Created: 10/14/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible



Office of Current Intelligence

SC NO. 5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence5


Sino-Pakistani Cooperation ln the Kashmir War

open backing of Pakistanrecent hostilities by propaganda andas well as by diversionary activitiesnorthern borders, raises questions as toof coordination and collaborationand Peking both before and during The limited evidence available isa variety of Interpretations aod thus makes

any definitive conclusions difficult at this time. Nevertheless, tbe picture that emerges suggests that both countries attempted to keep ln step as events unfolded, but that the amount of detailed Joint planning was limited.

The State of Slno-Pakistani Relations

current Kashmir crisis came at arelations between Pakistan andmajorgrown quite close. Fortwo years Peking had been assiduouslyPakistanis, playing with considerablePakistani apprehensions over the USprogram to India which began duringborder hostilities FromPakistani leaders were convinced thattbe US gave New Delhi would eventually be

used against them, and they were receptive to Peking's advances. Rawalpindi believed that lt could use tbe Chinese menaceounterweight to India'sstrength without seriously compromisingpositions elsewhere.

3. Both Premier Chou Eo-lal and ForeignChenepeatedly stopped for talks with the Pakistanis daring their many trips to and from Africa in recent years, and President Ayub visited Peking last March. Numerous sports, cultural, scientific, commercial, and governmental groups exchanged visits. In3 the Pakistani airline became the first lice outside the bloc to be permitted to establish regular service to Canton and Shanghai. In4 the Chinese grantedllllon interest-free credit, and last March amid considerable fanfare Chen Yi signed tbe finalon tbe demarcation of their common frontier.

to Karachi In Although some kind of loose understanding probably was achieved, lt Is likely that it was cast in tens which provided Peking with considerable latitude for deciding when and how It might come'into force.

summer as tbe Kashmir crisis cameboll there was undoubtedly close consultationPeking and Rawalpindi, but developmentsdo not appear to reflect eithercoordination or much in the way ofplanning before the crisis broke. Theand unexpected developments duringput the Slno-Paklstanl relationship to tbeexposed it for what lt reallyessentially unstable relationship.

Early Diplomatic and Propaganda Support

response beganow keyintensified as the crisis became moreinitial propaganda support given toto have been consistent with Pakistan'sworld attention on tbe unsettledtridency that might haveSlno-Pakistani plotting. The Chinese,vital ideological or political stake in theand with heavy commitmentsno disposition to get out in front of Pakistan

on the issue. On the other hand, the Chinese seemed willing to lend whatever low-risk support wasto preserve and further cement their ties with Pakistan.

7. The degree of consultation betweenand China prioreptember Is not clear, but it is likely that Peking was apprised at leasteneral way of Ayub's plans to infiltri Indian Kashmir.

oi China's propagandainitially limited to reportorlal accounts of tbe clashes In Kashmir slanted to play up Indiannot change markedlyeptember, when Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Ti visited Karachi en route to Mall. Following discussions with Bhutto, Chen publicly denounced tbe Indians for provoking hostilities, for violating9 cease-fire line, and for "aggravating tbe conflict." His public promises of backing for Pakistan, however, were guarded. He declared only that China "firmlyefforts by Pakistan to strike back at "armed by India.


arose, to bring possible to bear champlo states. to open


gencles of the ear xcly after renewed consultation.


fore the Indian attack ln theChinese were committed to little more than further consultations in tbe event the war expanded.

12. It seems likely that before the warfare spread to tbe Punjab both China and Pakistan wished to keep the Chinese role limited. The input of US military assistance, which was essential for the maintenance of Pakistan's military machine, bad not yet been suspended. Rawalpindi must have recognized that toohinesejL' continued US hell



down potential Indian reinforcements. The suspension of OS military aideptember probably deepened Pakistan's concern and lessened its inhibitions about seeking help wherever it could be found.

responded to the Indian attackits propaganda campaign and hintingmight become more directly involved. its first official statement on the7 September, and followed It upoteIndians the next day. These messageswith aggression against Pakistan, andIndians for enlarging what had beengeneral conflict" which constituted

a grave threat to the peace of "this part ofhe statement and note paired these accusations with renewed protests over alleged Indian violations of the Tibetan border opposite Ladakh and Slkklm.

