CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES (NIE 11-14-65)

Created: 10/21/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

15

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER4

OA HI5IDRICAL RP.1EW PROGRAM

R3.EASE IN FBU

Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces

br iht DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

n by iht UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai indKaod oveiloolCTOBER lv65

Th<inre/lrgetnce Ofgomxcrfionjh*f Inn eifrmof*:

dgency ond lheroonfcoNon. cd IK, DoporlStole.nd NSA.

Concvrvinrj:

Di.ecie* ol Inrelllgonc, and Re.earch, Deportmon.. Ofllomo Inlelligenc* Agency

rh* Atomlt FflflfgyRaarevenlaiiveiheiredoi of iho Notional Soouriry Agency

Abstaining.!

HtoM to Ihoederal Bureau of Investigation, Iho lubj.cl being ouiudo ol hi. juriidietion.

lrUg|og the Notic^o! Defect* olof,onn in any manwW*

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces

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SICHLf

TABIE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE PROBLEM

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE CENERAL PURPOSE

The Policy of (hc New Leadership

Trends (o

II. SOVIET THEATER GROUND

Ceneral Characteristics

Categories and Numbers of

Armies. Fronts, and TVDs

Ground Forces Training

Land

FORCES AIR AND MISSILE SUPPORT

Tactical Aviation

Tactical Missiles and Rockets

Weapons of Mass

Battlefield Reconnaissance

Theater Forces Air

NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Foices

Capabilities Against Carrier Task Forces and Sea Lines of

Capabilities for Anti-submarine Warfare

Capabilities for Mine

Logistic Support Capabilities

V. AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT CAPABILITY

Airlift and Air Assault

Sealift and Amphibious Assault

Page

VI. SOVIET THEATEH FORCE CAPABILITIES ACAINST THE

CENTRAL REGION OF NATO

Current Operational]fl

Forces Immediately20

Reinforcement

Mobilization Base

TABLE I: Estimated Numbers and Deployment o( Soviet Line Divisions2

TABLE II: Estimated Numbers and Deployment of Soviet Tacticalin Operational Units

TABLE III: Estimated Numbers oi Soviet Tactical Aiicraft ui Operational

* Units

TABLE IV: Estimated Numbers and Deployment of Soviet GeneralSubniarincs

TABLE V: Estimated Numbers and Deployment ol Soviet Surface Ships

ypo25

TABLE VL Estimated Numbers and Types of Soviet Naval

CCCALT

CAPABIUTIES OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces throughspecially against the Central Region of NATO, and general trends in those forces over thc next ten years.

CONCLUSIONS

new Soviet political leaders appear lo have modifiedpolicy of curbing military costs at the expense of theforces. This change is probably attributable primarilytensions arising from the war in Vietnam, but itthe increased influence of the ground

in the force levels, organization, and deploymentgeneral purpose forces are virtually certain to occur in thethe next ten years. The Soviets will probably improve tlieof their general purpose forces for non-nuclear war.of more advanced weapon systems will increase theof thc general purpose forces, but will also increaseOver the longer term we foresee some reductions indesigned to hold this increasing cost within limitsthe Soviet leadership. )

estimate that the USSR now hasineare capable of participating in the initial operaUons of adivisions have virtually all of their equipment. Theirmanning levels range from at leastercent of warthe Soviet forces in Eastern Europe to aboutercent in theof the USSR. Wc estimate lhat the USSR has an additionaldivisions manned at an average of aboulercent of full

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strength. Out confidence in these figures is higher than last yearonsequence of inmc intensive study and new information.

he Soviets have significantly increased theirnd missile support in the past year. Further increases are likely, as well as the introduction of systems of improved range and mobility. We believe that as thc capabilities of tactical aircraft improve the numbers of aircraft in Tactical Aviation will gradually decline.' )

the past year there hasarked increase inof Soviet navalarger number of unils havea distance from Soviet waters. Wc believe that Soviet navalfor operations far from home bases will continue to(he next ten years with the introduction into the forces ofsubmarines and support ships.

USSR is seriously concerned about the Polaris threat toand has intensified efforts to improve ils antisubmarinecapabilities. Wc estimate that, even so, the Soviet capabilityidentify, and destroy submarines operating in the openremain severely limited for the next several years. )

C. The Soviots have shown increasing interest in airborne and amphibious capabilities in support of theater operations. Over the next ten years they will probably improve ihese capabilities and seek to develop some capability for distant limited military action. (Paras.

H. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies haveivisions andombat aircraft immediately available for employment against the Central Region of NATO. We believe, however, lhat if thc Soviets planned to attack NATO they would reinforce these forces, if circumstances permitted, with additional ground and air forces from the western USSR. )

Tbo ACS/lntelligence. USAF i> uruble lo reconcile Conclusion B. which estimate*prob. able improvement In capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces for non-oueiear warfare, with (Ms. conclusion lhal there will befurther inn'-aie in ticbcil missile* which eranly with wiesear/CWbutredaction in Tecofal Avtatioa, which has an non bomb asas aand (if defense capaUWy. He notes further dut nuliirStoai of Tactical Aviationpredicted In eacn of the put several yean lias not malraialiird. He would substitute the following foa the final sentence:

arked clunge In Ihe overall structure and siee of Soviet general purpose fixces we believe thai the numbers of lircrsft In Tactical Aviation will remain about lhe seme as al prevent, ud letrooucuon of new sircrslt will provide improved cepabitutes"

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OlSCUSStON

I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Despite the rapid and costly development of Soviel forces lor strategic attack and defense, thc general purpose forces remain the largest and most expensive element in the Soviet military establishment. Khrushchev, concerned with economic growth and consumer satisfaction, sought to check rising military costs. Because he gave priority to strategic attack and defense, he couldthis only by reducing the share of the military budget allocated to thc general purpose0 he initiated drastic reductions in their strength. As flic result of military opposition, which was strengthened by the Berlin crisishese reductions wcie suspended, but Khrushchev continued to press for further cuts in thc general purpose forces.

Khrushchev's policy of cutting back the general purpose forces was basedtrategy of deterrence which placed first reliance on strategic rocket forces. These forces, he held, would also be most effective should deterrence fail,eneral nuclear war would be of short duration and its outcome would be determined by the initial nuclear exchange. Subsequent operations, in his view, could have only minor effects, and large scale theater operations would bein thealtennathasstse nuclear exchange.

Khrushchev's views were strongly opposed by the military establishment in general. The more conservative marshals vigorously defended the utility of large general purpose forces, contending that large-scale and protracted land campaigns would be indispensable for victoryeneral nuclear war; they concluded, not that these forces liad no further role to play, but rather that they faced new and demanding requirements. The position eventually adopted by most important Soviet military leaders, including Marshal Malinovslciy,ompromise. This accepted thc decisiveness of nuclear weapons andeneral svar would bc sliort, but it abo held thatar might be protracted and that thc requirement for large theater forces continued into the nuclear era.

The Policy of the New Leadership

men who displaced Khrushchev face the same problems thatregarding the proper allocation of Soviet resources. They arc no lessthan he to promote economic growth and to strengthen Sovietand defense capabilities, but they appear to have relaxed thehe exerted to limit expenditures for the general purpose forces.is probably attributable primarily to the increased internationalfrom the war in Vietnam, but it reflects also the increased influence ofmarshals.

rcccni restoration o( Marsha) Chuykovommand o( the groundIhc most definite indicationhange in policy. Hetrongthe maintenance of large ground forces. His hold public defense of hishc was relieved of that commandade his return to itIhere hadhange in policy in the direction which hcwc hehevrj there willlight increase in live strength ofpurpose forces, and that Ihey svill number some two million menend;

Khrushchev's fall was accompanied by expressions of military disapproval of his preoccupation with nudear armed missiles to thc detriment of other military requirements. Ever1 there have been indications of aacceptance of thc possibility of non-nuclear conflict between nuclear powers. In June of this year Marshal Rotmistrov.uclear stalemate between the OS and thc USSH, suggested that the ground forces might again become the decisive factor, inuclearon-nuclear situation. Twice within the past six months Marshal Malinovskiy has spoken of thc possibilityon-nudear svar. Marshal Sokolovskiy recently observedituation of nuclear stalemate requires constant reappraisal of the relative roles of strategic and general purpose foices.

Thus tha Soviet conviction that any conflict between nudear powers must inevitably and quickly escalate into general nuclear war is now undergoing some modification. We believe that the Soviet leaders are increasingly prepared to contemplate thc possibility of non-nuclear warfare between nuclear powers. Ncvcrthdcss, they almost certainly still consider that any conflict with NATO in Europe would cany grave risk of escalation to general nudear war.

There has been no perceptible weakening of Soviet insistence that thc use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war wouldtrategic exchange. While this doctrine serves deterrent purposes in part, it also represents anSoviet conviction that escalation under such circumstances would be well-nigh uncontrollable. We do not believe that Soviet doctrine regarding the limited use of nudear weapons will change in the foreseeable future, and we consider it highly unlikely that the USSR would initiate the use of such weaponsntiled conflict. If the Western powers were to do so, wc believe that, doctrine notwithstanding, the Soviets would seek to prevent escalation to general war.

There have been no major changes hi deployment of Soviet general purpose forces during the past year. However, after the collapse of border talksthe USSR and Communist China inoviet forces on the Manchurian border were strengthenedotorized rifle division which was probably redeployed from the western USSR. Moreover, within die past year, internal shifts in the Far East moved dements of two other Soviet divisions

' The numbers and distribution of manpower in all the Soviet military forces will be discussed in NIEMain Trends in Sovset Miliiarycheduled for completion in

closer Iu tlic Chinese border. cce*sors have avoided (lie teniturial issue, and lhc border problem appears lo have lapsedtata of armed qmcsccncc. However, the Soviei units moved ihcrc in lasl year's crisis remain in position.

Trends5

in thc force levels, organization, and deployment of dieforces arc virtually certain to occur in the course of thc neat (enchanges are more likely lo result from technical miliiary andthan from external politicalubstantialof tensions between tlvc. USSR and the Wesl would tend lobetween tlvc USSR and Communist China, and vice versa. Henceauthorities are not likely lo find in the development of theany warrantubstantial reduction in general purpose forces,the degree of tension may have marginal effects, as in the

Economic considerations will continue toajor factor affecting thc development of (he general purpose forces. The provision of more advanced weapon systems will increase their military effectiveness, but will also Increase their cost. Over the longer term we foresee some reductions in personnel strength designed to hold this increasing cost 'vithin limits acceptable to thc Soviet leadership.

Tlie principal changes over thc next decade will probably bc in theof thc general purpose forces, particularly if the Soviets should decide to emphasize preparation for contingencies other than general nuclear war.ecision would imply, among othermaller number of larger divisions and increased provisions for combat and logistic support. Somealong these lines Is probable, but it is likely to occur only very gradually.

II. SOVIET THEATER GROUND FORCES General Characteristics

Tlic present structure of the Soviet theater ground forceseneral war against NATO beginningassive nuclear exchange,Soviet nuclear attack on targets in Western Europe. In the aftermath of such an exchange, the Soviet theater ground forces are expected to advance rapidly and seize critical objectives before NATO forces have recovered from the destruction and disorganization resulting from tlie initial nuclearIn designing forces for this task, the Soviets have assigned tlie primary maneuver role to armor and have emphasized speed, shock effect, and tactical nuclear 6rcpower.

In keeping with this concept, the Soviet theater ground forces arc now characterizedarge number of heavily armored line divisions which, even

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altrength, are substantially smaller tlian US divisions Although Soviet divisions generally lave lets equipment tlian US divisiom, iheyigh

,1 of tanks relative to manpower They have less organic combat and service support than US divisions, even considering their difference in site, and aie backed up by less nondivisional combat and service support. Thesehowever, are attributableifferent concept of employmentspeed and shock effect at the capense of staying power. For that reason, any evaluation of Soviet ground units in terms of equivalents or percentage equivalents of nominally corresponding US units can be of little value inrelative oornhat

he Soviet conccntialion upon the requirementsapid advance in tho aftermathudear exchange has impaired the capabilities of their theater ground forces for action in other circumstances. In particular, thc proportion of infantry, conventional artillery, tactical air support, and logistic supportis not so wdl suited to the requirementsustained conflict. If events should not develop according to theudear war the Soviet advance should be held up by NATO resistance, or if die conflict should boSoviet theater ground forces would be handicapped by their relative lack of provision for sustained action. Tbc armaments provided for use by thc theater ground forceseneral nudear war do provideinherent capabilities to wage tactical nuclear warfare or non-nuclear warfare, but they are not what they would have been if those contingencies had been the basis of Soviet planning.

t is possibleealignment wilhin the Croup of Sovielortends an effort to enhance the capabilities of Soviet ground forces for sustainedotorized rifle division is now incorporated into each of two tank armies in the CSFC. and one of these armies includes an artillery brigade. Such Infantry and artillery elements are not In the normal complement of Soviet tank armies. We have no evidence that service support units are being strengthened, but this could easily escape detection. However, any general reorganization of Soviet ground forces along tbe Lines observed in the CSFC would probably extenderiod of years.

Categories and Numbers of Divisions

oviet military writings refer to line divisions at three different levels of strengdi and preparedness: at or near full strength, reduced strength, and cadre. We designate these levels as CategoriesI, and III.ivisions are those divisions maintained In the highest state of peacetime readiness forto combat; Category II divisions are intended for early rcitiforo-ment ofivisions and probably could be ready to moveeek or so; Category III divisions are intended toase for reserve training and mobilization. It is difficult to distinguish Category II divisions at tbeir highest manning levds fromivisions at their lowest.ivisions in Cermany. Poland, and Hungary are probably manned alercent of TO

strength orhe manning levels ofivisions are probably lower tn lhc border military ilislricts of the USSH and luwcsl in districts in die interior of tlw USSlt. Wc estimate lhal Category II divisions are manned al about GO loert-cut of TO. and thaiivisions nrc maimed at onlyercent.

estimate that the Soviets nosvine divisions at CategoryII readiness. Our confidence in this figure is higher than last year asof more intensive study and new information. Somefmotorized riffc divisions.rc tank divisions,rc airborneestimate that there arc also someategory III motorized riflethis number may be as low asr as highhis rangeas tu whether all of the entities counted an- in fact divisions.

Armies, Fronts, and TVDs

There areoviet Geld armiesn theroups of forces in Poland and Hungary. There arc in additionnd II divisions that are either directly subordinate to military districtor of undetermined subordination. Finally, therend II) which are centrally controlledirectorate in Moscow*

The Soviets maintain two types of field armies, the divisional composition of which varies according to their mission, thc terrain, and the opposing forces. The combii>ed-arms army (CAA) usually consists of two to four motorized riBc divisions and one tank division plus non-divisional combat and service support troops. Although we believeypical CAA (three motorized rifle divisions and one tank division) would have0 men at full wartime strength, the present strength of the three CAAs in CSFC varies0e estimate that the existing peacetime CAAs0 men in non-divisional elements rather than the0 which would bc expected in wartime. Existing tank armies contain three or four Unk divisions. They0 men in non-divisional support as opposed to anwartime strength0 men in sudi elements. We estimate Uiat lhe

Wo estimate the TO strength of arifle division to0 men; andnk division toen.

' Motorized rifle divisions typicallyorganized into three mototfaed rifle regiments end one tank regiment as maneuver elements, while tsnfc divisions have three tank regiments and one iixXori-fd rifle regiment. Tank regiment) are equipped with medium tanks, except tliatew Unk diviMons one regiment Is equipped with Iieavy tanks: motorized rifle reginienU haws one organic tank battalion Airborne divisions are similar in structure to the motorized rifle divisions, but are considerably miallei. laving no Unk units srtd less artillery.

Soviet corps is noi an intenncdlatc echelon between division end army, bul is rather, inmall army.

I gives the estimated number of Soviet line divisions, by geographiccategory of readiness, and type of division.

Ktrcngili ofwartime tank army with four tank divisions would0 men. However, thc two tank armies in CSFC currently have five divisions and0 men each.

n Ihe event ol war. most Soviet field armies would be grouped into fronts. The CSFC can be considered the nearest equivalentartime Soviet front currently operational. It contains two tank armies, three combined aims armies, and one tactical air army. Front-level ground units in the CSFC include0 men in combat0 in headquarters and service support, and0 in miscellaneous housekeeping functions. In wartime, thedistricts on the borders of thc USSR would provide thc basis for thcof additional fronts.

he Soviets currently envisage general war campaigns broken down into theaters of military operationshose in Europe arc designatedNorthwestern, and Southwestern. The Soviets may plan toheater headquarters for each TVD.

Ground Forces Training

peacetime, Soviet conscripts arc assigned directly to units andalmost entirely within those units. Tliere is no large separateThc one-third turnover in conscript troop strength eachto the three year conscription periodrop in combatautumn as recruits replace trained men. This problem and thecomplexity of Soviet theater forces have caused thc Soviets toinducements to technically trained enlisted men to reenllsLthe ground forces conduct extensive individual and unit traioing,efforts to conserve funds and to avoid wear and tear on newto limit tlve effectiveness of their field training program.

Land Armaments

The USSR hasajor effort to modernize thc equipment of its ground forces, but the potential of the Soviet armaments industry has not been fully utilized. Khrushchev's efforts to economize on expenditures for the general purpose forces apparently resulted in considerable suetdi-outs in landprograms. Much old-model equipment remains in the hands of the troops; in general, improved models have been introduced into combat unitsery gradual rate. Some newer models have been superseded by moreones before their distribution has been completed. The older equipment remains militarily usable, of course, but some modelshe older armored personnel carriers slill in use) are not wdl suited to the requirements of Soviet operational concepts.

Nevertheless, the Soviets continue gradually to improve the quality of equipment in the hands of troops. For example, the2 tanks arriving in the CSFC may soon be sufficient to recquip one regiment in each tank division. Tho oldrmored peisonnel carriers in the CSFC are being

r^ilwcd by thc tracked BTU SOp andM1utof rcpbomnl hu ptnvrf)

nth increased rangeegree traverse is beingnto artillery units. Increased du.tr.bul.on of new pontoonb providing CSFC units with greater nveT-rrossing capabilities Aanti-tank missile, which we have designated Sagger, was recenUy div

irrt ,imc* and has already appeared in

Ihc GSFC.

Soviets go to great length* to tonsurvc their equipment inalso maintain in storage large reserves uf ground force equipment,composed primarily of older models retired from active use that they have enough equipment, including supersededartime force of about MO divisions.

the next ten years Use Soviets svill continue to improve theof their theater ground forces. They will seek to increase theriver crossing capabilities of their tanks and armored personnelreduce the size, weight, and variety of their field artillery pieces, andtheir anti-tank missile systems The Soviets have indicatedew medium tank which may be armed wiihank could be in operation by the end of the decade.however, no weapons developments which would materially afiectof tlie ground forces or the basic principles of Soviet tactical doctrine.

III. THEATER FORCES AIR AND MISSILE SUPPORT Tactical Aviation

he mission of Soviet tactical air armies (TAA) is to support the fronts to which they are assigned, by gaining local uir superiority and by providing tactical air support to ground fortes. There -re currentlyAAs In Tactical Avialion. three of which are located outside the USSH in Cermany, Poland, and Hungary. These armies vary considerably In sire and composition;h TAA. deployed in East Cermany. has moreombat aircraft, while others range in strength from. There are nowixwational combat aircraft assigned to units of the Soviet Tacticalf these are fighters assigned to someegiments. Of these fighters, one-third to one-half have an all-weather intercept capability.ight bombers, including morerewers, are assigned to thesomber regiments.ther aircraft, both fighter and bomber types, are in reconnaissance units. We believe that, in addition to these aircraft assigned lo tactical air regiments, there areoassigned combat aircraft colocated on airfields assigned to Tactical Aviation.

