Created: 10/7/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible




Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack

r 3









Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack











ForcesIteeent 7

in 7

C Research and Development 8

Force LcveU10

of the 13



of the Force

Research and Devclopmenl

D Future






Developments in Long Range Aviation 23

Levels and Future

Capabilities 28






of Nuclear Weapons








To estimate the strength ami capabilities of Soviet strategic attack forces throughnd to estimate general trends in these forces over the next decade or so.


Estimates of Soviet strategic attack capabilities for the present and the next few years can be made with high confidence; those for the period five toears in the future are. of course, highly tentative. The Soviet planners themselves may not yet have set clear force goals foreriod. Even if they have, it seems certain that such decisions will be modified repeatedly in response to changes in military technology, In other Soviet weapons programs, in US forces, in resource availability, and io the general Soviet view of world affairs.


A. Over the nextears, weonsiderableof Soviet strategic attack forces, particularly In retaliatorywith chief emphasis on ICBMs. We do not believe, however, that thc Soviets will expect to achieve, within the period of thisforces which would make rational the deliberate initiation of general war. We believe that they will coniinue to adhere to the concepteterrenttress on qualitative factors suggests that the Soviets see technological advance fn weaponseans by



which they can improve (heir strategic posilion relative to the West.

Force. The present Soviet ICBM forcelaunchersormidable capability in terms ofmegatonnagc but itredominantly soft,Apparently recognizing its vulnerability, the Soviets areICBMs in dispersed single silos. Within the next twonumber of ICBM launchers will approximately double, butof separate launch sites will increase from )

estimate that the Soviet ICBM force5 willperationalorcehigh side of the range would probably consist primarily ofin single silos. Byorce near the low side,substantial numbers of small, single silo launchers,incorporate greater qualitative improvement andof larger ICBMs, perhaps with multiple warheads andaids. It is possible that within the nextearsati mobile ICBM system.

I IRBM Force. During thc past year, the SovietIRBM force leveled off atperational launchers,hard, deployed atites. It is capable of deliveringfirst strike againsi targets in Eurasia, but like theforce it is soft and concenbaled. he Soviets will

' Dctericnce li defined at the prevention from action by fear of lhalate of mind brought about by the emteneeredible threal of unacceptable count? rdctiOtv

'The Asriilant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF. would reword lhe latt two sentences at follow*:

"We believe they will continue to adhere to the concenteterrent force so long ni tbey continue to beosture of strategic Inferiority, but the intensive Sovietffort rakes the poMibdlty thai Soviel leaden already are focusing on achieve, menttrategic superiority which would enable more aggressive pursuit of their political aims, perhapa wilhin lha time frame of thb estimate" 'The Director. Detente Intelligence Agency, and the Asitttant Chief ol Naval Operabonjepartment of thc Navy, do not concur In th* high tide of the estimated ICBM launcher spread forelieving II to be too high. See their footnote to

The AniMant Chid ol Staff. Intelligence. USAF, estimate* (hat the Soviet ICBM force5 will include atperational launcheri and could well be above that figure.


probably have replaced lhe major portion of tlic force with new solid-fueled missiles deployed in dispersed hard sites and on mobile launchers. Thc flexibility and survivability oforce may lead them to conclude that the same target system could be covered with fewer launchers. We estimate that ineriod Soviet MRBM/IRBM strength will stabilize atunchers.)

Submarines. The Soviet Navyallisticsubmarines,0 nuclear-powered,otaltubes. Construction of ballistic missile submarines ofendede estimate, however, that tlie Sovietsa new class which could become operationaltcertainly bo nuclear powered and will probably carrythan are carried by current classes,. 'Aballistic missileange ofprobably enter service in two or three years, and5 amay be available. At that time the Soviets willsomeallistic missile submarines, including aboutftype. Ooly recently have Soviet ballistic missilecarried out ocean patrols; this activity will increase, andaboutercent of the force will probably be on station.

recent years, the USSR has emphasized construction ofsubmarines. The Soviet Navy now.otalaunchers. Thesewere initially intended to counter naval task forces, butmay be expanded to include land targets. Constructionto be tapering off, but will probably continueeducedseveral years.he Soviets will probably havemissile submarines, possibly including someew type.time, they will probably also have available new types

ug Rangeorce of somebombersediums, is. in general much betterEurasian than for intercontinental operations. This forcegradually through attrition and retirement. The Soviets may



devclop another new aircraft of medium bomber range, but we believe it unlikely that they willollow-on heavy bomber into Long Range Aviation.he heavy bomber force will probably be reduced to aboutircraft, and the medium bomber force to, compiised largely of Blinders.' )

EL Space Weapons. Our evidence does not indicate that the USSR is developing offensive space weapons, but it Is almost certainly investigating their feasibility. We do not believe that they will deploy such weapons within the nextears. This conclusion Is based upon our judgment that such systems will not compare favorably in cost and effectiveness with ground-based systems and,esser extent upon our view that the Soviets would see political disadvantages in deploying weapons in space. The USSR has, however, orbited reconnaissance and communications satellites, and is probablyother military support systems. )

Auhlaat Chitt ofntelligence. USAF. believe* lha Soviet* wiQ continue to consider manned sBalcgic elrmft an important tlrnsent of Iheir irtercontiar Mai itruung IMcee. He citiauUf that tht USSR wilollow-on heavy bomber inlo Long Range AvutJon. He further esomateanRA will mileavy bomber*ediump to half of which couldollow-on lo (he Blinder.




Thc change in leadership in Ihc USSR hasew element of uncertainty into Soviet military policy over the coming period- Thc main change has been one of style, but although the new leaders avoid Khrushchev's demagoguery, they appear no less committed than he to ambitious programs for overall economic growth, an improvement in agriculture, more consumer goods, and stronger defenses. Yet the tight economic situation continues, thofor high-quality resources remains high, and agricultural deficiencies persist

The major difference in the coming period may be thc inabilityollective leadership to.lear course. It is already apparent that the USSR is proceeding into the next five-year economic plan periodolitical environment more favorable to military interests than in the last years cf the Khrushchev era.ullew mouths various military spokesmen arc openly asserting the need for an enlarged defense effort, the Importance of more professional participation in military-political decisions,laimreater share of Industrial support. In particular, the issue of the proper allocation of manpower between civilian and military industry has been raised, along with callsreater research and development effort to support military needs. Moreover, the restoration of Chuykov at commander of the Cround Forces, may signify an end to Khrushcliev's continual effort to pare down the generalforces and save money this way. In sum, Khrushchev's effort toestraining hand on the military sector may be giving way to thc various internal and external pressuresotal increase in thc USSR's defense effort.

Even if this trend fails to develop, we think that strategic attack forces would not be significantly affected by any tightening of defense spending. We know of no significant opposition, under Khrushchev or since, to the buildup of large missile forces. What opposition did develop was largely over thc issue of whether thc buildup should be at (he expense of other more traditional arms. Thus, while there are many political uncertainties inherenthange of leadership, we think it unlikely that this will have any short-term effect on strategic attack forces. Ova the longer term, of course, political and economic developments could lead to another crisis that could Involve specific militaryas well as general doctrinal concepts. Thus our judgments about longer term programs and goals must he qualified because of thc probability ofpolitical shifts in the Soviet leadership during the period of this estimate.

These goals will be influenced by the Soviet view of their prospects in related military fields, especially antimissile forces. Developments on the US



side are equally Important: for example, the large US ICDM (orce almostinfluences the USSR to increase its force, and US deployment of ballistic missile defemes might incline them toward even higher numbers Technological advances willajor part, aodstress on qualitative factors is already evident as part ol the USSR's effort lo improve ils relative strategic positioa

Given all these uncertainties, we rely on past and present trends, as well as Soviet requirements and capabilities, in estimating thc broad outlines of future developments. In general, we believe that over the next decade the Sovieis will continue lo adhere to the conceptelerrente believe that strategic attack forces willariety of weapon systems, with chief emphasis upon ICBMs. Weonsiderable strengthening of these forces, particularly their capabilities for retaliation. We do not believe, bow-ever, that the Soviets will expect Io achieve by thetrategic attack capabilities which would make rational litenitiation of general war.

We have considered thc possibilityoviet attempt to acquire aof offensive and defensive forces, which, going beyond deterrence, wouldirst strike which would limit damage to the Soviet Union to acceptable proportions. Considering the number, hardness, and reaction times of targets lo be struck in such an attack, and the likelihood that many, ruch as Polaris submarines, would escape destruction,oviet effort would requirearge, highly sopliislicated missUe forceidespread, very effective air and missile defense. In view of the technological and economic magnitude of thc task and the likelihood that tho US would delect and match or overmatch the Soviet effort, we believe it highly unlikely lhat Ihe Soviets could achieveorce during lhe nextears.'