Asghar Khan

17. The specific mission are not known

ib ended before any shipments were made. There is no evidenceimilarwith the Chinese. There would, in fact, be serious

Shortly after*the Indian attack in the Punjab, Pakistan began-to seek alternative sources of arms and ammunition to sustain its war effort in the event Western-DS aid was cut off. .Only two of Pakistan's allianceandlikely to provide even token support, and it soon became clear that the amounts they could offer would not be sufficient to keep Pakistani armed forces supplied.

akistan International AirlinesBefense Ministry team beaded by Pakistan's Air Marshal Asghar Khan torief stop there may have provided an opportunity for discussion with tbe Chinese, but it appears that the major objective of the mission was to seek material assistance from Indonesia. The team arrived in Djakarta on the 9tb. ay of discussions, Asghar Khan and bla group, returned to China onh and to Karachi onh.




obstacles In the way of any Chinese attempt toPakistan with military material. Apart from the formidable delivery problem, military equipment from Peking'sof Sovietnot be compatible with Rawalpindi's Inventory of US-supplied material and would be unfamiliar to the Pakistani armed forces.

The Chinese Ultimatum

IB. unwilling or unable to provide significant assistance In the form of military hardware, Peking sought to help Pakistan by stepping up thepressure on New Delhi. The Chinese followed up their harsh government statement and threatening diplomatic noteeptemberublic warning by Chou Bn-laieptember that India must bear responsibility for "all the consequences arising from its extended aggression." At the same time the Chinese were circulating threateningthrough at least one of their embassies abi The Chinese first secretary ln Damasci

:old the editorajor Syril UMT that Peking was ready to provide a; and troops to Pakistan if and when required.

Peking's pressure campaign reached its peak oneptember when the Chineseirtual ultimatum to New Delhi demanding that the Indians immediately stop "provocations" along the frontier, return at once Tibetan people and livestock allegedly seized by the Indian armed forces, and within three days dismantle "military structures of aggression" built on tbe Chinese side of the Sikkls border, or face "grave consequences."

Chinese military preparations before and Immediately after issuance of the ultimatum make it clear that Peking's warning to tbe Indiansluster.

ot Chinese activity itrongly suggests tha; time when the ultimatum was delivered Peking Intended to launch diversionary probes along the Sino-Indian border when the three-day deadline expired oneptember, unless the situation bad changed infavor. Ullitary forces required for sharp, United-objective attacks were already in nlace

were preparingull-scale attack on India.

23. We have no conclusive evidence that Peking's ultimatum ofeptember and tbe concurrent Chinese military activity were In responseequest from Rawalpindi, but tbe developments during the previous week make it seem likely that Pakistan called for more help shortly aftereptember, when Indian forces regained the initiative in the fighting. The Pakistani counterattack in the Punjab had been blunted and although the renewed Indian drive toward Lahore had also been stalled by abouteptember, Indian pressure in the Slalkot area was being stepped up. The Pakistanis had suffered extensive losses in their unsuccessful efforts to break through Indian lines. Moreover,eptember all OS military aid had been suspended, cutting off tbe principal if not the only source of replacement parts and munitions for the bard-pressed Pakistani armed forces. Under these circumstances Ayub Khan, urged on by Bhutto and the other firebrands In the government, may have decided in desperation to askhinese demonstration along the Sino-Indian frontier in the hope that it would break New Delhi's apparent determination to press onar of attrition.

24. If Pakistan, in fact, called for moresupport just beforeeptember when evidence of Chinese steps to bring- their military forces in Tibet to full readiness began to appear, tbe delay in Peking' response must have been disheartening. It seemsthat tbe Chinese, like the Pakistanis, hadboth New Delhi's resolution and the affec-tivenessi'df the Indian armed forces and were unable or unwilling to react at once. By tbe time Peking did move, Ayub Khan may have concluded that the kind of help he could expect would be too little and too late to salvage tbe situation and decided to forgo assistance wbich would almost certainly foreclose tbe possibility of Western efforts to restrsln the Indians and toreasonable" settlement.

