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THE DIRECTOR Or CENT.tAL INTELLIGENCE
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: OXCART Deployment Proposal
1- ant to invite your attention to the critical need -or aaequato intelligence in order toossible Cn.nese Communist strategic buildup in South China and North Vie-nam which might load to their direct involvement in the yie,nan war. onsider 'orekr.owlodye of any Chinese intent to intervene in tho Vietnam war to be so vital to the national
Ul1 con&ctlon resources available to the United States Government should be committed to theof intelligence in this connection.
ffle,,coUeclion of intelligence to give early" warning o: possiblo Chinese Communist intervention in the Viotnans been assigned highest priority by the Intelligence It is ay conviction, shared by the United States la will-once Board, that high resolution overhead photography is essential to obtain such intelligence. Tho Joint Chiefs of btaij likewise are on record that overy means be exploitedatter of highest priority to obtain high resolution photographic coverage of ground force inatanations, ma lor compxoxes, and key lines of communication in the South China and North Vietnam aroas. Tho collection task involves adequate ini-Lial coverage and subsequont periodic coverage of I Iheavily decoded targets in North Vietnam andtargets in TButh China. Present coverage isas to extent and timeliness.
3. Currently, satellite photographic missions are bolngmned to achiove the maximum coverage of key targets innd North Vietnam. However, because of design characteristics of the vehicle and weather conditions in the
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area, satellite photography hasery Unitedprovide the desired intelligence. In South China, f
CHI survivability oiali'crar:Cfliawa air defense facilities is becoming increasingly doubtful. Heavy concentrations of airave rendered many of the highest priority target areas ia North Vietnam's. Drone missions into this area have provided some coverage, but the reliability of continueds uncortain. n ofm belief, therefore, that we car.not roly on the presently committed collection assets to provide the timely data base line and tho subsequent periodic coverage wo need to determine change.
In5 the OXCART aircraft and systems, including countermeasure defensive systems, were deemed operationally ready. This ia the most advanced capability for collecting high resolution photography available to. Government. It is judged to bo virtually immune to air defenses in tho South China and North Viotnarc areas. t is roady for actionelieve it should bo committed to help fill this urgent intelligence need. The OXCART canase in Okinawa and be ready for operational missions approximately throe weeks from go-ahead.
An obstacle to achieving agreement to commit the OXCART vehicle has been the belief thattep might beterproted by tho Chinese Communists as preparation by
. for aggressive moves agair.se China. Tho United States Intelligence Communityo not share this belief. It is my view that the Chinese probably would soon come to regard thos another stage. collection program, and that they would not be led to take any drastic now military action unless there wore other.ctions which could be interpreted by them as an intont to attack China. Barring the loss of an OXCART aircraft over Caiawse territory,ould not expect the Chinese to reactay as to significantly. national interests. Wo have also assessed probable reactions of other countries to the use of OXCARTmpocial NationalEstimate on this overall subject.
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the standpoint of the urgency ofould prefer to recommend to you thatvehicle be committed as soon as possible forover both South China and North Vietnam. Xproposing, however. Immediate use of OXCARTover North Vietnam with but ni^or penetration of m doing this becauso thai 's still offerof adequate coverage in the south China araa andit prudent to assure that -his capability cannotthe requirement before recommending full commitmentOXCART in this politically sensitive area. In the event
ogether with satellite photography,f fulfilling the requirement,ould expect to recommend to you the full operational commitment of the OXCART over South China.
faexor which significantly affects theoverhead photography in South China and North Vietnamweather. The climate in this area deteriorates sharply
in tne surair.or months from Juno through August. This condition limits tha capability of all overhead reconnaissance assets. At the saao tine, however, it points up the needelatively invulnerable, reliable, quick reaction capability, such as OXCART, to maximize tho exploitation of decreasing opportunities for photographic coverage during the summer months.
In summary, then,m recommending to you:
the OXCART vehicle beto Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa.
tha OXCART vehicle bo used aspossible following deployment forof highest priority intolliger.eeNorth Vietnam.
tho OXCART vehicle be heldfor backup photoaranhic covoray/aQisslons
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prove incapable ofhe intelligence requirements.
9. n attaching additional data to support theandbove.
fanc-rT. Director oi" Central Intelligence
Attachments:
' A. Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action"
B. Briefing Book: 'OXCART Deployment Proposal"
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Note: ,: "Reactions to
Cortain US Courses of Action"
Attachmentriefing Book: "OXCART Deployment Proposal"
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Thereritical need for adequateto detect possible Chinese Communist strategic buildup in South China snd North Vietnam which might lead to their directIn the Vietnam war.
A. In order toobtaln this intelligence we must acquire coverage on targets Id South China snd North Vietnam, chiefly ground force Installations, major complexes and key lines of communication. In all, there aren South China aad| fcn North Vietnam on which weata base and thereafter selective periodic surveillance coverage. (Tbe highestarea for coverage Is shaded lo red oo the accompanying maps.)
What resources are we now committing to this collection effort?
A. Clandestine assets cannot be counted on to provide us tbe essential basicWe must rely primarily onintelligence, and onphotography.
There are no* four high altitude, high resolution reconnaissance programsphotography of South China and North Vietnam, In addition, tactical low altitude reconnaissance missions also cover North Vietnamese targets on pre-and post-strike sorties. These fivehave provided coverage of some ofstrategicortion of this coverage has proved to be ofquality to provide base linedataand, in some cases, the periodic surveillance coverage which we seek.
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ircraft system, operated by SAC under the program code name TROJAN HORSE, is used primarily over North Vietnam and is nottooperate over China proper, although it occasionally obtains some oblique coverage of South China from across the border.
The BLUE SPRINGS program is carried out by drone photographic aircraft, operating over portions of South China but primarily over North Vietnam.
Therogram is our highsatellite reconnaissance system.
Despite their excellence, all of these systems are limited.
tactical Jets and the drones arein varying degrees not onlyfighters but also to bothAAA and to SAMs.
an be downed by SAMssome circumstances, by.
the satellites are not vulnerableattack, their successon weather. They cannot seekin cloud cover; our capabilitytheir flight paths is limited.
Let ine summarize our expericncowiththe four basic programs from5 to
uring thisotalere flown. These missions obtained base line coverage of|our priority targets,outhChina and| frn North Vietnam. Duringthls same period we also achieved periodic surveillancehird of theseThus ln nearly seven months we have acquired bane line data on less than half of our priority ob|ectlves and have accomplished little periodic surveillance.
rom thisonclude that the reconnaissance tasks which we need to accomplish in South China and North Vietnam are unlikely to be achieved successfully if we mustto rely solely ontbe assets which wc are currently using.
V. Adding the OXCART to the existingol systems would give us undeniable
A. The OXCART, like the satellites, isInvulnerable to fighters andmissiles. It can cover high-priority targets now denied to I'-lis jnl tactical photo reconnaissance aircraft.
D. Unlike the satellites, OXCART concoverage when there are sudden openings during periods of sustained badweatherrimein South China and North Vietnam.
C. It is bad now, and will bc particularly bad from June through September.
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F. There may be one or twoonth, however,arge bole or "bubble" will open in the overcast and permit photography. These "bubbles" arepredictable to the weathermen, and this pictureypothetical bubble,hour intervals, as it is blown across China from west to east.
n past years wo have been able to anticipate these peepholes and exploit them, Tho reconnaissance satellites, with their predetermined orbits, cannot be programmed to take advantage of theseanned aircraft is the only vehicle that can use these openings to gather somedata and changes from thethe Chinese military posture.
TOPCAnT rpEALlSTj
X. It is my recommendation that,irst step. Oxcart be deployed to Kadena, and that It be employed to acquire photography of North Vietnam.
favorable decision on thisnow or In the near future will giveopportunity to acquire experienceuse of the aircraft, and toCommunist reaction to itsin the theater.
as now appears likely,will not succeed in acquiringcoverage of theurtherbe submitted concerning the usein that area.
C. elieve that the need to proceed with OXCART is clear and demonstrable.
D. Let me simply say In closing: The OXCART is the best reconnaissancewe have. Chinaarget of the highest priority. To use less than the best now In observing this restless potential enemy would be incautious. To use less than the best would not be commensurate with the existing degree of our national Involvement and risk in Vietnam.
Vm. Tbe OXCART aircraft ia virtually invulnerable to enemy action, and it haa the capability to react quickly to meet the few good weatherthe "bubble"we un* going to have to depend upon if wc are to continue our surveillance of the Chinese from June through September.
A. We believe, therefore, that the use of OXCART affords the beat possibility of obtaining early warning on any Chinese Communist intervention In Southeast Asia.
IX. Wc have considered the probable reactions of other countries to the use of OXCART. The problem bas been studied specifically by tbe United States Intelligence Board,pecial National intelligence Eattraatr ban beenon thisopy is available for your perusal.
Summary, tbe estimate concludesChinese Com-nunlsts would notdrastic new military action.think at first that the Unitedseeking target Intelligence to bean early date. We feel, however,Chinese Communists would soonregard this vehicle us merelyln the continuing Unitedprogram.
he Chinese would probably refrain from revealing the successfulof Chinese territory, as they have done In the case oflighti. If an aircraft came down ln China, however, there wouldajor political and propaganda out-Cry.
believe that the North Vietnameseshow no significant reaction toof OXCART.
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