Short of art effective first-strike capability as defined above, but greater lhan might seern adequate for deterrence, lie force levels which would reflect no comprehensive strategic or doctrinal design. Such forces might result from the sheer momentum of deployment programs, attempts to capitalizeemporary technical advantage,sychological urgeatch the US in delivery systems. But they would most likely result from Soviet difficulties in deBning and agreeing on force levels which would conrtitute adequate detetrence.

"Foc tne vfew ol the Atiiatant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,ee hit footnote to Conclustoo A.

'The AaitaUnl Chief of Staff. lotelllgeme. USAF. cool-Jenajor Soviet effort to achieve acounrciforce capabO.ty during thc ocxl leaicly la view of (he eenphaM which hc believe* the ScvicU cunenl'y ere oewbnf kg (hairrogram! which might eliminate thee' tUalegit Wferiorfry. WheOtaa auch acan ba attained may depend ia eomidtrable measure on (he timeliness with which anyrograms ot technological tueaithrough* are delected.




Forces and Recent Deployment

S. We believe that tho Soviet ICBM force nowperational launchers tneployment complexes. It consists almost entirely of second-generationof which thcs thc most widelyhe ICBMs noware all large, liquid-fueled missiles, and theyormidableio terms of deliverable megatonnage. It is,redominantly soft force,oft launchers andard. And It Is relatively concentrated; tho soft launchers are deployed twoite, and the bard launchers in three-silo hard sites. Tnese vulnerabilities wereajor factor in the Soviet decision to stop second-genera Hon deployment3 and, late in tbe same year, to begin deployment of dispersed single silos for third-generation ICBMs.

have now identifiedingle silos in various stages ofat several new deployment complexes and at some of the older ones.deployment involves two different types of silos, one smalt and onehave located aboutilos of thc larger type andf thesmaller are apparently being deployed in groupscystem will be deployed in the larger silos andew, smallerprobably intended for thc smaller silos.

In addition to the Jlngle-sllo deployment, we have detected two new soft sites under construction. The general scale of these sites, suggests deploymentery large vehicle, perhaps larger than theowever, we continue to believe it unlikely that thc Soviets will embark upon any substantial new program of soft-site deployment.

We are virtually certain that no additional complexes or launch sites for first- and second-generation systems remain undetected. On the other hand, we consider it likely that some single-silos have escaped detection, but we believe lhat these would be in early stages of construction; we make allowance for this in our estimate.

In Deployment

ICBM deployment programs have followed an unevenby spurts of activity, long pauses, and abrupt cutbacks of whatto be Urge-scale programs. Deployment of thc first-generationended0 after construction of only four soft launchers.ix-month hiatus in deployment of second-generation systems;program was stopped altogether at this timeery limited dcploy-

'Por ejtirnatedand perforouoco of Soviet ICBM ryitems. seo Table I.

-*op- man-

mcnt. Therogram resumed in the fill2 and continuedut it too apparently stopped short of completion. In most cases, the primary cause of interruptions was probably the prospective availability of improvements or of new and superior missile systems. In some instances, importantin existing programs were probably contributing factors Whatever the reasons, however, tlte record clearly indicates that In tbc past the USSR has accepted considerable slippage. In progressing toward whatever force goals it has set for itself.

The eurrcnt single silo ptogiom represents thc greatest effort the Soviets have yet made in terms of 1CDM sito activations and sustained construction activity. This does not, however, appear torash program. Wa believe that construction progress at individual launch sites has been relatively slow and deliberate. Moreover,5 there have been fcidicatiomecline in construction starts of small silos.

Present evidence does not Indicate the reasons .for this unevennexs. but thc past may provide some guidelines. In earlier ICBM programs, thc Soviets evidently limited deployment because tbcy recognized shortcomings of systems then available or had better systems under development. Soviet decisions to do so were made in the contexttrained economic situation in which the resources to be divided between development and deployment were limited. Thc advent of small-silo deployment, with ils implicationmaller, cheaper, more rapidly deployable ICBM. raised thc possibility that the USSR had acquired the means of materially and rapidly improving its strategic position relative lo the US. The Soviets may yet fix upon this system for very large-scalebut evidence to date docs not indicate that they have decided to do so.

C. Research and Development

The sustained and vigorous pace of Soviet ICBM research andstands in sharp contrast to Soviet deployment programs. During the past year, ICBM development has involved the flight-testing of at least three new systems. There arc nowperational launchers and probably anothernder construction. Most of these Facilities can be associated with'known ICBM systems or with the space program. We believe that some, however, arefor systems now under development which have not yet reached the flight test phase.

TA*Syriem. We thinx that theroduct of the same design team that produced theystem; it appears to represent an intent toore accurate missilearger payload. Therogram at Tyuratam has been highly successful. Sincehe Soviets have conductedlight tests of theith only five failures. Four of the tests were extended

runge firings: Io ihc Pacific. Two re-entry vehicles have been tested wiih (heoeayloadounds; this was firedm. in the extended range tests. In the past year, five SS Os have carriedheavier payload, estimated0 pounds; with thii warhead, the maximum range would be. m

characteristics of thend the timing and progress of itsprogram lead us lo estimate thai Iheystem will be deployed insilos in the field. It will probably become operational earlyf the first of those silos, and it may bo operational now In someihrec-silo hard sites.

Theystem, The Soviets began flight-tcsting of another new ICBM system, thenhe program appeared lo progresswith only one failure in eighl Bighl tests, lhe last firing, inuccessful extended-rangeo the mid-Pacific There have, however, been no further tests since thai time. It is possible lhat the present standdown represents only an interruption. In this-case, we believe that theould not be introduced into service until6 and that deployment would be quite limited. We doubt, however, that lheystem will be operationally deployed.

Other Systems Under Development. Since early this year lhe Soviets have been Bightew missile, which we believe tomalt liquid-fueled ICBM and have designated thehe new system has probably been testedoft site. Early results were poor, but the program has recently been accelerated, with improved test results. Ofnown attempts, six flight tests appear to have been generally successful. Wo estimate that theill become operational byhen many of the smaller silos, for which we think it is intended, are completed.

e believe that lhe Soviets are alsomall, solid-fueled ICBM. They exhibited what mayrototype of this missile. Ihe Savage, in the Moscow parade last May. There have been several tests of unidentified vehicles at Tyuratam which failed, but ihere is no evidence lhal any of theseolid propellent missile, and we arc virtually certain that the Savage has not been successfully flight-tested in its three-iiage configuration. We believe, however, that the SovieU plan toolid fueled ICBM system based oo ihis prototype. If flight testing begin* soon, it could become operational in6 or

ur estimate that Ihe liquid-fueledill initially be deployed in the small single silos is based primarily upon the course and liming of its lestIt is possible thai Ihe delays observed in thc small silo program in Ibe field relate in some manner to the early lack of success in lheeat program.

-top scene*

The small, solid.fueled ICBM now under development will almost certainly also be deployed In silos, possibly in some ol (he small silos now under construction.

Future Trends in Development. The Soviets are continuing theof large, liquid-fueled vehicles. In July, they placed in orbit Proton I, their heaviest earth satellite to date. The booster used in this launching had an estimated thrust ofillion pounds.issile, it could0 pound payloadangem. This vehicle has not yet been tested as an ICBM. We continue to estimate, however. Oiat the Soviets willery large ICBM in small numbers for useglobal rocket" or ascarrier forwarhead. If testing "begins toon, the Soviets couldery large ICBM system operationalt may be deployed in thc two new soft sites'fseer in the oldaunchers after that system Is phased out.

Tbe substantial advantages in survivabilityail-mobile ICBM system lead us to estimate that, If they have not already done io. the Soviets willesligate the possibility of developing one. If the Soviets.doail-mobile ICBM, they might adapt some existing system to this concept. We be-lieve, however, that the special problems involvedobile system would leadong period of development, and thatystem could probably not become operational untilhey may deployystem in the period of this estimate, but we have no basis foronfident estimate of tbe likelihood of their doing so.

The evidence of currentctivity provides no basis for estimates of other follow-on systems which will be operationalhese have not yet reached the flight test stage, and some probably have not reached the drawing boards. However, the history of Soviet ICBM development to date and current activities provide some indicationi of future trends. Wethat thc Soviets will pursue solid propellant development andhey wiU probablyollow-on small, solid fueled ICBMuccessor to their first system of this type. The Soviets willalso coniinue with development of large liquid fueled missiles and couldew system operational sometimene effect of USof an ABM system might be toremium on large payloads which could carry multiple warheads or penetration aids.

uture Force Levels

do not believe that over the next two years the USSR could addto the operational ICBM force beyond tlie sites which are nowin thc field. We have noted the probability thai some ofnot been detected and make allowance for this in our estimate. Weassumed that all groups of small silos will be filled out toilosview of estimated construction times, it is unlikely that new launch groups


begun now or hereafter would be operational byur estimate of operational Soviet ICBM strength over the next two years is presented in tbe following table.