23. Thereumber of indications that Ayub was considering ways of ending the conflictm^

tary aid would not be required after all, and oneptember Pakistani Finance Minister Shoaib told Ambassador McConaughy that Ayub was "wavering" on the questionease-fire.

h, asking Oneptember tent word to Peking| :autionlng th.

Receipt ofessage would explain Peking's sudden and apparently unexpected decision to have Foreign Minister Chenhis way home fromIn Damascushour "rest" oneptember instead of going to Karachi as planned, and then continue his trip, bypassing Pakistan and returning to Peking via Afghanistan.

27. Chen's change in travel plans and the layover in Syria probably reflect surprise and confusion in Peking. The prospect of having to climb down from tbelr ultimatum must have been exceedingly distasteful to tbe Chinese leaders, and tbey may have used the interval to urge the Pakistanis to carry on with tbe war. If so, Peking's arguments were no match for the

29. Oneptember, tbe Chinese began tbe humiliating process of backing away from tbelrby delivering a'note to tbe Indians which Extended the deadllne'until midniftbteptember.

lat Peking would not have to chastise the Indians, because New Delhi had met the moat Important Chinese demands. Three daysafter agreementease-fire had beeoNCNA broadcast the text of an article in People'sby authoritative "observer" asserting that although the matter is "far fromhe Indians bad complied with ths most important demands of the ultimatum. Finally, oneptember, Peking made this official by broadcasting the text of two diplomatic notes asserting that Intruding Indian troops in the Slkklm area had been withdrawn "within the specified time limit."


30. While outwardly Slno-Pakistanl relations are likely to appear as warm as ever ln the months ahead, and Peking will seek to consolidate and Increase Its ties with Rawalpindi, recent events have probably created friction and raised serious doubts on botb aides. The Chinese were almost certainly angered by



Pakistan's last-minute request that they notmove Peking probably sees as weak-kneed, knuckling under to WesternRawalpindi's agreementease-fire under ON auspices has no doubt been especially galling.

31. ctober,eking banquet for the

visitf commerce, Vice that SI no-Pakistan

In tbe past, use

of this formulation by the Chinese has indicated the existence of differences. Despite such points of difference, however, the interests of Peking and Rawalpindi continue to coincide in many areas of foreignnd any immediate deterioration in relations seems unlikely.

32. ajor factor in shaping the future course of the relationship will be the degree to which these common interests are offset by Pakistan's success in winning material and'diplomatic support elsewhere. Rawalpindi's initial moves following the cease-fire suggest that Ayub is resigned to trying one last time for an effective UN settlement, although he has little faith that Pakistan's interests will be any better served this time than in the past. He may also ask the OS, tbe UK, and perhaps even the USSR to apply pressure upon the Indians. As long as he bas some slight hope that these diplomatic efforts will succeed, his dealings with the Chinese are likely to remain circumspect. If it becomes obvious, however, that there is nothing more to be gained from theeeply frustrated Pakistan probably will consider efforts to move closer-to the Chinese. (Annex and Map)



visits Communist China. arch noted withtbe continued Kashmir dispute and reaffirmed that the dispute should be settled in accordance with tbe wishes of the people of Kashmir.





arrives in Rawalpindi en route to Africa andull day in discussions with Ayub.

Rann of Kutch cease-fire agreement comes Into effect. Tbe agreement calls for ministerial meetingstbe two countries, followed by submission of tbe issueribunal if talks fail.

Both sides warily pull back from Punjab confrontation.




Z July !Si)j

istan is Informed of US intentcommend postponement of World Bank consortium pledging session, then scheduled foruly, because of US inability toledge at that time.

5 -

Takistani infiltration begins first batchl sent across tion is to meet infiltration head on, while appealinghant to declare against Pakistan.

August 5

5 -

information secretary when queried by Pakistani newsman as to whether there warn new assurance of support from Peking states that "an understanding" has been in effectong time and that China willIndia if New Delhi's forces push into- "settledhat is those not in dispute.

