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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTUM INTELLIGENCE UNn-ED STATES INTELUGENCE BOARD
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 THE DIMENSION OF THE
IL DECISIONS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR
lO. RESTRAINTS ON THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A. Prejent Safeguard System*
C Ini anur_j] AgreemaaU
D. Unilalcrsl Maaiure*
THE LIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
To estimate the capabilities of additional countries to acquire nuclear weapons, and the hieluSood that such countries will do so.
A. Beyond the present. Ave nuclear powers, only India is likely
want nuclear weapons in the next decade, but could obtain them only with substantial outside help. )
D. Present safeguard systems are likely to detect any significant diversion to unauthorized uses of nuclear materials or equipment which they cover. However, there are gaps and limitations in the system. In the future, compclitloo among the major nations supplying nuclear materials and equipment may erode the effectiveness of safeguards.)
K Multilateral treaties against testing or nuclear proliferation would impose legal, moral, and political restraints of some consequence. Butountry came to the conciusion that possession of nuclear weapons was required by its vital interests, mtemaiional treaties would be unlikely to prevent it bom taking such action.
F. It Is technically possibleountry tomall covert nuclear weapons program at least upest. The chances ofwould depend on the extent to which our suspicions had been aroused and tho methods available or used to acquire information.)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DRTE:1
L THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBlfM
i. Many nations in aoViMon lo (he mmkM mm mmtm power, havedevelop nucirar weapons. Each year uVblcxa aad (OAssmall numbers of philom'urnhis trend wfflBy ihear will dtnosrt certainly be widespread asepower reactor* which will produce, uby-prodtict. luge amount* Although there will beihis pluIorJum. its av.il.
erhsce further the technical [uoblems and com of weapons produc-lioo and frserease tba tamptallon lo crtiur ihe nuclear weapon* field. The dV ctafons of (ho potential nucloar powerns lo whether to aernnro nuclear weapons will depend fncreasingly uponchulnglcnl, and political motivation, rotramti.
ibid) IONS) IS1
The factors which datermlnu wlirther orallon will seek to aefmtni nuclear weapons differ widely from country to country. National Deed, and Interests vary from case to case, as do* of government and dccasiias-maldng. Some governments have to take public opinion Into account far more fully thanhe case ofecision can bo made by oneery few leaden, while In others It kmatter of weighing conflicting interests or reeAnrJog with divided counsels within tbe gowrmnent, pariiumeotary bodies, or the pubfae at large.
-adt* of Skafeci,,
n adnJrton. IcveU of BopinSlkatfan lo nuclear mattcri end th political thinking and military doctrine vary considerably from rtate to state and wRhtahat may appear lo lhe US or to other experiencedritical deficienciesrojected nuclear weapons program may not appear as such to the government considering live program: the latter may fed,Matare of political, military, and Other reasons,iven program wouldood investment
fl. Despite these variations, certain common motivation* figure in the eakek-bona of all pcrfentiaJ cootenden. The flnt and most compelling fa that of national leeurtey. ation may believe lhat it needi nuclear weapon* at a
deterrent or for naa la war If deterrencehe question may tub* both In micro which an without dees allies uxl in others which, though members of in aT-once Mn, do not Ied fwDy protected hjr fe, inne*notion has conduded thai rrodear weapons are vKal la Its seesirtry. no outside restraint other thao forcekdy to preventrom trying lo ncqulra them.
Anottser sign (Scantprychologiciil and portlylo acmiire nudcar weapon* it to avoid being left behind. Natioce dbllha the Idea that othen of ertual or lea Importance might move ahead of them. The man nations napilr* weapons, the more othnrs <im Snd muorui to dn likewise.ent proliferation couldnnwhuJl affect. Moreover,ome nalioni it Is argued that entering the nuctoir weapons 8cld it neteaanry lo keep abreut of technological and scientific ecvohmments.
Faulty,he incentive of national prestige and poUbcal leverage. Thla motrvaticm mm through all other calciiUtkma hot. In the modern worW, the Inllng has grown that nuclear weapons are irueaNal in front rankthe Fmnch force de dlauaihm being the prime eiample. De Cauue. hisin France, and Ifkr-niindal people ehewbera do not maintainaiim roustudcar tone rivaling that of the US or the USSR, but argue thatmall rone enhance* rhdr opportunities for independent action by giving them leverage Mnoft iho super powers.
III. BE5TBAINTS ON THE ACQUISITION Of NUCLEAR WEAPONS
wide range ol domestic and international restraints operates tonuclear proliferation. Inere U. of course, the restraint ofproducing weapons but more Importantly oleliveryevery nationotential addition to Ihe nuclear ranks therepobtKal and psychological force* averting against proliferationluselearUS* the USSR, and thethe spreadweapons. They do so through both bilateral und multilateralHowever, those nations mny not hell clrcumntantet topriority over other policylw attlltideihina toward proliferation arc ambiguous;ossiblealight fcefp certain other natiCroik!cur eopohility. Alodmtriallzad but non-rrudcarCcrmany. Japan, andbecoming major suppliers of nuclear oiuipment. Thefollow In the sale of reactors, nuclear equipment aad technology willthe rate and oloS of nuclear proliferitm evca if they themselves doweapons Although tha foreign polkses of the major powers tendfurther proliferation,o certainty that they will fire vent It.
