AfrROVRD FOB PHIJUSR HATE: 5
central
OFFICE OF NATIONAL BSTDUflBB
AGENCY
6
oh tub director
SUBJECT: Use of Nuclear Weapons In the Vietnam War
co?fci,usiors
of nuclear weapons by the US In the Vietnam varone of the most Important events of modern history. would be affected to some extent by the circumstances
in which the US resorted to their use, and the targets attacked. But almoct independent of these factors wouldidespread and fundamental revulsion that the US had brokenyear taboo on the use of nuclear weapons.
the consequences would be intense agitationprobably leadingestriction on US use ofand possibly to denunciation of the US-Japanprobably scce accelerated cop?nturn towardaccompanied, however, by internationaldisarmament In the nuclear field, with scant patience forofrobable resolution of condemnation
in the UN;arked diminution of such public support asIn Vietnam nowi
C. It is passible that once the US had used nuclear weapons the Chinese CotrjJiunists might move to disengage, but wo think it more likely that they would not do so, but would hope that accumulating US losses and mounting world pressures vould force the U3ack down, Tne DRV would have been reducedecondary role. The USSR would act vigorously against the US on the political and propaganda front; wc do not believe that it would enter the war or support the Chinese with nuclear weapons.
DISCUSSION
I. SCRWARIO
1. It will be argued in this paper that foreign reactions to US uec of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam wax would be determined far more by the fact that the weapons were nuclear than by tho circumstances in which they were used or the provocations which might have led the US to use then, nevertheless, the circumstances would make some difference, at least in certain quarters. The following short list of conceivable scenarios begins with one in which US use of nuclear weapons would appear least justifiable in the eyes of the world generally and least In accord with Communist expectations, and proceeds to the one which is at the other extreme In these respects.
The military situation in South Vietnam remains essentially as at present; the US employs nuclear weapons out of sheer frustration at its inability to obtain any decision by conventional scans.
The US invades Korth Vietnam, either overland or by amphibious assault, or both; the Chinese C'jtumunlyts Intervene in large combat force, either overtly or withnd the US forces
in Nurth Vietnam find themselves threatened with destruction.
UG does not Invade Korth Vietnam. Butplus Chinese Coranunlst ground forces,largest scale ovart Invasion of Southwhich they are capable, across and aroundzone. They may also eomoLaos in strong force. US andforces may or may not bein anyew phase of the
war ls epened by Chinese and DRV initiative.
area of conflict is expended byinitiative. Involving InvasionsThailand, and perhaps Burma.
(e) Tho Chinese Communists their, jelvos firstuclear weapon.
2. Neither the first nor the last af these scenarios appears worth serious consideration; they are both so highly unlikely as to be virtually out of the question, and they are included only to illustrate the possibility of situations different from those which we shall discuss. Within each of the three middle scenarios there are, noarge number af possible attendant circumstances which would have some bearing on the situation and might modify to
some small degree the .Judgments which the world made of the US nuclear response, end alter the reactions to it. Because the effect of such variations would almost certainly be minor it docs not seem uacful to attempt to explore any of them in detail. The dlscuecion which follows applies principally to situationarge-scale Communist invasion of South Vietnamtut we have Included some references to the differences In reaction which might be expected In situations (b) or
II. K TH3 BOH-COMMflOST WORLD
3. In the non-Communlst world thereood many people who neither know nor care much about nuclear weapons and would not react one way or the other if the US used them In Vietnam, partteularl: so long as the danger seemed remote from thersclvcs. There are governments which, whatever their public pronouncements on the subject, would in the light of their particulor national interests be glad to see the Chinese Communist regime destroyed by this means. There ore also individuals and governments who would consider the United States weak If It allowed substantial numbers of Its armed forces to be destroyed without attempting to save them by the use of nuclear weapons. And there are some who would consider the United States foolish to accept defeat or even compromise In the Vietnam struggle without having recourse to its moat formidable clement of military power.
k. Granting these and perhaps some other exceptions, there Is In the field of International affairs probably no more universal opinion than that which holds the use of nuclear weapons to be abhorrent. Any use of nuclear weapons by the US in the Vietnam war would be viewed as among tbe most fearful and fateful events of modern history. World reactions would be affected to some extent by the conditions under which the US resorted to their use and the kinds of weapons and targets involved. But alnost Independent of these factors wouldundamental revulsion that the US had brokenyear taboo on the use of nuclear weapons.
5* "Ihe use of atomic bombs against Japan ins still condemned by many, not only abroad buthe US. Most informed opinion, however, recognizes that it was intended to hasten the endong and bloody world war. Most important, it is seenad moment of history that occurredeneration ago and must never be repeated.
6. Over the years, world opinion has been generally surprised and relieved to discover that the US-Soviet nuclear race, rather thanar between the two powers, has tended to make
ar "unthinkable." Nuclear bombs and warheads thus tend to be looked upon as weapons which will never be used exceptorld bent on self-destruction. It has corac to be felt that the chancesuclear holocaust have significantly receded in recent years because the two super-powers are led by responsible governments which are prepared to go to great lengths to see that nuclear weapons will never again be employed.
7- Their use In Vietnam, regardless of the circumstances, wouldave of fear and anger through most of tho informed world. The general feeling would be that, once the taboo had been broken, there would remain no effective barrier to expanded use of such weapons. People would fear that the Communists vould respond in kind if they had, or coulduclear capability. Behind all this wouldear that the use of nuclear weapons might leadeneral nuclear war endangering the world at large.
8. Most friends of the US would condemn it for having dragged the worldew and terrible phase of history in which nuclear weapons hod become the working weapons of the times. Resolutions of condemnation would be introduced in the UN with the likelihood ofajority vote. NATO would be badly shaken. Such public support as US policy in Vietnam now receivesumber of governments, especially in Europe, would be ended.
British government which failed to make aof the introduction of nuclear weapons intorightIng would probably fall. In Japan, memoriesand Nagasaki would make the people especiallya second use of US .cuclear weapons against Asians. At aMiristerSato would feel compelled to end his support of
US policy, and, in particular, to restrict the US use of Japanese facilities. More likely, the Liberal-Democratic Party would replace Sato with someone less idcntlfiably pro-US in his views. It is possible that, under leftist prodding, the popular reaction wouldove to cloee US bases or even to denounce the US-Japan defense treaty. Most opinion in India and the Indian government would strongly condemn the US action, though some Indian leaders would be relieved to see the Chinese Communists set back, and some would be secretly pleased if Chinese nuclear facilities were destroyed. The general Indian condemnation would be somewhat reduced if the nuclear weapons wore used tohinese invasion of Southeast Asia.
very limited use of tactical weapons In onlybattle area wouldess violent reactioncircles than would the nuclear bombing of Chinese
airfields, rail centers, and nuclear production sites. but to much of the world the distinction would not be significant; the important thing would be that these wftapons had been used at all. the circumstances under which the weaponsd wthla also have some ti'fect on reactions. the most severe reaction would occur if the us had invadrvl worth vietnam (casen the other hand, the negative reactions would be reduced if nuclear weapons were employedast resort to stop the communist chinese free overwhelming the whole of southeast asia. indeed, in this case some positive support would be manifested.
these direct reactions, thererowing impactthe future, thi re woulda wave of international pressure for immediate disarmamentnuclear field. most of this would be aimed at the us asnation to have used such weapons, and there would bewith continued us insistence on tlie need for inspection.
it is possible, however, that some of this pressure could be diverted to the soviets in the form of demands for "real" and "verified" disarmament.
paradoxically, there would probably also bemomentum toward nuclear proliferation. s use which
"legit inatIzcd" nuclear weapons and demonstrated their critical importance and practicability in today's wars would lead rome governments to feel they oust have such weapons in their arsenals. At the same time, the US argument against proliferation would lose coral credit andynical reactions.
III. REACTIONS OP THENIST COUNTTUES
13. Communist China. Ihe Chinese Communist leaders arc quite conscious of the potent nuclear arsenal of the US. Inolicy involving the probability of war with the US, they would have considered the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used. They might have concluded that international and domestic pressures would prevent the US from using nuclear weapons under any conditions shortirecto its national survival. They could not be certain of this, however, and their plans would have included courses to follow if nuclear weapons were used.
l*i. It ie possible that once the US used nuclear weapons, the Chinese night move to disengage, particularly If they had not expected the US to do so. We think It more likely, however, that once committed, the Chinese vould attempt to continue in spite of
nuclear weapons. In the belief that they could eventually prevail,
they would probably press on, accepting tho military consequences while trying to minimize them by dispersal, close-embrace battlefield tactics, and an intensification of guerrilla warfare behind the US lines. They would hope thus to prolong the struggle to the point where accirailatlng US losses and mounting world preould force the US to back doim.
!5. The USSR, Moscow would be alarmed at the prospect of continued escalation which might force Ituclear confrontation with the US. It would take steps on all fronts to reduce the likelihood ofevelopment. It would act vigorously on the propaganda and political front, striving to generate sufficient International pressure in and out of the UN to force the US to pull back from its escalation. The Soviets would probably feel compelled to warn the US that the USSR would support China with military aid. At the same time, however, they wouldt clear to Peking not to count on Soviet nuclear weapons. They would almost certainly not provide any nuclear weapons to the Chinese.
16. The DRV. With the war having expanded to the point where the Chinese were directly Involved and nuclear weapons had been introduced, the DRV would have been reducedecondary role. The PAVl'/VC wouldignificant capability In tho
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South, but in theicture they would have become an adjunct of the Chinese forces. In the event that the use of nuclear weapons so alarmed the DRV as to lead it to wish to quit the war, the Chinese involvement aad presence would probably have foreclosed this option. They could end the war only if Peking concurred.
XV. LOSGBRLICATI0H3
17, If the tactical uso of nuclear weapons succeeded in turning back the Chinese and helped leaduick and advantageous settlement in Vietnam, there would be many gains for the US to set against the losses mentioned above. "Nothing succeeds likend many would forgive the US once the danger receded. Asian allies of the US would feel much more secure against Chinese encroachments. Peking, badly set back, would lose prestige, and this might leadeappraisal of the leadership by the masses and the younger party leadere. The Soviets would gain new fear and respect for the US hard liners; their conviction of the clanger of "wars of national liberation" would be confirmed. At the same time, those in the USSR who advocate greater stress on military development and arc unenthusiastic about detente would have their hands strengthened.
18. If the US used nuclear weapons with some persistence and still failed to turn back the Chinese oruick end to tbe var, the results would be serious Indeed. The ccaparative impotence of the IS end of Its cost vaunted weapons in copingrevolutionary struggle" would have been demonstrated to Peking's satisfaction and advantage. At tbe some time, the US vould pay the whole political cost of having used these weapons in the first place.
19- There ranains, of course, the question of the consequencessing nuclear weapons, and ofilitary disaster, perhaps extending to loeo of the war, which these weapons might have averted. evelopment would have profound implications for the standing of the US In tbe world end for the balance of power in Asia. Examination of these implicsSona, however, would involve consideration of the whole subject of US objectives and policies in Southeast Asia, and does not cose within the scope of this paper.
FOR THE BQttflD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
xbrjx man
Acting Chairman
Original document.
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