THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BRAZIL: THE MEANING OF THE SECOND INSTITUTIONAL ACT

Created: 11/29/1965

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I THAI. AGENCY OFFICETKATES

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SUftJECX; Ihe Political Situation In Brcail: The Kenning of

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President Castelloroclamation in Intoa second Institutional Act, under which ho assumedpowers,uajor setback Torradual return to constitutional noraalityvhllo at tho coao tine pursuing what hn believed topriority goala of thalitary revolution. chose to increase his fonsal authority whenfroai bin Inability to &twa the recenthow far his Inforaal influence over the aillltaryoatnbliahtffint had declined. Ke probablyoderate political course end to retain controlsituation'until the end of his ternas

little use of Ms new powers as possible. Should he begin to fcol that he woa losing his ability to keep this control, we thick the chances ere tetter than even that he would resign. In tills case, his successor would aUaoat certainlyore authoritarian military ruler.

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ho Octofcor Crisis

1. Aeecrdtng to the PneiUir. nilitary, theirV couy ngilustCnulnrt was en "authenticade necessarywenty yonrs of civilians-rule. They believed lhat the Jncc-^petpnce, corruption, aid de-vigoeucry of tho Varfcflfl-Kubltr^eX-Qiadros-Oouloxtot only had thwarted national progresa. Vat had nlrcoatci'^'fllat fcftlreow of the Tanfcr-'dat able

in'A*rt, j*erol GwMlo Bmfeoo i- *hexicy red decreed on Institutional Act to atu hta with special powersxecutor of their revolution.*

2. President Caotello fcracco, byolitical noderatooos tttJition? list, chose to use hiscu'.lvo authority with restraint. The nllttary'anrd tho elvlllon political establishment persisted.

* Although Congress preserved fom by duly electingranco no Ceulort's successor, tho otlitnry did not oeok ratification of the Institutional Act, preferring to huva it rest solely on their authoritycceasful. revolutionaries, llw Act empowered Cootollo Branco for specifled periods srbl-trerlly to cancel the reaadatos of elected officials, deprive indivlduala of their political rights, cod reiove nenbera of the bureaucracy and errrod forces without regard to tenure, it sIao gave hlu special powers to speed up congressionalsad constitutional

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Hut until recently Cootello Bianco's considerable pgfOOnlover both eotnblluhiaenta enabled Ma to avert direct clashes between the two pnd to resolve thosa that aid occur inossible tenia. his nc>tnfstratlocprogress toward tho political and ccotcrale objectives of ttwt the sacs tireradual moveient tword constitutional norcility.

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'-ti eal Act,* taajcsifl oear-rlc^aborlol powers. Paradoxically, tMs Increase ia hlaowersojor OtfMl Tor the President anddirectly rolntod tocllna, over tha preceding holf-yaar, of hioinfluoeco. Uto military, especially Ihe younger, *nordllnc* officers increasingly questioned Ma lr/>dershlp, in part because of their frustrations over his concern for legality when itto punishing the "enenlcs of thein part because of tbolr impatience with tho slew progress of hio economic policies. Vte politlcliifiu nteadllyoro independent, mora partisan eteaco an their fearsiliary taxeever receded arxi their interest in Has

tfpcontns fcubonvitorial elections grew. Ibis included key IcaOra of tho National Democratic Unionho party uost clowly essociatad with the revolutionary realms. Governor Carlos lacerda of Omaabara (city of Mo de Janeiro) becace far ord away theoutspoken critic of Castelloleadership; Governor Jowj Msgalhaes Pinto of Minusoro clrcuu-cpcct critic.

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do ahead vith tho elections norn,lly scheduled5 inf Brazil's-ubes. He saw to It that Congress passed stiff eligibilityend that the courts Interpreted ihea strictly, ro that oovaral candidates offensive to too revolution were eliminated, lhe eventual winners were political loierates individually acceptable to tho ftoyernrent. But the election re-suite, were not acceptable to tho revolution, in the opinion of its rilltory grantors. In the key Cuanabara nod Kloas Ceralc races, ceolld'teaocial Brrocratic (PSD)-habor Party (flu) coalition won unexpectedly strong victories over

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ihe tllft disciples of Governors hacerda and Finto. Thisofcat for pro-revolutionary forces and anfor Hie return to power of the volltlclaoa utost responsible for Brazil's prc-rovolutlocuy

sstello Branco's efforts to convince Ms military cccradsa that the ncv fcovernors wouldealto the revolution were imaedletely overwhelmed by repidly rising

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b;ec-rda. y The support of War Ministerilva cobbled Cas cello Branco to regain temporary control over tho KUch-agltaled military. She Prosidsnt then vent to Congresseriesern iseasures to "protect thef For the first tlao

l/ UI3 candidates did reasonablyin the oUier contests, especially whom tho Cactello Branco government and tho

local party wero able to cooperate closely. Oils veo not the case In tha two key contests. lhe eo/ernnent hadmixed attitudts toward the Guuaabora reco,trong IUN victory would have strengthened lacerda*c

loose erasures Included (l) brouaeolng of tho President's powers to lntorvcno Inilitary trial foraccused of erliaes agilaafc tho national securityestrictions on tM activities of ttoae deprived of thair political rl&ts. They woreincorporated, ejnoog others, in tho secondAct.

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elnco 'ijns offlre he could rotosvsreialunal zajcrltjr tociitleal crisis: his largely Informl par) Vunantary bloc tHalitegratcl, os former PHI) andwid tho standards of Kubltschckcocda. At thte point CaaU-llo Hronco concluded that tho only vny he coulderious split in tho solitary and regoln control ever tho titotion gonerally vas tovAct.

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tJ, ani tfetf statetl. It pandta hit*ithout tho conaent of Congresstotate of slego, to rule by decree, and to iutervcna In the affairs of state goveroneote. It rerevs Ms discretlonaiy authority to cancel electoral ivprt-tes, diprive individuale of their political rights, and fire civil servants urdor tenure. It olso increases tho Jurisdictionlitary courts at theof their civilian counterparts awl provides for the "packing* of the Supreei Court. Kin*lly, *ba Acttho direct presidential elections scheduled forC6 end substitutes indirect elections by the present Congress, to

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take plflce no later than October 3* At lite own inilr.tenco, Cnstello Ix;tnco Is specifically declared Ineligible for

'(. Caotello Bronco promulgated the secondonly reluctantly; ho new hopes to use Its powers aspossible end to regitn sciw of tho lost ground towarddurlss the final sixteen nonths Of hisi3Xl.n vt "vaWAtCt Mc pWMl

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stroked upi;;ar hia public appearances eod eddrossas. Apparently with the cooperation of War MinisterUva, he Is shuffling military ossly^nts to move pro-eovor/inent officers into kiy poats, er-pecleily in tho cconad structure of the First Anayho center of military unreal during the October crisis. Through Justice Minister Juracy

Ka^alhacs, uatll recently Ambassador to the US and now "the Preaifleat'e leading political advisory ho is promoting aof the political party structure; hoto

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B party that Is toth pro-ftovernrent and pro-rewlutlon end Independent of the Influence of either Iflcerdi or KuMtscheX.a

0. Ve believe that Castello hr<mco will probably be able to hold the loyally of the uillteiy on tost isitues, although this la likely to be an increasingly doltcitto task, lie probably con otllX count on the atrong support of the acnjor officers, noat of vhcn oro Ms coaradea ofstanding. Also, respect for hierarchyor constitutions If, sa sttlXpor-Hrti If diniatched, chests of thailUsey wzWlty,

9. coitalj- Gr^aaawcsneariy cr. the aupport of Hur rdrdstcriGSM officer corps, especially tho youngar officers, rxw probably exceeda hln own. At this point there la eoainthctUva ulU continue to back the President In the difficult task of holding Biilihiry dtsold/nca In check. ilva strongly desires to bo the revolution's candidate In next yoar'c presidential elections. This could leadnjor falling out If Castello Pranco throws his support to another candidate.

In order to fncllltote politicalthe second Institutions! Act abolished all oxlatlng political parties. Kubltochck, under the threat of prcoecutioa on charges of corruption in office, hisin left tho country.

)0. Whatever roleilva plays, ve believedlssiacuce will grew to sore extent over the nextpart It will tofco the form of atteapta by supportersend other would-be leaders of tho revolution, tooverthrow tho Castello Bronco goverraient. ostit will be More ideological than political in dlice Junior officers, Ihvro isly for nil civilianhut siff*.itca

they are largely unorganised, and unUtoOy to act Jn unison except when facedrisis that ishroat to tho rovolutlon. Even then, they would find it difficult to overcoTO Castello Branco's resistance on an issue, unless they woreto convince tho ollitory establishment at large that tee revolutionaryn danger.

31. The first test between the President and acne groups of military dinoidents will coma over tho investiture of Covernor-olcct Kegrao do Llwa of Cuanabara, scheduledecember. Negrao has given ewsur*ncos of close cooiwratlon wllh thoeraU6nt, but is strongly opposed by sup-porters of lacerco. Castello Braaco boa made tho seating of

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nil thef honor oed recentlyublic waroins to lhe onti-Hegrao ogiUbors. Wo believe that the bulk of tho military will support the President on this issue, and that any attempts to prevent the Inauguration of tlcgrao will bo ovtirooow. But othor to3ts of strength nro certain to follow, a3 one group of hardliners after soother presses the President to use his powers against local "ersecdes of the revolution."

1*N Caetello France's ecoji-*oa for folriag t, v; V 1 Olitli*

nro fD'A' Scr-idroppededr/icca only because they misjudged the severity of the military'sIn tho October crisis. TPaey see once again th/ib support of Castello Branco Is lhe only eltei-ratlve to outright military rule. *Tne new governors in particular will elxwst cort-drily cooperatejto insure their tenure*

13. era will nonetheless bo vory considerable political problems. Iho planned reorganization of tho party structure down to tho local level will pressoyrled of vested regional, ccononla, end personal, as well es per Mean,ieorJ-i, quiet for ti'a fjcaont. will probably return to his deeia-go^lc attacks against the government. leftist extremists will

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try to provoke the government or the rillltaiy into repressions, to split toe two, and to prevent eny progress toward Ihose political tensions will eldest certainlywith tho closo approach of tho presidential elections anfl of the congressional end Gubernatorial elections still scheduled for

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he will seek to keip control of the situation through tho end of his tem> perhaps with sccewbat tore frequent use of Ms arbitrary powers than in the past. egin to feel thab he was losing Hie ability to keep this control, we think tbo chances are better than even that be would resign. In this case, his successor would almost certainlyere authoritarianruler. Also, unless Castello bronco rakes some progresstoward constitutional norcality boforo the end of his tern, even a. duly elected succosftor now vory likely to be vouM probablyro prone than ho is to rule erbilrerlly.

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