A. Present Safeg-ord Systems
elaborate restraint on nuclearystem oftoco oil designed by international bodies or In/ nationand opilpment to detect any diversioninch products to unnuthortred
hile the objective ti to prevent diversion, safeguards per te are concerned mora with dejection than prevention. Like other Internationalsafeguard agreement* could be abrogated or violated Tbe sanctions imposed on offenderi would depend ultimately on the amount oi political, eto-ocroic, or military rsressurc which other eountries were willing to bring to bear, la the ease of recipients who are dependent on continuing supplies of. those using enriched uranium in reiictors, the need to avoid alienating sup-pBers actsanction to ensure compliance with safeguards.
e believe thai the inspection and veriScatton provisions of broad safe-guard" such as those administered by the IAEA and EORATOM are generally effective in fulfilling their limited raoetloB; It, they an likely to detect any significant diversion of materials or equipment from the uses mtended by tho supplier. In addition, the risk of detection Iseterrent of some im-portBr.cc agatnvt the ananthoritcd use of materials and equipment covered.
owever, there are certain gaps and limitation* hi (be safeguard systems. For example, some of tha earlier iraru actions fa nuclear material and equipment were under no safeguards or under nereemeots of limited
as nukeAed ta^-JOS). v.
Hint safeguards will b: applied lo reactor, or nucloar mattrriab or equipment;
aoch safeguards as arc applied rosuH from the unilateral docUlora of thenrrmhers.
While it Is present practice for the UK and Canada tn require safeguards
thnaa Imposed by the US, France has rejected the policy of automaflcally
mg saftrgaards in connection with sales. Soviet and.Chinese policy with regard
to safeguards is unclear. Tho USSR as weD aa most East European countries
are active members of the IAEA and approve tho jarrndple of safeguiudj, but
no reactors In existence or under construction En the Sino-Soviet area hove been
placed under IAEA safeguards. Neither the USSR nor China has to date pro-
vided any other countryeactor able to produce phjtordum In rruntrues
sufficientacttpt that the Soviets may have fnrnbhod the Chinese
prior0 with equipment and technology for buildingeactor.
Nevertheless, reactors now tinder construction In Ciwhoslovakia and East
Germany with Soviet assistance will be capable of producing enough platonuim
fur weapons. We do not know whether any safeguards are applicable to these
reactors but almost certainly these countries will not undertake Independent
nuclear weapons programs.
are no comprehensive controls over world trade In naturalthere far an Informal arrangement between the principal Westernof uranium and some other materials to keep each other informal as to
sales. It has been possible for both Israel and India tn boy unssfeguarded uranium. Furthermore, there is no standard polity regarding the provision of technical information or irnrciariiod equipment.
wOJnbrtantial Increase hi the number of nuclearIn operation In corningonsiderable number arc nowin India, Sweden, Japan, West Germany. Italy, and otherwill produce some plutooium or other fissionable materials, many willlargo quantities. Tn tha client that these reactor* are undercountry or agency admirrWcrmg the safeguards willean, ofwhot use is made of the plulonlum. However, competition in the salealready exists and is likely in grow. Such competition may erodeof safeguards, particularly If the competitors include supplierswhich have no policy of strictuch croricn wouldlikdy In the fields of equipment and ancillary technology.
B. Nuclear Shoring
W. It is possibleation which wanted nuclear weapons might have Its aspirations satisfied, at least for some time, and be restrained from underendeal weapons program, by on arrangement under which Ithare in
nd VI of Anaesouw in opumtk. cr under eeretnaeoM
in (Conineslinn ihanautu pennm.
the control of weapons belonging to an riisting nuclear power. We do not believe that oaeful gencralirabcai can be made in this fkld. Inreat variety of (acton would bear on tha effectharingthe degree of control which tho non-nuclear power had overhe prospect* for future greater control, the level of confidence between the aharing partners, tho domestic and foreign tacenttves and restraints bearing on the non-nuclear power, etc So far as tho matter of proliferation is concerned, tho effect of aa offer lo share could be judged only la terms of tho particulars of tho offer and an analysis of the individual case.
f the US and tho USSB agreed on multilateral treaties furtherrohfbKIng testing, or prohibiting further nuclear proliferation, they could bring considers bio pressum to bear on other nations to sign such treaties. More nations would probablyurther treaty on testing than wouldon-proliferation treaty, since this latter kind of treaty ia considered by marryas discriminatory In favor of the present nuclear powers. Such Deo Dos would impose legal, moral, and political restraints of considerable consequence -on the signatory nations. .Tha 1SS3 partial test ban already constitutes some political and psychological curb on proliferation. However, most countries would sign such treaties only provided that they could withdraw If they later felt they matt. We believe thatountry came to the condusion thatof nuclear weapons was required by lot vital Interests, international treaties would bo unlikely to prevent It from testing or producing them.
arious unilateral measures by the US or the USSR might restrain farther proliferation. For example, the US or the USSR could cut off economic and military aid, eg, to India or Israel, or disavow then* alliances with any nation hich began to develop nuclear weapons. Ia areas where US or Soviet political and economic leverage Is strong, even threats or partial steps In this direction wouldignificant restraint. In particular, any country dependent aa continued imports of nuclearhose having reactors needing enriched uranium, would hesitate to dlrregerd the pressures of its supplier. It Is also possibleotential nudcar power could be dissuaded fromnuclear weapons on its ownirm aeeurlty guarantee or othtrfrom the US or USSR. There are, of course, limitations on the valltngnca f the major poweri to toko such steps as ducnsied in this paragraph and (bay ay act be prepared to give oan-prolifcrsuon priority over other policy |g| objectives.Original document.