ii. teb STTOATICSSPSCTS IX
t. rOBAELI 1SACTI0K5 II POTCTiAL AJTp SOOTH africa
ti. in or s
tci. TO CCVX.TUST
TCH. THS DlTTB)
X. DffUCATCCM FOB TE8 08
Tbla eatioate la primarily directed to tbe few Booths- follovlDgdeclaration of lodepeadesee by Soothers Rhodesia, though sarce longer rangee Bade.
A. Ve believe that for tbe next aeveral yesxs at least,econosais aasc-tioa* vould Dot dislodge white rale in Southernthatt* ailitury latarrwatloo froe enyIs Rboaesla'a whiten*tent would probablyatemal aecurity follovlag ladepeaceace; It would beundertake se.-iccs ecoooale steasmree aawlact aelgh boring Afrlcaoseverely prcrrokad. (Para*.
2. African frustration* onr SaodeiU'* ability to sustainceaset Ithe Vest la tae- ira and African
aeasarca agaiaat Rhodesia.
C. The aituatloa atfght lead to aerare strain* betveea Britaia and tbe African state* la the Ccanosvealtbev ofatter alght vithdrav.
d. Tbe probability that tbe Veet vill be usable to resolve the Bbodesla issue to tbe satisfaction of tbe African* vill pre/ride opportunities for Cessaauiist juropagnnda. While Vestera influence villon-alderable setback, the Veat vill, iwwrrer, retain aa laportart presence la Africa, aed African* vill eootlnae to look to Ue Vest for tbe balk Of their economic, technical, aad other assistance,
1. ecision, by the gorvrnoeot of Soothers Rhodesia to cast aaide its rvnalalag colonial tie* and declare independence vould provoke an iatenaeesponse throughout fiub-Saharan Africa, andev andtg laeue for the Vest on tha vorld aceae. Although
U feesirtually autonoccusVK has srliaheld
full Independence toerraua* tieBhcdeslan vhltes havtusvUlitg to prcTlde Ironclad jruaranteas of pcUtlcal *dTaaceQetit end eventual majority rule for tbeear bIIUoo slack Africans. Tie vines' exasperation vlth Britain for stalrrtslning Rhodcslaa colonial atatua has
sharply asof Africa has;eal. At the aazo
tlmt, black Africans ln Rhodesia and elsevtere regard UK aad Westers attitudes Wvards Rhodtilan ladepeodene*hite alacrityest of Western Intentions tovard Africans generally.
JI. TEEJp PROSPECTS HI RzDllEElA
2. Prime Moist tr laa 6aUtb'* RhodesIan Front (RP) Party voovictory la the?? perlitssentary elections toy carpal sr. Irtb* continuation of political domination by tb* vfcltes. Thecourse, constituted th* erenrbeleing sonority of those vhoth* Pront's leadership is firuva largely froo Its nestthe party reflects the detemiaed mood of th* great bulk ofcccacualty, vtico la convinced that th* Africans are Incapabletheir affairs, and that thevn velfare, astbe interests of th* vMtes, can be secured only under vfclt*ar* confident tbat tbe West vlll soon acknowledge th* justiceaxguawnt that flack African governoerti ar* Inherentlyrapidly coming-fl .-
3. natltimallat* ar* badly divided and coDotv.tly
bicior aaong themselves ever persucal and political differences. Bit mejor bines MtioaalljtJoshuafrican People's Unionand th*bebve African Rational Doloa (ZA.TJ) ara poorly organised and ineffective, vltb ten of their leaders either lo detention or lo tall*. ActivitiesAPU and other nationalists lo exile tare bees lc effect Ire, only partly because they lacs bases la contiguous areas. Thennt**ot ln general bas thus far failed to attract th* fins support of African urban vorsers. Hcrvcrer, tb* government's effectivetea, plus Its bar.nlag of Afriian parties aad banishing nationalist leaders to react* area* la the territory, bare limited nationalist activities to minor uncoordinated acts of vtoleac* and sabotage.