IIcstinuied rumUm endof SevSel tactical .Ircraft Inbyctet**

Mml ol the fighters assigned Io Tactical Avialion were designed asIhcir utility as fighter bornliers lor olhei tlian nuclear operations would be limited by tbcu small payload capacity, relatively short range, and lack of an all-weather bombardment capability. On tliei hand, the light weight and simplicity of Soviet tactical aircraft permit! them to use relativelyairfields and bases. Soviet tactical air units are practiced in rede ploying quickly with all their maintenance- and support equipment and haveapability lo operateery short timeew location. In the forward area, many alternate fields are prestocked with fuel and munitions

The Soviets emphasize flexibility by the use o( the same lighten for air defense, Hose support, interdiction, or reconnaissance missions. Some fighter units appear torimary mission of ab defense and others of ground support, but pilots are cross-trained in both missions. Foi example, the Fitter, which is best suited for the fighter/bomber role, has been employed in the interceptor role. Tho Fishbcd D, whose search/tiack radarrimeIn thc intcrceptnr role, is also used in the ground aitack role, performing air-to-ground gunnery, air-to-ground rocketry, and bombing.

he reequipment ptogram Is continuingteady pace. Theof older models .by current model aircraft will probably continue at tbe present rate of nearly one for one throughe estimate that Beagles will be phased out byanners bynd Frescos byew. improved, tactical fighter wiD probably be introduced into Tactical Aviation, perhaps as earlyhis model will probably be followed early inore advanced tactical fighter that might be also suitableight bomber role. Becenl intelligence reveals that the Soviets are engaged in research and development work on STOL and VTOLaircraft; it is possible that they will bring such aircraft into operation late in the period of this estimate. The production cost of these new types of aircraft will be considerably greater than that of current aircraft, but their capabilities will also be greater. Wc estimate thot the numbers of aircraft in Tactical Aviation will bennd will decline over the next decade to perhaps"

Toctlcol Missiles ond Rockets

n the but year or so. there hasignificant increase in tbc number of rocket and missile launchers allotted to the CSFC These launchers can deliver nuclear, chemical, and high explosive warheads. In nuclear war tbey would probably be supplemented by some medium and intermediate range

Short uleolflaaCtsafjlakeofi and unding.

' Eitinutee ol numbers of Soviet Ueueal aircraft67 ire given In Table III. "Foe the views of the ACS/Iiitetligence. USAF. on thu subject, see hti footnote toD. pan* 2.

missile* ol the Strategic Hocfcct-Forces which initially svoiild be directed n'.innt taigcts ol importanceront commander nnd subsequently would probably lie used lo support tlmler opes at root.

e liclieve tb.it rath Sovietndivision (except airborne) lias nu oig.inie Frog battalion wilb nl least two launcliers. eacb mountedight tank chassis; Category III divisions may as yet have none at all- Frog battalions in tlvc CSFC havebird tracked launcher, and similar augmentation appears torogress in other Soviet forces. Wc estimate thai there are approximatelyracked Frog launcliers in the CSFC. This irxfi-asc responds to the earber complain! of Soviet division commanders that tbcy had insufficient Frog buiichers to provide continuous fire support lor fast-moving offensive operations, as prescribed in Soviet operational doctrine.

e believe that lite Scud brigades in tlse ground armies in the CSFC Iiave also been significantly augmented during lhe last year by tbe additionhird battalion,otal of nine launcliers perimilar augmentation appears to be under way in other Soviet field armies, starting in thr western military districts of thc USSR. In addition, we confirmed5 the earlier deployment in East Cermanyurface-to-iurfaceof the Kennel cruise missile- This is one of the most accurate short-range missile systems available for direct support of ground force operations; however, the organization and subordination of units equipped with this weapons system is not yet clear. Wc estimatecudonncI launchers arc currently available for support of Soviet ground forces in CSFC.

o far as we know, tlse SovieU Iiave not yetactical missile system with Ihe range and mobility required to support front operations. At one liine ballistic missile systems for employment in support of from operations included the Scud and thehem missile system dating hackas subsequently been retired from service. Scud missiles,ange of up tore not capable of furnishing adequate missile support throughout the entire depth of Ibe battle zone.ossibly two, Maum-brr regiments ofjn. mobile cruise Ussilc system, were at one lime assigned to tactical air armies for employment support of front operations. There are recent indications tbat it isoast defense role. The Soviets areun ballistic missile system which could become operational in5 and which could extend missile coverage to the full extent of the battle zone of the front.

here will probablyonsiderable increase in tactical missile support over the neat ten years. Improvements in Frog systems will stress greater mobility, possibly including an air transportable version. We believeolid fueled missile will probably be introducedeplacement for the Scud, which uses slorable liquid. The pmvision of tactical rocket and missile systems fo divisions, armies, and potential fronts will probably bo standardisedthe theater ground forces.

I 1

Weapons ol Mow Destruction

- Soviets consistently group biological. chemical .ind nuclears "weapons of anaisliui lion' Wc bdievc flat, in Soviet thinking, thc same constraints apply io Ihc use of toxic CW weapons as to the use of nuclear weapons, that llie use of eitlier wouldecision tl the lugbetl political level, and thaioviel leaders would almost certainly authorize the use of toxic chemical agents liy tlicater lorcesuclear war, but not under any other conditions. Although research continues In the field of biological warfare, wc Isnvc no evidence of any current Soviet capabilities for applying BW tocrations and wc believe Soviet tactical use o( BW lo lie highly unlikely.

uclea'We estimate that tlie numbers of nucleai weapons allocated to the theater forces has increased considerably over Ihe past few-years. Soviet theater forces now have ai their disposal nuclear weaponsariety of types and yield* suitable for delivery hy tactical rockets, missiles, and aircraft.tmi gun-howitzeruitable candidate for Ihe delivery of nuclear shells, but we have no evidenceuclear projectile of this caliber.

entire system of command and control of nuclear weaponsdesigned to reserve to the national leadership the decision to inibaleof nuclear weapons. Special units of KCB (Committee of Statehava been created to provide security for nuclear weapons, notstorage, but aba) during delivery to units. We believe that Soviet procedures

give Moscow strict control over lhe numbers and yields of weapons to be

employed In major theaters.

Wc have been able to identify nudear weapons storage sites only inside tliehe Soviets do not already have nuclear weapons stored in Easternubstantial logistical effort would be required toeasonable quantity for the delivery systems currently in the area. Forarge number of sorties by transport aircraft would be required to moveand bombs forward from storage sites inside the USSR. We estimate that thc Soviets could launch nuclear-armed aircraft from East Cerman basesew hours after the transports had landed at tha bases, In the case cf Frogs and tactical missiles, wc estimate that it would take longerove the warheads lo tlve delivery units because rcshipment by land transport or helicopter would be required Movement of nudear weapons from the USSR by rail would, of course, take considerably longer than by air. In view of the above, we think that thereood chance that nuclear weapons are stored in some CSFC depots, although we have no firm* evidence.