In the absenceN report and faced with further infiltrations, India moves first across theline at Kargil and Tithwal, and finally across the line to cut off the Url-Poonch salient.

5 -

replies with drive in the Chhamb area aimed at cutting road to Poonch; Pakistan also, for tbe first time, acknowledges direct role as adversary. Indian reply is toair power to cover retreating Indian forces.

5 -

Yi and Bhutto conduct lengthy talks in Karachi when the Chinese foreign minister Is en route to.

55 -

at press conference beforesays Peking "completelywith Kashmiri peoples' Juat struggle."

5 -

launch attacks toward Lahore and Sialkot which penetrate about five miles before being stopped. UN Security Council meets toease-fire.

75 -

85 -

on his recent visit but the Pakistanis declined on the grounds that such assistance was not yet needed.

Harshly worded Chinese Government statement terms Indian action against Pakistan "naked aggression" andIndians occupying Chinesein Slkklm border area.

Three Pakistani transport planes arrive in Southwest China from East Pakistan, apparently carrying "ferry" pilots.

Indians open two new fronts bytoward Sialkot from Jammu in the north and driving Into the Slnd toward Hyderabad in the south. UN Secretaryhant arrives in Karachi on his peace-seeking

suspends military aid India and Pakistan.


prime minister leaves for Turkey to discuss aid to Pakistan.

Threatening Chinese Communist noted to New Delhi raises issue of Indian military structures in Sikkim pass areas again and makes parallel between Indian actions against Pakistan; also alleges Indian provocations onfrontier.

5 -

Pakistaniet on secret round-trip flight from Karachi to Djakarta via Pekint


Pakistani counterattack in the Lahore sector pushes the Indians back to the border carries Into Indian territory in tbe southern part of the front. Chou En-lai warns India that it must bearfor "all tbearising from its extended aggression."

UN Secretary General Thant arrives in Pakistan,

Liu Shao-cbl talks with Pakin Peking and gives note replying to message from Ayub.

Secretary of Chij nist Embassy In Syrlal Itold editordaily that Chinese are ready to provide arms and troops to Pakistan If and when requested.


5 - Indian counterattack pushes back

into Pakistan in the Lahore area and regains much of the lost ground, although Pakistani forces continue to hold some Indian territory.

Indian forces advance toiles of Sialkot.

- Indian reply to Chinese notecharges of Sikklm borderand offers to allowobservers."

5 - Official TASS statement appeals for

peace and takes Chinose to task by condemning "those whose inciting statements help fan the conflict."

take effect on tho eveningide complies.

ChiComs issue low-key protest onfailure to return assets of Bank of China branches closed down by Indians





Secretary Rusk publicly warns tbe Chinese "to stay out" of Indo-Pak-istan conflict.



returning from Africa makes last-minute change of travel plans and stops over in Syria oneptember for hourefore proceeding onh to Peking via Afganistan. top in Karachi was apparently scheduled, buth hour change was probably made at Ayub's request ln order to avbid the appearance of Slno-Paklstani collusion in the Kashmir


Chinese note to Indiansdeadline on ultimatummidcj time)

that Chinear llays groundto position that have actually met term out Ln ultimatum.

5 - Third Pakistaniet

eptember makes trip to Communist China from Karachi.

5 - UN Security Council passesease-fire. EDTeptember.

- Feking People's Daily editorial contains fiercest Chinese attack on Soviet attitude toward Indo-Fakistani conflict. "Sovietare charged with colluding with US.


Feking "Observer" article claims that Indians have complied with Chinese ultimatum but asserts that "matter is far from closed" as personnel and livestock allegedly seized byhave yet to be returned.

Both India and Pakistan apree to cease-fire to be. EOT oneptember.


broadcasts two diplomatic notes to New Delhi asserting that intruding Indian troops in the Sikkim area have been withdrawn "within the specified timen an apparent effort to maintain some pressure on New Delhi,reiterate earlier warnings that, if Indians keep up their intrusions, New Delhi will have to "bear all the consequences."


Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: