE FORCES:

I. The Soviet Union's principal threat, theRocket Force, has moreen manning Intercontinental, intermediate-range, and medium-range ballistic missile units.

(MAP, ICBM DEPLOYMENT)

ICBMs are deployed atcomplexes shown in red on thismore complexes, shown in black,construction for new systems.

the past year or so, the numberlaunchers has Host of these are deployed in pairs. The resthardened silos, clustered inway of comparison, the US hasMinutemen andsilos.)

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(GRAPH, ICBM DEPLOYMENT RATE)

1. Duriris'..tho next few months, however, the number of operational SovietCBM launchers will begin rising sharply, whon the Soviots complete

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first of0 dispersed

at four of the older ones which arc marked with green circles. Byhe total will ba doubled.

2. Since the now silos are widely

spacod, the number of separatepoints which must be targeted for any Western counterforce strike will triple. C. Two types of single silos are being

built. One is abouteet in diameter,

and the otheroeet across.

1. Tho larger silos will probably house the newCBM, which had been tested for two years, and may already

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be operational. Itargecapable of carryingmegaton warhead. 2. maller ICBM still under development is probably intended for the small silos. This missile, thean carry awarhead. Weit to bo operational by theof this year.

I. Soviet ICBM testing5 culminated in an

unprecedented flurry of firings around Christmas.

(MAP, ICBM RANGES, TYURATAM AND PLESETSK TO KAMCHATKA)

a six-day period, the Sovietsleast one of each of the deployedmissiles in their inventory.

important test was what we callfiring" of the SS-9. Theapparently attempted toix-minute period. Onlyand third launches were successful.

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1. This type of firingystems test. Tbe missiles are launched from silos using nearly the same sort of launch sequence that would be used in astrike.

othor newalong in its test program, butrate has been50 Sincot hasfiredimes,shots to tho Pacific.

testing of thendare already deployed, continuedrelatively high rate during the Eighteennd sixere

successfully fired from Tyuratam Thes the mainstay of the operational Soviet ICBM force and is deployed ataunchers.

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recently, we had detected only twolaunchings fromnd the other

December, however, the SovietsICBMs from an operationalPlesetsk in the northwostern ussr.

Two of these were theype, the first operational Soviet ICBM.

The other three were probably SS-7s.

The Soviets are probably checking

on the effectiveness of older missiles which have been standing by foryears.

Plcsotsk firings provide anthe resources .required to monitormissile effort.

1. As youreat deal of ourmonitoring is carried out by facilities in Turkey, Iran,

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3. We have radars on Shemya Island in the Aleutians which detect theof the missiles on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

IV. We believe that the Soviets aremall ICBM which will use solid fuels. (PHOTO, SAVAGE)

havo detected no flight tests forICBM. As far as woSoviets until now have usedonly in their shortermissiles.

Moscow parades have featured similar INUTE MAN, which

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call the SAVAGE. The Soviets say itolid-fueled ICBM. We think it mayock-up or

I. If testingolid-fuel ICBMsoon, it could becomeby. The Soviets are continuing to develop

large liquid-fueled missiles. The launch vehicle which was used to place theatellites into orbit could be used as an ICBM. However, it has not yet been tested in this role.

The Soviets have shown keen awareness of the advantagesobile ballistic missile. They may beobile

ICBM.

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1. They displayed this vehicle, which we call tho SCROOGE, oscow parade last November. They calledobile launcherolid-propel-lant ICBM. We think that special problems with this type of system, probably would prevent it fromoperational. So far, we have not confirmed Sovietof ICBM penetration aids, but wethem to add such dovices, including multiple warheads. (MAP, DEPLOYMENT OF MRBM/IRBM LAUNCHERS) MRBM-IRBM Force VI. The Soviets also have mori< ixed

launchers for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Lessf these are in silos. (The United States no longer has any fixed-site MRBMs or IRBMs in operational use.)

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this map, the black dotssilos for either type. Thearc soft pads for MRBMs, anddots are IRBM pads.

ercent of these missilesthe western USSR. They coulda devastatingmuch targets in North Africa, and the Middle East.

canew which areattack South Asia, Japan, and for that matter, Communist China.

(PHOTO,SCAMP)

Soviets are apparently trying toadvantages of mobile launchersfuel into their MRBM/IRBMshowed this vehicle, which weSCAMP, ay, arade. it as thea solid-propellant IRBM.

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1. Our analysis indicates that the missile could probably achieve MRBM/IRBM rangesight warhead. It almosthas not been flight-tested to full range. It may yet prove toactical rather than strategic missile.

STRATEGIC BOMBERS VII. Long Range Aviation remains an important element of Soviet strategio strike forces, although the USSR is placing chief reliance on ballistic

{TABLE, SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY MISSION)

estimate that the Long Range Airmoreombat aircraft f these are heavywith an intercontinental range. rc medium bombers. (TheUS inventoryoavy bombers,

ediums.)

patterns and range capabilitiesbombers indicate that an attack

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the continental US would involve heavy bombors almost exclusively. Medium bombers would probably be used on European and Asian targets. C. The Soviets could puteavyover the US on two-way missions. Apart of this force would probablyof the turboprop BEAR. Aboutof the DEARs have been equipped with their-to-surface missile* Thiseapon which can be launched againstas muchautical miles away, at twice the speed of sound. 1. The BEARs, incidentally, are the air-

which have been used on long-range

practice missions to locate and overfly

our naval task forces* on the ocean ap-

proaches to both Europe and the Asian

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(PHOTO, BLINDER)

D. This picture shows an aircraft we calla medium bomber withwhich is now entering the Soviet Air

Force inventory. LINDERS are operational.

Soviets are developing anmissile which is probablyfor the BLINDER, the AS-4. willange of aboutmiles, and comes ln at MACHother words, four times the speed

of sound.

want to emphasize the nature ofwhich these air-to-surfacecan pose, not only to landbut to our naval units, troopand surface convoys at sea. ariety of guidanceof them have active radar for -Others"terminal

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-guidance from enemy "submarines ornear the target. Defense against such missiles, coming in atspeeds,eal problem. E, The Soviets may develop an improved medium

bomber to replace the BLINDER. We do notit likely, however, that theyollow-on heavy bomber. Currentresearch and development on heavy*appears to be directed toward new

(PHOTOS, FOUR SUBMARINE TYPES)

STRATEGIC SUBMARINES VIII. The Soviet strategic submarine force consists of aboutissile-equipped units. (Ourolaris submarines, withissiles apiece,uch greater total firepower than the entire Soviet sub missile force. Polaris missiles alsouch . inersion.)

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A. Most of the Soviet ballistic missileG and Hequipped withile missiles, ew canile missiles while submerged. Aboutre nuclear-powered.

D. Their cruise missile submarines are equipped to fire missiles against surface ships and probably shore installations, at ranges upiles. Aboutf these units arecarry six to eight missiles,

C. In addition to the missile submarines, there areirst-line torpedo-attack units*f them nuclear powered,

submarines, includingunits, now are conductingclandestine patrols with

are already patrolling theNorth Pacific, andoutine basis. Wc expect

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COUMITTEK BRIEFING

SOVIET DEFENSES

I. The Soviets give defense against strategicigh priority in their military planning. Theyuch larger share of the total military budget to this purpose than wc do. II. This investment has provided the Soviets with

a good defense against manned bombersthe Soviet Union at medium and high altitudes. A. Soviet antiaircraft defenses are still uuscep-

tible, howover, to penetration by tho sophis-

ticated attack techniques which we have de-

veloped in rocent years.

III. The current Soviet air defense system is equipped with an impressive quantity of weapons deployed in depth. It Includes moreurface-to-alr missileet interceptors, and an extensive radar and control network.

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(MAP SOVIETNDEPLOYMENT)

as been the mainstay ofmissile defenses foryears. An early version of thisis currently in action in North Vietnam.

(PHOTOITB)

Thishoto of anite in North Vietnam, takenow-altitudeaircraft.

Theystem in North Vietnam has not been effective against our aircraft there. It is older equipment, it suffers from being moved frequently, and the Vietnamese operators are not yet sufficiently trained or experienced. In addition, we havesome effectivo counterraeasures, including evasive maneuvers by our pilots.

asic weakness againstat low altitudes. In the USSR, protection against low-flyingis provided bywith theystem. Deployment

of theas virtually stopped, however.

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suggests the Soviets are not satisfied with theTABLE, SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY MISSION)

C. Tho Soviet air defonso Interceptor force isircraft. Only hull of these are equipped for all-weatherand less than half can carry air-to-air missiles. risis situation, thoair defense can augment its interceptor force by incorporating fighter regiments from tho Tactical Air Force.

Advanced Defense Systems (MAP, NEW DEFENSIVE MISSILE AND ELECTRONICS

IV. For tho past decade, wo have been watching a

vigorous Soviet effort to develop defenses against ballistic missiles.

A. The Soviots have experienced manyand failures. An early start was madeystem at Leningrad, which seemed to be intended for both antimissile and antiaircraft defense. This was halted2 beforewas completed.

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D. New approaches apparently fared better, and we believe that the Soviets are now deploying an ABM system for the defense of Moscow. Our understanding of this system is stillbut we believe we have identified key elements. (PHOTO, OLENEOORSK)

1. This is one of two large radarin the northwestern USSR which probably provide initial warning and tracking of incoming missiles. (PHOTO, "DOGHOUSE")

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radar which also probably acquires and tracks targets. Therea v. other electronics installations, at five locations around the city, whichprovide final target tracking, and guide the defensive missiles. 3. At Sary Shagan, the Soviet center for defensive missile research andthereomplex which we believe torototype of the ABM system being built at Moscow. We believe SMIL-22

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antimissile missiles have been fired from

at this location.

4. The Soviets at Sary Shagan have probably conducted intercept tests within thebut we have yet to detect full system tests involving intercepts outside the atmosphere.

0. They almost certainly have not tested antimissile missiles with nuclear. Their underground test program could be giving them information on the effects of such warheads.

Moscow antimissile system could boas earlyut we8 is

a more likely date.

cannot predict the future deploymentany confidence. In the nextSoviets could expand ballistictorther urbanotal of about one fourth ofpopulation and more than half of

(PHOTO, TALLINN)

V. Another new defensive missile system is being

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deployed in barrier fashion in tho northwestern

USSR.

estimate that this system is intended defense against bombers andbut cannot discount theit is ballistic missile defense.

launch complexes 1iko this one arebuilt at three locations in theCherepovets, andTho launch facilities at Leningrad.

on which work stopped in are apparently being converted for the newer system. Wm have recently discovered three more of these complexes under construction in the Sverdlovsk

of the Urals industrial

VI. The Soviets may be working onerns in addition to their ABU program. A. We estimate that tbe Soviets could now have

a limited antjsatellite capability based on an existingas the SS-4armeduclear warhead and usingSoviet tracking facilities. We have no direct evidence, however, thatystem has been tested.

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placement and estimated capabilitieshuge radar complex under constructionshown here, and another atsuggest that thoy arean advanced antisaiellite system.

They are very expensive and morethan is necessary merely to track space vehicles. They are not properly placed for ICBM early warning.

These radars will bo largely complete in the next year or two, and a antisatellite missile could be ready at the same time.

Soviets' traditional concern forsecrecy gives them an incentive todefenses against US They are probably alsotho US may develop space woapons Wo believe that the USSR would attack a

US satellite in peacetime only if, alongtrong desire for secrecy, they arc willing for other reasons toajor disruption of East-West relations.

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February M%

FULBRIGHT COMMITTEE BRIEFING

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

I. The Soviet general purpose forces comprise the ground, naval, tactical air, and militaryforces. These elements still maxc up the largost and most expenslvo component of tho Soviet milltary establishment.

(TABLE, SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER)

estimate the strength of Sovietforcesilliontotal armed forces amounto There were some slightorlod.

Soviets continue to retain a largeof. Moro thanf thesebetweenndercent of fullrest are at reduced or cadre strength.

(MAP, DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET ARMY DIVISIONS) II. Deployment is concentrated mainly in tho Wostern USSR and Eastern European area, confronting NATO.

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The observations of

confirm

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that there are stilloviet divisions in East Germany. 1.

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Soviet articles on military doctrine. These indicate Lhat the heavy Soviet deployment in East Germanya general war against NATO. 2, The doctrinal articles indicate that the war is expected to beginassive nuclear exchange, after which the Soviet theater forcos are to advance rapidly and seize critical objectives before the NATO forces can recover. In keeping with this concept, Soviet ground forces nowarge number of heavily armored tank and motorized rifle divisions.

at full strength, these divisions

are substantially smaller than US divisions

also have less organic andcombat and service support,proportion to the lower manpower.

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Yrs^hBlt neam* that there Is little point in to compare Soviet ground unitt* to US for relative combat capability.

1. The Soviet units are organized primarily

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for speed, shock effect, and tactical firepower-

2* oviet advance is stalleduclear exchange, or if the conflict should bo non-nuclear, then the Soviet units are going to bo handicapped becauac thoy lack adequate capability for sustained action.

(PHOTOS, SOVIET ARMOR AKD ARTILLERY) III. Tho Soviets are gradually improving the quality of equlpaent In the hands of the troops.

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A* tor example, tfcio xonth

tankthe nwt nodar^tank in the hand* of Soviet troopsfortineoviet rifle divljloiit

Division. New ernored personnel carriers are also repUcln*in ^

B. Conventional artillery is being improved.

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artillery units are getting theilllneter gun-howitzer. This has an in-

egrco traverse.

increased range and

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(PHOTOS, FROG, SCUD, SHADDOCK)

C. Conventional arLillery is also beingby tactical missiles and rocketsto our Honest John. Here are some of these weapons,

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in Moscow parades. They can use nuclear or chemical warheads.

the past year, the Soviets havea ballistic missile, thoaximum rangeiles. Wcyet seen this weapon in the field,training has begun.

(CHART, COMMUNIST SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION)

Soviets have not neglected small Our study of weaponsWorld War II reveals thatew light Infantryall of these can fire the samerifle cartridge of mediumhigh rates of automatic fire.

1. Thessault rifle is the standard

individual weapon In Soviet and East Euro-poan ground forces. It is also being copied by the Chinese Communists, and is used by

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forces in South Vietnam. Tho

rifleround magazine. Itsrateounds perbe matched in rate of fire only by6 rifle. 2, Our tests show that the RPD and RPK light machine guns are also very effective small unit weapons, with practical rates of fireounds per minute.

SOVIET AIRCRAFT BV MISSION) IV. The Soviet Union currently hasombat aircraft assigned to itsactical air armies. All of these are capable of delivering nuclear weapons, although only one-third are bombers or lighter-bombers.

A. New supersonic fighters, fighter-bombers, and

bombers arc steadily being added to tactical air units, with first priority going to Soviet air regiments in East Germany.

V. Modernization of the general purpose forces will continue. he USSR will probably reduce the number of divisions slightly, but mayreater proportion in combat-ready status.

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A. The Soviets are beginning toimited capability for long-distance military actions. Air and sea lift is being improved, and thoro is greater emphasis on airborne operations.

Thishe world's largest transport aircraft, is supposed to have surprised the world at the Paris Air Show last June.

Actually, we had been looking for ithen we found the first reference

to it in

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tified the aircraft plant in Tashkentfor the development. 3. Shortly after the prototype was+wo years before it showed up in

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our experts managed to post-

ulate dimensions and performancewhich were within about five percent of the actual figures obtained in Paris.

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As for sea lift.

that the

is working on the development of large

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landing craft.

A marine corps was established4

and is being built up rapidly.