V.ir^ru Wr estimate that the'Soviets have an eatensive stockpileariety of toxic chemical munitions available for use with tactical aircraft, missiles, rockets, artillery, mortars, multiple-rocket launchers, and land mines. Spray systems have also been developed. Missile warheads are bulk-filled, probably with one of ihe extremdygents; other munitions are apparently loaded with otber nerve agents including thetype (sarin orr with oldea types ol agents first used in World War I. We estimate

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SCCSH-

thai die total toxic agent stockpile is atons. Some chemical weapons may hc in the lunds of the IrOOps. but moil are slOred in tl* interior of-'lw USSH.

DtfcnK. Soviet military authorities evidently assume that dieum! chemical and biological us well as nuclear weapons in die eventgeneral war. All elements of the Soviet forces stress training forsuch weapons. Manual and automatic devices are available forof radiation and chemical agents, but there is no known Sovietdetection ofype nerve agents.

Battlefield Reconnaissance

believe that Soviet battlefield reconnaissance and surveillancehave not improved significantlyhen some Sovietstrongly criticized the surveillance available as incapable of fullyrequirements of nuclear warfare. The reconnaissance equipment inis for the most part incapable of rapidly providing ground andwith accurate fire-adjustment data, automatically processed andAerial reconnaissance is thc principal means of procuringthe Soviets also rely heavily on patrols in force, infiltTatiOD, tacticaland artillery surveillance radar, flash detection, and soundhave some evidence that live Soviets arc working on more advanceddata acquisition, processing, and transmittal, but wC have no basis forprogress they have made.

Theater Forces Air Defense

Theater air defense is composed of thc fighter aircraft of Tactical Aviation.urface-to-air missilesnd antiaircraft artilleryhe defensive capabilities of Tactical Aviation have continued to increase over the past year with the introduction into operational units ofll-weather missile-armed Fishbcd Ds, which now make up morefighters. An air defense control syslem with semiautomatic features has been deployed in tlw USSR and is being deployed in East Cermany, Poland, and Hungary.

Thes road-mobile, but several hours arc required to setite for firing or to dismantle one for moving. Main reliance is placed onantiaircraft weapons for low altitude defense and for protection of swiftly moving forces when fighter cover is not available. The Soviets haveew missile system, the Canef, apparently to provide mobile missile

coverage

for troops in the field, but wc have no evidence of Its deployment with field forces. Although thc requirement still existsobile SAM system capable of both high- and low-altitude defense, there is no evidence of ib development. We believe, Iwwever, that the Sovieis will seek to meet this requirement by tlie developmentobile missile system or possiblyyperveloclly AAA system, and lhat they will deploy some such weapons within the next ten years.

srencr-

lthough Ihu Soviet, have conduced extensive rescard.ield anti-ballistic missile system, no such system is now operationally deployed. Wc are unable to estimate whether or when tins Soviet, will be able to develop nnd deploy one.ystem .nay be capable ol destroying tactical missiles of short. or less) under the most favorable circumstances, but sve believe (hat the Soviets do not consider it lo be an anti-missile defense system.

IV. SOVIET NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES"

uring the past year there hasarked increase in the tempo of -Soviet naval activity, ciinracterizedarge number of unils operatingistance from Soviet waters. Tlic Soviets haveontinuous presence in the Mediterranean Sea with both surface and submarine units from theBaltic, and Black Sea Beets. They have maintained surveillance of thc US Polare. submarine bases ati, Hota, and Cuam with intelligence trawlers and submarines. They have extended their operations into the Philippine Sea, have maintained surveillance of Western forces off Vietnam (with intelligencend have continued patrols in (he north-central Atlantic and north-central Pacific. In addition, some long-rangeeconnaissance aircraft have been assigned to Naval Aviation, and have been frequently observed conducting maritime patrols in the northeastern Atlantic.

Forces

4S. Submarines, There areirst line submarinesallistic missile submarines) in the Soviet general purpose submarinencrease ofver last year. All of these submarines have both torpedo attack and mining capabilities. Included in this number are aboutruise-missile submarines, of which aboutre nudear powered; these mayualprimary ono against ships at sea.econdarv one against land targets. Included also arc someong-range torpedo-attack submarines, of which aboutre nudear powered, andedium-range torpedo-attack diesei-powered submarines. In addition lo these first line submarines, the Soviet Navy has aboutld coastal type diesel submarines."

lie operations of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines away from submarine support vessels during thc past year, coupled with evidence of under-the-ice operation, suggest that such submarines may now be considered fairlyiable. With existing hull designs and currently operational engineering plants, Soviet nuclear submarines canaximum speed of aboutnots, with normal cruising speeds probably on the order ofonots. The radiated noise levels of Soviet nuclear submarines appearigher than those of

"Defined in ,hU estimate as all Soviet naval forces except the WlUstie missile- "dudetuck forces. These Marinesalso tonpede*?and could be used ingeneral purpose

by"2uenUmb"1 Soviet general purpose submarine,

i

Ciirly US nuclearo sign ili cunt submarine quieting program lias been ohsci veil. While incremental imiirovcmcnts could be made at any time, an eflrettvc noise reductionfor existing submarines would probably require calcmive modification of the engutetiing plant We do not believeignificantly quieter Soviet submarine could appear

of cruise missile submarines will probably continue forthe next several years, but at reduced rates. If llie Soviets secrole lor this type, constiuetion will probably continue througlioutol lluv estimate and mayew chm. We estimate thaiof torpedo-attack units, both diesel and nuclear powered, will continuecurrent levels for tbe rear of the period of tbe estimate, butwill be more than oil set by the retuernent of mediumlassWc believe that new construction will be focused on long-rangea result, the proportion of long-range submarines will increase fromof the current force to virtually all of the

n recent years thc Soviet Navy has increased Itsconsiderably by installing missiles in new surface ships. It now hasandestroyer types so equipped. Thc cruiserf thecarry SAMs only;estroyer types carry surface-to-surfacearry both types. Most of these ships were builtlo their missile armament, these ships also carry anti-submarinesystems. Mafor surface units not equipped svith missiles nowcruisers,estroyers, andscort types, most of whichhe Kashin class guided missile (SAM) frigate andare thc only major surface vessels currently under construction.the Soviet Navyarge number of patrol boats, some ofarmed with short-range missiles It also lias shore based cruise-missilelor coastal defense.

va-ixifoviet Naval Aviation is land based. Its capabilities are focused primarily on reconnaissance and strike missions against maritime targets and to some extent on antisubmarine warfare. The force is composed largely of jet medium bombers, most of which are equipped to carry air-to-surfaceIt also includes jet light bombers, patrol aircraft, and helicopters, it is possible that helicopter-carrying ships will be introduced. During the pact year itew Bear heavy liombers which had been modified for arole. Some additional Bears will probably be introduced Into Naval Aviation In thc next year or so. Moreover, naval operations will continue to be supported by aircraftng Range Aviation. We estimate that as the Soviet Navy receives Blinder supersonic bombers the Badger vriTl be phased out. No ASM for the naval Blinder Is operational, but we expect Deployment to begin during the next year or so. We also estimate that the Beagle light bomber will

ivot estimated numbers tad deployment ol Sovietnrrftee itupi by type. "Toblo VI grve* eitlmitedl Soviel naval alrualt.

bcgin phasing oul in lhc next year or two. but doubt ihat thc new Brewer liglil jet bomber will replace il in Naval Avialion. Tlie Soviets may develop (ollow-on aircraft of longer range for Naval Aviation to perform specialized missions such as reconnaissance and antiship operations willi air-to-surface missiles. We have no evidence, however, that such aircraft arc under development.

Capabilities Against Carrier Tosk Forces and Sea tines of Communication

naval capabilities to combat carrier task forces and to interdictof communication arc based on long-range aircraft and submarinesnuclear or high explosive missiles and HE torpedoes.Soviet Navyhampered by thc necessity of operating its submarines at greathome bases. While it is possible for Soviet submarines to operate offcoasts, only relatively small numbers can bc maintained continuouslyin these areas at any one time. Wc estimate that the Sovietsaboutong-range diesel and nuclear submarines on station inAtlantic or on the approaclies to the Mediterranean, and aboutnumber off the US west coast. If the Soviets were able to provideduring patrolsorward base, such as Cuba, the number ofIn the western Atlantic could be more than doubled. Thc threat ofsubmarine force to sea communications is greatest in tlie northeastnorthwest Pacific.irst line torpedo attack and eruise-rnlssikare available for deployment in the Atlantic approaches to Europe.number, aboutould be maintained continuously on station.

Capabilities for Anti-submarine Warfare

Since thehe Soviets haveajorheof ASW ships, particularly small coastal types. The most advanced ship capable of effective ASW is presently the Kashin-class guided missile frigate. An ASW mission may also have been assigned io thelass submarines and to thelass. Senior Soviet navalhave written articles that advocate tbe "multi-purpose" submarine, one purpose of which is ASW. Tlic Soviets also use aircraft and helicopters for ASW operations. Detection equipment now fn service includes sonar aboard surface ships and submarines, air-launched and ship-launched passive sonobuoys, airborne magnetic anomaly detectionquipment, and shore based hydro-acoustic systems of limited range and effectiveness. ASW weapons now in service include depth charges, multiple tube ASW rocket launchers, mines, and passive homing torpedoes.

Tlieeriously concerned about the Polaris threat to tlie homeland and during the past few years lhe Soviets have placed increased emphasis on ASW. New detection devices and improved ASW ordnance have appeared. ASW training has significantly increased. In addition, the Soviets haveintelligence collection efforts against US submarines and overseasbases.

c believe that at present the Soviet ability to search (or andubmerged submarine in open ocean areas is extremely limited. Detection potential, however, significantly increases within coastal areas contiguous to major Soviet naval facilities. Soviet capabilities to idimlify and destroysubmarines detected within range of an ASW platform arc considered fair, those against nuclear submarines, poor.

5V. We believe the Soviets will continue to improve ASW detection equipment and weapons systems, including land based hydroacoustic installations in some areas. Increased emphasis on the use of submarines for open ocean ASW is expected, butignificant submarine quieting program thismphasis will not resultorresponding increase in open ocean ASWWith better afloat logistics. ASW surface units will extend their patrols further seaward and the overall effectiveness of such units will probably be improved by tlie addition of belter detection equipment and weapons systems. Airborne ASW will be improved by Ihe addition of more effective turbine powered aircraft and helicopters and better detection systems and armaments. Despite these improvements, we believe that the capability of thc Soviet Navy to conduct open ocean ASW will remain severely limited for the next several years.

Copabilifios for Mino Worfarc

believe that Soviets will seek lo make maximum use of nas-alpossess large numbers of conventional mines suitable for laying bycraft, or submarines, and probably haveine with anuclearignificant quantity of these mines, as well aspercentage of conventionally armed mines with more sophisticatedfeatures, could enter the Soviet mine stockpile during tlie period ofMines could play an important role in Soviet ASW. Thea moored, contact-firing mine, with antennae. It can effectively minesurface downeet in waters as deepeet. Existing ormines would be used in waters shallower than ISO feet

Logistic Support Capabilities

the present time the USSH can logistically support limitedthe high seas for extended periods of time, and larger operationseeks. Since the middle4 they have utilized afloat logisticmainorce of submarines and surface units continuously in theSea.5 afloat logistic support was provided Soviet navalthc Philippine Sea and the Norwegian Sea. Afloat logistic supportof the Soviet Navy are being improved by the addition of nesv tankersships as well as by improved techniques. Thc Soviets are alsoa system of dispersed mobile bases, consisting of groups of auxiliarywhich submarines could deploy In time of war for repair andthc event of the loss of major sltore bases and logistic Stockpiles, sustained

17

- SLfcttf-

submarinc operation* byoviet Navy would Ih: critically dependent upon llie survival ol sudi mobile submarine support groups. In circumstances which permitted them to continue to operate, thc large and widespread Soviet fishing fleets could provide hiniled support to submarines.

V. AIRLIFT ANO SEAIIFT CAPABILITY

reater range of general purpose force eapabililies forsupport of theater operations and for more distant limited militarySoviets would have to develop substantially their aidift and sealiftSome progress in this direction is. evident. However, tliecapabilities for sealift. airlift, and amphibious assaull me still tiedof local operations.

Airlift and Air Assault

During thc past year several distinguished Soviet military theoreticians haverowing interest In distant airborne operations. Paradrop and troop airlift training has been noted with increased frequency and included for the firstombined nir-sea assault Thc number of aircraft assigned to air transport has Increased; and development work has continuedew transport aircraftarger payload.

