NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation
FOR RtliASE MTLLUV1III
DEFUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
C-co in 11 lh*
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Al i-.Qtf-d l
I. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
II. DECISIONS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
HI. RESTRAINTS ON THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Measures . ..
Puge .. 1
THE LIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
To estimate the capshihlie. of additional countries to acquire nuclear weapons, and the likelih".XMl that such countries will do so.
A. Beyond the present five nuclear powers, only India is likely touclear weapon* program in the next several yean
tuid the UAH.South Africa, are likelynuclear weapons In the next decade, but could obtain themsubstantial outside help. )
safeguard system* are likely to detect anyto unauthorized uses of nuclear materials or equipmentcover. However, there ure Raps and limitations in thethe future,on among the major nations supplyingand equipment may erode the cHctiiveness
treaties against testing or nuclearimpose legal, moral, and political restraints ofountry came to the conclusion that possession ufwas required b> it* vital interests, mternational treatiesunlikely to present it from laklng such action.
is technically possibleountry tomallweapons program ut least upest. The chances ofwould depend on the extent to which our suspicions hadand thevailable or used to
I. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
any nations in auditiari lo (lie prewnU five nuclear iKnvrrsotential to devrlop nuclear weapons. Each year tin- irt-hniml problems and co*ts of makingnumbers of plutonium weapon*hi* trend willBy the, there willliiii.lv be widespread use of nuclear power reactor* which will produce.y-product, large amount* of pli.lonii.rn. Although there will he industrial uses for this pli.Nm.um. itswill reduce further lhe technical problems and costs of weapon* produc-Iioii any* itKTCiue the temptation to enter the nuclear weapons field, lheif the^ potential nuel.nr powers .is to whether tu atrjnirv nuclear weiipons will deixml increasingly upOu miliary. psychological, and political motivations ,inil restraints.
DECISIONS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
li- factors which determine whether oration will seek to aixjuin? nuclear weapun* didcr widely from country lo country. National needs and interests vary from ease to case, as do systems of government and decisi. in-making. Some governments have lo take public opinion into account fiir more fully than others; in the caw oflrciMon eiin Ik; made hv oneery few leaders, while in others ilatter nf weigMug conflicting interests or reckoning with divided counsel* within thi- government, parliamentary bodies, or tin? public at large.
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In addition. levels ofin nuclear matter* and the liases of politicalh1 military doctrine vary considerably from state to stale and within states. What may appear to the US or to other experienced couiibles as critical deficienciesrojected nuclear weapons program may not appear as such to the government considering the program; the latter may feel,ixture of political military, and other reasons,iven tsrogram wouldood investment.
ft. Despite these variations, certain common motivation*heof all potential contenders. The first and most compelling is that of national security.ation may believe that it needs nuclear weapons as a
deterrent or for usear if dcterri-ncehe, (jui-etion may arbe bothwhich an* wilhonl clone allies aods wltkli. thnuglialliance sWim. do not fret fully protected hy it In general, oner anurlt-ar weapon* are vrtsl to its sccsajty. no mil- r :. ml
other lhan force is likely lo prevent it from trying loem.
Anuthri significantmid partlyto Kijuirr nuclearo .ivumI being lelt behinddidekr the Idea that otbm of eerual orimportance might rntne ahead uf them Thc rnore uatii-n* ac(|ulrrhe mem- nthef* inn find reason* to do likewise. Tim* nuclear proliferation couldinwlkill effect. Moreover. In some nation* it is argued that entering Ihe unclear weapons field Is necessary to keep abreast of technological and Ktenlifltrlnpn.
Finally,he Inu-nlnr i4 iuIkii.iI prestige and politscal leverage. This motivation runs ihienigli nil rithrr cakulaiioov but, in the modern worM. the. fciling has grown that nuileai weapons arc ctscnltnl to fmtil rankthe French force He Hitsutnkm lietng (hi- primeaullc. hi* sup-porters in France, and hkr mkmlrd people rbrwherc do not maintaination must haveunclear force rivaling that of the US or the USSR, hut argue thatull forcehe-ir opportunities lor imlepi-ndmt action by giving (hem leverageii tin- super power*.