a. Tb* vhltes' desir* for independenceclst*red by their con-fldenc* ln Rhodesia's eco&ocr/ and their belief that independence vould essur* an la?lev of Investment and vfclt* lnjaigratico. The territoryc^lturel and mining economy,apidly groving Industrial sector. AlthcAUjh political uncertainty has Halted the flov of Inrcstaent capital, Rhodesiaalanced budget and favorable trade balance lent year. Tobacco la the stoat Important cash crop and the chief eaport. Xt earned0 million In foreign exchange last year, vith the UI buying more then half the crop. Although not aof Bhodeslan tobacco, Zmabla Is an ecnially important customer; each takesjoarter of Rhodesia's exports.
$. Indeed, Rhodesia's Importance to tte economies ofle-boring fcUck African state* is likely torucial sIet*ot ia their reaction* to Rhodesiaa indepeadeace. Salisburyold oa Zaabla, vacsearticularly the copper industry,eavily dependent oa Rhodeeiaa electric jvwer, coal, and transportation facilities (see Bars).
ercent of Zambia'*of vbich is usee in the
imus-try) vaa generated la Rhodesia at Karlba Daa or by tbercal plants ia Zanbia using Rhodeslea coal, Chile sooc alterant* sources Of coal and power could be developederiod ofoss of Khodeaisa aupplies vould seriously curtail Zflflbia's copper production. Also,verercent of Zambia's ovea-sea* trade va* carried by the
sian railway aystaa. Th* Ktrlba perrer eonplex and the railroads ar* Jointly ovaej by ZaaMa and Rhodesia. But Salisbury has physical control over the pover generating eoulpoeat aad, of coarse, control over the railroei throucb ita territory. Rhodesia provides employe*nt 'or soo*X0 foreiga African vorsc.-s, including0 froaroo Kelavi,0 froa NniasrtlKM. The lea* cf the earning* of these vorsrrs vould have aeriou* affects la their hoe* countries, particularly in poverty-strikes Maiavij even the repatriation of son* Bightisturbing effect.
6. Se be Here that Salisbury vc-dd prefer not to exerciseover Zambia, end vould rather havehreat tolatterrs good behavior. Once iaiepec-'enee bas been declared,GcveTaroeat vould try to nlaialzeits African
neighbors to the extent eoerpetibla vith its ova rtablUtynoalc nil-being. It wold ace* tobusiness as usmal" stacsphere.
vbltes are concerned for their country's statu* on thezf! scene; after independence they vould be even acre anxlocj to attract capital, laaigraats, and nev Bsrfcetil
Tbe realize that once they bad played
their tranp cardhe capability to cripple-Zambia's cashhey vould have seriously daaaged thet- ova econcey as veil as eliminated one of the aajor factors laduelng caution In their adversaries, Rhodesia =ty engage ia occasional acts of aiaor eccsnoclc harase-aect tovardand perhaps Kalsvi, Just to abev that It haa the ability to inflict serious injury oo tneae Africaa hostages.
7, Rhodesian Cererruw-mt vould be *bl* to act tolerantlymiters, t la uf.lliyly toerious internal
grcs-itr proales for bom considerable tta* toba vtltea*eise Independence vould not ln itself persuade tbeionalists
ifferences, although their African srEa>athli*rsheir efforts to heal the rift. Ve lock for see* Increase in
-illnt Infiltration and acts of violence and sabotage. Jvea If tbetonsilprove able to fora scaa* kind of gOTfjrtswiit la exile vltb Or^nlsation of African Ofclty (CAU) encourages..ot, ve foresee no early Cf aCOnld not be handled by Rhodesia's efficient
police fore* snrpported, if necessary, by tbe aroedauMaHiry vould be onlinely to apply drsvrtle eccnoolc retaliatory Manures stalest neighboring African states unlets It vaa threatenederious Insurgency based ln and eupported by those countries.
fee Snonesien Police Pore* bas aReservebout half Of Vhow art voltes,pecial Bescrve of0 vblcb has little training. The ersey has an actual strengthegulars (all odfl are vhlt* aa ar* about AO perceot of the There are Inhlte Territorials vho have sot* training. Tb* %Xr forcea and six operationalnej-flv* of vhich are raited for an internal security role.