Theightedium transports of Military Transport Aviation (VTA) assigned to airborne troops could probably transport thc assault echelons of One airborne division with all of Its combal equipmentadius_ In an emergency this capability could be augmented by other aircraft in VTA and civil aviation, This limited transport capability highlights the importance of theilitary cargo transport displayed at the Paris air show. Tliean0 pounds. It would give thc Soviets for the firsteal capability to suppori distanl operations by air. We estimate that this transportcome operational late7 ornd that there will be somen VTA byiving the Sovietsingle distant lifl capability of0 lighlly equipped men. We believe that thc number ofn VTA will level off within thc rangeircraft

The Soviel lltcatcr forces possessook heavy helicopters capable of lifting payloads of aboutons to shortore practical lift wouldonsadius ofautical miles. In addition,ound light helicopters are assigned to the several tactical air armies. These rugged and reliable helicopters are assigned throughout tlie theater forces. They play an important role in Soviet tactical planning. Wc believe that thc helicopter force will grow, that Use proportion o( heavy helicopters in the force will increase, and that new helicopters, such as thc Hiputure bladc-jet heavy helicopter, will increase the Soviet capability.

Scalifl ond Amphibious Assault

he Soviet navnl infanlry. since its recstablishmcntas been greatly emphasized in lhe Sovicl press. Wc believe there arc such units in all Tom major fleet areas, but that the total strength of Soviet naval infantry is probably no moreen. lis mission appears to support thc planned high rate of advance of land operations, probably by short leap-frog landings along tlvc coast. Its capabilities arc limited by the numbers of troops and landing craft to battalion or regiment size landings in each of the Beet areas.

Soviet military svrilers talk of more distant operations. There is, however, very litlle evidence of the actual developmentignificani longer range Soviet amphibious capability. Few specially designed amphibiousships arc available, and there is no known construction program In the USSR, which relies on Polish shipyards for this type of ship. Moreover, Soviet naval forces would be unable to provide adequate protection for any sizable forces of amphibious ships over long distances. Wc believeignificant long-range amphibious assault capabilityairly remote Soviet goal.

Soviet sealift capabilities continue to improve, particularly through the construction of large-hatched ships such as those which delivered offensive missiles to Cuba. These, as well as other types of new units being added to thc Soviet rperchant fleet, arc characterized by relatively high sustained speeds, long endurance, and heavy lifl boom capacity, all of which contributeto military sealift. Although the USSR has the fleet capacity toivisions under varying assumptions in thc Baltic, Black, and Pacific areasivisions in thc Northern Fleet area, these lift operations would require ports or olher extensive off-loading facilities in thc landing area.

VI. SOVIET THEATER FORCE CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE CENTRAL REGION OF NATO

this section wc confine the discussion to Soviet capabilities againstCentral Region of NATO- The Soviets maintain proportionatelyforces opposite Scandinavia. Southern Europe, and Turkey whichused for concurrent campaigns into those NATOovietin the Far Cast have no significant capability for amphibious assault,probably adequate lo cope with incursions shortull-scale

Curronl Operational Doctrine

the past year there have been indications that the Sovietsgreater consideration to thc possibilityon-nuclear war.military writings and exercises generally assumear inbeginATO nuclear attack; war-games are addressed to surviv-

insalpliOn af Waisaw Pact forces available for operations in Soolhem Europe tee. NIK la-flS. "Eaitem EuropeU> Wimw Pact."

GccncT

ing Mich an attack and moving as rapidly a* possible to the oiFeiisivc. Soviet tactical doctrine has thus been based on initial strikes with weapons of mass deal ruction, iu great numbers and in greal depth, with the main target the NATO nuclear capability. They envisage that thc initial strikes would be exploited by the rapid advance of heavily armored Soviel formations at rates of up toay.

n such an assault the Soviets would have to relyreat extent on forces alr.ady in place, as tlie lines of communication to the interior svould be subject to interdiction. Tliey have therclorc shaped the CSFCirtual front in being, capable of quick reaction to various contingencies without reinforcement, and have improved the capabilities of thc East European armed forces to enable them to take part in the initial operations on the flanks of thc main Soviet attack under Soviet direction. These forces provide tlie Sovietsoncentrated counter-attack potential astride die best avenues offor NATO forces. The intensive CSFC training program continues to emphasize large exercisesimulated nuclear situation. Although the Soviets proclaim only defensive intentions, and observation of the major exercisesa general counteroffensive pattern, current dispositions continue to allow the forces to initiate an atiack Into Western Europe.

Forces. Immediately Available

f thc achievement of surprise were the overriding consideration, or if thc Soviets concluded they must quickly initiate pre-emptive operations, they could launch an attack against the Central Region of NATO with Ihe forces immediately available. The Warsaw Pact forces immediately available in the forward area includeoviet divisions in Cermany and Poland andast European divisionsolish,astwenty-one of theseivisions are tank divisions, and thc remainder arc motorized rifle. Warsaw Pact air strength in the forward area consists ofombat0 Sovietast Cerman. Polish, andboutercent of these aircraft are current models.

Reinforcement

oviet operational concepts for nuclear war, the reinforcements available, the size and nature of the opposing forces, and thc geography of the areathat, if circumstances permitted, the Soviets would seek toarger force before initiating an attack against the Central Region of NATO. We estimate that reinforeemcnt would be by armies for the most part The total force, comprisingtriking forceheater reserve, probably would not exceedrmies with someivisions, including those already in place-Following Soviet organizational concepts, the striking force would probably be deployed in two echelons and would be organized into Uiree frontsofrmiesast European)otal of aboulivisions. Four or five armies (aboulivisions) would be held initially in

20

[heater reserve in western Poland and Czechoslovakia. Inoviet airborne divisions would bo redeployed lo more foiward air bases,

deployorce would require bringing forwardivisions) from the Wesluii USSK and possibly one (with fourfrom Southwestern USSIt. In all of these reinforcing ground armiesarc prepared to move immediately, svhile other elements,and front level support units, probably wouldeek or so toout with personnel. Thcivisions now in some ofwould have to be replaced with availablerivisions.

A receni sludy of the problem of organizing andorce ofovietnd II divisions and Ihc best East European divisions frompresent locations, together with army and front support units, indicates acapabilily to accomplish live movement, utilizing current road and railand to position thc force for an attack inays. However, other factors, such as the time available for essential prior preparations and limitedand the ability of the Soviets to make maximum utilisation of thesystems are uncertainties which lead us to believe thatractical matter, from the decision to do so, about three to four weeks would bc required for deployingorce under noncombat conditions. Air reinforcement probably would include three air armiesircraft from Western USSR; these units could readily redeployew days. Inland waterways and Baltic sealift could contribute substantially to the forward movement of supplies, but could not materially increase the rate of troop reinforcement Available airlift probably would be used initially for the movement of key personnel and supplies, such as nudear weapons.