Ill RESTRAINTS ON THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ide range of dennistic arid interna!tonal restraints operates to prevent further nuclear pro! lie rat ion. There is.r*e. the mMrninl ofonly of producing weapon* but more ImpOrt.lully ofelivery system. Within every tut inn thatotential addition tn the nuclear ranks there are strong pufttical ami psychologicalakingrulifesation. The asa)or nuciear pow*r> the US.AH and tin-the >read of nuclearhey doin* nigh both bilateral and muliilatci.il amuigr-mrntw, However, these nations may not Ih* willing in nil ciriumvtnnm to give nuupnillferatinn priority over uthrr policyhe altitude* of Francerrnn :China toward proliferation an ambigunirt. it is pouiberl; Blight hcip certain other rtsrtiosriimlejrf iixln.truli/cd (ml non-nuclearGermany, Japan, and Sweden, forbecoming major suppliers of nuclear eiptfpiniml, The policies they follow In the sale of reactors, nuclear equipment and technology will mflu-rncr ihe rati -endof noclrsr proliferation imii if they Iheinarlvrs do not develop weapons Although the foreignf the major powrn tend fa limit (iirthcr proliferation, there is no certainty that they will prevent II.
A. Present Sotegvord Systems
An elaborate restraint on nnch-aiystem ofnntioU designee) by inter national liudmpcathigr material* ami iipiipment tn tlt-tccf any diversion of vnch product* lo unauthorised
hile lhe objective is tu prevent diversion, safeguard* per se are concerned more with detection than prevention. Like other internationalafeguard agn-enwiits could Ix- abrogated or violated. The sanctions* imposed on offender, would depend idtiinatcly <tn the amount of political.or military pressure which Oilier countries were willing to bring to bear. In the case of recipients who are dependent on continuing supplies ofhose using enriched uranium Inbe need to avoid alienating sup* pliers actsanction to ensure compliance with safeguards.
We believe lhat Ihe inspection and verification provisions ol broadsuch as those administered by the IAEA and EURATOM are generally effective in fulfilling their limitedhey arc likely to detect any significant diversion of materials or equipment from the uses intended by the supplier. In addition, lhe risk ot detection iseterrent of someagainst the unauthorized use of materials and equipment cos'crcd.
However, there ore certain gaps and limitations in the safeguard systems. For example, sume of tlie earlier transactions in nuclear materia) and equipment were under no safeguards of under agreemenls of limited scope.
l nr.etween the supplierMm recipient tuunliy under which Ihe latter pToniise* to tare thelcil coix.li only hir spes-ifiedIn addition, the-isrew loetailed writtenist ill .el-vine. tnvolvlnS the nuterUl andamiiittiiw tlie supf-iylngheif ntutnissi make on-tiieli> inftin Unir accuracy. Suchimy be enmiwd over mpplHt of natural umilium, liuionalilc eiiilrriah iIpciiKijKilly itlutonUiin noil uuiiium ciirfcbodnvy waicilhci TOv <ir etpmtfrlh prodortt-in of tU-aoiwbk matrrluk, trtbUni.egion, ami neutron Rei-craton. Safcguar-L. iius be ulmintslereil by vaWmsho US. British, anitc-vminwiili,implc,n thoir cspoit* ofeUtcd producls. EURATOM supcrvisr* tufegnardany nuclear fa-.ila.c* in the Coirtinon Market eauMnrs. The Irrtrrnatloaal Aiowfc- Energy Agency (IAEA) nilnrinntnrt w'cuUiinl. in mate-raltynil abomerAt lo vshldl il hn. branli> the adoiinMr-riiin iigeiicy by lhe VS and iKbcrome ineraber nallons hate siilun hully >ulimilt<-il llmi-avi-lvrx lo 1AKA .afeguanii. EIFiim are being made toore facilities of various countries under 1AKA rtfe-guard*..