f. pscrsiau; rcacncss jt pwccvj. aid south aj3ICA
Portugal does ootrisis over Bhodcsian Ifldepeudesc* and the oscertelatSes It brings, petf^lculaciy becnus* it inevitably focuses attention on Hotnnbique end Angola. Lisbon's locllnstion Is to restln Inconspicuous. Eovever, Portugal vould probably b* vllling to slice part of Zaublan traffiers*vlly transits Khodesfs end Hosasbleu* to usa tie route through tbt Congood Angola.
Berertheless, Portugal Identifies Its basic Interests vith these of th*regis* la Salisbury, and It cooperates in security and lnt*llig*nc* operations vlth Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Portugal vould not STiyport tlortugal vould euletly facllltat* Salisbury's efforts to evade then by providing access to international svtrkets and giving son* financial assistance.
I*, iika SeJanar, Prisse Ministervould be apprehensive over the eoaaec.-eL.-es of Bhodeslan Independence. S* baa done van: be could to dnnpen Bhodeslan expectation* of South African repport, and there is
virtually bo chence ofnerser vithesia. Bcvcver, South Africa vouldo actvhlte-ruled buffer statehodesia for as long as possible. South Africa vould sot Joia In US or CK eccconie atactlons against fhodesia; cn the contrary. It vould provide anf access to the sterling area and sight heip naniet Rbodeeiin erpcrts In the eventoycott. Should Salisbury becao* pressed, Pretoria vould elccet eerlaicly extend leans and credits and, If required, am and Bilitary eauipcast.
n. the nt's pcsmcn
15. The CX faces an extraordinarily cruel dUsnsna ia detemining its response to Rhcdcalao seizure of independence. Iondon recognises that African erotiers run highbls issue, and that British, axdegree Cur at wtlth, prestige ia Africa ia isreolvad. On the other band, theone sic etahe in Bhodeaia la large, cany vhltestill have elosa fenlly or personal ties la thend anyrerneeat vculd be reluctant to eaploy eatrene nee-Tcres against theirhe DE has both publicly and privately ruled oat solitary action against the vblt* regine. loodoo vould tterafora sees, to devise Manures abort
It will be Terr difficult snd pertara Isrpossiblc fcr Britainecebination of political and aco&oolc erasures vbich voold haveeffects. Price Kiaister Vilsco has already said thatidepeade- loand If It takes place, the British plan to
difslss the Salisbury cabinet aad to cn.'1 cn all other countries totxdanctions. f
punitiveenoval of Cccxorveelth preferences, freciing any renaialag sterling balances, and exclusion frees the sterling bloc, could be takes vlthovt ndverse effects for tbe bard-pressed British The tougher senden on irhode**an_ tobaccoeneral trade ealnrco, vould be costly to both
the OS decides to do, hovever, we estlrata that neither Portugal nor South Africa would support Londonalisbury and, ia these cir-cuaurtaaces, the ecoccnic consequences for Rhodesia vould be aisalfieent but not decisive. Tha next Rhodeslan tobacco crop vill not ba tarke'ed untilobacco boycott could notignificant effect before that tine.
18. KeBxvblle/.the UK will attempt to bead offrul African reaction ty taiing tbe initiative in tbe US. If Bhcdeslaa Independence la declared, Britain vill propose resolutions calling for UB economic sanctions along lines parallel to these vticb Britain Is ready to impose unilaterally. But it vill te very difficult for the British to retain tbe initiative at the UW, for fev Africans vould te sat^sned^rfth^ econoclc censures once they begin to prove ineffective.
t: vculd"rance, Vest Cexr-aij, ^apan, tb* retherlAode, tnd tt* US) to cooperate la ecoeoele sanction*. While such gmrxcents vould find It difficult to reject srueharticularly If esbcdledtrong Iff resolution, the ability cf rest countries to control their inpcrter** is seriously United, a* th* UE kncvs frcn ita own eabarso cxperlenet.hile other Vestem countries vould join in International indignation arainst Sallshury, acd seek officially to he helpful, tbey vould probably not prevent access to supjlies and barrets.