VI. We have detected significant changes in theforces of the East European satellites in the past several years.

can now contributeillionthey have aboutivisions readycommltmont to Warsaw Pact forces.

Soviets have been giving themore modern weapons at anover the past two years. Thisitems as tactical missiles andnewer types of fighter aircraft.

1. It seems unlikely that the Soviets would

do this if they had doubts of the effect-

ivenesstfra-i-ftft of the satellite

forces.

(MAP, DISPOSITIONS ON SINO-SOVIET BORDER) VII, Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, we have been especially watchful for signs that the Soviets or

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the Chinese might be beefing up the forces along

iles of their common border.

At present the frontier appears to be quiet,

but both countries have taken some steps already to strengthen border security.

Chinese, for instance, have carried onamount of resettlement in anremove population elements offrom some sensitive points along

Soviets have strengthened both theand regular military forces atlocations.

In the fall4 the Sovietsotorized rifle division from tho Moscow area to the Manchurian border. Lastorps headquarters moved from the Afghan to the Sinkiang (SIN-DJUNG) border.

In the past three months the Soviets haveew airfield near the only rail line running to the Sinkiang border. This suggests they want to be prepared totroops into the area.

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(PHOTOS, SEMIPALATINSK TEST CIRCLE BEFORE AND AFTER)

year,Sovietsew instrumenta-

circle at the Senipalatinsk nuclear weap-

ons test center

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Onhe Soviets first used this test site toow-yield nuclear

C. The Soviets could be using underground tests in an effort to get information applicable to understanding the destructive effects of exo-atmosphcric nuclear bursts, but we are unable to identify this kind of testing Jrom available evidence. III. Two of the nuclear tests5 appeared to

have been experiments liko our PLOWSHARE program,

designed to explore the use of nuclear explosions

for peaceful purposes.

A. One of these waslloton explosion which vented Into the atmosphere on This explosionam across the Shagan River,cre lake near Scraipalatlnsk.

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B- The second probable PLOWSHARE-type experiment

took place on in east This appears to havemall under-

ground explosion designed to evaluate the use of nuclear explosives to increase gas or oil production.

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FULBRIGHTIEFING

SOVIET SPACE ACTIVITY

I. The Soviets continued an active and varied space program during the past year. Besides theflight with the first "walk in space/'progress was made in unmanned space operations and the landing ofn the moon was an outstanding space achievement.

9 was launched from Tyuratamnd landed on the lunar surface on 3 Besides sending pictures of theas this,ransmitted data onthat will be of considerablethe Soviet lunar program.

1. ash Soviet soft-landing attempt, but the first complete success. It may well mark inaugurationigorous Soviet program of instrumentedrelude to mannedandings.

do not yet know how successful twoen route to Venus will be. Theyare on course and will reach the

vicinity of Venus ln early March.

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communications satellites, bothMolniya or "Lightning" by thesuccessfully orbited been used to transmit color TVand Paris, as well as forwithin the USSR, We haveSoviet interest ln usingsatellites to boam programs intoof the world.

important acblovement was thetwo largond 2. cientific point of view,purpose of those launchingstoory powerful now launchhas put payloads0 pounds intocould launch payloads0hird stage.

1. The launchtwo-stageis larger than Saturn I, and has on the orderillion pounds of thrust. It probably is Intended for use in more complex spaco oporatlons, such as manned space stations and manned circumlunar flights.

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(PHOTO, "J" COMPLEX AT TYORATAM)

2. Here is an indication that the Soviets plan an even larger space booster. Thisew and very large launch facility still under construction. It is designed for vehicles in the multi-million-pound thrust category. E. The new space launch facilities are indications of things to come, but most Soviet heavy space launches are still made withhe first Soviet ICBM. That ICBM is still the standard booster for Soviet space shots, including manned missions and photoreconnaissancc satellites.

A total ofeconnaissance satellites were launched from Tyuratamompared with

In addition to satellito photography of Western military installations, the USSR has undertaken photoreconnaiasance of China, concentrating on Chinese advanced weapons test and development facilities.

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