lav is no formal agreement in existence among all potential Suppliers (hat safeguards will be applied tor inx lenr materials oi equipment; such safeguards as arc applied result from the unilateral dci istons of the suppliers. While il is incscnt practice for the UK and Canada In require safeguards like those imposed Iry lhe US. France has rejected tbe poliey of automaticallysafeguards in connection with sales. Soviet and.Chinese policy with regard to safeguards is unclear. The USSR asast European countries arc active members ol lhe IAEA anil apputve the principle of safeguards, but no reactors in existence or under construction in the Sino-Soviet area have been placed under IAEA safeguards. Neither the USSR nor China lias In dateany olher countryeactor able to produce plutonium in quantitics sufheiert for weapons, except that Ihe Soviets may have furnished the Chinese priorith equipment and technology tor hnililingeactor. Nevertheless, reactor* now under construction in Czechoslovakia and East Germany svilh Soviet assistance will be capable of producing enough plutonium foi weapons. We do not know svhet)>cr any safeguards are applicable lo tbe.se reactors hut almost certainly these countries will not undertake independent nuclear sveapons programs.
There are no comprehensive controls over world trade In natural uranium, although then* is an informal nirangcmcut bttsveen the principal Westernof uranium and some other materials lo keep each oilier informed as to sales. It has Ivccn possible for Wh Israel and India lo Imy unsafeguarded uranium. I'lirlhcnnorr, lliere is im standard policy regarding lhe provision of technical infoiuiation or specialised equipment.
Thereubstantial increase in the number of nuclear power reactors in operation in comingonsiderable number art' now under const nut ion in India, Sweden, Japan. West Germany. Italy, and otherl) will produce some plutonium or olher fusiuiinhlcany willtarge quantities. To tlie extent thai these reaclurt are under safeguards, the country or agemy administering (he safeguards williemu olwhit use is made of the plutonium. However, competition in the tale ol rcactois already exists and is likely to grow. Stich competituin may erode the effectivi-lies* of safeguards, particularly if the competitors include suppliers from countries which have oo policy of strict tab-guards. Such erosion would be most likely in tbe fields of equipment ami ancillary technology.
ossibleation which wanted nuclear weapons might havesatisfied, al least for some lime, and he re-strained fromnational weapons program, by an arrangement under which ithare in
'Secinl VInnnir rc-iclors nnw inniiim or nrtih'i ittiairuclimi in lOiiolrici ocbci than lhe five nuiltar
the motrol erfbe-i. ; topmn We do not
beheve thai useful grntrali/a'-oov tan be made in this field. In each riypotheti' n!l variety of factors would liear on the eifectharingeg, the degree of control which the non-nuclear jtowcr had over weapons, the prospects for future grriitcr control, the level of ccai6ocnce lietwocn the sharing partners, the domestic and foreign incentives and restraints Inuring onBMk-niith ar power, ete. So far as the matter of proliferation is concerned, the effect rsf an offei to si-are could be fudged only ia terms of the iwrticulais of the offer and an anatyui of the individual case
C. International Agreements
the US and the USSIt agreed on multilateral treaties furthrrprohibiting testing, or prohibiting further nuclear proliferation, they(cuuldcrabfr pressuren other nation* to sign such treaties.would prtstablyurther treaty on testing then would sign aatmn treaty, since thts latter kind of treaty is considered by manyat iliseiiminatory in favor of the present nuclear powers, Suchimpose legal, moral, and political restraints of ceinsidcralilrthe signatory nations. Theartial test ban already commutesand psychological curb on proliferation. However, moilsign such treaties only provided that ihey lonld withdraw if llicythey mud We brlttve thatitttntry cstrne to the conclusion thatof nuclear weapcsui was rea|ciired by its vrtal Inter rati.would be unlikrly its prevent it from luting or prod-King rhem.
unilateral measures by the US or the USSR might restrainFor example, the US or the USSR could cut off, to India ur Israel, or disavow their alliances with anybegan to efcvrlopliar weajionv In areas where US or Sovieteconoenk leverage is strong, even threat* or partial steps inignificant restraint In particular, any countrycontinued imports of nucharhose having reactor-,uranium, would hesitate to duregard the pressures of Itvi* also possibleotential nuclear power could Ih: divsuadedeapons on il* ownirm veciuity guarantee or otherfrom the US or USSR. Tlsrre are. of course. limitations on thethe major rxrarcri to take inchs dhcsissed in this paragraph andnot be prrrsared to give non-pcohtcratKm priority over otherOriginal document.