The estimated reinforcement as outlined is subject to many variations in scale and execution. It is conceivable, in some circumstances, that the Soviets might deliberately reveal their intentions to reinforce, but, in any case, aon the scale and at thc rate Indicated probably would be quickly detected by the West. The Soviets could elect to reinforce more slowly andesser scale In order to preserve secrecy. Ostensible Warsaw Pact exercises and other deception techniques could bc utilized to attempt to conceal their actual intent. However, the Soviets would Iiave to weigh the advantages of such techniques against thc value of more rapidly increasing the weight of attack and to recognise the ever-present risk of premature detection with possible NATO counteraction.

Mobilization Base

Soviets have available large numbers of trained reservists whoused for filling out existing understrength units or mobilizing newone million of these reserves would probably be required to fill theofivisions to wartime strength; this would involve Beshingunits andarge number of additional combat andunits (or armies and /rents. Stocks of materiel on hand at or near exist-

21

ing unils would bc sufficient lot ihis mobilization, although some ol thcwould be obsolescent. Logistic support forobilization would be supplemented by engineer items and motor transport from civilian sources. Wc believe that manpower would notimiting factor inreater number of divisions, but equipment for such divisions would be either obsolete or substitute items. In view of tlte costing structure of their theater forces, it is probable that the Soviets would place initial stress on building stronger support elements rather than on thc immediate creation of additional divisions.

c know of no organized air reserve units, but lhe Soviets have sufficient numbers of trained reservists to bring active units to authorized unit manning levels, to create additional units around cadres of regulars, and to provideWe estimate that the Soviets also have, in addition to aircraft at tactical airfields,ld model fighters and light bombers in storage. These aircraft could be used for augmentation or replacement of aircraft now in Tactical Aviation, but would require time for maintenance check out.

ESTIMATED NUMBBHS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET LINE DIVISIONS

cxre-oonr

hu it i

IU SCO

Cat

Germany

0

0

0

USSR

2

USSR

0

USSR

1

USSR

2

USSR

Eastern USSR

0

S

*

Wc estimate tliat all ot these divisions arc raotoHeed rifle divisions end tbet there are noank or airborne divisions.

b This number may be as low asr as highhb ranee reflects uncertainlyo whether aU ot the units counted are In (act divisions.

TABLE II

ESTIMATED NUMUERS AND DEPLOYMENT OK SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS. BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS$

co

Germany

Russia

|

East

BY MODEL TOTALS, ROUNDED

140

figures do not ir

There arc alsoircraft unassigncd, but eo-loeaicd al tactical airfields, clud? nlrerafl In training, establishments.

ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS. BY MODEL

I

Old Models

Fresco Farmer Flashlight Beagle Current Models

iller Mangrove Brewer Future Models

0

0

Rounded,

* Tho Director. National Swirity Agency, believes that the projected number* of Brewer aircraft operational byndre Wo high. He boifcvee thai ranges of

fororould bc more aceu/.te projections.

-SftCRET-

TADLF. IV

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE SUBMARINES. BY CLASS

1S BY ft-BET*

PA-

TYPE OF SHIP

M.TIC

AC

Submarine *

Missile

Class ir it rf

ll

tfi-lK

n^

ft

v

Cf i

0

version "

Class

Cruise Missile

Attack

Class

Class

Class

Class

Claw

Torpedo Attack

First-Line Submarines

Submarines (all types)

Submarines

397

Thc distinction between first- and second-line submarines is an arbitrary ooe. based oa age. First-line submarinesthose of modern oonatrucUon: tbo second-line category lists unit* tromoears old. Some units carried as first lino may bo removed from cperational status ot bo scrapped earlier than on an ago basis Id order to maintain personnel li-vt-ls and the adequacy ol logistic support. Submarines io the second-line category may continue io ao operational RtaUit, and. it employedvar at aea. represent military capability.

i- Includinglass submarine converted tologlc cylinder. First observedhis submarinewag an experimental model and Is believed to have preceded the development of the Twin Cylinder version first otiK-rvcd

This number included submarines currently in the areas indicated (or test and trials but whleh will roost likely be iliT>1oycxlthe Northern Fleet.

SCCRCT

SlCflLI

TAD LB V

ICSTIMATKI) NUMBERS AND UGPLOVMlvNT OK SOVIET SU It PACK SHIPS

BY

Tvrvor vim

A

Line Surface Ship)

Dcatioycr Type*

Line Surface Sltips

Line Surface Ships

era

Second Line

Toul Surface Ship*

227

TABLE Vr

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND TYPES OF SOVIET NAVAL AIRCRAFT

OCTOftSR

Bombcts

(ncconaain&ancc)

20

Bomben

Recoo-Tanker)

B (Two AS-1)

C (One AS-2)

A

B (One ASM)

i

Bombers

Aircraft

ASW Aircraft *

ITcli copiers

Helicopters

Totals for themail number oflectronic reeoeatissAocc aircraft and aboutadger used in ASW operation*.

* It ia possible that aome Brewer light bombers will enter service as the Beagle ia phased

out-

e Mall twin-tu/boprop seaplane and probably tbe ASW variant of the Coot four-turboprop uenanort.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

I. This document was diiieminoled by rho Control Intelligence Agency, ll-i. copy ii lor Iho inlormolion ond uie of ihe recipient ond ol per,on. under hii jurisdictionoed to know bom. Additional essential dissemination moy be aulhoriicd by 'he following official! wilhin their re.pecHve departments.

ol Inlelligenco and Beseoreh, for the Deportment ol Stare

Defense intelligence Agency, for iho Office ol the Secretory ol

Oelenie ond the organization of ihe Joini Chiefs ol Stofl

Ch.ol of Stofl for Intelicence, Deportment of ihe Army, for the

Deportment of rho Army

Chief of Naval Operoiiomor the Deporimcm of lhe

Novy

Asiotant Chief ol Stofl. Intelligence, USAf. for ihe Depo.Ki.eni of rhe Air Fc*ee

of tntellflon-e. AEC. for the Atomic Energy Commission

Director, FBI. lor tho Fodvral Bvreauigohon

of NSA. (or the Nolionol Security Agency

irector of Centrol Reference. CIA. (or ony other Oeporlmenl or Agency

This document moy be retained, or desiroyod by burning in accordance with opplicoble locurity regulations, or returned 'a ihe Cenlrol Intelligence Agency by orrungemenl with the Office ol Central fiefercnte. CIA.

When this document is disseminated overseas,rteoi recipient* mo,eriod notess ol onet lhe ond oleriod. Ihe document should either be destroyed, returned to Ihe forwarding agency, or per-mission should be requeued ol ihc lorwording agency to retain it in oceordonce wiih,

liilv

DISIRIBUttON:

White House Motional Security Council Departl Stale Department ol Defense Atomic (norgy Ccmmiuion Federal Bu'eau ol tnvetiigtiiion

Original document.

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