80. Ih*vould provid* Kcsccv and Feining Tithpportunities for political seddline tt llttl* rise or cost. Ih* Cocaujiiet povers voald eneace in prore^enl* In end out of ti* CU, vccld bent th* anti-colceialitt drus, azd vould urge tt* African* to rlsht their grievances. Shay mU offer sepport and eoccfltfafierent to Ittodesiaa exile groups, and vould show tiers el res vlll ins- to rujply sot* am* and training forand insurgent opera"Iocs. Shea particular, vocldin th* situation an opportunity to adTvnee their hopes to infiltrate Southern Africa. As tb* frustration* of Bbodeeian black nationalists and their activist snxjnsorters arev vith tie resistance of tie Kbocesisn Covejrnaent to preasurss, tbey vould probably accept, if tot velecxe, Chines* and other Coaainlst support. s, th* Ccczunist powers
are unlikely toecisive role, partly became th* veaineEtes ofhe lack of military forces end contiguous tase areas, vould Bale lt difficult for tte Ccnsauniat* to bring these assets to bear.
mi, T3 UETTSD WTI0R3
Th* fihodeslan ouestlon nil ctickly te brought he fcrthe M, probably by the UE. Even If the British are Bbl* to retain the initiative t the USiee, the7 Till frees the eery beginning ccce under strong
and repested pressures for stronger Bees-ires. The Afrlcta states theo-seieea can take fee practical ateys other than to increase their aid to Rhocesiaa exile netlonaliat groups. The Africanovever, vill use CATJ and Afro-Asian sseetlngs to prod tt* UE to eract sere severe resolutions and to keep the isace active. Over the short-run tht Africans, nevertheless, trill probably aoderate their erltlcisa of Ue British as any UK and Cf sanction* ar* applied. Icvsrver, their patience vould aoon be exhausted if, aalikely, Uese sanctloca prove ineffective. They vould thenbo re urgently for international solitary Intervention.
EC. THS CT7TXCCF.
22. It searj highly unlikely that African desands fox military intervention vould receive affective sAroport froa Ue baJct povera. ror Ue Beat several years, at least, Ue vhlte regis* ia Salisbury ls not
m* . &'. a*
likely to tc dislodged except byntervention. Thus it appears that thessue vouldtl place as aa unresolved, If recurrent,oncenc*. Despite sire-cgly-hcld efitl-coloniallst sitltsdee, tbe Africans vould be forced to live vltbtm is siailAr situation* vhich are beyond their pever to change atngola and South Africa. This aituation sdfrt endur* until the Rhodeslaa aatlont-liat eoveneit could secure pever through its cvn efforts, or until thereeneral shift of pever to the Africans ia southern Africa. If this proves to be tt* case. Vestera influenc* ia Africa villonsiderable setback. Tt* Vest vill continue, hove-'fir, to taintein an important prtserce ia Africa, rrta In these countries nest deeplyn th* etatus of Jfcodesla, and Africans vill continue to Icoi to th*for the bulk of their econceJc, technical, and other assistance.
X. aSLICATTCKS FOP TBI US
zu. The USolitical leverage oa the parties concerned toecisive influence on the Rhoceilan queitlea, though It eould assist the UK corally and caterlally. Tli* US could, of course, dery diplotatle recocaitloa to aa ladepeodeat Bhodesia. Tha US could also join UK and UScensures against Salisbury, but ve have esticeiel that they are unlike, lj to te affective. US trafe vlth Rhodesia Is only coe-slrtb. that of the UK, and US direct Invests*at there accuxts to" ellllon.
any eveat, the US vould share ln the opprobrium directed at the Vest by Africans, tbe Rsodesisrs ere concerned about US public opinion, though oot so tueh as tonewly ven independence or to yield political paver to th* black tajorlty.
- IT -Original document.