SS-Very Large


Hard lT>lpU Sib)










H2-H8 09












AjiiiUM Chief of St.1T. Intelligence, USAF. would eiUlnatc tbe tola! nuiober of operational ICBM launcher* as folhiwi:

1 OcroBer.

He eeeMtderi that fee the neer-terei. the majority ciunute male* inaaScimt anowanoe IM launchers and pouible launch cotnpSrae* net ret ideouSeA He believe* the corripleted launcher* at Tyuratam would be available for operational osc lo wartime to h* Include! them In hu total of op-ralrfinal launcher*.

Ir poiiibte lhat inme of time lile* aie equipped with theyiteri

"ie of the imall nVn now undei ronitructioo may be intendedolid-fueled ICBM.

' We eatimale thai tome,f lhe louDcber* et Tyweuun have an operational ai well a*ad mining roU. We (edge that the other launcht Tyuratam are not normally available for.arying number* of Ihem could be pieparird lo Jue ICBMi at the US. dependingtbe amount of advance notice.

orct Coots0S. In our previous estimate, wooviet ICBM force ofperational launchen forhis estimate took into consideration economic, strategic, and technicalAn important factor in thc selection of this range was the timingossible new, small ICBM system. The low side of the range assumed that no such system would be brought inhe high side assurned its Introduc-


(iont now appears thatystem will be operational byur present estimate forperational launchers.*

We recognise lhat Soviet planners may not yet have decided on the size and composition of (he ICUM force foreriod. Even if they have, il seems certain lhat such decisions will be modified lepeatedly In response to changes In military technology, in other Soviet weapons programs, in US forces, in resource availability, and in the general Soviet view of world affairs. Despite these urtcertataties. we continue to estimate that,he Soviets will regard their ICBM force as the primary elementtrategic posture designed to deter attack byhreat of heavy and assured retaliation. On this basis, and taking into consideration the factors cited above, we estimate that the Soviet ICBM force Inill be somewhereperational launchers-*

Within this range, we ihink thateneral rule, the missile systemsmaller force would be more advanced thanargerorce near the high side of the range would probably "consist primarily of small, less expensive ICBMs In single silos and would involve the retention of second-generation launchers well intoeriod. Byorce near the low side though including substantial numbers of small, single silo launchers,

1 Tlie, disagrees with the high ildc ol the spreadOO Ine estimated an ICBM force o(peratioral launchers lor mld-iWTO, We also said that It appealed that the attainment of the high tide oforce at that time woold be Uety only if the USSRmall ICBM aad daptered IIapid latehe advent of single silo4 indicated that deploymentmall ICBM probably would occurear earbtr than wc had eiprcted.Ihe scale of the construction staid tn lha small tilo program It appears obvious that the low side ofpread "ill no longer obtain. There appears, however, to have been somewhatecline in construction starts of small silos. Further, we cannot determine the construction tkne involved. Considering their factors, we cannot aay that the high sideot still valid. Therefore, be believe* lhal the high aide of thc spread should.

The Aiililant Chief of Stat.SAF. believes hii pr'vfaus estimalfoviet operational ICBM launched by mid-lWOonservative estimate.

'The Director, Defense Intelligence Ageniy, and the Aniiiint Chief of Naval Open lions (Intelligence) do not concur in the high stale of theCBM launcher spreadore* wouldar greater emphasis on numerical deployment elsJe forces lhan has been evidenced to date. Qualitative smprc*rciaeBtt ka lhe ICBM force coupled with developments in other strategicoth offensive aad defensnr would tend lo constrain Ihe numerical growth of the force. Further, the Soviets mull reason thai an ICBM force which serins lo reach fo* numerical parity wiih lhe US wouldeaction to iheir duadvantnge. For these reasons. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and tha Astlstant Chief of Naval Operation* (Intelligence) believe thai th* high side of lhe spread Inhould notiuoehers. Th* growth in force capabilities05 would ba primarily qualitative rather than oauuauv*.

The Assistant Chief of Slaff. InleUigence, USAF. esrirnalei lhal the Soviet ICBM force5 wifl include atperational launchers and co-Id well be above that figure.



would piobably incorporate greater qualitative improvement and significant numbers of larger ICBMs. perhaps with multiple warheads and penetration aids, and possibly rail mobile launchers. In the case o( the smaller force, the phase-out of second-generation systems would probably begin earlier, and would probably be completed

Wcaunchers as the lower limit forecause we think It very unlikely that the Soviets wouldorce smaller than Ihisatisfactory deterrent. On (he other hand, they would probably judge that ii ihey appeared to be acquiring as many ICDMs as the US Ihey would simplyurther arms race and that as Ihey approached the upper limit of our estimate this danger would Increase. We do not believeorce "goal-near the upper limit wouldeparture from the doctrine ofThus we intend our estimateange within which we believe theorce will fall, not as alternatives representing alternative Soviet strategic concepts.

Whatever the Soviel force goal, deployment programs are likely totheir uneven course of recent years. The Soviets will almost certainly not fix upon any one ICBM system for urgent deployment. Rather they will continue to experiment andmprove their missile technology. Interruptions andwill probably occur as Improvements are incorporated and promising new weapons are brought in.

E. Capabilities of the Force

Whether falling toward lhc high or low side of the estimated range, the survivability of the Soviet ICBM force, and hence its retaliatory capability, will steadily increase. Witliln lhe next two years, the number of aiming points represented by individual launch sites will increase fromt present to at. As soft sites are phased out. and single silos come to comprise lhe great bulk of the force, the number of launchers will roughly equate to the number of aiming points.obile system, if introduced, would pose difficult targeting problems.

There will alsoeneral improvement In the performanceof operational ICBMor example, accuracy will probably be improved from, for currently operational systems to.0.eadiness and reaction time will improve markedly as single silos are deployed and soft sites are phased out and will become more uniform throughout lhe force. This development, together with improvemcnls in control and communications and experience gained in exer-

"Such uuprovemeDU ara noted to detail lo Table 1.


cises. wiil servo lo Improve coordination in operations. There should also be some improvemcut in reliability, particularly in thc case of solid-fueled missiles.

Refrt Capability. There is good evidence that most soft ICBM sitesefire capability. We cannot determine the actual number of missilesfor refire from these sites, and we believe that this capability Is not uniform throughout the force. We believe, however, that on the average ar least two missiles are availablo for each soft launcher. Considering requirements of hard sites, which we believe have no refire capability, we estimate the currentICBM Inventory atuitles. This refire capability will dechne as soft sites aro phased out. If tho SovieU wish toecond-strike capability, they may come to rely more heavily on submarine-launched missile systems or mobile ICBMs.

Hardn. we estimated the design overpressure of Soviet hard sitessie have acquired no evidence which would lead us to revise this pdgment;ecent statement by Marshal Krylov {to the effect that design overpicssure of Soviet hard sites Issi) tends to support It. We have no evidence that the Sovieu are investigating supcrhardening techniques, but they almost certainly will do so over the next

Penetrafion Aid, and MultipU Warhtads. We have no firm evidence that the SovieU are developing penetration aids or multiple warheads.lhe large payloads of some Soviet ICBM systems present an obvious opportunity for tradeoffs between nuclear yield and such devices. Relatively unsophisticated types of peneration aids such as fragmenting boosters and balloons aje willun present Soviel technical capabilllics and could be developed withoutrecursor nuclear burst could be developed on the basis offromesU. Development of other penetration aids such as shielding, decoys, and jammers would require flight tests. The chances are good that we would detect suchA US decision to deploy an ABM system would spur Soviet development of pene-baboo aids.

Multiple warheads could be developed to increase the effectivenessiven number of deployed missiles, although total megatoonege would be re-

ard tits li designed to remain compUuly oprtabUiwcifiadfiorn given weaponhii specified overp.ea.ure Is callederpiassure.he overpressure at which, for given weaponite become.he detlro overpressure estimated ibove Is0 MT weapon. Hardness will .ary wuh dJTerencea In practice and tn weapon yield.


involved, oo rnear^jjul rrt-nat. of the designdre.wk

equirnd, be believe*iguren should be used.



duced. These would alsoonus effect of complicating the defense. Deployment of multiple warheads would probably be pieccded by one or two years of testing, which we would probablyore sophisticated multiple warhead could be designed to direct several warheads carriedingle missile against separate targets, allhough this would involve complex problems of system accuracy and reliability. Thc Soviets could piobably attain ancapabilityultiple independently guided re-entry vehicleV) In the.

