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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Peking's Attitude Toward the Threat of US Attack
SUMMARY
Peking appears to be engagedeterrent psychological warfare campaign. This is expressed in its recent propaganda concerning ChinesetoS assault, in private statements of concern over the possibility of Imminent USand to some extent also in current fulmina-tions about "imperialist encirclement," Bythemselves asearful ofbut ready toitter-end war in self-defense, the Chinese probably hope to stimulate additional politicalthe US as well as among American allies and"rash" US escalation which mightiscalculation by apprehensive men in Peking. In emphasizing that China will respond militarily only if directlyby the US the Chinese may be attempting to establish ground rules which if the US adhered to them would, over the longer term,ar with the US.
The evidence available at this time does notonclusion that genuine Chinese anxietyS attack has increased significantly during the past few months. In fact, examination of domestic propaganda and the pace of civilpreparations in China suggests that Peking was equally or more concerned over this possibility last spring and during the summer than at present. Thus far no ro-deploymont of Chinese military strength has been detected of the kind which might
be expected if Peking actually regarded anwhich recent Chinese statements imply isas likely in the near future.
While their actions belie their protestations that they expect an early attack by the US, theleaders, as orthodox Marxist-Leninists,do believear with the US inn the long historical sense. We do not believe, that this will make them fatalistic and will lead them, any pore than it did Lenin or Stalin, into provocative acts or even lead them in the present circumstances to take actions more risky than those they would have taken without this belief,
Thero has not been, for example, any indicationhange in Chinese policy regarding support for the Communist war effortore cautious lineore adventurous course. Peking continues to provide military assistanco and political backing for North Vietnam, aimed at keeping Communist forces steadfast and in the field against the US in South Vietnam. The Chinese military presence in North Vietnam, made up of service troops and air defensedetected lastto growoderate rate. It seems probable that if the Chinese actuallyS attack soon, some pronounced change in Poking's Vietnamese policy would be observed.
1. From the outset, Peking probably recognized and accepted the risk that Chinese support for North Vietnam's effort to subvert the South might leadonflict with the US. Inear ago Chen Yi told the French ambassador that the Chinese saw US "fireworks"ossibility before the eventual Communist victory he claimed was certain. It seems likely that rapid escalation of the US war effort during the winter and early spring5 increased apprehensions in Peking. The Chinese press as early asarch began to take note'of "rabid threats of war against China" by the USeople's Dally editorial three days later declared-that the Chinese could see that after US "occupation" of South Vietnam and "aggression" against North Vietnam the "next step will be aggression against China."
the increasing weight ofagainst the DRV as well as theirnorthward toward the Sino-Vietnameseapparently further increased Chinese concern.
Onay Peking broadcast the full textong gg-darticle by Vice Minister of Nationaland Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching in which tho possibility of war with thonuclear attack againstraised.
Lo charged that the US had "spread the flaraos of war over North Vietnam and was preparing to spread them further to China." Ho called for readiness, stressing that political and ideologicalhis end must be given first priority: Tlie articlo closodefiant statement that China would go on helping the Vietnamese Communists no mattor what the US did to enlarge the war, adding to this thoa central theme in Peking's"we will not attackare attacked; if wo are attacked we will certainly counterattack."
Peking's outcry against alleged US plans for spreading tho war to China was in partpropaganda but it probably reflected genuino fear that the probability of US air attacks on China was growing. The war in South Vietnam was going very badly for Saigon forces, and the Chinese, perhaps taken in to some degree by their ownabout "imperialist" aggressiveness, may havo felt that the US might Lash out in desperation.
They wore, moreover, in tho process of implementing contingency plans involving theof Chinese service forces in North Vietnam to assist the Vietnamese with the task of keeping logistical channels to China open despite US air attacks against lines of communication. Theof Chinese military pernonnel in the northern part of North Vietnam began to be detected after mid-June. These movements were secret, but the Chinese must have taken into consideration the possibility that their presonce might be discovered and provoke
a violent US response.
ay, Peking sent private warningsUS, doubtless Intended to support deterrent
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propaganda, via the British and the Finns. onversation with the UK charge, Chen Yi stated that although China did notar with the US, it was roady for one if the US exceeded the "limits" sot by Peking. In this connection Chon referred specifically to airstrikes againstin China.
There was, however, no apparent spoodup in Peking's efforts to increase its air defensein either the border region or elsewhere in China, Poking hadrogram to build up air defense capabilities in South China shortly aftor the Tonkin Gulf crisis in August This has gone forwardteady pace ever sinco.with tho peak effort to improve these air defenses coming in tho poriod from the fall4 to the winter
Starting in May, Peking alsoeavy domestic propaganda corapaign on tho theme that it had become the nation's foremost task to prepare against the possibility that the US might attack "at any time." The subject ofrequent topic for neighborhoodmeetings. One heavily publicized type of "preparation" has been militia training, which was intensified last summer.
This deliberate fanning of popular war fears was probably intended, in part, to stimulate compliance wlth the fairly extensive, butcivil defense measures which began to be undertaken late last spring. Such programs woro in evidencemall scale in the falletters from insido China indicated that early last summer localall overstarted to draw up contingency evacuation plans.
10. These plans havo apparently not boonon any significant scale, however, although there have been some actual movements ofospital, and small factories from Canton,and of some scientific institutes out of Peking. Governmenthave been urged, but not forced, to sendto live with relatives in the countryside. This policy has not been popular, and recent reports
Indicate that some dependents are quietly returning homo.
By last fall, the regime began to slack off on domestic propaganda concerning the imminenceossible conflict with the US, porhaps because Peking believed It was necessary to calm down people who had been made jittery by the campaign during the spring and summer. There is evidence that Peking has been using the war preparation theme intornally to justify long-standing domestiche dispersal to the countrysido of redundant urbanto Increase the effectiveness of its home propaganda by playing on the Chinese people's patriotism. While the necessity for "war preparations" continues as an important theme, refugees and clandestine sourcosthat"it is now being presented in termsontingency that isear or two In the future
According to reports fromrlvo was launched ln September, pushed with special vigor in South China, against rumorwho "exaggerate" the effectuclear attack. In Do-cembor, the acting governor of Kwangtung, speaking at the annual meeting of thepropaganda forum for united frontthat a
US attack was expected" Twiceeople's Daily underscored the long-run nature of the US throat By noting thatS attack was an important factor in long-term economic planning.
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14. Meanwhile, Chinese propaganda directed at external as well as domestic audiences throughout the summer and fall continued to accuse the US of planning to attack China, and to trumpot that the Chinese were "standing in battle array" ready to repel any adventurous thrusts and to "utterly
destroy" the aggrossors. Thoro was, however, no special emphasis on the Immediacy of the US threat. The emphasis throughout was that the US was moving "step by step" to impose war on China but astiming declared only that the USrial of strength "sooner or later."
Yi'a remarks during hie pressoneptember put war in tho standardthe US took theprojected the possibility into the He declared in an angry outburst thatready for an assault by thebyBritish, Jnpanese, and "modernmight come "as early as tomorrow." Chen went
on to say, however, that tho Chinese hadS invasionis hair had turnedadded that if by chance he did not Live long enough to see an invasion, his children would "resolutely carry on the fight."
time to time during October andpropaganda reiterated the charge thatof US aggression" was pointing not only
at Vietnam and Korea but also at China. The contoxt, howovor, was generally on the need for long-range strengthening of dofenses. Tho roportLAWork Conference broadcast onanuary noted, for example, that the US has "always wanted to Impose war on tho Chinese people" and "for this reason, to strengthen combat readiness is by no meansemporary measure, butong-term strategic task."
Peking's rocont propaganda statements"encirclement" of China are used to bolster charges'of US aggrossive intent, but it is clear that they areey element in the Chinese struggle with the Sovietreceived new impetusesult of Shelepin's trip to Hanoi in early January. Charges that the Soviets werethe US incordon" around China carry no sense of urgency, however. The perfidious US and Soviet scheme is prosonted as in process but not near completion.
Onlymall number of privateduring January and February did the Chinese
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indicate that theyS attack as coming soon. Those "messagos" appeared intended notfor the US, but for US friends and othors who night be persuadod to bring pressure on
The Chinese leaders probably do feeland encircled bygood reason and largely as the consequence of their own actions. They are likewise convinced of US hostility and recognize that Peking's course in Vietnam carries some risk of an expansion of the war into China. Their apprehensions probably Increased somewhat when the US military buildup began to gather speed last spring and was carried forward during tho summer. Peking's fears of an attack, howover, appear to have leveled offoint far short of any "certainty" that the US would strike at Chinathat such action was "inevitable in the foreseeable future.
Current Chinose propaganda charges of US aggression intent and recent private statements implying that Peking regards an "invasion" as either possible or likely in the next fivo or six months appear, therefore, to be partsychological warfare campaign. When Peking wns apparently genuinely alarmed over possible US-supportedNationalist landings lnhemoved quickly to bring in heavymany as soven or oightcoastal defense opposite Taiwan. There have thus far boon no indications thatove is now contemplated or undor way.
Original document.
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