Soviet decision to undertake development of MIHVs would affectsize and composition of the ICBM force. If development werecould leadreater emphasis on large ICBMs. and it might inclinetoward smaller numbers of launchers. Present evidence does notthatecision has yet been made. Warheads and guidanceunder development do not appear relatedIRV system.


the past year, deployment of. MRBM and theIRBM came to anhe force now basf them hard, deployed atess than wc had estimated foreflecting theof someew more soft sites are likely to be deactivatednext year or so, but the size and composition of the foice wiU probablyconstant through












estimated dime!eristics and performances of Soviet MRBM and IRBM systems, see Table 2.



apabilities of the Force

The bulk of thc MRBM/IRBM force is deployed within range of targets in Western Europe and parts of North Africa and the Middle East Theaboutercent of the launchers, is deployed in the Caucasian,Asiatic, and Far Eastern regions of the USSR. This force is capable ofevastating first slrikeowerful retaliatory attack against Eurasian targets; it can also attack; some important targets outside of Eurasia, such as those in Greenland and Alaska. We believe that some of the MRBM/ IRBM launchers would be used in support of theater operations.

Soft launchers are generally deployed fourite, with two or three sitesomplex; the few remaining sites which are singly deployed willbe deactivated. Wc believe that all of these soft launchersetire capability. The MRBM hard sites contain four launch silos, and the IRBM hard sites, three. Evidence acquired during the past year indicates that both MRBM and 1BBM hard sites are configured for in-sllo. launching; they probably have not been providedetire capability. We still have no good evidence as to thc hardness of these sites, and continue to estimate that they are com-parable to hard ICBM sites (see.

In addition to thc primary launch sites described above, fixed field sites have been prepared near about two-thirds of the Soviet MRBM complexes. These areas usually contain four clearings, believed to be launch positions, and few if any permanent facilities. We have now identified aboutuch sites. These sites do not all appear to serve the same purpose. We believe that some are intended for use by MRBM units as alternate firing positions under certain conditions, such asecond salvo. Others, which do not appearas alternates, may be used for field training of launch crews.

C. Current Research and Development

believe that the Soviets are developing follow-on missile systemsrange. In the past two years, we have not detected theany such missile on thc Kapustin Yar range, but, we believe that flightin the offing which will include testsolid fueled missile. In theparade, the Sovietsobile, solld-fueled missile (Scamp)Marshal Krylov claimed an intermediate range capability. Ourthat, depending on payload weight, this missile could probablyranges; if this Is the case, however. It almost certainly has notflight-tested to full range. Flight testshortt Kapustin Yar, under way sinceould relate tothe Scamp, which may prove toactical rathertrategicthe evidence points to increased mobility and solid-propellant mis-



sites as imporlant new developments in lhc Soviet MRBM/IRBM force over the next several years.

D. Future Trends

We believe that the USSR will replace the major portion of its MRBM and IRBM force during tlie nextears. The SovieU are certainly aware of the vulnerability of their fixed soft sites and multi-launcher hard sites, and new deployment will probablyix of dispersed bard sites and mobile launchers. Solid-fueled missiles will probably be used in both deployment modes. It is possibleingle solid-fuel missile system could fill both an MRBM and an IRBM role. It could become operational as early asnixed or mobile mode.

ew missile system would probably be retrofitted, at least initially. Into existing hard MRBM sites, but thc Soviets would probably wish to augment this deployment with dispersed single silos. It may also be deployed in IRBM hard sites, but if the Soviets require very large payloads for some" of the force they mayew liquid-fueled IRBM to replace thef so. itwould not become operational9

he USSR will probably have begun to phase out soft sites and to replace them with hard sites; some mobile units will probably be operational.e believe that thendystems will have been largely phased out, and that the force will consist primarily of solid-fueled missiles deployed in hard sites; by that time there will probablyizable number of mobile units, The capabilities of the force will be greatly improved.of solid-fueled missiles in fixed sites will increase alert rate and reliability and decrease reaction time. Deploymentobile system would greatly decrease thc vulnerability and increase the flexibility of the force. By employing concealment and irregular movement, the Soviets could make it very difficult to obtain evidence as to actual numbers and locations of mobile launchers. Mobile launchers could also be shifted tohanging threat; for example some might be deployed along the Chinese bordereriod of worsening Sino-Soviet relations.

We believe that in general the number of Eurasian targets which the Soviets will wish to cover will remain fairly stable over the next decade, and that they are unlikely to expand their MRBM/IRBM force beyond present levels. Some portion of the present force, however, probably represents an attempt by the Soviets to enhance survivability through numbers. If, as wcthe future force willix of mobile and hard deployment, they may conclude that the same target system could be covered with lesser numbers. We estimate, therefore, that0 thc MRBM/IRBM force will probably


0 operational launcheri and that ineriod (he force will stabilize at


urrent Soviet missile submarine forces are the outgrowth of decisions takeno develop quickly an extensive but unsophisticatedInitially, long-rangelass submarines were converted to cany ballistic missiles; this effort was followed by construction of two new classes of ballistic missile submarines, thelais and thelass. The later development of cruise missile submarinesimilar pattern, with conversion oflass by Installation of cruise missile launchers (opside. and subsequent production of two new classes, the nuclear-powered F. class and the diesellass. The Soviet Navy now basallistic missile submarinesubes andruise missile submarines0 launchers."

ince their inception, Soviet missile submarine forces have been plagued by changing concepts of their missions, by the operational limitations of tbeir weapon systems, and by technical problems in developing advanced propulsion and navigational systems. These factors delayed their maturation as an cflective strategic strike force. Only recently have Soviet ballistic missile submarines regularly carried out ocean patrob. and even these pattols appear to be in staging ateas rather than on strike stations. During the past year, some nuclear-powered cruise-missilo submarines have abo conducted out-of-arca operations.

nitially, the SovieU intended to employ rnissile submarinesecision was appaiently made8 to limit potential (argeU for naval ballistic missile strikes to enemy naval bases and naval support facilities. This decision influenced training, construction programs, and weaponsIt ledalt in new construction ol current classes of ballistic missile submarines and to an increasa in cruise missile submarine construction. The last ballistic missile submarine,lass unit, was deliveredn that year, however, public statements by senior Soviet officials suggested that the Navy may have once again been assigned lo strategic attackf so, new ballistic missile submarines systems may now be under development or In production.

" The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF, would liuatt the following new paragraph at Iht* point:

As part of their program of retrofitting MH/lHBM iltes and assigning part of the MRBM rote lo mobile units, the SovieU may elect to deploy some new small ICBMs In ei tiling hard or soft MR/IIIBM (ilea.rogram Is technically feasible and would Improve the Soviet ICBM pot-:iion at leaser cost than the conitroccjo* of new ICBM launch faculties.

" For characteristics of Soviet submarine-launched missiles and of Soviel missile submarines, seend ti. respectively.

" Fe* coverage of US targets by mb-iinne-lt jn<hrd mm.In. see map.

uch new programs are not likely, however, lo affect Soviet missilestrength for the next few years. Our estimate for the period throughhich follows, reflects the hiatus in construction of ballistic missile submarines, and the continuation of cruise missile submarine programs.


15 8

Baujitic MusrLK* Nuclear



W 08





Missile '






*lisiau carry thtee mliide tuber each; andonvetiion clus, two; we believe thatI claw will alto carry three mastics.

'Equipped with.obmerged-iaurich missile. The earlier classes carryile surface-launched.

" Numbert of launchen carried by these elaiser varies ai followsi Ed.I,lui..

A. Ballistic Missile Submarines

e estimated In.ew class of large ballistic missile submarines was in production. We based this estimate on evidence which, upon subsequent analysis, appear to relate to existing classes. Nevertheless, we think that the SovieU will probablyew class of ballistic missile submarine. There Is no direct evidence ofrogram, but Soviet statc-menU of interest in naval strategic strike forces, plus fhe particular advantages of these forces, point in this direction.rogram may have started during the readjustments of Soviet military forces which took place after the Cuban missile crisis; if so, the Erst unit could become operational The


claw will almost certainly be nuclear powered. It will probably carry more missiles than are carried by current clajscs.nd these willbe of an improved type. J


Missile Systems. All three ballistic missile submarine classes originally carried.issiielow-paced program tslass to thehich has the advantages of longernd submerged launch.lass submarines may be similarly converted; the Soviets have done extensive work on the superstructure of several of these units.

New ballistic missiles may be underaval missile, which wC designate Serb, was paraded in4 andhe external con-figuration of the Serb indicates that it could beingle stage liquid or two-stage solid vehicle. Ii the former, it may be thc. missile using liquidigh Soviet naval officer rceentiy claimed that they have another missile, newer thanerb. This' new missile allegedly employs solid propellants. is capable of underwater launch, andange in excess. To date, however, we have not seen evidence thatissile is being tested.

We think It probableew ballistic missile employing solid orliquid propellants andange ofCO nautical miles, will come into service in two or three years.5 the Soviets may haveolid propellant missileange ofautical miles, Io any event, we believe that many of the presently operational ballistic misiiles will be phased out over thc next ten yean.

B. Cruise Missile Submarines .

Thc Soviet cruise missile submarine fleet was initially designed to counter naval task forces, particularly carrier forces. As the number of cruise missile submarines increases, however, their mission will probably expand, and the submarines may be targeted against land targets. We believe that cruise missile submarines are now being built at four of tbe five Soviet submarine construction yards, and Ml units are being delivered each year. Of these, four or five arcI submarines,Iass diesel powered units. For thc next few years the Soviets will probably continue to build both the E-lasses,Iass production will probably end8lass production apparently is to be reducedate this year, production of this class will probably end at one of the two yards now building it

Soviet force level goals for their cruise missile fleet will be determined in part by future developments in both US and Soviet weapons systems. The Soviets may continue to expand this Beet in order to complicate defensive


measures with diversified strategic capabilities. In this case, construction ol cruise missile submarines would probably continue for thc nextears, and mightollow-on forI class. On the other hand, the Soviets may decide to restrict cruise missile submarines to tactical missions. If so, they may now be approaching planned force levels, and cruise missile submarinewould probably be phased out

Systems. Most, and perhaps all, Soviet cruise missilecarry.issile, which entered serviceLmissile has active radar homing guidance, possiblyan infrared system for use against naval targets. If used against shoremissile would probably employ an inertial guidance system. We believelonger range version of this missile,.ill enter servicenext year or two. We also believe that the Soviets, during the period ofwill develop new types of cruise missiles having higher speeds,and better protection against countermeasures,

C. Operational Capabilities

During the pastonths, thc Soviets have greatly stepped up ballistic missile submarine operations and have begun to send these units regularly into the north central Atlantic and the north central Pacific. These submarines are not deployed on strike stations, that is, within missile range of potential targets, but generally patrol within two or three days steaming time of important target areas. We estimate that this patrol activity will slowly but steadily increase, and that someercent of the Soviet ballistic missile submarine force will consistently be on station

We have not identified any significant changes in the operationalof Soviet missile submarines during the past year. We believe that the Soviets are presently concentrating on improving thc reliability of existingand subsystems. For example, they appear to have gained considerable confidence in the reliability of their nuclear-powered submarines and now send them on frequent long patrols and on under-ice operations. In contrast, as recently as two years ago these submarines rarely left local waters and then only when accompanied by supporting surface ships.

Present Soviet nuclear submarines can probably develop submerged speeds of aboutnots, and with improvements in existing propubion systems may reach speeds of aboutnots within the next few years.hc newest Soviet submarines may be capable of reachingnots.

The radiated noise levels of existing Soviet nuclear submarines appear higher than those of early US nuclear submarines. These levels can be reduced, but we have insufficient evidence lo determine the extent to which noisetechniques have been applied to existing operational Soviet submarines.



Incremental'improvements could be made at any time; however, an effeclivc noise reduction program for existing submarines would probably requiremodification of Ihe engineering plant. We do not believeew, significantly quieter Soviet submarine could appear

The diving capabilities of existing Soviet missile submarines rangeeet (normal operating limit) for thelaxt lo aneet forL With present materials and technology, the SovieU should soon be able to achieve norma! opera ting depths ofeet- The SovieU are studying the feasibility of very deep diving lubmarines, Sovietcontinue to report the progressesearch submarine capableeet which ts scheduled to carry out test diveshey mayilitary submarine capable of opciatlng fiom two to three times deeper than present uniU.

We have little evidence on which to base an estimate as to whether the SovieU still rely mainly on celestial and bottom contour methods of navigation. There is evidence, however, of Soviet interest inquipment Several under-ice cruises by nuclear submarines suggest thc existence of an advanced navigation system, perhaps inertial. New navigation systems will probably be in service within thc next few years; these mightLK system, an earth satellite system, or an Inertial system-

6A. Support. The Soviets have made strong eSorts during the past two year to improve logistici support for their submarine forces. New types of auxiliaries have been built, new bases established, and existing bases have been expanded and hardened by buHding bunkers and underground storage Training facilities and devices have also been improved. Wc believe that the submarine baseis nearly complete, although the Soviets will probablyew more small dispersal bases or sites. They will, however, continue to expand their fleet of submarine auxiliaries, constructing several large, modem submarine lenders and special purpose ships.

uture Force levels

he present rate of submarine construction will probably not change greatly over the nextean. The nature of the conttruction programs,will change considerably. It likely that the oldest classes of both cruise and ballistic missile submarines, both of which ate conversions, will be scrapped or placed in reservee estimate that byomeallistic missile submarines, including perhaps sevenew class, will be in service-Byomeallistic missile submarines including aboutew class will probably be operational. If. as we bebeve. dulse missile submarine construction will be curtailed, we estimate that aboutf these submarines will be in service Inonstruction may stop altogether at that time. On the other hand, the SovieU maytrategic attack rote for lids type, tn


which case construction would probably conlinuc throughout the period of (he estimate, and aboutf these submarines, possiblyew type, would be in service by


uring the past year there has been no mayor change in the capabilities and structure of Soviet Long Range Aviationhe bomber force stilligriificant portion of thc USSR's capability for intcrconrioental strategic attack, but Soviet LRA, by reason of its equipment, basing, andis in general much better suited for Eurasian operations. Long Range Aviation now consists ofeavy bombersediums, some of which are utilized as tankers."

A. Recent Developments In Long Range Avialion

n general, LRA flight activity during the past year bas continued to' reflect training for the primary missions of intei continental attack by the heavy bombers and peripheral attack by (he mediumongc Range Aviation has longecondary mission of supporting naval operations.his mission has received more emphasis. Maritime operations by medium and heavy bombers of LRA have been conducted both independently and inwith Naval Aviation. Naval Aviation has nowew Bearaircraft, and there are indications that it will acquire some more. The extent of LRAs involvement in maritime operations may gradually diminish as Naval Aviatioa acquires more long-range aircraft

he heavy bomber force contains about equal numbers of Bear turbo-props and Bisonodification program for thc Bear has produced several variants. Theomber, not equipped for aerial refueling. Thes modified to carry- Kangarooissile; some of this type are equipped for aerial refueling. Theissile carrier which is equipped both for aerial refueling and reconnaissance. The current operational force contains aboutear As andfariants. The Bears assigned to Naval Aviation appear to represent still another variant. Bear D, which ls configured for reconnaissance missions arjd does noteapons delivery capability. There is firm evidence tha( Bearnd there has been considerable activity since then at the

" The Assistant Chief of SUIT. Intelligence, USAF'. generally dissents to this section because he considers that it rrunimiiee the present and fuhue capabilities of Soviet Long Range Aviationnd seriously underestimates the manned aircraft threat to the continental United Statos In the eveavl of war,

" For characteristic* of all-to-surface missiles and bomber aircraft of Long Range Aviation, seend 5.

"The AtiL'taut Chief of Staff, InteUigence. USAF. believe* that th* ititelligenc* available on training indicate* continued Soviet Interest In intercontinental use of the medium bomber,


Bear production facility. At least pari of this activity is accounted for by the Bear modification programs,radual rise in the number of Bears identified in operational units suggests that production may have continuedow rate.

of theew medium bomber with supersonicproceeded slowly. Deliveries may have been interrupted byWhatever the reason, however,re now in thc LRAafter three years of production, and these are concentratedewWc have no evidence that the Blinder B, which was designed toKitchenlr-tosurface missile, has as yet appeared Inbut we believe that it will enter service within the next year or sa

B. Forco Levels ond Future Trends

believe that the Soviets will maintain their heavy bomber forcethe present level over the next two years. Blinder deliveries willstepped up. but not sufficiently to offset the continued phase-out ofestimate of the composition of Sovietver the next two yearsbelow.


1 Octobct

Heavy Bombers *




Medium Bombers ft: Tankers


bombers of LRA. we believebere-ean, moreadgers, end aboutlinders In Na-al Aviation.

Arrlstaot Chfef of Staff. Intelligence.imite* that LRA force common for Ihe next two yean wil reflect the high tide of the heavy bomber Md tanxer postttoneBect retention ofgen tand

for bothnd

t is evident that, in building their strategic attack forces, the Soviets are pacing chief reliance on ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, the tattcduction of Blinder indicates that they stillequirement for manned aircraft in Eurasian operations, although it isuch smaller requirement than theyfor the Badger. They will probably attempt to preserve and extend the life span of the present force of heavy bombers, but we do not believe that


(hey will replace them. Thus we believe (hat the Soviets Intend to retain sdable bomber forces which will decrease gradually through attrition and retirement.**

eu* Aircraft Development. There is no evidence which identifies specific Soviet development effortollow-on heavy bomber. Current Soviet work in large aircraft seems directed primarily toward the development of new transports, This work advances the state-of-the-art andechnological and production base which could apply to bomber development. If the USSR has activelynd committed funds for production anda new heavy bomber could enter service ineriod. Oa thc basis of previous experience, we believe that US intelligence would obtain indications of the development and production of such an aircraft one to three years before its introduction into operational units.

Considering thc probable growth of Soviet ballistic missile capabilities over the nextears, we consider it unlikely that thc USSR willollow-on heavy bomber into Long Range Aviation during the period of thist is possible, however, that Soviet views on the primacy of rm'ssilj; weapons will change For example, US deployment of an ABM system might lead them backhc manned bombereans of penetrating the new defenses.

Thc requirement which led to the Blinder may lead thc Soviets toollow-on aircraft to perform specialized missions in peripheral areas, such as reconnaissance and antiship operations with air-to-surface missiles. Inime period, thc Soviets couldnew supersonic-dash medium bomber with better range and altitude than Blinder, orupersonic cruise bomber of somewhat shorter range than Blinder. In any case, the Soviets' decision toew bomber for LRA or naval use will depend in part upon their experience with Blinder. We have no evidence that such an aircraft is now under development.

Force Levelse estimate that the heavy bomber force will be gradually reduced by about one-fourth over the next five years.. the aging force will decline more rapidly. We believe that at the end of this period the Bear component will have been reduced to.aboutircraft. The Bison bombers will probably all be phased out,umber

"The Asiiium Chief of Stafl. Intelligence. USAF, would delete the tut two sentence*substitute the following:

ollow-on medium bomber probably wfll be introduced. Tbe Soviets will probably attempt to preserve and extend tlie life ipan of tbe present force of heavy botoben. and weollow-on heavy bomber Li likely to be introduced to maintain the trie of tbe force es well as improve IU capabilities. Thus we believe that the SovieU (Mend to retain (liable bomber forces throughout the period of this estimate.*

"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes it is likely that Use Soviets wiUew heavy bomber lo theeriod.


of Bison lankers will probably be retained. The reduction of (he heavy bomber force may be more rapid than we have eiiiiriaied, possibly as the resul( of transfers to Naval Avialion, orecisionut the force. For at least (hc next several years, however, the Soviets will probably continue their efforts to extend (lie life of thc heavy bombers now in service-**

he Badger force will probably continue to decline more rapidly (haa (he heavy bomber force.t will probablyircraft, andhc number of Blinders will probably Increase tond then remain relatively constanthus, we estimate that inhe Soviets willedium bomber force of. possibly including some aircraftew type,**

C. Operallonol Capabilities

Our evidence has reflected continuing Soviet efforts to maintain an efficient and well-organized strategic air force. Crew training and maintenance, while not up to US standards, appear adequate. Bombing proficiency and use of ECM have received particular emphasis.Heavy bombers haveengaged in low altitude penetration practice. The bulk of the force is based atermanent airfields, some of which are now being improved probably to accommodate theew aircraft are permanently based at two Arctic airfields. There is oo evidence that LRA units arc routinely on airborne or constant alert status.

The force has formidable capabilities for operations io peripheral areas. Its capabilities for intercontinental attack, however, have remained limited primarily by the range of thc jet bombers which make up the bulk of theerial refueling and Arctic training in the past several years have reflected Soviet efforts to overcome this limitation. The USSR bas ootaircraft specifically for tanker use; instead. Bisons and Badgers are converted for use as tankers. In-flight refueling and proficiency is probably

" Tbe ArrWant Chlel of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. believe* the Sorlet, wflj cootnoe to emphasize improvement of their manned strategic bomber capability as an important adjunct to their ICBM force. He estimate* the heavy bomber force will be maintained close to Its preseol strengthombination of effortsitend the life of bombers now lo service and the introductionollow-on bomber.

"Tbe Assistant Chief of Staff, InteUigence, USAF, does notmediumwfll decline at the rale Indicated by this paragraph. He estimate* the futurestrength as follows:

I. '




' See Map* depicting range capabilities of LRA been ben against North America.


fairly high Sn those heavy bomber regiments where it has been regularly practiced.

ng Range Aviation has gained extensive flying experience in thc Arctic region. Its capabilities, however, are limited by an Arctic base structure which must be supplied almost entirely by sea during Ihe short navigation season. The Soviets have not yetogistics support capability toarge force (several hundred bombers) quickly through tlte region.

RA activity in the Arctic has centered around four or five bases which appear adequate in terms of POL storage, navigational aids, and minorfacilities to support heavy and medium bomber operationsear-round basis. Toarge bomber fotce in an Initial mtercontinental attack, the Soviets would have to use other Arctic airfields as well There are aboutrctic airfields with runways long enough for LRA bombers, Some of these have natural surface runways usable only in winter; some are alreadyby other services; and most, except those so occupied, have little POL storage or servicing facilities. We believe that the Soviets would have great difficulty in using these airfields as staging bases, although they could be used for recovery operations as indicated by recent training activity."

Training patterns and range capabilities of Soviet bombers Indicate that aircraft attack against the US (except Alaska) would involve heavy bombers almoste estimate that the Soviets would commit virtually their entire heavy bomber force to this mission as weapons carriers andew of these aircraft might be dlveiied to maritime missions. Considering thc requirements for Arctic staging and refueling as well as non-combat attrition factors, we estimate that at present the Soviets could put somewhateavy bombers over target areas in thc US on two-way missions.

We do not believe that medium bombers now figure prominently in Soviet plans for an initial attack on Northew squadrons of Badgers would probably be employed in attacks on Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. When thc Soviets have acquired some operational experience vrith the Blinder, it might be used against Alaska and other targeis within its range capabilities. The success of any attempt to use Badgers in attacking the US would depend primarily upon logistics. We do not believe that the Arctic stag-

"The Assistant Chief ef StoH. Intelligence. USAF, reeognttes thef rUging through Soviet Arctic baser, but he believer thit available faculties are lufficient to enable the Soviets' to launch enough bombers and tankers to put moreombers over the continental US.

"For the view of tbe Assistant Chief of Staff. Inielligence, USAF, ice bis footnote,

TOP Gccnn



ing bases could simultaneously luppott heavy bomber and medium bomber strike* of major proportions."


The Sonets are almost certainly investigating the feaiibility of space weapons, but we have no evidence that they now have programs under way for Ihc development of such weapons. Sovicl published statements and writings on the subject deal almost entirely with US programs, and. attributing aggressive designs to the US. hint that the USSR cannot safely ignore such developments, fn recent rnonlhs there haveumber of allusions to "orbitalhich may be intended to indicate that the USSR has an orbital bombardment system. This claim was probably advanced for propaganda purposes, since we do not believe that the USSR now haiystem, and there is nothat the Soviet leadership intends to develop one,

Tbe Soviets have, of course, long had the capability to.uclear-armed satellite.hey have launched and de-orbited an increasing number of satellites inound classes using thcooster with suitable upper stages; such spacecraft couldeapon payload ofounds With the launching ofn5 they0 pound spacecraft whicheapon payload of0 pounds. But while the Soviets could orbitatellite at any time, we consider it unlikely that they will do so.eapon would have limited military effectiveness. Moreover, the Soviet leadership would probablythat this would be an act of major international import which would greatly intensify East-West hostility andtrong new stimulus to US military programs.

e believe that the attainment of reliability and accuracy, particularly lot out-of-orbit detonation near thc earth's Surface, wouldcries of flight tests extending over atear after nn initial launching. After such testing, the USSR probably couldm.ill number of bombAidmentwith CEP's on the order. against targets located up to several hundred nautical miles from its earth track and with orbital lilc-times ranging up to several months. For an orbital bombing system of military significance, thereide lange of delivery technique* and types of orbital bombnrdim-nl

likehief af Still, fntrlliiifitce, USAF, oiiKideri tho majority awfument eertouily laananaleliiiiiUi the muor-ed threat Iu thefil US. Ini war should cventutie and Ihe USSR atUcta nW US with nocleire htircves thu wfll be a*lint aimed eluUnoim number ol wrapnrn on I'Sn any ruth attack,vei lhat the Snvleti.itigmcnl Ihclr ICflM lorce withomber*.all faclnri cicept con-bat alttltton. thcoukt. hy using Arctic bur* put ; M0 bimiheii rwii NOtlh Ancrica an Iwo-waiIf the USSR were IO employ Badgers eileenUvely on one-way mnBrOni as pari ol the Mini, die mm-bcr of bombers reaching the US could.

forces which might be sought by thc Soviets, with considerable differences in developmental requirements, costs, and effectiveness. Tohreat of retaliation against population centers, they mightelatively small force of limited effectiveness composed ofeapons in orbit. For large-scale use against smaller or harder military targets,uch larger, sophisticated force with sltOrt times to target, near-simultaneity of delivery, and an accuracy approaching that of ICBMs would be necessary. Even the lesser of these forces would be extremely complex: and expensive, and wouldajor Soviet effort to perfect new hardware and to develop advanced techniques. In any case, developmental testing of an orbital bombardment system should be observable to us atear or two prior to attainment of an accurate, reliable system.

or the foreseeable future, wc think that offensive orbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBMs in terms of effectiveness, reaction time, targeting flexibility, vulnerability, average life, and positive control. In view of these factors, the much greater cost of such orbital weapons, and Sovietof the UN resolution against nuclear weapons in space, we believe that the Soviets are unlikely to deploy an offensive orbital weapon system within the next five to ten years. Even without any special efforts, however, Soviet technology applicable to this field will improve In the normal course of continued development of nuclear technology, and space projects. We recognlie that the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to cost and effectiveness, and that altered political considerations in some future phase of East-West relations might lead themifferent decision. Even in these circumstances, we bellve that they would regard space weapons primarilyeans ofexisting forces, of introducing additional complications into US defense planning, and of supporting Soviet claims to strategic parity or even superiority.

USSR has orbited reconnaissance and communications satellitesprobably developing other military support systems. Throughout thethe estimate, new military space applications wil! be introduced asadvances and as requirements for such systems are developed.that they will experimentariety of space systems whichused for military purposes, that they will employ those systems whicheconomically and militarily justified, and that some military role for manmay emerge by the end of the period, particularly as the ability tospace stations grows.


authority over the Soviet strategic attack forces and nuclearexercised by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU; itswould initiate any strategic strike action. We have no evidence that any


of the present leaders has succeededosition of sufficient authority within the party to fill the office of Supreme Commander-in Chief, held by Khrushchev. Nevertheless, the functions that were vested in this office are of such vital national interest that no long delay could have been tolerated in continuing this Instrument of control or developing substitute arrangements. It is certain that suchwould provide for the continuity of ultimate authority at the top level of the party and that they wouldapability for quick decision in the event of emergency.

The chain of command from thc political leadership to the strategic attack forces apparently proceedsentral authority In the Ministry of Defense which coordinates the operations of the several elements of the strategic attack forces: Long Range Aviationhe Soviet Navy, and the Strategic Rocket Forceshe Soviet Navy and LRA have long had their own channels of command and control and their own communications; the SRF havechannels and networksn addition, tbe Ministry of Defenseeparate communications network throughout the country.

We believe that the central authorities in Moscow are developing afor access to the lower echelons of the strike components, both directly and through Intermediate headquarters, in order to reduce reaction times and tomore direct control. We have no firm evidence of provisions to insure survival of the command structure, but wc assume that such provisions have been made.

B Communication

communications systems available to the strategic attack forcesadequate for most purposes, but would be degraded in aWe believe that, in general landmines and microwavethe primary means of communication. Secondary communicationsrely on high frequency (HF) transmission, which would be subjectblackout, and fn Siberia there arc inadequate land lines. Theseweakenesses are being remedied. We believe that the Sovietsvery low frequency (VLF) radio transmitters, which retainunder adverse conditions of propagation Additional land lineshardened cables are being built, land-tine capabilities are beingmultiplexing, and facilities aie being hardened. It is probable thattropospheilc scatter system will be constructed in the Arctic.

C. long-Range Reconnaissance and Targeting

considerable Soviet effort to pinpoint polential targets forin the US and elsewhere has resulted in the acquisitionargetthat is adequate fortrategic attack. The mostaffecting Soviet targeting capabilities is the photographic recornuussanee



piogiam, which startedt employs both search aad high resolution cameras, and coverage appears adequate to have photographed all important US Installations. Thc increased pace ol this program suggests that the Soviets find it valuable in targeting and monitoring the status of US installations and in establishing an accurate geodetic base. The vehicles used are sufficiently large to carry other collection devices in addition to photogranhic equipment.

Tbe satellite reconnaissance programigh competence in geodetic mapping provide the USSR with an excellent targeting base. Soviet target location errors against US missile launch sites have almost certainly been reduced significantly over the past year as the result of their use of highsatellite photography. We estimate that, including geodetic uncertainties concerning the size, shape, and gravity anomalies of the earth, total Soviet targeting and geodetic error against US missile launch sites is on the ordereet. With full realization of the potential of existing Soviet geodetic surveying programs employing earth satellites, the USSR will probably be able to reduce lotaltargeting and geodetic erroreet

Continuous and up-to-date information on the location and movement of key Western forcesigh priority Soviet requirement. In peacetime, this requirement is met in large part by the extensive Soviet radio direction-finding effort, which permits location of Western communications circuits and the units employing them. The Soviet direction-finding effort couldigh degree of effectiveness under wartime or alert conditions in the absence of strict Western communications security measures and electronic emissions control. We have no evidence as to Soviet plans for post-strike reconnaissance. Manned aircraft could be used against Eurasian targets, and photographic satellites against the US. Thc increasing use of electronic computers will greatly Improve theof fast-changing situations and should permit rapid re-targeting of strategic weapons.

D. Conlrol of Nuclear Weapons

believe thai the Ministry of Defense maintains direct control overand logistics systems for nuclear weapons. It would abolevel decisions to release nuclear weapons to operational militaryto authorize the use of such weapons; thc order to release and thefor use would probably be transmitted through separate channeb.allocated to the LRA and the SRP are for lhe most part storedstorage facilities of the Ministry of Defense, which are part ofbase or of the missile launching complex. Wc have no information onof nuclear weapons in Soviet submarine missile forces, whichnuclear weapons on submarines at sea as well as in shore storage.posture would require the Soviets to keep the bulk of their nuclearto SRP mated to the missiles. We have no evidence as to thecontrol under such an alert posture, or of fail-safe procedures in general















C>_Date the first operational unittrained and equippedew missile and launchers.


Air-tc-Surfcce SysUms-SUnt range between Inching aircraft and targetinstant of missile

V'"" rang, under operational


CM. Error ProhnMiTyht radiusircle centered on the ertended target, within which SO percent of the arriving missile warheads arc erpectcd to fall.


Re.enrn,partissile designed to re-enter the earth's atmosphere in the terminal portion of its (rafeclory. Re-entry vehicle weight includes ,ha, of the warhead necessary shielding and structure: any penctiatfon aids that may be present, and any other necessary or desired components.

Multiple He-enrryayload package consisting of two orvehicles. The Individual re-entry vehicles areuring theor ternunal portion of the trajectory ln order to confuse enemy radar,and/or increase fall *

'htcUonsisting ofmore BVS each of wluch is independently

Uand it. associated furing

and firing


Short Range Ballistic MltriU, (SRBM) Up to.

Medium Range flnlfsific Missiles (MRBM).

' r


'nfermedwie Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)


Interconiinenial Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)

ractional-Orbital Weapon

Exceeds ICBM range by sigruficant factor but re-enters short of full orbit. Practical limits axe on the order0. (The term global rocket as used by the Soviets probably applies to this class of weapon.)

Orbital Weapon

A weapon system which achieves orbital velocity. RELIABILITIES

Ready Missilepercentage of the operational missile force .that will be available to immediately initiate launch preparationormal'readiness condition. The ready missile rate may vary with international conditions and will probably be somewhat higher during periods of tension and strategic alert.

Ooeiallpercentage of the operational missile force that will successfully detonate in the target area. (Overall Reliability is the product of the Ready Missile Rate. Countdown Reliability and Inflight Reliability.)

Reactionrequired to proceedeadiness condition to launch.

Re/irerequired toecond missile from the same pad or launcher.


ite Readiness Conditions

Conditioncrew In launch area and onvehicle

and missile mated and checked but still in readyisbe the normal readiness condition for soft site ICBMs.

Conditioncrew at launch station. Missile with re-entry vehicle erected on launch pad. Propellant facilities (liquid) in position, attached, and ready to start propellant loading. Initial guidance alignment and sub-systems checkout complete.

Conditioncrew at launch station. Propellant loading complete. All systems ready for final check and launch sequence.

Hard Site Readiness Conditions Condition



Conditionnew on alert. Missile with re-entry vehicle mated tn place in the silo, checked and ready for propellant loading (applies toin': propellant missileshis is believed to be the normal readiness condition for cryogenic propellant missiles.

Conditioncrew at launch stations. Propellant loaded, allchecked and ready for launch sequence. This is believed to be normal readiness condition for slorablo liquid and solid propellant missiles.



2 zi a





r- 2


Is 11




Mm. Range (nm )



Warhead Weightili Oil Wleo figuration Propellant

ReadyOverall Reliability

Reaction timeeadiness Cood.

Hold Time Cood. Rerue Time (Soft Silos)




ingle Stage Slorable liquid





ains 55 roios ini Manyrs



. Rlogle Stage Slorable liquid





ins 55 mine , Manyr*

-top sccRtrr


IOC MAX. Speed Cruise Alt. (Ft.)

Minimum Rangeype and Propulsion


Warhead Woght

Warhead YieldCircular error, probable

Levaeb Condition Reliability oneliability Inflight' Selvo time *

missiles per submarine:



Reaction timeInclude) min on surface

ljglit Prog];


0 terminal approach)

ruiae. turbojet'

loiraclivc radar terminal homing; agaioil land targets1 inertial

ba. nuclear or RS

ISO ft acaiQit ships

. against leod targ.-j


r 4 9 Class: '

land targets






Single-stage ballistic, etornbte liquid. Inertial





Z-Conv8 min)


Id targruj

I tnia




Sioglc-eUge bailblj storable liquid locrtial




G-Coov teat4 mio)

8 min)

Land targets









eororaaod override,


homing 1


Lend Targets

o. '

s.oooC 0


Weight (lbs)


at0 or 0

(Meeh No.)





of Missiles

Altitudes (It.)



this guidance CEP againsi ships wouldhe inclusioneeker loore effective soli-ship capability ft technically feasible.

' Theas been under flight teal We sre unable lo determine whether

the missileoost-glideoast cruise-vehicle. It is possible thet two missiles have

been tested, or that the tests have involved one missileodes of operation, Tbe

first figures in these entries areoost-glide vehicle against land targets snd the second

oost-cruise vehicle againsi ship targets.

Increases with launch. assume) launchaximum ranee.

on estimated weapon lypes in stockpile.

reliability rales may be high because lhe effects of Soviet operational concepts and troop Iraining standards arc at least ss important as technical characteristicsof system reliability. We have no reliable basis for estimating Ihese cffeclo.

terminal phase of thelighl profile would be at low supersonic speed.




B? "'a USAreduced to ,


vd- Ititude,^e)



Grose Weight (Ibe)

right Obs)

Combat Radius/Range0 lb. bombload

one icf

0 lb bombload one refuel


1 lb. bombload

oae refuelWith ASM


one refuel (BEAR B) II.BLINDER B) one refuel (BLINDER B)

b. bombload (Supersonicrefuel

b bombload (Supersonic Dash) one retuel

Supersonic Dash) (BLINDKitne refuel



Spaed Altitude (stafft)



s Msiimum speedOptimum altitude b. Target speed/target altitude (Sottooic) '. Tercet speed/target altitude (Superaonie) d Launch speed/launch altitude with ASM

Combat Crib or. (II)

System Accuracy (CEP)




I-2NM vs. land target*

s. Bombing 00 ft. b. ASM Accuracy t. AS-3

See looinnie* ai end or table.



SOVIETF1KR WEAPON SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE under an optimum mission profile (Calculated ia accordance with USpec eacept lhat fuel reserve" aie reduced toaalmum olinute* loiter at teand aircraft operate at altitudes permitting ma rim urn radius/range)


System Reliability (percent)

reaebiag Urget areas In North America

reliability on launeber/ioS6Aircraft aod ASM overall un

' The range and radius figures given la this table ara mail mumhey ara applicable to the meal up-to-date models of these eirosii flying optimum missionThe use of older model aircraft, olher missionndirect routes, low-level penetration or other tactics designed lo delay or evade detection and inlctceplloo would reduceh* calculation or degradation io riege and radius resulting from sophisticated penetration UcUcaoin-plea process which can best be accomplished for individual missions. Asrule-ol-thumb for low-level operations of heavy bombers, thc radius at optimum alliludn will be decreasedile* for every mile flown at se* level.

'sbomber.ndre missile camera equipped with aa*ANCAROO missile.a* slightly reduced performance data from lhat ofue to different basic weight ol aircraft.

' BLINDER Ana bomber.arrier equipped with oneITCHENt isnot yet operaUonal BLINDER aircraft mUsioos are basedM dash in and Oct of target area On radlua missionM dash in only on range mission. There is no direct evidence of an operational refuelfor these aircraft at present.

AssoeleUd combat load0 lbs for BISON aod BEARbs foend BLINDER A, ooee*nd C; *od on*or BLINDER B.

' Bombing accuracies Indicated are for visual bombing or radar bombing against well-defined target* with free-fall bombs. These figures ai* not applicable lo drogue-retardedhich would be mocb less accurate

' These reliability rales may be high, iloce Ih* effect* of Soviet operations! concepts and troop training standards are at least as Important a* technical characteristic* io determination of ayilem reliability, and we have no reliable basis for eatimating these effects.

'Include* the following operational attrition rates, deluding combat attrition;f aircraft at home bans would be In commission0 day maintenance slaoddown prior to initial operalions;f aircraft inat bom* bases would be launched from stagingf aircraft launched from staging bases or directly from home base* ot anrrlucled mission! would arrive in target areas, (d) 6S% of aircraft launched on ictUcled missions would arrive in target arras. Calculations for BEAR and ASMed on refueled IlighU direct from home bases Alt others assume arctic staging, and refueling of BADGER and BISON aircraft It should be rated that without peine msintensnee standdown, the in-commiuloo rate of heavy bomber*ome bases would bend for medium bombers





a HON*




In, Depth

pie Depth

Speed Endurance





Nuclear Power HM


Diesel Power 3SB


Crviu .tfVuiii Kuelear Power





Msi 30

C0 Mas 20






0 10



M 1








60 Sea

Fuel r l


Sea Fuel


60 Sea

TABLE ft (CMnt.







operating deptb limit Ii JtBr.ri aa tha depth toubmariae may proceed aa unlimited number of times. Duringubmartae n- etceed thii depth to aa iadetermtnate point approaching col:eplb and etltl survive.

capacities are the masimum numbora which can be carried. ombination ol torpedoes/ml net could be carried.

time oa ita lion aad to station) have been computed on the bail) of various operationalrincipally, thee* relating to "Se*aad "Fuel endurance."

"Se* eodLtaace" ii deSetd a* tA* toul length of timeubmario* can rtmaia atthout ree'ea'ahmeat coder combat coodlUeeti and It estimated o= tbe bui* of pemoane: endurance, generalood, aparend consumable* other than fuel. ThendI" classes of Dueltar propelled lubaiarloti art esllmtlti tondurance" oijtyi. The "G" andonvertloa" cluaet of die eel powered tubmariaei tie eoll-maUd loSea endurance"ay* while lheonveralon" cluiea are estimated loSea endurance" ofay*.

"Fuel endurance" It defloed at th* total length ol timeubinaflne can remain on patrol under combat operational condition* without refueling. For diuel powered submarinct. It is computed on the basis of fuel consumption resulting from an arbitrarily latumed avtrsge transit routineours surfaces" hours snorkel,aur* lubmtrgtd eperttioas dally,sumpt.oa oo sUiica is computed oa th* bailsewfperation*tJy to malBUIa the ilau of charge of lac main storage battery for ivbmerged operation* daily, sufSejeat ooly to maistals th*of charge of the main storage battery for submerged operation the rtmiinder of thc day.

Th*s oca and tniilmum operating rsdlut of nuclear powered tubmtrines arc limited by factpra other than fuel. For th* purpose* of thi* Uble. it ha* been arbitrarily attuned thai Sovitt nuclear powertd submarines would transit to station uting th* following criteria:

Speedit in area where ASW opposition is anticipated (assumed lo bef the time).

Dermuda cf New

Speed ofit lo area where AflW opposition Is not erpectet!f tho transit Urno). .




Pa nam a

i nam*




Xols Inlat


Pttropavlovak .


Os* unit of the "G" class has been asodated to Sre two maples and hi probably the teal platform for Uo advaccedystem, wc beheve thsl future convert,oas wiU esny three mtuIMM

' Three different coDveniont have been observed Idon version" data cruise miitile launching tubmariaei.LONG BIN) loiTWIN CYLINDER) loach,SINGLE CYLINDER) toissile.

d-ttsncee from Soviet port.

Lo* Angeles San








hii document wos disseminoied by tho Contra) Intelligence Agency. This copy it fo. iho Info/motion ond uie of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdictioneed lo *now basis. Additional essential domination moy bod by the following officiali wilhin their respective department!;

of Intelligence ond Research, for tho Department of Slate

Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary ol

Defense and the oigo/niotion of the Joint Chiefs of Siaff

Chief of Staff for intelligence. Deportment ofy, lor the

Deportment ofy

Chief of Novo! Operationor lhe Doportmoni of me


Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, (or the Deportment of the Air


of Intelligence. AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commrtiion

Direcior, FBI, for the Federal Bureau ol Investigation

of NSA for the National Security Agency

i. Assiilant Di.ector for Central Reference. CIA for ony other Deportment or Agency

This document moy be retorned. o. destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security reguWrtons, or returned ta the Central Inielligence Agency by arrangement with the Office ot Central Deference. CIA.

When this document is dmemlnaled overseas, tho overteat recipients mayeriod no.eis of one year. At the end of this period, the document ihould either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission shojld be requeited of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with

title of this document when used separately from the lew ihould be.


White Mouio

National Security Council

Deportment of State

Department oi Defense

Atomic Energy Commission

Federal Bureau of lnve*iigoi?on

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: